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ABSTRACT
The Tonga Plateau was the main area of white settlement in 
Northern Rhodesia and in the 1920s many Africans there were moved 
into reserves on poor land which soon became overcrowded. At the 
same time, official restrictions were placed on the marketing of 
farm produce by the African population which supplied part of the 
Copperbelt market. Such grievances, together with settler pressure 
for closer union with Southern Rhodesia, prompted Africans in the 
area to form some of the earliest political associations in the 
territory. By the late 19^0s, there was a small group of highly 
commercialised Tonga farmers. The Government tried to enlist the 
support of this elite with a scheme for 'Improved Farmers', but it 
was only partly successful and rules for land conservation antagonised 
the great mass of small scale African farmers._ From the first, the 
plateau provided substantial support for the country's first 
nationalist party, the A.N.C. However, the party’s leaders regarded 
the area, with its income from commercial farming, primarily as a 
source of funds and its organisation on the plateau was poor and 
several influential Africans declined to lend it any active assist­
ance, The Improved Farmers, for instance, preferred their non­
political Farmers Associations. This brought on them accusations 
c£ collaboration with white oppression which only increased their 
alienation. After the 1938 split in the A.N.C,'s leadership which 
led to the formation of U.N.I.P., the A.N.C. came to be more closely 
identified with the Southern Province (and its political centre- 
point, the Tonga plateau), which area provided its most consistent 
support. U.N.I.P.iad the disadvantage of being rooted on the
Copperbelt where few Tonga lived or worked. Besides, most of 
its leaders were long-standing urban residents and the Tonga 
had doubts about committing rural claims to such people. This 
lack of affinity with the Copperbelt partly ensured the A.N.C.1 
continued popularity on the Tonga plateau.
NOTES ON SOURCES
The following abbreviations are used in this account
Z.N.A. Zambia National Archives.
P.R.O. Public Record Office.
L.M. livingstone Museum
F.C.B. Fabian Colonial Bureau.
A.C.J, Arthur Creech Jones.
M.M.R.S. Mount Makulu Research Station.
2.M.R. Zambesi Mission Record.
PREFACE
In many ways the Tonga plateau is a crucial area for the 
study of economic and political change in Zambia, formerly Northern 
Rhodesia. It is therefore curious that hitherto it has received 
very little attention from historians. There has of course been 
some very important anthropological work^ * but neither the pre­
colonial nor the colonial history of the area has been covered.
In this study, I attempt to fill in at least a part of this wide 
gap in Zambian historiography with a survey of various aspects 
of socio-economic and political change in the area during the 
colonial period.
The Tonga plateau is an important part of the Southern 
province. It occupies a prominent position within the framework 
of Northern Rhodesia's history of racial conflict. It was a major 
centre of European settlement during the Colonial years. The ex­
tent of white settlement in the area raises several interesting 
questions. How did the settler population come by the vast tracts 
of land that were reserved in the area for its occupation? What 
was the reaction of the African population that was dispossessed 
of land in several areas to accommodate the white immigrants?
How did the Colonial Administrations handle the problems generated 
by the uprooting of several sections of the African population? 
These are just a few of the questions which will receive attention 
in this discussion.
X
See Bibliography for the anthropological studies carried out 
by Elizabeth Colson.
The Tonga plateau also happens to be the centre of African 
commercial farming activity within the territoiy. The area has 
often been referred to as the granary of Northern Rhodesia. During 
the period under survey, local African grain production was to ex­
pand considerably and,because the area's European farmers saw this 
expansion as a threat to their operations, the Administration was 
to place restrictions on African enterprise. We will be examining 
the reaction of African farmers to these constraints which operated 
not only between the races but also within the African farming 
community after the introduction of an Improved farming scheme in 
19^6. We will also see how this Government sponsored scheme pro­
moted divisions within the local African population that were to 
frustrate efforts to unite the Africans of the plateau for political 
action during the 19^ -Os and 1950s.
Henderson has drawn attention to the need for an assessment 
of the role of the Tonga farmer in the politics of the African 
National Congress (A.N.C.). I will be examining the political 
activities that centred around settler demands for closer politi­
cal union with Southern Rhodesia. In this connection, I will high­
light the political reaction of Africans on the plateau to the 
challenge of settlerdom as seen in these demands and in the general 
operation of the colour-bar. Congress' activities on the plateau 
in the period before and immediately after the declaration of
1 '
See Ian Henderson, "Origins of Nationalism in East and Central 
Africa: The Zambian Case", Journal of African History« XI,
1970, p.60l. In another article, Henderson called for an investi­
gation of the economics of Tonga farming. See 'Pre-Nationalist 
resistance to Colonial Rule in Zambia", African Social Research,
No. 9» June, 1970, p.678.
the Central African Federation in 1953 receive much attention.
Among other things, we will see how responsive the various
Chieftaincies on the plateau were to Congress' programme and
how the movement failed to capitalise on the potential reserves
of goodwill it enjoyed in the area because of its poor organisation.
Although Congress won the support of the grass-roots, it failed
to attract the active support of several influential Africans on
the plateau. We will see why this was so and how much it limited
the movement’s effectiveness in the Chieftaincies concerned.
Throughout the discussion of political activities, an attempt
is made to see the Tonga plateau within a very general framework
of territorial African protest against white rule. Up to 1958*
the Southern province operates none too conspicuously alongside
the other provinces of the territory in support of theA.N.C. In
that year, a major split developed within the A.N.C.'s leadership.
The effects of this development on Tonga support for the leaders
who continued to serve within the A.N.C. are examined as are the
circumstances of the second split of 19&3 i*1 which Tonga members
of the Congress leadership were much more directly involved. It
is hoped, among other things, that this study will succeed in
highlighting the importance of the Tonga plateau's contribution
to the nationalist struggle in the then Northern Rhodesia while
a
at the same time serving as/contribution to the growing literature 
on African reaction to various aspects of Colonial rule.1
1
Some of the contributions to this literature are: Lionel Cliffe,
"Nationalism and the Reaction to enforced Agricultural Improvement 
in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period", East African Institute 
of Social Research Conference Papers, January, 1965; J. Lonsdale,
"Some origins of Nationalism in East Africa", Journal of "African History, 
IX, 1, 1968, pp. 119-1^6; G. A,Maguire, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania - The 
Politics of Participation (Cambridge, 1969); G. Caplan, The Elites of 
Barotseland (London, 1970); H.S.Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism 
(Manchester, 1971).
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I have made use of "both documentary and oral material in 
the preparation of this study. Before proceeding to Zambia for 
eleven months of archival and field research, I consulted various 
sources in the United Kingdom, Apart from work done at the Public 
Records Office and the British Museum on Colonial Office and 
Missionary archives respectively, I spent some time on a small 
collection of material at the Society of Jesus Headquarters in 
London. This provided some insights into the early work of the 
Jesuits among the plateau Tonga. Rhodes House Library in Oxford 
also carries a collection of private papers as well as correspondence 
between the A.N.C. and certain individuals who were interested in 
colonial politics. The Fabian Colonial Bureau was also in touch 
with the Congress leaders and Rhodes House has some of this 
corresp ondence.
In Zambia, my archival work was done in five main centres: 
the National Archives of Zambia, the Livingstone Museum, the library 
of the Mount Makulu Research Station, the Institute of African 
Studies, University of Zambia,and the home of the Rev. Fergus 
Macpherson. In the National Archives,which operates a twenty 
year rule over its collection, I was allowed access to material 
only as recent as 195^. This explains why the official material 
used in Chapter VII is less detailed than that in the other chap­
ters. The National Archives was ray main source of documentary 
evidence. The Livingstone Museum carries some interesting docu­
ments on the British South Africa Company period and certain as­
pects of Tonga pre-colonial history. The Library at Mount Makulu 
has a very comprehensive collection of Agricultural reports and the
f
iV
Institute for African Studies keeps a manuscript collection that 
provides someinformation concerning the formative years of colonial 
rule on the Tonga plateau* The Rev. Fergus MacFherson was kind 
enough to allow me the use of a private collection of A„N.C. 
material which was extremely helpful in my search into the politi­
cal activities of the late 1950s.
field research was devoted to recording reminiscences 
from Informants in nine of the plateau's Chieftaincies, viz._ Monze* 
Chongo, Ufwenuka, Chona, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde,
Mwanza and Siamaundu. The choice of Chieftaincies was largely 
dictated by the fact that key informants (some of whom had been 
mentioned in the documents) were living in these areas. These 
Chieftaincies also happen to be centres of African commercial 
farming activity and, in some cases, of European settlement. I 
was convinced that the oral material collected from villages in 
these Chieftaincies was capable of providing a representative 
picture of the situation on the plateau during the years under 
survey. Informants ranged from a few Chiefs, Headmen and some 
small scale cultivators to prominent local political organisers 
and successful commercial farmers. Some informants . 
who have for various reasons left the plateau for some other prov­
ince were traced and interviewed. Most of my Informants were 
Africans (the European population having declined considerably 
since independence) but I was able to interview some long-standing 
white farmers and traders around Monze and Choma. Settler In­
formants gave accounts that echoed, in many ways, the reminiscences 
of the Africans I interviewed. Most interviews were done in Chi-tonga 
with the aid of an interpreter but several Informants also spoke
V
English. On the whole, the oral material collected on the plateau 
gave a wider and deeper dimension to the documentary evidence.
I wish at this stage to record my appreciation of the 
assistance I have received from various sources during the course 
of this study. I am very grateful to the Central Research Fund 
of London University and the Authorities of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies for part financing my research trip to Zambia.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Andrew Roberts of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies who supervised this study from 
conception to fruition and whose inspiration and guidance I found 
invaluable. I gained a lot from his firm grasp of Zambian historio­
graphy and his very penetrating critique of the material. In Zambia, 
I enjoyed the hospitality of several households, too numerous to 
mention individually, which provided my assistant and myself with 
food and shelter during the course of our motor-biking between 
villages. To all these people who were only too eager to help a 
stranger in need I will always be in debt. I am particularly 
grateful to Mr. Martin Mooba, who physically introduced me to the 
plateau and was very instrumental in securing for my benefit the 
services of Mr. Evans Chongo, who became my research assistant. 
Without Evans' knowledge of local geography and his tactful hand­
ling of suspicious Informants my task would have been infinitely 
greater. For his devotion to the study throughout my stay in 
Zambia I thank him.
Throughout my stay on the plateau I was attached to the 
household of Mr. Jimmy Mwale. It is perhaps to Jimmy that I owe 
my biggest debt. For the interest he took in my work and the 
lengths to which he went to make me amember of the household, I
Vi
will be for ever grateful. This list will be incomplete without 
mention of Messrs. Amos .Walubita,Samuel Sibanda, Patrick 
Sikawala, Wallace Munangandu and Y. Nampindi, who unfailingly 
responded to my many demands on their time and resources.
I wish also to thank the Rev, Fergus Macpherson and family 
for the kindness they extended to me while I was in Lusaka. I 
learnt a lot from Rev. Macpherson's rich knowledge of political 
developments within the territory and profited immensely from 
various documents he placed at my disposal. I am deeply grateful 
to Prof. Rowe-Evans, Mr. Mubanga Kashoki and the staff of the 
Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, for all the 
help I received in connection with my transport and accommodation 
problems while in Lusaka. My thanks are also due to Drs. Robin 
Palmer, Neil Parsons, Keith Rennie and Le Roy Vail of the Uni­
versity's History Department for the keen interest they showed 
in my work while I was in Zambia. Dr. Vail was even kind enough 
to read part of the manuscript and he made several useful sug­
gestions. I also thank Professor Cherry Gertzel of the University's 
Politics Department for drawing my attention to various publications 
I might otherwise have overlooked. I am deeply grateful to Professor 
Roland Oliver of S.O.A.S. whose recommendation led to the award of 
a bursary from the African Education Trust of Covent Garden, London.
I will lie for ever grateful to Mrs. D.H.Herbert and the other mem­
bers of the Trust for financing my stay in London during the final 
months of writing, %  thanks also go to Mrs. Nina Fuller who pains­
takingly typed the material. Lastly, I wish to record my debt to
all my various informants without whose cooperation this work 
might have been impossible. If the account presented here should 
go some way in meeting their oft-repeated demands for a record 
of the Colonial experience of the Tonga,one of my desires would 
have been fulfilled.
Chapter I
THE BACKGROUND: THE PLATEAU BEFORE 192**
As one moves away from the comparatively higher lands around 
Lusaka into the area of Mazabuka and beyond, one cannot help being 
impressed by the gently undulating plains of the Southern Zambian 
plateau. For the most part, it is rather flat country covered with 
savannah bushes and open plains or damboes with the south-west more 
heavily wooded than the north-east. In a number of areas, the 
vegetation is made up of scattered trees and bush mixed with light 
savannah grass. Towards the east, the land descends in an escarp­
ment as it approaches the waters of the Zambesi. Although there are 
a number of streams and rivers in the area, the Kafue is the only
one with a perennial flow, a number of them having dried up within
living memoiy. The lands of the Tonga plateau covered in this study
r
extend for some 7*^50 square miles between latitudes 16° and 17° 
and are about 3*000 to ^,000 feet above sea level.
The plateau experiences three distinct seasons. The rainy
season begins about the end of October or the beginning of November
and usually lasts into March. The rainfall is highly variable in
spread and duration and it is not unusual for closely situated 
1neighbourhoods to experience different amounts of precipitation 
during the same season. The unreliability of the area’s rainfall 
explains the importance the inhabitants have always attached to 
their various rain-shrines and the respect they accorded their 
successful rainmakers.
The rainy season is closely followed by the cold season which 
lasts from about April to the end of August. Next comes the hot
These are groups of villages.
season which, at times accompanied by drought conditions, 
lasts -until the coming of the rains. Maximum tempe ratures'on the 
plateau range from about 75°^ in June/July to about 9^°F in 
October as the rainy season approaches. Minimum temperatures range 
between 35°F and bO°F in June/July and rise to between 59°F and 
Sk°F during the rains.
The Ecological Survey of 1936 identified three principal 
soil types on the lands of the plateau with high variations in 
fertility from area to area. Most parts are covered by the sandy, 
leached soils of the plateau type which separate from each other 
the more fertile Upper Valley and acacia-thorn soils. The plateau 
soils are light textured and they derive from metamorphic and acid 
igneous rocks. The Upper Valley and acacia-thorn types are of a 
medium to heavy texture.
linguistically the term 'Tonga1 has been used to describe
a group within the Central Bantu Zone which includes the Tonga,
2
Lenje, We, Ha, To tela and others._ The Tonga share strong cultural 
links with their neighbours and there is a striking root similarity 
between the languages these people speak. The ancestors of the Tonga 
appear to have been in their present area since early in the second 
millenium A.D. In the light of what we know about Tonga social
organisation, especially the ease with which newcomers to the society
3are absorbed into the clan and kinship structures, we can assume
■^G.C.Trapnell and J.N.Clother, "The Soils, Vegetation and Agricultural 
systems of Morth-wes€ Rhodesia - Report of the Ecological Survey’1 
(Lusaka, 1937).
2E.Colson, "The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia", in E. Colson 
and M.Gluckman (Eds.), Seven Tribes of British Central Africa 
(Manchester, 1951)» p• 9'trT" 1
3''See E. Colson, "The Assimilation of Aliens among the Zambian Tonga", in
that the people of the plateau as v/e know them today grew out of 
various immigrant groups which moved into the area over a period 
of several centuries. These immigrants from various areas were 
absorbed into the social system and their various cultural back­
grounds were submerged in this cultural melting pot. The existence 
of a plethora of dialects within the Tonga group could well be a 
reflection of the varying degrees of differential development of 
the constituent peoples. Tonga informants who today talk in terms
of a general migration of Tonga peoples into the plateau may well be
1groping for a bond to unite originally diverse groups.
The plateau Tonga are a matrilineal people who trace their 
descent to a putative ancestress. Age grades and lineages do not 
feature prominently in their social organisation but clans which 
are widely dispersed and lack any corporate existence or leadership 
are recognised. By far the most important social group to which 
the individual pays loyalty is the kin group. This is a group that 
represents his interests in marriage and other social arrangements 
and it also offers him protection whenever he is wronged.
In the nineteenth century the plateau Tonga were organised on
a highly localised basis in neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods, 
made up of a number of villages, varied in size and . the more
popular the Ulaanvika, or neighbourhood head was,the larger the
neighbourhood was likely to be. The TJlaanyika was, in the majority 
of cases, the first man to establish a homestead in that particular 
locality or a descendant of his family. He was not a Chief in the
R.Cohen and J.Middleton (Eds.), From Tribe to Nation in Africa 
(Pennsylvania,' 1970).
This paragraph has benefitted from discussions with Tim Matthews 
who has recently carried out research on the valley Tonga and their 
relations with the plateau Tonga and other neighbouring peoples.
commonly accepted sense of the word. He had no retainers and enjoyed 
the regard and attention of those around him only for so long as 
they were prepared to put up with him. If his ability to succour them 
in times ofneed, or protect them during an inter-neighbourhood skirmish 
diminished* he lost the support of his following* who would begin to 
think of tying in their fortunes with a more successful Ulaanyika.
Where, however, the Ulaanyika combined this secular authority with the 
ritual powers of a Sikatongo (the power of rain-malting, for instance), 
his chan^£ of retaining the regard of his following were substantially 
increased. In the majority of cases, the offices of Sikatongo and 
Ulaanyika were held by different individuals. These officials were al­
ways of the same lineage and their claims on these positions were justi­
fied by the argument of original settlement in the area. However* as 
well as the ritual office of Sikatongo there was that of Basangu. The 
holder of this office wqs usually an individual who might not be a 
traditional office-holder but who was possessed by a spirit and, as a 
result, came Id acquire some ritual power. The office of Basangu was 
the chief means by which a commoner could exercise power in the religious 
and, to a more limited extent, the secular sphere.*1"
During the 19th century the most widely acclaimed of ritual 
leaders was Monze, the rain-maker. As well as Monze, there were a 
number of influential Ulaanyika and Sikatongo on the plateau, Sianjalika, 
Mwanachingwala, Chongo, Moyo and Siamusonde being among the most 
prominent. Each of these office-holders enjoyed the respect of 
the people living in his area and they all appear to have operated
"^ For a detailed study of Tonga social organisation, see the various 
studies of Elizabeth Colson.
for the most part*-' independently of Monze. Some of them were rain­
makers in their own right and their ability to aid those around 
them had attracted a lot of peopleinto their neighbourhoods. Others, 
like Siamusonde, who lacked ritual powers, had local rainmakers in 
their employ. The majority of the Ulaanyika were not therefore 
directly dependent on Monze and they did not see themselves as 
Monze1s subordinates. Later attempts by the Colonial. Authorities 
to put Monze in a position of seniority over them were therefore 
to be stoutly resisted by some of their number, as will be seen in 
the next chapter.
In pre-Colonial times, land -.was for the people of the Tonga 
plateau a free resource. It was in plentiful supply and every member 
of a neighbourhood had the right to occupy or abandon a plot when­
ever he so desired. This situation encouraged the practice of shift­
ing cultivation. Land was neither inherited nor sold and newcomers 
to the plateau were always welcome to land that was not already be­
ing formed.
The Tonga practised a simple hoe culture and maize, millet 
and sorghums were the principal crops cultivated. The men took an 
active part in the raising of these crops and the tending of ground­
nuts, beans, peas, pumpkins and various other cucurbits was left 
to the women who always kept little gardens of their own.
Most families prepared their new plots with the help of friends 
and neighbours who would first settle in for the traditional beer drink 
before moving over to the land to stump and burn. Actual cultivation 
however was, in the main, the responsibility of the family. With
1Various interviews on the plateau.
6the approach of the planting season, the land was fired and the 
ash left to settle on it. When it was time for planting, the 
field was hoed and the seeds thrown in.
In addition to farming, most families raised cattle and small 
stock, mainly sheep and goats. The1* work of herding the cattle 
rested on the men and boys and this task was particularly important 
during the cropping season when wandering animals could do damage 
to crops. During the dry season, most areas suffered from inade­
quate grazing and, in certain parts, farmers practised transhumance 
to the pastures of the Kafueflats. Cattle featured prominently in 
the social system and was widely used in bridewealth payments, 
especially in the Western Chieftaincies. It also played a major 
role in puberty, funeral and other ritual occasions when a certain 
number of animals would be slaughtered depending on the wealth 
of the individuals involved. There were various other uses of 
cattle. They supplied milk which was consumed as food and also 
made into butter for use as an unguent. They provided hides which 
served as mats and thongs for making rope. Animals were seldom 
slaughtered for food. The consumpion of meat was restricted to 
those times when animals died of natural causes or were slaughered 
for ritual purposes.'*'
********
For detailed information about the general role of cattle among 
the Tonga, see E.Colson, "The Role of Cattle among the Plateau 
Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes Livingstone Journal, XI,
pp. 10-46.
Traditionallyi the people of the Tonga plateau belong to 
that group of societies which has variously been described as 
'stateless', acephalous' or 'amorphous'. There is very little 
to suggest that they developed, at any time, a centralised form 
of political organisation. It is difficult to discuss the acti­
vities of the plateau's peoples before the 19th century, for 
not only is there a dearth of documentary evidence, but also 
Tonga traditions for this period lack the necessary depth. It 
appears that during the early 19th century the plateau Tonga 
lived in fairly large settlements and were mainly engaged in 
the peaceful pursuits of farming large areas of land and raising 
cattle.1 This halcyon phase of Tonga history did not survive 
the early years of the century for their seeming, prosperity at­
tracted the attention of raiders from as far afield as Southern 
Rhodesia and Barotseland. These invaders plundered their villages 
persistently into the 1890s.
One of the earliest raiders on the plateau was Pingola, who, 
it seems, was motivated not so much by a desire to capture cattle 
or slaves but by sheer adventurism. His raids started around 1820. 
Pingola, who is said to have come from the North-East, usually 
carried on his missions large numbers of smiths' bellows which he
used to heat his arrow heads before shooting. He raided extensively
2'devouring oxen, cows and calves, without retaining a single head',
D.Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa 
(London, l8j?7)» pp. 553-55^•
^Ibid.
During the late l830s, Sebituane of the Kololo, fresh from 
his encounters with the Bechuana tribes and the Matabele, arrived 
with his army on the banks of the Zambesi. After successfully 
outwitting the valley Tonga Chiefs who were intent on killing 
him,^ he over-ran the villages of the Tonga. Sebituane is said 
to have captured 'so many cattle that his people were quite in­
capable of taking any note of the sheep and goats'. He plundered
'all the high lands towards the Kafue and settled in what is called
2
a pastoral country'. However, Sebituane's attempt to make a 
permanent base in the area around Kalomo was frustrated by the 
advance of Mzilikazi and his Ndebele impis. A new spell of raid­
ing thus began. Makololo and Ndebele booty hunters made a common 
raiding ground of the Tonga lands and when the power of the Kololo
collapsed in l86*f, the Lozi, under their great warlord, Santebe,
3
took their place.^
Although the Tonga enjoyed some peace betweenthe late l860s 
and mid-l880s, the raiders returned shortly after to continue the 
plunder. The main perpetrators of the raids that took place 
during the late l880s and early l8$)0s were the Ndebele and the 
Lozi, Barotseland was at this time in the throes of a political 
revolution and the lands of the Tonga attracted those refugees 
whose claims to power had proved unsuccessful. Once they had 
recovered from defeat, these exiles began to use their hideout as
Livingstone, op.cit., p.86.
2Ibid.
^People still talk of Santebe's raids, especially in the area of 
Chief Siamusonde, which has the unique reputation of having de­
feated the warrior's forces on one of his raids.
a base from which to attack their rivals in the Lozi homeland.1 
One such exile who settled among the Tonga during this period was 
the ex-King, Mwanawina, who was deposed in l8?8 durig the struggle 
which brought Lewanika to power. Mwanawina collected around 
himself some Chikunda slave dealers and elephant hunters who were 
living among the Tonga and together they attacked Sesheke. Al­
though this assault, which was a failure, did not result in a 
counter-offensive into Tonga country by Lewanika's army, a subse­
quent effort by another Lozi exile in 1888 provoked such a response. 
In that year, Lewanika sent his forces after the retreating army of 
Maracinyan (Moransiane Sitwala), who had once been in charge
of Sesheke. Maracinyan's army was, apparently, mainly made up of
2Tonga sympathisers who lived around his base. Thepursuing Lozi 
army, having failed to inflict any serious punishment on Maracinyan's 
men, turned in frustration on the surrounding Tonga villages and 
raided for cattle and slaves. On his arrival at the kraal of Monze 
after the Lozi army had departed, the traveller, Selous, found the 
rain-maker 'bewailing the loss of his cattle which had all been 
carried off about two months previously', ^
It did not take the Tonga long to realise that their Lozi 
as well as their Chikunda guests were a liability they could ill 
afford. Like some of the Lozi, the Chikunda appeared to have designs
]_
See E.Colson, "A Note on Tonga and Ndebele", Northern fthodesia Journal, 
Vol. II, 195o.
2
These reportedly came from the Kanchomba area and they usually 
teamed up with Maracinyan in terrorising the more distant T onga.
Ibid., p.39.
^F.C.Selous, Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa (Bulawayo,
1972), p.211.
on Tonga cattle and crops. Cases of cattle theft proliferated. 
Because they lacked the necessary military skills to confront 
and evict their unwanted guests* the Tonga had recourse to the 
Ndebele who they knew to be extremely capable fighters.1 Emi­
ssaries were sent to Lobengula with requests for assistance. The 
Ndebele king in return despatched an impi to Tonga country but 
once they had succeeded in routing the enemies of the Tonga, the 
Ndebele troops turned on the herds of their hosts and gathered 
as much booty as possible to add to the gifts they had received 
for their help. The Ndebele army returned home in triumph and 
for sometime the Tonga were left alone. This period of tran­
quility did not however last very long for the Ndebele found the 
urge to capture some more cattle from the Tonga irresistible. In 
1889 and 1890, they returned to Tonga country. They routed many 
villages and there was much suffering especially in the areas around 
the escarpment. The Ndebele are said to have killed and maimed
several people and many slaves and cattle were taken. The Tonga
2
refer to this raid as Ngwalungwala war.
In 1892-931 the Tongaggain suffered considerable hardship at 
the hands of the Ndebele who devastated several villages in the 
eastern part of the plateau before turning south towards Choma.
Here* tradition has it, they came across pots containing medicine 
for the prevention of smallpox. Not knowing what was in the pots, 
they smashed them open and unleashed an epidemic to which several
^.Colson, ,!A Note...'1, op.cit., p.39.
2Ibid., p.*1-0. Also interviews on the plateau.
of them succumbed on the way home. Those who survived name this 
place 'Imbiza zi nga bulawi1 - 'The place where pots should not 
be broken'.1 The Ndebele raid of 1892-3 was the last they carried 
out in Tonga country for colonial rule was soon to be established 
in Southern Rhodesia, limiting the scope for such activities.
What then were the consequences of the various raids on the Plateau 
Tonga?
The incursions appear to have caused much disruption and chaos 
among the Plateau Tonga's southern and south-eastern neighbours, viz 
the Toka-Leya and the Valley Tonga. They also fell rather hard it 
would seem on that section of the plateau's population that lived 
in the eastern areas adjoining the escarpment. The raids of the Nde­
bele were for the most part concentrated in these areas which were 
more accessible to their armies by virtue of proximity. The Tonga 
population in the western parts of the plateau appear to have es­
caped the brunt of the Ndebele attacks although they suffered more
at the hands of the Lozi who were very active in the villages around
2Bwengwa, Mapanza and Mbeza, However, because the Lozi raids were 
fewer and also, apparently, less devastating than those of the Nde­
bele, the western areas survived the incursions, on the whole, much 
better than the escarpment peoples. The cattle population in the 
west was much higher on the eve of Cfojlonial rule than that in the
a
east, chiefly because the latter area lost more cattle to the
1
This incident is widely spoken of on the plateau. 
^E.Colson nANote...,t, oo.cit., p.35.
1
invaders, Fanning activity generally appears to have suffered
less disruption in the Monze and surrounding areas than in
the escarpment regions of the plateau, as will be seen presently,
Livingstone's description of the Tonga in 1855 as 'a nation
scattered and peeled' whose population had undergone much decline
and whose people were hiding in the hills in large numbers seems,
on available oral evidence, to describe more the situation in the
escarpment country than that obtaining in the Monze and adjacent
2
areas close to the Ha.
In both the eastern and the western parts of the plateau, 
the raids undermined the traditional patterns of settlement. Be­
fore the raids began, the Tonga maintain that they used to live 
in large settlements. During his visit to the plateau in 1855* 
Livingstone observed the remains of some : of these settlements 
which had all been abandoned for a new mode of residence, A life 
of insecurity had forced the Tonga into small widely scattered 
villages, a pattern of settlement adopted in order to give alarm 
should any . enemy appear. **
The socio-economic and political organisation of the Tonga 
before the imposition of Colonial rule should therefore be reviewed
E.Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 1962), 
p.1 -^1. For several years after the raids, cattle did not feature in 
bridewealth payments in the eastern areas. Goats and chickens were 
used instead. See Ibid., p.1^2.
2D.Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa 
(London, 1857), p.553.
*5"interviews with Nacob Hundyanga and others in the neighbourhood of 
Chief Monze's village, 22.11.73.
^Livingstone, op.cit,, p.55^. The Seventh Day Adventist Missionary, 
Anderson, was given similar "reasons when he asked about the pattern 
of settlement on arrival among the Tonga in 1899. See W.H.Anderson, 
On the Trail of Livingstone (California, 1919)1 p.l65.
against this background of outside harassment. It must be pointed 
out, however, that although they suffered from external attack, 
the people of the Tonga plateau were never subjected to the poli­
tical control of their adversaries. The Lozi appear to have enjoyed 
a measure of political control in the Toka-Leya areas around Kalomo
before European rule was established, but this control did not ex-
1 Jtend to the area north of Muzoka, The Lozt King's authority does
not appear to have had any impact in the areas north of Siachitema
2
in Toka-Leya country. The Tonga did not regard the Lozi as over­
lords. The tributes that were sent periodically to the Lozi Paramount 
by Monze and other Tonga leaders were, apparently, despatched with 
much reluctance. This disinclination to pay homage to the Lozi Kin g 
increased in the late 1890s when European rule was about to be 
established. Harding tells us that in 1900 when he met Monze, the 
rain-maker questioned Lewanika's right to tribute in the following 
words.
'Why should I pay tribute to Lewanika when I am 
under the White Queen? Does Lewanika pay tribute?
I am a Batoka; I lay my presents at the feet of 
the white chief,'3
In the same year, B,S.A.C.officials also commented on Monze's re­
luctance to meet any tribute obligations to the Lozi King:
Under Colonial rule, the Lozi Paramount was to station various 
Indnnas among the !tfoka Leya. It is not very clear whether he did 
this at any time before the British came. For the activities of 
these Lozi Indunas under the B.S.A.C. Administration, see BSI/31 
and BS2/186, Z.N.A,
2See S.Holub, Travels Morth of the Zambesi 1885-6 (ed.) L.Holy, 
Translated by C.Johns (Manchester, 1975)» p.80.
•^C.Harding, In Remotest Barotseland (London, 1905), p.276.
'King Lewanika ... still collects tribute from 
the Mat oka who pay very reluctantly. They 
prefer to consider themselves under the direct 
rule of the British South Africa Company, Monze 
being most emphatic on this subject, and saying 
that as he and his people work for us his tribute 
is accounted-for in that manner.
Despite Monze's opposition, the payment of tribute to the 
Lozi was to continue for some time. Various secular and ritual 
leaders among the Tonga who aspired to political office under 
the white Administration saw fit to maintain their links with 
the Lozi Paramount. This, presumably, was a way of legitimising 
their positions and enhancing their status.
2
19th Century Tonga Agriculture
Although certain sections of the Tonga plateau suffered 
periodic attacks from outside forces during the 19th century, 
there is evidence to show that agriculture flourished in several 
parts of the plateau during this period. Because the raids were 
not evenly spread, some people were free to carry on their farm­
ing activities, safe from the incursions that were disrupting 
living conditions in other parts of the plateau. The people in the 
western and north-western areas appear to have been particularly 
fortunate in this respect.
^B.S.A.C. Reports 1898-I9OO, p.99*
2
Ken Vickery of Yale University has carried out very detailed in­
vestigations into the pre-Colonial agricultural situation among 
the Tonga. In the writing of this section I make use of various 
insights lie has provided us in his Aspects of Plateau Tonga Economic 
History* a mimeographed paper presented to the History Seminar of 
the University of Zambia on the 10th January, 197^ -* I also rely 
here on the various contributions of Elizabeth Colson.
Livingstone's accounts of this period refer to the large 
quantities of food with which the Tonga welcomed him. Such 
hospitality, though perhaps indicative of the relief the Tonga 
felt at the approach of peace, could hardly have occurred in a 
situation where farming activity was at a virtual standstill be­
cause of foreign invasion. When he arrived among the Tonga in 
18551 Livingstone reported that 'Great numbers of people came 
from all the surrounding villages with presents of maize and
masuka'.^ At the village of Monze., he was supplied 'most liber-
2
ally' with maize, earthnuts* corn, a goat and a fowl.
Although the documentary evidence is very sketchy, one can, 
with the help of oral information, construct a fair picture of what 
the agricultural system of the Tonga was on the eve of Colonial rule 
There was an abundance of land and every member of a neighbourhood 
had the right to occupy or abandon a plot whenever he so desired. 
Because it was in plentiful supply, land was neither inherited 
nor sold and newcomers to the plateau were always welcome to land 
that was not being farmed, so long as they made their intentions 
known to the local Ulaanyika and could find a sponsor within the 
neighbourhood.
The Tonga practised a simple hoe culture. Finger millet and 
sorghum were the main staples but by the mid-19th century maize was 
also grown. Production was mainly for subsistence but some families 
grew more than their subsistence needs in order to have a reserve
1Livingstone, on.cit., p.551*
2Livingstone's African Journal, Vol. 1 (ed.) I.Schapera (London,
1963), p.350.
on which to fall during poor seasons. At such times, a family had 
to meet both its requirements as well as those of needy kinsmen, 
some of whom may have travelled for miles in search of food.
Since they had a lot of land, Tonga farmers did not adopt inten­
sive cultivation methods. The traditional system was one of shifting 
cultivation with^the widespread use of heat and ash from burned 
trees and branches. Gardens were moved around as the fertility of 
the soil declined and long fallow periods were observed to allow 
the soil to regain its fertility.
In the absence of a regular commercial demand for their crops, 
the majority of the area's farmers did not aim at producing large 
supplies and they tended, on the whole, to cultivate small gardens. 
Agricultural practice also tended to vary with vegetation and soil 
conditions. Vickery has pointed out that gardens in the south­
western parts of the plateau, where therelatively poorer plateau 
soils predominate, were usually smaller than those in the north­
east. Because the south-western areas were heavily wooded, stumpi ng 
was always very hard work here and this tended to limit the size 
of gardens. New gardens were usually about 2-A acres in size and 
were exteisded annually at the rate of /2 to 1 acre. Because of 
the relatively poor quality of the soil in this part of the plateau, 
garden sites were changed more frequently than in the north-east.
Most gardens tended to be exhausted in the space of 2-*f years.^
In contrast, the north-eastern part of the plateau was for 
the most part covered in the more fertile Upper Valley and Transi­
tional soils. For miles the land here is mainly open rolling country
Vickery, 'Aspects...', op.cit., p.**.
interspersed, with damboes, requiring much less effort in 
clearing than the south-west. Farmers generally tended to avoid 
the heavily wooded areas in spite of the fact that some of them 
had very rich Upper Valley soils. Gardens in the north-east 
tended to be larger (about 5-6 acres on average) and the in­
herent fertility of the damboes and surrounding plains meant 
that garden sites could be cultivated for much longer periods 
before the soil was exhausted.'*'
Most Tonga families kept laige bush gardens (usually some 
distance from their homesteads), as well as smaller village gardens. 
Work in the bush gardens was usually carried out by the husband, 
his wife or wives and their children. This was the primary work team. 
Their individual roles were apportioned according to a none too 
rigid traditional division of labour. The clearing and stumping 
of the land was usually performed by the men and boys. The male 
members of the family also assisted with planting although this task 
as well as that of weeding usually fell to the women and girls. In 
the majority of cases, the women and girls planted the seeds, under­
took the hoeing and were assisted by the menfolk in the job of 
harvesting. When a family had to tackle a job which required more 
hands than they could manage, work parties were usually called in. 
Workers vrere rewarded with meals and beer and there was always an 
understanding that such assistance would be reciprocated in the future 
if the need arose.
Apart from the main bush garden from which the family's main
supplies came, it was the responsibility of every husband to clear 
a village garden for his wife. Evidence on the rights of women to 
dispose of the crops they grew in their own gardens is rather con­
flicting. Some Informants claimed that husbands had to be con­
sulted before gifts could be made from such gardens but this was 
denied by others. It does appear, however, that the gardens of 
wives were simply subsidiary sources of supplies. The raising of 
groundnuts, beans, peas, pumpkins and various other cucurbits was 
often done in these smaller gardens although these crops could 
also be grown in the main garden,
A
Although I saw more about the impact on the plateau of labour 
migration in search of wage employment in Chapter III, it may be 
helpful at this stage to look briefly at .the effects of early mi­
grations on Tonga agriculture. Round about the l890s, large numbers 
of Tonga males began to travel from the plateau to the southern 
territories and other parts of what became North-western Rhodesia 
in search of wage employment.1 Labour migration among the Tonga
did not however pose the sort of problems it created among the Lozi
2and the Bemba. Most of the men were never away for very long periods
and their trips were usually timed in such a way as not to coincide
with the entire duration of the planting and harvesting periods
when the need for their services would be greatest. Many worked only
duripg the inter-cropping season so as to be available to perform any
3
strenuous tasks which the women and girls may find too demanding.
■^B.S.A.C.Report, 1898-I9OO, p.9*f.
2See G.Wilson, 'An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in 
Northern Rhodesia', Rhodes Livingstone Papers, Nos. 5 and 6, 19^1-2.
^Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga (22.11.73)? N.Muyovwe (6.6.7^) and 
other older Informants on the Plateau. ~ Hundyanga's father made 
several trips to Rhodesia and South Africa before he settled down 
to full-time farming._
Besides, in those sections of the north-eastern parts of the plateau
where the land was mostly rolling country with lots of damboes
and where, as a result, very little clearing was necessary, the
absence of the men would have been much less of a problem. In the
more heavily wooded south-western areas, their short absences may
have been slightly more burdensome on those at home.
The cattle population of the plateau on the eve of
Colonial rule was not very high, due to the raids, but, on the whole,
1the western areas appear to have had more animals than the east.
This, as already pointed out, may have been partly due to the fact 
that the raids fell more heavily in the escarpment regions of the 
plateau. The rinderpest epidemic of 1896, which many people still 
remember vividly, also contributed to this decline. The ownership 
of cattle was vested in individuals. In disposing of his herds a 
man was expected to be cognizant of his obligations ro his kinsmen 
for it was his duty to assist them with cattle whenever they were 
required to meet bridewealth and other social obligations.
Pre-Colonial trade
Vickery has recently argued that because of the prevailing 
climate of invasions on the plateau during the 19th century, it is
unlikely that the area witnessed during this period, the intense
2trading activity of which Miracle has written. Archaeological 
^E.Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester,
1962), p.1^ 1.
2Vickery, 'Aspects., oo.cit., pp. 5-6. See Marvin Miracle, 
'Plateau Tonga Entrepreneurs in Historical inter-regional Trade’, 
Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, No. XXVI, i960.
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research in the Southern Province has provided us with an idea 
of the sort of goods that were produced and exchanged in the 
area during the Iron Age. Although there does not appear to 
have been anoverall cultural continuity between the plateau and 
the area further south which has been more intersejy worked by 
archaeologists! excavations at Lochinvar and Kangila have revealed 
very interesting data. Apart from pottery traditions! some iron 
and copper workings have also been unearthed. Hoesi arrowheads!
axes and other metal tools! either produced locally or imported!
during
were very much in use/this period.
My investigations into Pre-Colonial trading activities re­
vealed that some of the Ulaanyika, notably Monze Mayaba and certain 
others around the neighbourhood! organised small caravans periodi-
2
cally and these are said to have traded as far as the Lozi and Lenje* 
Groups of tradersi acting on their own accounts! also went among 
the Valley Tonga, Totela, Soli, Chiknnda and Ila, These trips 
were not however always organised on a regular basis. Among the 
items traded by the Tonga were animal skins, cattle, ivory, slaves 
and salt. They took in exchange fish, tobacco, guns, slaves, hoes, 
axes etc.
Trading activity within the plateau was on a very limited 
scale. The Tonga never established market places as such but this 
is not to say that there was no inter-neighbourhood trade. There
a _____
1See B.M.Fagan, 'The Iron Age sequence in the Southern Province 
of Northern Rhodesia', Journal of African History, No. 2, Vol.
IV, 1965. Also B.M.Fagan, Southern Africa during the Iron Age 
2(London, 1965), pp^75-77.
Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga and other Informants in the Monze 
area.
were no full-time craftsmen, but pots, baskets, ropes and other 
artifacts were exchanged between the villages. Grain was always 
changing hands between kinsmen and neighbours and there was 
usually a considerable grain traffic in periods of famine or ex­
ternal attack.1
The Tonga did not look on their cattle as a regular commercial 
asset to be traded for profit. The social value of cattle tended to 
weigh more heavily thanthe economic. This is not to say that cattle 
was never sold in „ Pre-Colonial days. European cattle traders 
from the southern territories were very active on the plateau during 
the l890s. Many were eager to re-stock their herds after the rinder­
pest epidemic of 1895-6. They were not always well-intentioned.
In l899» the traveller, Stevenson-Harailton, commented on some 'low 
class traders' who had been operating in the Monze area during the
previous year . This was almost certainly a reference to cattle 
2traders. Such behaviour, coupled with the derisively low prices
they sometimes offered for animals, may partly explain the reluctance
3of the Tonga to trade their stock during this period. Nevertheless, 
there was a certain amount of cattle trading. During the late l890s, 
we are told of traders with donkey wagons who traded along the Zambesi 
river and then northwards towards the plateau. These wagons usually 
returned to Bulawayo with cattle, sheep, skins and curios. Informants 
in the Monze area remember these trading caravans which were usually
^Interview with J.Hundyanga, 22.11.73.
2W.P.R.Wallis (ed.), Barotseland Journal of James Stevenson Hamilton 
(london, 1953)* PP* 229-30. Some Tonga informants told the author 
that the B.S.A.C. was invited into the plateau to put an end to the 
activities of these traders.
■^Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga (22.11.73) and Judah Bbuka. (15-12.73)* 
Both Informants told the author of several farmers who refusedto ~ 
sell cattle because the prices were too low.
^B.S.A.C.reports, 1898-I9OO, p.91.
accompanied by guides recruited in the Zambesi valley.
******
In 1855 when Livingstone visited the Tonga plateau, he reported
that the African; population was badly in need of peace and was very
enthusiastic about his plans to bring white men into the area to live
among and teach the people. He wrote:
•All expressed great satisfaction on hearing my message 
as I directed their attention to Jesus as their Saviour, 
whose word is ’’Peace on Earth and good-will to men”.
They of course did not understand the full import of the 
message, but it was no wonder that they eagerly seized 
the idea of peace. Their country has been visited by 
successive scourg^s^during the last half century...1 •L
Some forty-four years later, a group of white men, perhaps not the 
type that Livingstone had in mind, were to move into the plateau 
to establish a new order. The area was absorbed into the British 
Empire. How did this happen?
Although the Lozi never established effective control over 
the greater part of the Southern plateau, Lewanika regarded the 
tribes of the Ila-Tonga group as his subjects and he looked upon 
their lands as being under his protection. In 1890, he had re­
ceived a visit from Lochner, the representative of Cecil Rhodes, 
head of the British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.) whose task it 
was to gain for the conpany the lands to the north of the Zambesi 
river. Lewanika*s desire at the time for protection from a group 
of hostile Lozi Chiefs to the south-east of his capital, led him 
to sign a concession with the Company which promised him the pro­
tection he sought. He was also to receive a salaiy of £2,000 a 
year and the Company promised to undertake development projects 
such as the building of schools and the making of roads etc. in
his area. In return the Company was granted mining rights over 
Barotseland. Lewanika later tried to repudiate this concession
Livingstone, on.cjt., p.553.
after a trader, George Middleton, had raised doubts about it, but 
this did not stop the British Government from recognising the 
Company's rights of protection over Barotseland in 1891. Having 
established formal relations with the Lozi Paramount, the B.S.A.C. 
began to take a closer interest in the rest of his 'domain'.
There are two main accounts of the circumstances surrounding 
the coming of the Company's pioneering column into the Tonga plateau. 
One states that the Tonga actually requested the protection of the 
B.S.A.C.'s police and that the establishment of a fort by the pioneering 
column was in response to this invitation. This account states that, 
after the 1896 risings against the B.S.A.C. in Southern Rhodesia 
and the rinderpest of the same year, a number of unscrupulous cattle 
dealers crossed the Zambesi to purchase cattle from the Tonga.
The price of cattle was very high at the time and these dealers 
did not hesitate to cheat their hosts whenever they could. Because 
they were not getting reasonable prices for their stock, Monze 
Mayaba decided to send three men to Bulawayo to ask the B.S.A.C. 
police for protection from the dealers. As a result of this, the 
Company despatched a pioneering column to the plateau and it pitched 
camp on the west bank of the Mulonga Noma river, which was close to 
Mayaba's village.1
Other accounts reject this story of an invited occupation 
force. They argue that the pioneering column came into the plateau 
without the consent of the people. It is said to have moved in with
1Cl/8/7/2m Z.N.A. Moreau to D.C.Mazabuka, 11.12.35* and interviews.
with big guns and established its base at Moonya Hill. The leaders 
of the column then sent for Mayaba but not before one of the guns had 
been fired to attract attention and exhibit its capability. Mayaba 
came with a number of Ulaanyika and Sikatongo and a handful of local 
villagers. He was asked by the white officers to make a choice be- 
tween war andpeace. The leader of the column placed on a table a 
cob of maize and a bullet and he asked Mayaba to choose between the two, 
Mayaba chose the cob to signify his desire for peace and, there and then,
1
he agreed to the pioneering column’s request to build a fort in the area.
The accounts of the circumstances surrounding the B.S.A.C.'s entry 
may differ but there is no doubt that the Tonga were in no position to 
offer any resistance to the newcomers. The pioneering column came in 
well armed and the inscription on a plaque which marks the site on which 
the Company established its first base on the plateau, makes this quite 
clear. Among other things, it states that 'a moat with earth ramparts 
mounting maxim guns at the comers enclosed a small strong point'.
Armed as it was, the column must have been regarded as a force capable 
of offering the Tonga the protection from raiders they badly needed.
This consideration must have weighed heavily with Mayaba and others 
when they consented to its presence. The British South Africa Company's 
base at Moonya Hill country, established by one Captain Bury in 1898, 
was named Fort Monze. It was approximately ten miles north-east of 
Kalomo and within a mile of Monze Mayaba1s village.
The Company's Administration
Under the B.S.A.C., the territory of Northern Rhodesia was,
^Interviews with J,Hundyanga (22.11.73)* N.M.Muyovwe (6.6.7*0 and 
others. At the site where the B.S.A.C.first pitched their camp, 
Informants pointed out the line of fire of the Company's maxim gun.
up to 1911* partitioned into two parts, North-western and North­
eastern Rhodesia. A resident Commissioner from Zomba was the 
Administrator of the North-east and the North-west came under 
the British High Commissioner, who had his headquarters in Cape 
Town, South Africa. Up to 1907» Major Coryndon was in charge 
of North-west Rhodesia. He parcelled out the area into three 
districts under District Commissioners. These were responsible, 
among other things, to protect the welfare of the African population, 
to keep population records and to control the police units in,their
v
various districts. After the imposition of taxation on the African 
population, the Commissioners were also charged with its collection. 
The plateau Tonga were within the Batoka District and F.V.Worthing­
ton, based at Kalomo, was their first District Commissioner. The 
district was divided into five sub-districts: Kalomo-Choma,
Mapanza, Monze, Buni and Sijoba. The officials who were placed 
in charge of the sub-districts were at first called Collectors, 
but this title was subsequently changed to that of Native Commissioner 
The first group of Collectors to be appointed were C. Hazell to 
Mapanza, W.Tilney to Buni, M.C.Cox to. Sijoba, J. de C. Dillon to 
Monze and R. I.Hughes to Kalomo-Choma. The affairs of the Tonga 
plateau were, at first, managed from Fort Monze but in 190*f the 
Headquarters was transferred to Khaunga. In July 1903 it was
moved again to Magoye and in 1922 to Mazabuka, when part of the
1
Gwembe valley was added to it.
KSP 3/1* Z.N.A. Kalomo District Notebook; also W.F.Stubbs,
"Southern Province Historical Manuscripts", Institute of 
African Studies, University of Zambia, Manuscript Collection.
The chartered company's administrative policy was one of 
direct rule. The Administrative Officers made all the main policy 
decisions and, as far as possible, supervised their execution. 
However, because it lacked sufficient staff, the Company had to 
recruit prominent Tonga to serve as approved Chiefs and Headmen. 
Monze Nchete, the leading rain-maker, was requested to point out 
those section heads who* in his view, were capable of serving in 
the new roles of Chiefs, Divisional Headmen and Headmen. He 
singled out all the prominent IJlaanyika and Sikatonga within the 
population. Each recognised Chief was required to supervise a Chief- 
taincy and had for his assistants Divisional Headmen who were heads 
of groups of villages and Headmen who supervised single villages."1'
The Chiefs were responsible for 'the general good conduct of 
the natives under their charge' and were expected to report all 
criminal activity and outbreaks of disease or epidemics among their 
people or animals. They nominated the local Headmen and were ex­
pected to discourage such practices as witchcraft and divination and 
to control human and livestock movements within their various areas. 
In this connection, they had to notify the Native Commissioner of
all applications from newcomers who intended to reside in their 
2areas.
Perhaps the most problematic of the Chiefs' duties was that of
1Up to 1919, there were about 116 districts on the plateau, each 
under a Headman. In 1919 these areas were grouped into larger 
enclosures and placed under Chiefs. See E.Colson, Marriage and Family 
among the plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, (Manchester, 19,98) , p. 10
BS2/7, Z.N.A. High Commissioner's Notice No. 68 of 1908.
recruiting labour from the villages whenever the Administration 
requested it. The recruits usually served as porters, construction 
workers and road makers. The Chiefs frequently encountered oppo­
sition from their people when they sent their messengers out on re­
cruitment drives. This was because in the majority of cases 
labourers were not paid for their services and were thus reluctant 
to :come forward,.i s '\Qn a number of occasions the Chief's messengers 
would forcibly conscript those who were unwilling to offer their 
services gratis. This was Cibalo« a practice which was to have 
wide repercussions in the coming years. In the early years of its 
administration, some Company officials criticised the practice of 
forced labour on the plateau, but theirs was clearly the minority 
view.1 Most officials saw nothing wrong in the use of involuntary 
labour. In fact whenever difficulties were encountered in the re­
cruiting of labour, they would accuse the Chiefs of not trying 
hard enough.2 At times, Chiefs were punished for failing to pro­
duce the required number of men. In April 191**-, Hughes, the 
Magistrate of the Kalomo sub-district, imprisoned a local plateau 
Tonga Chief, Mapanza, and his Headman Siwanze,, for about, 10-13 
days because they had failed to provide, on time, twenty-eight 
carriers required for an official tour. When eventually the twenty-
eight men arrived at the Boma, they were made to work for several
3days and sent back to their villages without pay,
^The Secretary for Native Affairs was very critical of the practice 
especially after the introduction of taxation. See BS2/18?, Z.N.A^ 
Secretary for Native Affairs to D.C., Batoka, monthly report 1907.
2Interviews with J.Hundyanga (22.11.73) and N.M.Muyorwe (6.6.7**-).
3Bs3/68, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from McKinnon to High Commissioner, 
24.2.1^. "Ah official inquiry into Hughes' conduct led to the ex­
emption from taxation for life of Mapanza and others who had suf­
fered imprisonment at the hands of Hughes for similar reasons.
1.8
The Headmen who served the Company were responsible to the 
Chiefs and were required to draw attention to 'any unusual 
occurrence in their sub-districts ... and assist the messenger 
and other officials ... whenever called upon to do soj It was 
their duty to 'prevent the settlement of fresh villages or the
removal of existing villages in their districts, without the
1
consent of the Native Commissioner..,.'
Due to the lack of personnel, the Company's officials did 
very little touring and the Chiefs and Headmen operated, on the 
whole, with very little interference from Company officials. In 
most local matters they were allowed a free hand but their authority 
was slightly restricted in the judicial sphere for they were not 
empowered to punish offenders; this was the province of officials. 
As in the days when they were Ulaanvika or Sikatongo < some Chiefs 
continued in the role of sitting over inter-neighbourhood and 
village disputes but their opinions and views continued to have 
no more weight than those of other commoner 'council' members.
On the whole, the people acknowledged their position as the Ad­
ministration's spokesmen and looked on them as defenders of their 
Interests. The Chiefs appear to have settled down in their new 
roles with much enthusiasm. In 19151 an official noted that 'the
assistance of Indunas and Headmen has been freely given to the
2
Government when they have been called upon'. Another wrote in
1916 of their reputation 'for prompt and effective response to
3
all calls made on them1.
* $ * * % « *
^82/7, Z.N.A. High Commissioner's Notice, No. 68 of 1908.
2ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year ending 
31st March, 1^15./
^ZA 7/l/3/3i Z.N.A. Annual r^ort for Batoka District for year 
ending 31st Marchi 19l6.
Once its Administration had been established, the B.S.A.C. 
proceeded to exploit the labour potential of the plateau. To 
company officials, the value of North-western Rhodesia as a whole 
lay primarily in its ability to serve as a labour reserve, supply­
ing manpower to Southern Rhodesia, which territory was the company's 
real concern. There was much movement of labour to Southern Rhodesia 
during the late l890s as white labour agents endeavoured to meet 
the needs of the railway contractors and mining officials of that 
territory. Many people from the plateau who went down during this 
period were never to return, for they established resident com­
munities or joined those already in existence around the various 
work centres. A number of Tonga labourers also made the trip further 
afield to South Africa during this period.
Company officials reporting on various activities between 1898 
and 1900 noted that the people of the Batoka plateau north and 
north-east of the Victoria Falls as well as those living in the 
Zambesi valley, supplied the bulk of Northern. Rhodesian labour em­
ployed in the mines of Matabeleland. They believed rthat with a more
intelligent and energetic system of labour agency, the supply might 
1
be trebled'. Harding, the Acting British Resident in the area, 
observed in 1899 that although there was some reluctance to go 
down south, due primarily to the Tonga dislike of organised recruit­
ment drives, but-also to harsh conditions encountered on the way, 
several men were still travelling down to Rhodesia for employment.
He wrote:
^Report of the British South Africa Company, I898-I9OO, p.9^.
'The men even at this distance find their way to Bulawayo 
and Salisbury for work. I was constantly meeting boys who 
had just returned from Southern Rhodesia or were going .down, 
but they object to be taken down in a mob by an Agent.
Being improperly fed on the journey some of them run away, 
some die en route and only a certain percentage arrive at 
Bulawayo .... Those who desert return to their barracks 
and prejudice their brothers and friends against going down.1
The introduction of taxation on the plateau was to quicken the flow of
labour to the south. Unfortunately, there are no reliable figures of labour
migration during this period. The Company's records are not helpful in this
respect, while very few records have survived of the labour recruiters who
were active on the Tonga plateau at this time. In any case recruitment
figures alone would not, of course, indicate the total scale of Tonga
labour migration. It is therefore difficult to quantify the flow of wage
earners from the Ton^a villages during the early years of Company rule.
During discussions on the timing and the rate of tax to be imposed on
the Tonga plateau, local officials appears to have had no qualms about the
Tonga's ability to meet this new obligation. In 1902, Coryndon had argued
that the 'great majority of the natives living within the triangle which
forms the Batoka plateau ... are not only quite aware that the time is near
for the payment of the tax but are perfectly willing to pay it when it is
proclaimed*. He therefore saw 'no reason why the first payment should not
be made to be due in July, 19031. He argued further that 'the Batoka are a
timid and law abiding tribe and have absolutely no cohesion, so that there
2
will be no chance of organised opposition.' In 1901 the Administration had 
started to compile a census of eveiy man, woman and child within the District 
Having acquired this information, it now decided to introduce taxation and 
the actual collection of the tax began in 1904.
Until 1911 when the territory was united, North-western and North­
eastern Rhodesia operated uner different tax levies. The former
Ibid., p.98.
2BS2/36, Z.N.A. Coryndon to Secretary, B.S.A.C,, London, 3.3.02.
Ibid. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.5.03.
area had an annual poll tax of 10/- and there was an additional
10/- tax on men with more than one wife. The North-east had
an annual tax of 3/-. However, after 1914, the entire territory
came under a poll tax system and the rate in the North-east was
2gradual^ increased.
To get the Chiefs to encourage their people to meet their 
tax obligations, a system of badge awards to deserving Chiefs 
was initiated in August 1905* According to the rules governing 
the award, 'no Induna should receive a badge unless by the 31st 
December of the year in which the tax falls due, 95°/o of his
people have paid their tax in full'. The badges were in two sizes.
The larger one was to be awarded to a Chief whose people paid £50 
or above in tax, the smaller one to Chiefs whose people paid less 
than this amount. A Chief who won an award had the right to retain 
it for a year. When it was time for the tax to be collected, he 
surrendered his badge to the Collector and got it back only if 
his people paid 95°/o or more of the amount due. The Company had
no doubts that this system of awards 'would ensure continued effort
3
on the part of the Induna to retain his badge'.
To meet their tax obligations, more men began to leave the 
Tonga villages in search of employment in the Southern territories.
In 1912 we hear of the so-called 'Bulawayo fever' as more
1In 1929 the plural wives tax was abolished but there was an overall 
tax increase of 2/6d, bringing the rate in the North-west districts 
(excluding Balovale where it was 7/6d) to 12/6d and 10/d in the 
North-eastern district. ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum 
on native policy.
2ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on native policy*
^BS2/76, Col. II, Z.N.A. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.5*05*
4
Zambesi Missinn Record (hereafter Z.M.R.), Vol. IV, No* 58, October, 
1912.
r©iu\went down south to serve on white farms in particular,
rose, work in the mines having become very unpopular and, attract-'
1ing very few workers. The effects on local agriculture of this 
seemingly large out-flow of males is an open question. In certain 
areas, notably Ufwenuka and Chona, it appears to have coincided with 
a period of famine which lasted from about 1914 to about 1919* in 
April of that year, Catholic missionaries in the area commented on
the fact that crops grown by Africans had been very poor for some
2five years. One is however in doubt as to the real reasons of 
this apparent decline in output. Was it due to weather conditions 
or the absence of the men? Or did the problem really arise from
the lack of up to date agricultural implements as the missionaries
3
seem to suggest. We do not have similar accounts of famines
for other parts of the plateau and this makes it difficult to
speculate on the general situation in the area. The Ufwenuka and
Chona famines could well have been a very localised problem,
if
considering the climatic variations on the plateau.
The Tonga developed an aversion for work underground during the 
early years of Company rule and this had a lot to do with the 
high death rates in the mines. The death rate of North-west 
Rhodesia miners in the Southern Rhodesian mines was 38.76 per 
thousand in 1907-8 and the figure rose to 42.68 in 1908-9. ^he 
death rate did not begin to fall until around 1913. See M.Gelfand, 
Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter (Oxford, 1961), pp.
99 and 106.
2Zambesi Mission Record, Vol. VI, No. 84, April 1919» p.133.
•^Zambesi Mission Record, Vol. V, No. 74, October 1916, p.393.
4See Chapter I, pp.
The overall initial response of the African population to the 
Company’s tax policies was quite encouraging. Between the middle 
of October 1904 when collection began on the plateau and the 
end of January 1903, over 2,000 people had paid their tax 'willingly 
and without compulsion'. Officials recorded only 500 defaulters 
'from various minor causes1.'1'
As the tax net was expanded, however, it ran into opposition 
in some of the Chieftaincies. In 1903t Tonga Chiefs in areas close 
to the Ila joined their neighbours in resisting the tax demands of 
the Administration. According to the reports, the leaders of the 
protest among the Tonga was one Siahkamolo. The B.S.A.C. had to 
despatch a patrol made up of eighty policemen and a maxim gun under 
the command of Colonel Colin Harding, Commander of the Barotse 
Native Police, to the area. Harding took with M m  -one Captain 
Hodson and a regimental sergeant-major and with this force he was 
able to contain the resistance for a while. By 1908 there were 
more tax protests and it was reported that some of the Tonga had 
not only refused to pay their tax but were prepared to 'fight the 
Government'. Lewanika, the Lozi Paramount, had to intervene and
1BS2/76, Vol. II, Z.N.A.Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.3*03.
2BS2/234, Z.NjA, Harding to Imierial Secretary, 10.3.05.
4icounsel the Tonga to be loyal to the Administration. This wave 
of anti-Administration activity was certainly not unconnected with 
the work of certain prophet figures who operated in the Monze sub­
district during this period. In 1909* one such figure is said to 
have told the Tonga ’that they should all go to sleep for five 
days when he would awaken them by firing a pistol and they would 
then see that all the officials and their messengers were dead.
The Kafue bridge and the railway would be done" away with and all 
the property of the officials and messengers would be divided 
among the people*. This prophet figure won a number of supporters
in the area and one of his disciples was even arrested by the
2
Native Commissioner of Magoye.
Apart from these pockets of protest, the majority of the popu­
lation who fell within the taxable category met their tax obligations
3
without much ado. This led the Company to contemplate a tax in­
crease on the plateau^which seemed to be relatively better off than 
most parts of the territory. In 1905» Coryndon suggested an in­
crease of 10/- for the Batoka District for he was ’convinced that 
the very great majority of the natives in this district are per­
fectly capable of paying the full amount, one pound'. He drew at­
tention to the amount of maize that was being sold by various Tonga 
villages to the railway contractors. He pointed out that the con­
struction of the railway had been in progress for six months and 
that approximately 3*000 men were working on it at wages ranging 
between 10/- and £1 a month in addition to rations. The railway 
contractors were also providing half pay to workers 'while travelling 
from their homes to their work and back'. He further observed that 
the peace provided by the Administration's presence had given a
1BS2/187, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Lewanika to Hazell, 13.1.08.
HiCTE 3/l/l, Z.N.A. Monthly report, April 1909* Gwembe 'sub district.
^In the Monze sub-district, with an estimated population of about
boost to local agriculture and pointed out that the Administration 
alone was purchasing 'not less than 800,000 lbs of grain 
(if,000 bags) from local natives, besides the needs of the railway 
contractors, travellers and permanent residents...'."*' Coryndon 
was fully convinced that 'the Batoka people have in every degree 
as good facilities and opportunities for earning a pound a year
as in many districts of Southern Rhodesia and far better facilities
2
than in some..,.'. As such, he saw nothing wrong in increasing 
local taxation. It appears that the Company accepted Coryndon's 
suggestion and did in fact increase the tax on the plateau to one 
pound. This new rate was not however maintained for long and it
3
was subsequently reduced, perhaps because of local opposition.
Tonga Agriculture and the work of the Missionaries
As we have just seen, the beginnings of European enterprise 
on the Tonga plateau provided a market for local African cultivators, 
who were quick to respond. Such commercial activity was something 
of an innovation for Tonga agriculture had been much disrupted 
during the 19th century and was in effect confined to cultivation 
for subsistence. However, the transition to produce for the market 
was very gradual. Most Tonga farms were very small and few 
produced much maize for sale over and above their subsistence re­
quirements. It is probably fair to suppose that the condition of 
agriculture on the plateau as a whole in 1905 closely resembled 
the following report on farming patterns in one Chieftaincy:
21,280 people, £2,4^3.10/- was collected in 1905; £31^ 99.10/-
in 1906; £3,^7 in 1907; £3*757.10/- in 1908 and £3*612 in
1909. See BS2/l^f5, Z.N.A.
"^2/76, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 5.6.03, 
Unfortunatelythere "are no comparable figures for an earlier 
period with which one can check this estimate.
^Ibid.
^Most of the older Informants remember the days of the £1 tax.
’The fields were merely little scratches of 
ground hardly noticeable. Particularly good spots 
in a vlfcy, the tops of large ant heaps, a few 
hundred square yards under a big rausangu tree - such 
were the fields. The grain grown was mostly kaffir 
corn and a very poor kind of mealies with small 
grains of various colours on very small cobs, a 
few patches of monkey nuts and a few pumpkins were 
all the Batonga grew, ’ -1
The most significant change in Tonga agriculture under 
Company rule was a matter not so much of commercial expansion» 
as of technical improvement in certain Chieftaincies. This was 
largely due to the work of missionaries who arrived on the 
plateau during the early years of the century. In 1902, Frs. 
Moreau and Prestage of the Society of Jesus had travelled from 
Empandeni in Southern Rhodesia to the plateau with a view to 
getting the necessary approval for the commencement of mission 
work among tie Tonga. Livingstone in 1855 had described the Tonga 
as a people ’humbled by the scourgings they have received', who
were, as a result, ’in a favourable state for the reception of
2the gospel'. This had yet to be proved. The visitors were
received by Monze Nchete who was 'flattered with the idea of
3having Missionaries at his village'.^ They told Monze that 
before they could embark on work in the area, they would like to 
take some Tonga youths down to their mission in Chishawasha for 
instruction. Monze was delighted at this request and offered four 
boys including his son, Bbinya, who was about thirteen and of 
'exceptionalintelligence'. The other three were Haatontola, about
1J.Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission, How it came to be started in 1905" 
p.29. Held at the Mission's Chikuni Headquarters. Moreauvas 
probably referring to Ufwenuka chieftaincy.
2 ^
Livingstone, Bp.cit., p.55^.
3Cl/8/7/2, Z.N.A. Moreau to B.C. Mazabuka, 11.12.35.
1? and the son of Monze's sister; Jahaliso, the son of Lisho,
an adviser to Monze; and Jo jo, the youngest in the group^who was
1the son of a man in the Chief's village. Before the party left
for Ghishawasha, the Jesuits received a grant of land from Monze
in a place called Rusangu, but in their eagerness to return, they
2
failed to peg the area or put any marks of claim on it. On their 
return in 1905» they found that the Rusangu area had been occupied 
by Pastor Anderson of the Seventh Day Adventists (S.D.A.), who 
had made a similar trip in 1903 to see Monze. Anderson received
a total of 75 acres at sixteen cents an acre, and his Church
3
was given ten years in which to pay with no interest charge. The
Jesuits had to move further south to an area called Chikuni where,
on a plot of 10,000 acres containing a population of 300 Africans,
Athey began their work in 1905.
Although in the very early years the majority of the African 
population kept its distance from the mission stations, a number 
of curious villagers came forward to find out what the work of the 
newcomers was all about and offer whatever assistance they could.
The missionaries needed men to help with the erection of buildings 
and so some of these Tonga males, who were not keen on travelling 
away from home in search of employment, turned to the local alternative. 
In starting Chikuni mission, Moreau and others seem to have enjoyed 
much local support. Moreau himself tells us that 'the people were
^Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission....", op.cit., pp. 16-17.
2
"Recordings from interviews in later life with the Boys who 
accompanied Fr. Moreau to Empandeni Mission Station in 1902."
Part of the Jesuit mission material in the possession of Fr. Max 
Prokoph of Lusaka.
3
^Anderson, on.cit., p. 179.
^Sec/Nat/ROl. Z.N.A. Moreau to D.C. Mazabuka, 11.A.35.
very willing to help - Men cut poles, women cut grass and brought
it in heavy bundles on their heads, men dug out clay, women brought 
1water,..1 and in less than three weeks the buildings had all been
erected. The new religion held some fascination for a number of
villagers but the overall response left the missionaries in no
doubt that 'material advantages are more readily appreciated than
2
purely spiritual ones,,,.'. In the absence of widespread polygamy 
and drunkenness, the churches were convinced their work would 
thrive."5 The population, on the whole, did not oppose Christianity. 
According to one observer, 'they adopted it too lightly and sifting
if
and screening were needed all the time'.
In the early days the churches made few converts among the 
Chiefs and Headmen. Their links with the rain shrines and other 
elements of Tonga ritual appear to have been very strong. One very 
prominent figure^ however, who showed much interest in the early work 
of the S.D.A. Church was the Headman Chikonka, who lived a few miles 
from the mission's station. He gave Anderson and his colleagues 
all the assistance they required and became so dedicated a convert 
that he surrendered the village dancing drum to the church. 'We 
have stopped dancing in our village', he said on presenting it,
'we don't use this any more so I give it to you.' There were 
many converts in his village and 'a feeling of sacredness and quiet*
*1
Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission...", op.cit., p.2hm
2ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year 
ending 31st March, 1915.
"’A. Casset, "The Chikuni Mission", Z.M.R., Vol. IV, No. ^9,
July 1910, p.9^*
M.Prokoph, "Chikuni, 1905•-1955l,i in The Catholic Teachert Vol. IV, 
No. 13» September 1955.
was said to have reigned over it on sabbath days.'*'
Although the missions devoted some attention to the teaching
of various subjects, their curriculum focussed heavily on craft
2practice and agricultural instruction. Their widespread use of 
the plough and draught oxen was to revolutionise local agriculture 
when the practice filtered through to the Tonga villages. In 1908 
Anderson had 4l students in the Mission’s boarding house and eight 
of them were in a position to pass a grade four examination in
3
reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, geography and the scriptures.
They had also undergone basic agricultural training. The mission
had its own farm on which students gained experience in the use of
the plough and the cultivation of local crops and fruit trees. At
Rusangu in 1908, there were over 400 fruit trees and vines. The
mission was self-sufficient in the production of vegetables, and
cabbages, radishes, beets and lettuce were all being produced. All
work on the farm and the farm buildings was done by the students
and Anderson had had no cause to hire any workers, apart from a
4mason who came in to help put up the buildings. By 1915 it was 
conpulsory for all students to spend about six hours daily in the
manual training workshops of the school, under the supervision of
5qualified instructors. As Rusangu expanded, so did the work of
"l'F.M.Robins>,on, "True Riches11, African Division Outlook (hereafter 
a;d,0.), Vol. 25* No. 8, April 151 1927.
2Almost all the educational work done among the Tonga during the early 
decades of Colonial rule was carried out by the missions, the Ad­
ministration bearing no direct responsibility. After the investigations 
of the Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1924, the Administration was to set 
up an African Education Department, and the first grants-in-aid were 
made. See Prokoph, ’’Chikuni, 1905-1955n» op.cit., p.15. See also 
Trevor Coombe, ’’The Origins of Secondary Education in Zambia. Part I, 
Policy Making in the Thirties”, African Social Research, No. 3» 1967» P.174
•^ Advent Review and Rabbath Herald (hereafter, A.R.S.H.), October 29, 1908.
4
Ibid.
■5zA 7/1/2/5, Z.N.A. Report for the Magoye sub-district for year ending 
51st March, 1915. "
the S.D.A. mission on the plateau. By 1923* out-schools had been 
opened as far afield as Kasikile, Munenga, Banakaila and Bwengwa.1
At Chikuni* Father Moreau gave far more attention to vocational 
and agricultural instruction than to purely academic training. This 
approach was verymch in keeping with Livingstone's argument that con­
cern for the welfare of adherents should be the missionary's first 
priority. Moreau argued* as Livingstone would have done* that Tonga 
welfare and living conditions had to be taken care of* before a mission- 
ary could turn to nurturing the minds of his adherents. In 191^* he
had forty students who were receiving instruction in brick-making and
3agriculture. The overall contribution of the missions in the field 
of agriculture was to have a lasting impact on Tonga farm practice, 
as will be seen later.
Land Alienation
In 189S, Lewanika, the Lozi Paramount, had granted to the B.S.A.C. 
'the right to make grants of land for farming purposes in any portion 
of the Batoka or Mashukulumbwe country to white men...1 and the Company 
had, in turn, promised 'that the native lands, villages, cattle posts,
if
gardens and fountains shall in no way be interfered with...' The B.S.A.C 
did not secure Lewanika's permission to make land grants on its own to 
non-natives in the area under the king's protection until 190^. Between 
1898 and 1904 the Lozi king insisted on personally approving all appli­
cations for land.
■I
ZA 7/1/6/3, Z.N.A. Mazabuka sub-district report for year ending 31st 
March, 1913*
^Perhaps this explains why his nickname 'Siabulembe' ('the good gardener') 
gained much wider currency on the plateau than the other two: 'Banza Ku- 
enda' ('He who reads while he walks') and 'Mukarapaila' ('He who walks 
majestically'),
^ZA 7/1/3, Z.N.A. Magoye sub-district report, 191**.
^IN/l/8/l, Z.N.A. Memorandum on native rights, by F.V.Worthington, 
Secretary for Native Affairs.
•^ Gelfand, on.cit., p. 128.
The first European to receive a plot of land from the Company 
im. North-Western Rhodesia was one H.F.Walker, who* in
1902, was allowed an area of 8*000 acres for himself and two sons* 
in the area around Kalomo.'L This was at a time when the European 
population was a mere handful. In 1901, the entire European com- 
mun ity in North-west Rhodesia numbered thirty-seven; four of
the number vrere policemen, three were Civil Servants and there
2were thirty missionaries and farmers. The railway which was 
being constructed by the Mashonaiand Railway Company reached 
Wankie in September 190,3» crossed the Zambezi below the Victoria 
Falls in 190^ and reached Broken Hill in 1906. Three years later, 
it reached the Congo border land and thus' linked up' with a railway 
from Elisabethville, in Katanga province. Up to 1910 land was very 
easy to come by for the Company was asking only 3d an acre for 
land which was more than twenty miles from the railway and l/6d 
an acre for land within twenty miles of the line. After 1910 
these prices were raised to l/~ and 2/6d respectively, for by 
then the expanding copper mines of Katanga provided a market for 
farm produce from Rhodesia. Several Europeans were now attracted 
to settle near the railway, producing maize and raising cattle 
for the Katanga market.
Lewanika had given the Company permission to alienate land 
in the Tonga areas without adequately consulting Monze and the 
other traditional leaders on the plateau. This was to create
"^ E3/7 Acc. No. 2/2927, Livingstone Museum.
2Gelfand, op.cit., p.128.
3
F.Carpenter , "The Introduction of Commercial Farming into Zambia 
and its effects, to 19^0", in R. Palmer (ed.), Zambia Land and 
Labour Studies, Vol. 1 (September, 1973), p.3.
difficulties. When the B.S.A.C. began to hand over large plots
of land to white settlers on the Tonga plateau in 1903, Monze
Nchete came out in open opposition to the new policy. Up to
this stage, the Tonga had not opposed the idea of the Administration
taking up some land on which to establish buildings for its purposes,
or of Missions settling down among them to teach the people.
The handing out of land to traders and settler-farmers was however
a new phenomenon, and the Tonga feared that once this had started,
it would lead to further land alienation as successive waves of
immigrants entered the territory.
African opposition to land alienation forced the Administration
to seek the help of the missionaries. When Pastor Anderson arrived
in Kalomo in 1903, it seems he had not by then made up his mind as
to where the S.D.A. would base their mission work. It was the
'Chief Official' at the Kalomo Headquarters who suggested that the
missionary should settle among the Tonga. According to Anderson,
'The reason he wanted us to go there was that old 
Monze, the chief rain doctor of the Batonga, had
started a rebellion the year before and they de­
sired a missionary located in his district to keep 
watch over him. The late Mr. Cecil Rhodes once 
told me that he found missionaries to be much 
better for keeping the natives quiet than soldiers 
and certainly a good deal cheaper. So the Admini­
stration desired us to settle near the restive 
Chief ... and report any disorders that might occur 
in his 'district,'1
Monze's military capacity certainly increased somewhat during 
the first few years of Company rule. From being a Sikatongo who 
used to rely very heavily on Ndebele support to protect his follow­
ing, he was by 1903 a Chief who had under his control 'a body of
1Anderson, oo.cit., p.173.
1
men armed with rifles'. These men were in his direct employ and 
he is said to have drilled them every morning and evening in 
the presence of his admiring villagers. He regarded them as 
his police. One Informant told the author that Monze knew his 
handful of guards would be no match for the Company's troops and 
maxim guns. Yet he hoped that by refusing to cooperate with the
hy
labour and other demands of the local officials and/surrounding 
himself with a body of armed men, he would have registered the 
point that the Tonga would rather die in a confrontation with the
p
Company's police, than lose their lands to white settlers. I
came across no evidence of any clash between Monze and the Company's
forces and it appears that the Administration's move in 1903 to
■3
disband Monze's guard after disarming them took care, for a time, 
of the threat posed by the Chief.
In 1904, Monze decided to make a protest trip to England to 
report to the King the land appropriation measures that were be­
ing inflicted on his people by the B.S.A.C. The Chief seems to 
have got his inspiration from the trip Lewanika had made to England 
in 1902 to attend King Edward's coronation. Monze thought that 
one of the reasons for Lewanika's visit was his desire to present 
a petition in which the conduct of the Company in Barotseland was 
called into question. To finance his trip, Monze went around the
^BS2/ll3, Z.N.A. B.C.Kalomo to Administrator, 22.6,0.3. Informants 
said that Monze's guard was made up of about fifteen to twenty men.
2Interview with Jacob Hundyanga, 22.11.73.
%S2/ll3» Z.N.A. B.C. Kalomo to Administrator, 22.6.03.
This was gathered from various interviews on the plateau.
villages collecting money "by giving people the impression that he 
had been instructed to collect taxes. He is said to have raised 
£600 before he was arrested by officials and brought down to
Kalomo.^ At his trial he pointed out that 'he had collected the
2money with the idea of going to Bulawayo and England.,.'. Bonze
is said to have called several witnesses to testify on his behalf,
'but the evidence of the first three or four was so damaging to
his case, that he declined to produce any more, exclaiming "What
is the good, they will not say those things which I have told them
to say1' . T h e  Chief was found guilty and sentenced to two years
I*
imprisonment which he served at Kalomo and Gwembe.
Once Monze*s threat had been contained, the Company carried
on as before providing land for settlers who needed it. By the
31st March 1909, fifty-eight farms had been taken up by settlers
mainly in the Batoka district, especially around Kalomo, Choma 
5
and Pemba, A number of farmers came into the area from Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa but few had the capital to make their 
farming activity worthwhile. The majority of those from Southern
Z.N.A. Despatch from Kalomo Boma to Lewanika, 19.1.0A.
2Ibid.
^BS2/311, Z.N.A. Report on opposition to taxation in the Gwembe 
sub-district, by F.V. Worthington. On his release from prison 
in 1906, Monze was told to build his new village near the Magoye 
Government Station, his original lands having gone, in part, to 
a settler called Faulkner. He lived in Magoye ■until 1910 when he 
was allowed to return to His old area and he established a new 
village some three miles from his original homestead. See, 
Worthington, "Report on Native Reserves", University of Zambia's 
Institute for African Studies Manuscript Collection. Also G/0 ,^ 
livingstone Museum. Political Institutions of the Tonga and other
^Histoiy by D.Nchetijj.
The Tonga have recorded the circumstances of Monze's arrest and 
subsequent imprisonment in a song. See Appendix.
Rhodesia were attracted by the comparatively liberal land policy
which the Company was operating here at a time when the practice
of attracting settlers to Southern Rhodesia through free grants of
land had come to an end. The Jameson era in Southern Rhodesia
during which such grants were common had come to an end and that
territory’s Administration had passed into the hands of Grey, a
director of the B.S.A.C., and Milton, a Civil Servant from the
Cape. The new officials accused their predecessors of having
alienated too much land to the settlers. They criticised the big
land owners and, in 1903» called on them to surrender a third of 
1their holdings. This land squeeze forced a number of white sett­
lers across the Zambesi into North-western Rhodesia. Within the 
Magoye sub-district there were ll*f Europeans in 1911-12, twelve
traders, two officials, thirty farmers, five missionaries, 13 rail-
2
way workers and 12 others. By 1919 with the end of the war, the
■Z
number had risen to 303 and it was 397 in 192*f in the newly
established Mazabuka sub-district which included part of the Gwembe 
kvalley.
The amount of land granted to individual settlers for farming 
or trading purposes on the plateau varied with their means, but on 
the whole, the land grants tended to be quite large. In 1919 the
R.Palmers The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia, 
1890-1936, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University of London, 
pp. 73-7^ and pp. 93-96.
2KDB 6/6/1, Z.N.A. Magoye sub-district Annual report, 1911-12.
^ZA 7/lA/3» Z.N.A. Magoye annual report, 1919.
^ZA7/l/7/3, Z.N.A. Report for Mazabuka suh-district for year 
ending 31.3-<&-
smallest plot of land awarded to a settler was in the region of 
1980 acres, the largest, which went to two brothers^being over
10,000 acres.'1' All lands in the railway area were alienated in 
freehold and this was a sufficient bait for undercapitalised 
farmers who looked forward to running their farms by employing labour- 
intensive production methods.
To make way for the railway line, several Tonga villages were 
evicted from their sites and their inhabitants had to open up new 
homes in other areas of the plateau. Africans were also turned off 
lands required for white settlement. These evictions caused much 
social disruption in the affected areas and they were to bring 
Company officials into conflict with some of the African villagers. 
The Chartered Company officially recognised the villager's right 
to compensation in the event of his eviction from lands he had 
stumped and developed. In a number of cases on the plateau, though 
not in all, villagers who were evicted during this period received 
some money by way of compensation. When, for instance, in 1913 
land was required for white settlement in the Munanpamba and Mugwali 
areas of Sianjalika Chieftaincy, compensation at a rate of £1 per 
hut and 5/- per acre was awarded to the villagers involved. Until 
1921, the rate of compensation was purely discretionary and local 
Company officials had full powers in deciding how much a village 
about to be evicted should receive. They assessed the so-called 
'native rights' in the area concerned by making estimates of the
^ZA 2/1/A/3, Z.N.A. Magoye annual report, 1919.
o
KTC l/l/2/l, Z.N.A. Native Commissioner, Magoye to Magistrate, 
Livingstone, 26.6.13.
value of property on it, viz. huts, fruit trees etc. and from this 
calculated how much should be paid in compensation by the intend­
ing settler. In 1921, however, mainly it would seem because of 
opposition from villagers who considered compensatory payments too 
inadequate, it was decided that a uniform rate of 10/- an^acre was 
to be paid to all. It was also agreed that in cases where the land
had been developed, something extra shiuld be added to the basic 
2_
rate. A total of £^7^*10/- is said to have beenpaid in compensation
2
during the course of that year.
While compensatory payments were quietly received and lands 
duly vacated in some areas, in others African farmers refused to 
consider the Administration's request that they should move off 
their lands and accept some money for this. In the majority of 
cases, this strong attachment to the land was due to its proven 
fertility. Farmers were also reluctant to move into areas far 
away from rivers as this would pose all sorts of problems regard­
ing their general farming activity and the availability of dry 
season grazing for their cattle. Strong ritual attachment to 
lands where reputable SikatonRp and close relatives had been buried, 
was yet another reason why moving away was so unpopular. Besides, 
no village looked with enthusiasm at the prospect of having to 
clear and stump new fields, especially in cases where the fertility 
of their present lands was far from being exhausted.
^ZA 2/2, Z.N.A. District Circular No. 2* 1921.
2ZA 7/1/5/3, Z.N.A. Magoye Annual report for year ending 31st March, 
1921.
In 1920-21, the Company experienced much difficulty in 
getting Chief Mwanachingwala and his people to hand over part 
of their lands to Messrs. White and Symons, both of them ex­
soldiers who wanted to settle on the plateau. The villages in 
question were in the Chalimbana and Munenga areas and the soils in 
these parts were widely known for their fertility. When he was 
approached by one Griffin on behalf of the Administration, the
Chief explained that the graves of their dead were in the area and
n
that they intended to continue living close to them. He suggested
that Symons and White should be given land around Mazabuka or
Kaleya, so that his lands which were already heavily populated
could be left alone. As the officials persistedjin their demands
that the area should be cleared, Mwanachingwala laid down conditions
under which he would be prepared to quit the area. He demanded that
his people who were living on the northern side of the Magoye should
be allowed to retain their lands for one more year, during which
time they would seek out and prepare new fields. He also asked
that those of his people who could not abandon their lands at the
end of the 1921-22 harvest should be allowed to retain those lands
2
and serve as tenants to the incoming settlers. This did not meet 
the approval of the officials who had already drawn attention to 
the 'very selfish and obstinate attitude'"^ that the Chief and his 
people had adopted throughout the discussions. They insisted that 
the Chief should move and collect compensation. To this ultimatum,
KDB 1/5/6, Z.N.A. Interview with Mwanachingwala and others near 
his village, '2.9.21.
2
Ibid. Magistrate to D.C. Livingstone, 11.1.20.
Mwanchingwala defiantly replied in 1921, 'If the Government drive us 
away, we must go, hut money, no; we will not take any money at all. 
We will not sell our land.1
In the same year the old men of the Chieftaincy, under harass­
ment from Company officials, lamented the losses of land the Tonga 
had suffered since the arrival of the Europeans. They reflected upon 
'the large area from Mazabuka right down the Magoye and on along 
the Kaleya over which they used to roam, hunt and graze their cattle 
in the dry season and asking where could they go today- every bit 
of this old land was now occupied by whites and now the whites were
at their very doors, so much so that the cattle of both had now to
2
share the scanty water of the Magoye.' The land losses suffered by 
the Tonga during the Company years, though smaller in comparison with 
what was to come under Crown rule, engendered much ill feeling on 
the plateau. By taking their land, the source of their livelihood, 
the Administration seemed bent on impoverishing the Tonga for whom 
shifting cultivation was a way of life. To the Tonga family that had 
lost the fertile plot of land it had occupied for many years, the 
settler and the Administrator were nothing but unscrupulous land- 
grabbers who had no concern for the welfare of the African population,
The B.S.A.C. and the settlers* demands
E m m  the earliest days of white settlement it was quite obvious 
that at some stage the labour needs of the settler farmers would 
clash with those of the Administration. Both groups were intent on
1Ibid. Interview with Mwanachingwala,... 2.9.21.
2
Ibid. After a period of indecision during which White and Symons 
were"even advised to withdraw their claims to the area (see KDB 
1/3/6, Z.N.A. District Commissioner to Secretary, Livingstone,
19.10.24), "Mwanachingwala and his people left the area.
•^Interviews on the plateau.
making maximum use of the available labour supply but whereas the 
farmer needed men to work locally, the Company concerned as it was 
about the Southern Rhodesian economy, was more inclined to directing 
the labour flow southwards across the Zambesi. A Rhodesia Native 
Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B.) had been formed in August 1903 in Southern 
Rhodesia for the recruitment of labourers needed by the agricultural 
and mining interests of that territory. By a proclamation of 1907, 
the Administrator of North-western Rhodesia granted to the R.N.L.B. 
a virtual monopoly over labour recruitment within the area under his
*L
jurisdiction. The Bureau had its Agents stationed across the Zam­
besi and these employed runners who went into the villages to 
secure the recruits. Local settler-farmers never took kindly to 
the operations of the Bureau for they saw in its activities a direct 
threat to their labour supply. Although the Bureau undertook to 
supply their requirements, they were convinced they could make 
better arrangements on their own.
Up to 1910, the Company, under pressure from the local settler
farmers, refused to allow the R.N.L.B. Agents to recruit within
2
the farming districts. This restriction however did not meet the 
demands of the farmers who wanted a total ban on the R.N.L.B.*s 
activities within North-west Rhodesia. In 1910 an official was 
forced to take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the 
labour situation in the area and he discovered that the white 
farmers' complaints about an inadequate labour supply were by no
•*-G§lfand, on.cit., p.98.
^32/145, Z.N.A, Report on North-west Rhodesia for year ending 
31st March," 1910.
means general. There were farmers who had no labour problems, 
while 'others can find few to take service with them...1. He con­
cluded that 'the cause of the shortage of which employers complain 
must therefore be due to the uninteresting nature of the work, 
the low wage offered, or inconsiderate treatment, probably a com- 
bination of all three.' He found out that 'the majority of natives
prefer 9 months on a mine in Southern Rhodesia to six or even three
2on some farms in North-west Rhodesia.'
By 1913, the situation had changed considerably in the Bureau's 
favour. The restriction on its activities in the farming areas had 
been lifted, mainly because of persistent pressure from the South. 
Between Apiil of that year and March 1915, its Agents recruited
486 labourers from the Magoye sub-district for work in Southern
3
Rhodesia. The Bureau's runners began to aim too much enthusiasm
for their work and the Native Commissioner observed in that year
that 'they exceed their instructions and forcibly recruit labour
since their remuneration entirely depends upon the results of their 
A
recruiting.' Local settler farmers repeatedly called the Company's 
attention to the activities of the Bureau and its failure to meet 
the needs of the local farming community while despatching large
1Ibid. Whereas wages offered locally tended to fluctuate sharply from 
time "to time, R.N.L.B. wages were relatively more stable. In 1914 
local wages for labourers who worked in a settler's house, garden or 
farm, were between 10/- and 30/- a month. By 1916, most employers 
were offering something between 5/- end 7/6 a month. In 1919 the 
local rate was between 7/6 and 10/- and only artisans were able to 
make between £2 and £3 a month. At the same time, the R.N.L.B. was 
paying 18/- a month to adults, 12/6 to adolescents and 8/-"to 
young boys, consistently up to 1927. See ZA 2/1/1/3; ZA 2/1/3/3;
ZA 2/1/4/3 and ZA l/918/4/l, Z.N.A.'
2 ,  3 ? ! / / ^  7 1 , - r X . A -  O p  - u > -
3
ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year ending 
31st March, 1915* Because the R.N.L.B. supplied the greater part 
of Its recruits to the mines, the majority of Tonga labourers who 
disliked work underground made the trip to the south 'independently 
of the Bureau*. What happened in 1913 when the Bureau's activity was 
at a standstill, was by no means an isolated instance. See ZA 7/1/I/3, Z.N.A 
hZk 7/l/l/3, Z.N.A.
numbers of labourers to the South,1 As Tonga agricultural pro­
duction expanded, some white farmers found it increasingly diffi­
cult to attract local 3abour from the villages into wage employ­
ment. More villagers were now giving more attention to culti­
vating grain and raising cattle than before and most of those 
who offered their services did so only for short periods during 
the inter-cropping season.
Encouraged by the success which the Administration had in 
the recruiting of involuntary labour, some of the settler-farmers, 
apparently out of frustration, were to make similar demands on the 
African villagers living near their farms. The reluctant and, at 
times, hostile villagers were usually told that the Administration 
had given the farmer carte blanche as far as the recruiting of 
labour from areas that adjoined his farm was concerned. This dubious 
authority was made to look like a condition of the purchase of his 
land.^ Although a few farmers succeeded injgetting away with this 
practice, the Company officials did all they could to discourage this 
competition for scarce labour which they faced from the settlers.
In December 1920, for instance, a settler in the Pemba area com­
plained to local officials that an African driver who lived at 
Headman Malama's village had refused to work for him, even though 
the Headman had advised him to take up the job. In his frustration
the settler asked: *Can I rightfully demand his labour, and in
3case of his refusal, can I bring him before you?1. The District
^ee petition of North-western Rhodesia Farmers Association to 
High Commissioner, ^.8.19 in BS^/l^S, Z.N.A.
2
This was pointed out in various interviews on the plateau.
^KTC l/l/2/2, Z.N.A. Knox-Little to Assistant Magistrate Magoye, 
1.12.20.
official in his reply explained, unequivocally, that the people
of Malama's village were no tenants of the settler concerned
and so he had no right to call on the driver to work for him,'1'
Such incidents only increased the settler farmers' problems.
They were having to rely heavily on labour from Barotseland and even
this source was of irregular flow. Petitioning the Administration,
they argued that 'the requirements of Northern Rhodesia should
have first consideratioi and receive preferential treatment by the
2
Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau,,.'
Dissatisfaction with operating conditions led the settlers 
to contemplate acquiring political power. They were convinced 
that they had to organise themselves if their interests were to 
be protected. In June 1908, Leopold Moore, a leading settler spokes­
man who lived in the Livingstone area, suggested that a Landowners 
and Farmers Association as well as a Chamber of Commerce, should 
be formed. This met the approval of the majority of local plateau 
farmers who had for some time been toying with the idea of forming 
some organisation to represent farmers' interests. Moore, who was 
a chemist by profession, was not however to enjoy the confidence 
of the farmers for long. His opponents, among whom was a leading 
Mazabuka settler, Tom King, accused him of showing far more interest 
in the activities of the North-western Rhodesia Commercial Association 
which was formed in March 1909 and they clamoured for an Association 
that would be geared specifically towards the defence of farming interests
Ibid. Assistant Magristrate Magoye to Knox-Little, 4.12.20.
2BS3/138, Z.N.A. North-western Rhodesia Farmers Association to 
High Commissioner, 4.8.19.
■3
-'As was to be revealed later, the reasons for this opposition to 
Moore went deeper than this. His unwillingness to contemplate 
Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in the years before the Lord 
Passfield 'Paramountcy' Memorandum came out, was more fundamental.
As a result of this pressure, the North-western Rhodesia Farmers 
Association was formed in 1912. The Association under the leader­
ship of one Colonel Gibbons, had clear political goals and its 
members were determined to gain a voice for farmers in the making 
of policy within the territory. Apart from labour problems, the 
farmers had other grievances to which the Company seemed indifferent. 
At a meeting in Kalomo in July 193-2, the Company came in for indict­
ment over its failure to provide more than two veterinary surgeons 
for the entire North-western Rhodesialt was accused, in this 
connection, of 'a total lack of any organisation to combat disease...1 
The farmers demanded that three additional veterinary surgeons should 
be appointed and they called for the setting up of an efficient 
Veterinary Department. They also made it clear that, with the ex­
ception of the demands they were now presenting, their association 
had resolved to make no further requests on the Chartered Company 
but rather to seek political representation for the territory's 
farmers.1 This settler drive for representation was checked by 
the outbreak of the war, but it was to gather momentum once the 
war ended. In 1918, the Company had to give in and an Advisory 
Council was established which consisted of five unofficial members 
drawn from the settler community. The Council had no executive 
or legislative powers. Its function was mainly to advise the 
Company 'on any proposed legislation affecting European interests 
and on the more important regulations required under any proclamation
1BS3/392, Vol.I» Z.N.A. Resolutions adopted at a meeting of the 
North-west Rhodesian Farmers Association held at Kalomo, 27.7.12.
1
issued by the High Commissioner'.
The concession of an Advisory Council only whetted the sett­
lers' appetite for more power and the Company came in for even 
more violent criticism. The Company was regarded as a stumbling 
block which had to be removed if the goal of Responsible Govern­
ment for the territory or Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, 
objectives which a number of settlers had long set their sights 
on, were to be achieved. In a leader in the Livingstone Mail of 
7th March 1919* Leopold Moore had this to say about the Chartered 
Company's record:
'It is well known that all who have settled in this 
country came here against the wishes of the Chartered 
Company which has done absolutely nothing during a 
space of 15 years to advance the interests of the 
settlers, but has left no opportunity, legitimate 
or illegitimate, of scheming for present or ultimate 
profit for its Shareholders.'
Moore was determined to see the territoiy rid of this 'old man of
the seai
Opposition to the Company's Administration among local plateau 
settlers mounted during the early twenties. At a meeting of sett­
lers in Mazabuka^in 1912, one observer noted that 'there was a
unanimous wish that the B.S.A.C.'s Administration should be ter-
2
minated at the earliest possible moment....'. The decision of 
the British Government to withdraw the Company's Administrative 
rights over Northern Rhodesia in 192*f and to introduce an Admini­
stration under the Crown, was certainly not unconnected with this
settler opposition to the regime.
*******
1See Sir Alan Pirn, "Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire 
into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia"
(1938), p.1^ 8.
2BS3/509, Z.N.A. Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, to High Commissioner 
13.10.21.
By the time of the handing over of power from Company to 
Crown, several important changes had taken place dn the Tonga 
plateau. The area was now, irrevocably, being drawn into the 
money economy and the African population was beginning to react 
to the demands that this new development made on it. Under the 
rule of Europeans, new social positions, unknown in the tradi­
tional system and heavily dependent for their legitimacy on the 
new dispensation, had begun to emerge. The first chapter in the 
land question which is so central in the area's colonial history, 
had been enacted and the small settler community was already 
beginning to show signs of restlessness and unease. The settlers 
were already making demands which were a pointer to the sort of 
activities that would engage their attention in the years ahead. 
Perhaps, we should first turn to an examination of the formative 
years of the Crown Administration to see, among other things, \yhat 
major changes there were in land policy.
Chanter II
LAND ALIENATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 192A-1937
The Genesis of Land Policy
The first Governor of Northern Rhodesia under the Crown Ad­
ministration was Sir Herbert James Stanley. Stanley had spent the 
greater part of his career in Southern Africa and was well known 
for his strong pro-settler views, ids ideas on the role that 
settlers could play in the development of the territory were to 
have a great influence on the Administration's land policy. Stanley
and his closest aides shared that optimistic settler dream of which
1Hellen has written. This was the conviction that some time in the 
future there would be a large influx of immigrants into the terri­
tory. To prepare for this, they believed the administration had 
an obligation to reserve large tracts of land which would be re­
quired as ranches and farms by individual famer-settlers as well 
as companies. The lands of the Tonga plateau, among others, were 
therefore the focus of much attention during the early years of 
Crown rule.
The creation of native reserves
In 1913, the British South Africa Company had toyed with the 
odea of delimiting reserves on the Tonga plateau and had even dis­
cussed this issue with Chief Monze and seventeen Headmen at a meeting
2
held in the Chief's village. Monze seems to have responded with 
■^ J.A.Hellen, Rural Economic Development in Zambia, l890-196if (London,
1968), p.135.
2
V.W.Worthington, "Report on proposed native reserves, 1913”, 
Institute for African Studies (University of Zambia) manuscript 
collection.
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some enthusiasm to the suggestion. He is reported to have said:
’It is good news. We shall all be glad when we know 
where we are to live. Farmers are coming to settle 
all around us. They come to look at our lands and 
say, ’’this land is good, we shall settle here”. We 
are accused of grass burning and where we used to 
graze our cattle we are told it is now the property 
of a white man.
The Colonial Office was however at that time determined not 
to be rushed into conceding a reserves policy. It insisted that 
no delimitation of reserve boundaries should be embarked on be­
fore the Rhodesia native reserves commission, under Coryndon, had 
reported. When the war broke out, the native reserves idea was 
shelved for the time being. After the war, the company began 
once again to call for the creation of reserves. It was now being 
supported in its demands by certain settlers and missionaries. Some 
of the latter were alarmed by the way the Administration was dis­
possessing the indigenous population of its lands to meet the needs 
of incoming settlers. The majority of the established settlers 
who were now calling for reserves were those who were having prob­
lems with Tonga villages close to their farms. Like the mission­
aries, they demanded the division of the lands of the plateau into 
black and white residential areas. The missionaries believed that 
such a division would protect the land rights of the African popu­
lation and prevent the suffering that accompanied large scale 
evictions. The whites on the other hand were arguing for reserves 
mainly because of the desire to create a settler zone where local 
Africans would operate only at the settler's pleasure. In a speech
i
Ibid. The reference to grass burning was the Tonga practice of 
setting fire to the bush while hunting for game.
at the Northern Rhodesia Missionary Conference of 1924, one of the 
speakers summed up missionary opinion on the question of native 
reserves:
•It should be remembered that much of the unalienated 
land is unsuitable for cultivation.....In view of this, 
the conference is strongly of the opinion that no more 
land should be alienated without the express sanction 
of the Governor until a reserves commission has reported 
and the needs of the native peoples are fully met.
When some of the territory's leading officials added their
voices to this clamour for reserves, the possibility of their
creation became much more real. Governor Stanley was convinced of
the need for a reserves policy to regulate the position of the
settlers and he argued in 1924 that the 'present uncertainty
,/about native reserves/ cannot but produce a feeling of insecurity
2
among the natives and have an unsettling effect on their minds.1 
He talked the Colonial Office into agreeing with his view and, be­
tween 1924 and 1927» Native Reserves Q$mnissions were set up in the 
territory to examine the land situation in all three areas where 
settlers had taken up residence.
The Commission which examined the land situation along the 
line of rail was set up in July 1926. The members were P.J.Macdonnel, 
a Judge of the High Court, J, Moffat Thomson, a District Commissioner 
who later became Secretary for Native Affairs, and H.P.Hart, a 
local farmer. The Commission sat in the Mazabuka District in October 
1926 and it heard evidence from white settlers, mainly farmers, and 
local chiefs. The farmers were divided on the question of whether 
reserves were necessary or not. F.P.Goodson, who had been farming
1Proceedings of the General Missionary Conference of Northern 
Rhodesia (LovedaleV 1924) / p.24. ~ """
2C.0t 795/41726, P.R.O. Stanley to Thomas, 10.8.24.
in the Mazabuka area since October* 19191 argued that the creation 
of reserves was in the interest of both the African and Euro­
pean communities. He explained that 'native cattle ... are a 
danger to European herds on account of disease...' and was con­
vinced that 'native stock can be better looked after if the people 
are in reserves'. He drew attention to the heavy capital expense 
that the fencing of land to keep out cattle involved and added
that since few settler-farmers were in a position to afford this*
1reserves were the necessary answer. Others who favoured the
creation of reserves and who apparently had had difficulties with
their Tonga workers condemned local labour as inefficient and
untrustworthy. They argued that the movement of villages away
from the borders of their farms would not affect their labour
supply. One of these farmers, from Nega Nega, told the Commissioners
'I do not get l°/o of them to work for me and they steal crops
especially in bad seasons and this more than outweighs any benefits 
2
to settlers'.
On the other side, arguing against the need for reserves were 
a number of settler-farmers who seemed to have got on well with 
Tonga villagers living near their farms, but whose main interest 
in the residence pattern of the African population appeared to 
derive from their labour needs. One of them, from Mazabuka, told 
the Commission: 'Most of my labour is local... say 60°/o of it...
■kf.O. 795/18, P.R.O. Native Reserves Commission, 1926 (Evidence),
Voi; II.
2
Ibid. Evidence of D. J. Gray. Many settler farmers were loath to 
employ Tonga labour except as a last resort because the average 
Tonga labourer, being so close to his home, was always taking 
time off to attend social functions in the village. The incidence 
of cattle theft was also higher on farms with predominantly local 
labour. Labourers from the Eastern province were very common on 
settler farms, especially those growing tobacco^for the 'Easterner'
I am almost surrounded by Simonga and his villages and I have no 
trouble with them,*,.. I don't want the villages moved as I get
my labour from them and they go home at nights* but if they are
1moved 10-15 miles, 1 might not get them to work.1
Another went even further in revealing his views on what
the future settlement pattern should be. He told the Commissioners:
'I am not in favour of native reserves as a general 
rule... they will retard the progress of the country.
At abater date, certain native reserves will be neces­
sary but not in a wholesale way..... wherever there is 
land suitable for Europeans, mov3'natives off and wherever 
there is land unsuitable for Europeans, let the natives 
remain... My labour is 75°/o local labour to 25°/o from 
a distance.,... There are drawbacks to villages near a 
farm but the labour is a great benefit.*2
So long as surrounding villages could continue to supply the 
cheap labour these undercapitalised farmers had become so dependent 
on, they saw no need for reserves. Africans living on lands ad­
joining white farms were notorious for their habit of starting 
bush fires during their game drives, but even this the farmer was
prepared to put up with, if proximity to these villages guaranteed
3his labour supply.
The Commission took evidence from twenty-two Tonga Chiefs, 
representing an estimated ^6,0A** people, on the 9th October. One 
after the other, the Chiefs outlined the reasons why they did not 
want to be moved from their lands into reserves. Mwanachingwala, 
speaking on behalf of his 77 villages, told the Commissioners:
had more experience of this crop than his Tonga counterpart and 
he was believed to be infinitely more reliable. Interviews with 
H.Yates-Jones (17.5.71*) and Ekuce Miller (18.5.7**).
XC.O. 795/18, P.R.O. Native Reserves Commission, 19&6 (Evidence), 
Vol.' II, Evidence of C,A.Harvey
2
Ibid. Horace Xsley's evidence.
~z
Ibid. Evidence of C.A.Harvey.
'I was first told to move to the west of the 
Magoye river and I have done it and I do not want
to move again. I am unable to move again  I
want to stay at Magoye. I know I am in trouble and 
I and my people will die as we have no good "Bwana'’
/white man or official/ to look after us. When X 
was moved before from east of the Magoye, I was told 
I would not have to move again. I ask why 1 have been 
troubled by Europeans like this.11
Mwanachingwala was not alone in this situation where he was 
being asked to move again after he had received assurances that 
his tenure was secure. Sianjalika, living on the banks of the 
Ngwezi river to which he had been moved in 1913 from his original 
home, was quick to point out: 'Mr. Griffin told us we were to
stay where we were and we would never be moved and Mr. Willis told 
us too'.^
Chief Naluama, representing his twenty-seven villages, also 
had his reasons for not wanting to move. He told the Commissioners 
'Mr. Willis moved us already from Bell's farm and Molyneux's farm 
and east of there are only hills and they are full of baboons and
■z
the cattle will die and baboons eat our crops /sic/’.
One striking point that emerged from the evidence of the 
various chiefs was the view that the white man was going back on 
his word after assuring them that after their first evictions they 
would never be troubled again. It mattered little to them that the 
decisions of the earlier years had been taken by Company officials 
who were, perhaps, no longer in the employ of the territory's 
Administration. To them, it was simply a question of the white man 
failing to honour his obligations to the African population. The
1Ibid. Evidence of Mwanachingwala.
2
Ibid. Evidence of Sianjalika.
3
Ibid. Chief Naluama's evidence.
Commissioner's work was widely discussed in the villages and the
fear of being displaced once more engendered strong opposition
in several areas. The District Commissioner observed that 'the
attitude of the local natives to the proposals was frankly hostile'
and he predicted that 'it will be no easy matter to convince them
1of the necessity for the reserves'.
The Commission in recommending the creation of reserves 
along the line of rail provided for a total of sixteen reserves; to 
cover an area of 24,87**, 000 acres. For an estimated African popu­
lation of 268,000, it recommended an allowance of 93 acres per 
head or a density of 6.89 persons per square mile. It reserved for 
non-African occupation 23,682,000 acres of Crown land of which 
2,980,636 acres had already been alienated. By so doing, it made
more than adequate provision for the large settler influx which so
3
many believed would take place during the coming years. In report­
ing, the Commissioners explained that they were guided by six main 
considerations!
'l) Reserves are to be situate in country away from 
the railway line but where possible with "lanes" 
or "corridors" giving access to it.
2) They are to be homogeneous and not intermingled 
with areas of European settlement.
3) They are to be tribal, so that no part of a tribe 
is cut off by intervening land from the remainder.
4) They are to be permanent and perpetual.
^KDB 6/l/l/l, Z.N.A. Report for the year ending 31.12.26.
2SEC/SL/32, Vol. I, Z.N.A., Maxwell to Amery, 18.4.29. Also 
R. Palmer , "Land in Zambia", in Zambia Land and Labour Studies, 
Vol. I (London, 1973)> p.58.
3
This was to remain a dream for settler immigration during the 
ensuing years did not approach anything like the scale envisaged 
by these officials.
5) They are to he suitable and of sufficient size.
6) They shall be an indivisible part of a general
scheme for the improvement and civilisation of 
the native.
Although the Commissioners talked of only six main considerations 
that had guided them in the delimitation of the reserves, there can 
be no doubt that the proven fertility of the lands around Mazabuka, 
Magoye and Choma was a major consideration in their decision to 
exclude large parts of these areas from the native reserves created 
on the Tonga plateau. In the Chieftaincies of Sianjalika, Mwanaching­
wala, Siowe and Siamaundu, in particular, the soils were known to be 
very fertile and ideally suitable for grain production. There were 
in these Chieftaincies, wide belts of fertile upper valley and 
acacia thorn soils. Not surprisingly, these Chieftaincies became 
the principal centres of land alienation on the plateau and the re­
serve boundaries were worked out with such precision that they by­
passed all the lands that officials and settlers were keen on reserv-
2
ing for white occupation in these areas.
On the recommendations of the reserves commission, four re­
serves were delimited to accommodate the plateau Tonga and neighbour­
ing peoples. They varied in size and population density. The Ha/
Tonga reserve No. XIII was the largest covering an area of some 
4,992*000 acres as compared with reserve No. X which was designed 
to accommodate only about 7*300 people within an area of about
■z
472,000 acres. All the reserves were situated away from the line 
of rail, the centre of commercial activity and the Commissioners tried
^ZPl/2/ll, Z.N.A, "Report of the Native Reserves Commission, 1926",
2PP* 70-71.
- See Map 1* p.7 ^  •
•^ See Sir Alan Pim, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire 
into the linancial and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia, 
Appendix VIII.
to justify this by arguing that 'the native from his simple wants 
and standard of life is under little or no handicap if at a further 
distance from the railway and the market it provides* He will 
still be able to sell whatever he produces at advantage to himself.
The creation of reserves was officially recognised by the 
Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserves) Order in Council 
of 1928. Those sections of the African population that were not 
already living within reserve boundaries were called upon to move 
into the nearest reserve. The majority of the Tonga Chieftaincies 
were already within reserve boundaries but there were a number of 
villages, such as those under Chiefs Siowe, Sianjalika and Mwanaching­
wala which were in areas that were now considered Crown land.
Such villages were therefore asked to move. Coming as it did after 
the suffering occasioned by evictions during the days of company 
rule, the decision , to resettle these villages within the newly 
created reserves incensed the African population in the affected 
Chieftaincies. In several areas this sense of grievance developed 
into strong hostility to the native reserves policy. Some villagers 
simply refused to move into the reserves, Whenever the Administration' 
officials encountered such hostility from people who would not vacate 
their lands, they employed coercion and this, invariably, yielded 
the desired result. Villages of uncooperative farmers were burnt 
to the ground and recalcitrant Headmen were summoned to the Boma (as 
the Administration's offices were called) and whipped with sjamboks. 
Informants pointed out to the author that this practice of burning
1Report of the Native Reserves Commission, on.cit., p.70. This 
myth was to be later exploded as African producers anxious to 
take advantage of higher market prices on the line of rail, moved 
out of reserves to squat on unoccupied lands adjoining the railway.
villages and beating Headmen and others who would not yield, 
started with the Crown Administration.1
I was told of three villages in the Sianjalika area whose 
inhabitants on refusing to abandon their lands had their huts and
crops fired by the Boma messengers acting on official instructions.
2These were Siamakone, Milimo and Mpesu villages* Like Mwanaching­
wala, Chief Sianjalika stoutly resisted attempts to force his people 
off lands they had cropped for many years. When his people were 
asking in 1920 to vacate the area of Dora Farm which had been 
alienated to a settler but remained unoccupied for a long time, 
the Chief proved most uncooperative.-^ Not only did he insist on
his people's right to the area but he was also later on to encourage
4
them to squat on it after some of them had been evicted. '
In the Monse Chieftaincy, Konje and Moomba villages were razed 
to the ground in the mid-twenties, the former because an adamant 
Headman Konje is said to have told an official who demanded that 
he should clear his people from the area, that the land belonged to 
his people, and that he was therefore not prepared to listen to any
such instructions. Konje was arrested, sjamboked and imprisoned for
5
about two weeks at the Boma for being so bold.
^Informants distinguish between the BSAC and Crown periods by talking 
about the periods before and after tluTGovernor’s arrival.
^Interview with Naul Moonga, 29.^.7^.
^K.D.B. 1/3/6, Z.N.A._ Assistant Magistrate to D.C.Livingstone, 23.3.20
‘^See Chapter III, -
■^Interview with N.M.Moyouwe, 6.6,7^.
Informants also referred to the burning of huts in Headman 
Shimonga's village in Chief Mwenda's area. Shimonga is said to 
have been a very popular Ulaanvika before the Europeans came and 
he was one of those called by Monze to Moonya Hill to meet the 
pioneering column in 1899. Shimonga gave in to the demands of 
his people who were against his willingness to move out his area 
as requested by the Administration. One Siantuba was the leader 
of the protest group and he ended up in prison after the area had 
been burnt.'*’
In most parts of the plateau, Africans received the news
that they should vacate their lands for settler occupation with
strong opposition. They were now being asked in the majority of
cases to hand over their lands without compensation since the
Commission had ruled that compensation should be awarded only in
special cases. The Commissioners had argued that by reserving land
for African occupation they were recognising the African's right to
the land and, to them, 'the payment of monetary compensation weakens
that right'. They maintained that as a result of the reserves policy
'natives move from land where their title was less to that in which
it is more secure’. The security that these new lands afforded
was adequate compensation. The Commissioners recommended compensation
only in cases where a settler required land in an area where new
fields had recently been cleared or where a private company needed
land for development purposes. In cases where the land was needed
'to erect roads or public buildings or to open mines' no compensation
2
was to be offered to the evicted villagers.
^"Interview with William Kazoka, 26.^.7^.
2
Report. of Native Reserves Commission, op.cjt., paragraphs 290-292.
In the absence of compensation! some Chiefs and their people 
decided on confrontation with the Authorities. In May 1930! 
Mwanachingwala who was being asked to move his villages across the 
Magoye river to the west was described as 'Somewhat of an obstruction­
ist and anti-Government1.1 The Chief objected to moving across
the Magoye and pointed out that the soils on the other side 
2
were very poor. He repeatedly spumed invitations from local 
officials to discuss the movement of his people at the Boma and is
said to have refused to provide the carriers needed by touring
3
officials.
The Commissioners had paid little attention to Chiefs' bound­
aries in the delimitation of the reserves and in a number of cases, 
villagers were being asked to break their ties with Chiefs under 
whom they had lived for years and to tie in their fortunes with 
those of the areas to which they were asked to move. This, in some 
cases, meant forgoing the advantage of living in a neighbourhood 
under a proven ritual leader of whose rain-making ability the people 
had come to be fully convinced.
In 1930, commenting on the pace ofmovement into reserves, the 
District Commissioner noted that 'little headway has been made in 
getting natives to go into reserves. They are most reluctant to 
move and water seems scarce where land is good; no real migration 
can be made until this is provided for. One great obstacle to move­
ment is that people of one Chief will not willingly go into the
1Zky/k/l2, 2.N.A. Lloyds Tour report, May 1930.
2Ibid.
^Interview with Job Michello, 28.6.7^.
"country" cf another*
In spite of various pressures exerted on the African popu­
lation there were over 20,000 people still living on Crown and
alienated lands in 1932 with approximately 3*h°00 already within
2 *reserves. It was reported pn that year that * generally speaking,
movement into reserves is not popular with those concerned and
difficulty is being experienced in getting them to select sites to
3be occupied by them during the ensuing year*.
The large size of the African population outside the reserves 
were partly due to the fact that a number of Africans were already 
moving out of reserves by the late twenties to occupy lands that
ij,
lay unused. It was also due to the set tier-farmers '^practice of 
so-called 1Kaffir-farming *. Farmers encouraged labourers to reside 
on their farms and entered into sharecropping relations with them.
5
Some even collected rent from their tenants in the form of cattle.
6One farmer in 1933 had about 75 tenants on his land. This practice
substantially undermined the efforts of officials to get the Tonga
7to enter and live m  the reserves.
Attempts in 1933 to evict certain villages of Chief Siowe 
which were on Crown land eight miles from Mazabuka, ran into considerable 
opposition from the Chief and his people. Siowi, about eighteen, was
*hcDB 6/l/l/3i Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Report, 1930.
2ZA7/l/l5/3, 2.N.A. Provincial Annual Report, 1932.
3Ibid.
A
The dynamics of this movement of squatters will be examined in 
the next chapter.
^Native Affairs Report, 1933* p.13.
6Ibid.
?The practice was not illegal. A Natives on Private Estates Ordinance 
passed in 1937 sought to regulate the position of African residents 
on white farms^ It tried to discourage squatting and protect African
in 1933 the youngest chief on the plateau* having succeeded to
his position during his student days at Rusangu (S.D.A.) Mission.
The Chief is said to have been 'subjected to protests stormed into
his ears by his various Headmen and encouraged to make an absolutely
1
firm stand against moving into the reserve.,..* The villages in­
volved were situated along the edge of the Kafue Flats* in an area 
where the soils were known to be 'extremely fertile1 and where 'with 
the minimum of agricultural labour, they /Siowe1s people/ provide
themselves with enough food to employ the maximum amount of time in
2
contemplating their numerous and well fed cattle.,,.* They were 
now being called upon to exchange these lands for the poorly watered
Monzwe area in reserve XIII where wells and dams had to be provided
3to make the area habitable.
There was even a more fundamental reason for the refusal of
these people to move into the reserve. For many years, the Monzwe
area had been regarded as a 'no man's land* between the Tonga and
the Ila and Siowe's people were naturally reluctant to move into an
A
area where they believed their tenure would be questionable.
A number of Headmen in the Chief's area, notably Kabanji and 
Sintume, decided to organise the people in protest and, if necessary, 
confrontation with the Administration's officials. Kabanji, who 
was very influential in the area, is reported to have told an official 
'that he was going to sit in his village, while his huts might be 
burned round him and he himself shot down perhaps by soldiers, but
labourers by laying down tenancy rules. See Sec/Nat 203, Z.N.A. 
^ZA 7/^/39» Z.N.A.Tour report No. 6, 1933.
2Xbid.
■%DB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office Report, 1933.
^KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office Report, 1933.
nothing would induce him to move out as he knew the. country
1across the Magoye and he would only die of hunger there.1
In the ensuing protest in Siowe Chieftaincy, the Chief him-
2
self went on a hunger strike and he threatened to hang himself.
His people were very much behind him. The Administration, fearing 
an uprising, decided to act., With much firmness. The ringleaders,
Kabanji and Sintumwe, were arrested, sjamboked and detained at
3the Boma for some time. This seemed to have weakened the 
resistance for it was later reported that 'all the villages con­
cerned had removed either into reserves,.... or into "yellow11 areas 
situated some distance from alienated land and unlikely to be re-
if
quired for settlement in the future'. Other areas which might have 
been comtemplating resistance to the Administration's reserve policy 
appear to have taken their cue from the way the Siowe case was 
handled and the movement of people into reserves progressed without 
much incident from this time on.
By 1933 large areas of land which the Tonga had occupied for 
centuries had been cleared of their villages and reserved for white 
settlement. A total of about 2,190 square miles of land had been
5
alienated on the Tonga plateau. The fertile plains of Maunga in 
Sianjalika Chieftaincy and Chisobu in Mwenda's all passed out of 
African hands. In the Mazabuka and Magoye areas, evicted villagers
7A/39* Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1933.
2KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
•^Interview with William Kazoka, 26.7^.
^KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
^Hellen, on.cit., p.128. For. a fairly comprehensive list of villages 
that were evicted, "see Appendix.
^Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7**.
were already opening up new fields in the hilly areas to which they had
been forced. In September 1933 the Provincial Commissioner was, in
fact, moved into congratulating his District Commissioner for his
success in moving the Tonga into reserves 'with the minimum of friction
1
and without losing the goodwill of the natives concerned'. In the 
absence of production statistics for this period, it is difficult to 
estimate the extent to which Tonga crop production was affected by the 
twin policies of land alienation and the creation of reserves. There 
are hardly any reliable records of African maize output for individual 
areas on the plateau before the late 1930s. Nevertheless, the move, 
in certain cases, from fertile and relatively treeless areas into
hilly, heavily-wooded reserves must certainly have made the farmers'
2
task more difficult, if it did not directly reduce his output.
With the native reserves now a reality, the Administration looked 
forward to a massive settler influx. A settler who applied for land was 
required to pay an initial deposit which was a tenth of the assessed 
value of the land. After making this deposit, he received a permit of 
occupation. He then had to pay, over the next five years, six per 
cent of the remaining nine-tenths of the purchase price. If at the 
end of the five years he had fulfilled the land use requirements of 
his permit of occupation, he then had two options open to him. He 
could either pay the balance of the assessed value of the land, thus 
securing a certificate of title, or decide to spread the repayments over
3
a period of fifteen years with a six per cent annual interest. Officials 
were convinced that on the terms they were offering, the settler popu­
lation was bound to increase substantially during the coming years to 
cover all the lands reserved for white occupation.
■^ KSB 1/7/2, 2.N.A.Provincial Commissioner to D.C.Mazabuka, 19.9.33.
2The resettlement of Chief Sianjalika's people is a case in point.
See Chapter II, p.^ fo.
5Sec/S.L./32, Vol. I, Z.N.A. Maxwell to Amery, l8.*f.29.
From Direct to Indirect Rule
It was on the Chiefs that officials had laid the responsi­
bility for moving the people into reserves. They were the main 
links between the Administration and the people and the amount 
of responsibility they were called upon to shoulder increased con­
siderably under the Crown Administration. In the newly established, 
reserves, it was their charge to maintain the populations of their 
various areas in a mood conducive to easy administration.
In 1927 Sir James Crawford Maxwell had succeeded Herbert 
Stanley as Governor of the territory. Maxwell had earlier served 
in Nigeria and the Gold Coast and he firmly believed in the Lugardian 
policy of Indirect Rule. His appointment to Northern Rhodesia 
strengthened the chances of this system of Administration being 
introduced in the territory. In 19^9* Indirect Rule was officially 
introduced although the practice of using Chiefs and Headmen in the 
running of the provincial administration was nothing new. By the 
Native Authority Ordinance of that year, the 1916 Proclamation 
for the Administration of Natives was repealed and the territory's 
Chiefs were now organised within a structure of Superior and Subordin­
ate Native Authorities. The Paramount Chiefs of the various African 
peoples were recognised as Superior Authorities and the ordinary 
Chiefs were the Subordinate Authorities, In areas where
a Paramount Chief as such had never existed in the traditional system, 
the Superior Authority was made up of a council of all the Chiefs, 
each Chief retaining the right to recognition as a Subordinate 
Authority in his own area. The Native Authorities were empowered to 
make rules andorders for the administration of their various areas 
and could arrest people who contravened their rules.
The ordinance also conceded some judicial authority to the
Chiefs. Courts were set up to he administered by a Chief or sub-
Chief and they were allowed the right to handle cases on their
own. In their absence, Assessors, usually Headmen, who were
selected by the Chief and approved by the Provincial Commissioner,
presided. A court of appeal, presided over by the Paramount Chief
1
to review cases from the lower courts also provided for.
In 1936 another Native Authority Ordinance was passed which 
allowed the Native Authorities to raise revenue and incur expendi­
ture on schemes for improving the welfare of their people. They 
were allowed to collect court fees, bicycle and game licences and 
court fines and although responsibility for tax collection was not 
delegated to them, Native treasuries received 10°/o of the taxes 
raised locally.
Before the passage of the 1929 Ordinance, the Administration 
invited Chief Monze to identify those Chiefs who deserved to be re­
cognized as leaders of the Tonga. This was mainly an economy drive 
for the Administration was anxious to rid itself of the plethora of 
Chiefs that the B.S.A.C. had recognised. The Company had itself been 
in this position in 1918-19 when it had decided that for reasons of 
economy and efficiency in Administration, some of the Tonga Chief­
taincies had to be amalgamated* This decision resulted in a number 
of ritual and secular leaders who had been prominent in the tradi­
tional system and had served as Chiefs up to 1918, being reduced to
2the position of Headmen. These included Chona, and Chongo. The
*1
KSB l/8/l, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to all District Commissioners 
l8.10.29.
Interview with N.M.Muyovwe, 6.6.7^.
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Crown Administration* on Monze's recommendation, now reinstated
Chongo as Chief but Chona continued to serve as a Headman under 
1Chief Mwanza. A total of 21 Chiefs were finally recognised on
2the plateau by 1938. The Administration withdrew its recognition 
of two prominent Chiefs, Chisuwo and Siowe. In Siowe's case, his 
conduct during the evictions of the early thirties seems to have 
told against him. The most likely reason for Chisuwofs failure 
to gain recognition seems to have been his failure to identify with 
the work of the Catholic Mission. The mission took strong exception 
to Chisuwo's interest in the un-Christian Muchape movement which
3
indulged in sorcery and divination. Father Moreau is said to have 
played a very active part in getting Chisuwo replaced by the less 
controversial TJfwenuka who had always been very interested in the 
mission's work.**
Administrative ■problems of the 1950s
The Administration's first opportunity to test What goodwill 
it enjoyed in the newly established reserves grew out of the issues 
of Chief Monze's position as Paramount Chief and that of getting 
the people to accept the need for cattle.*dipping tanks in the re­
serves. The Administration's recognition of Monze as^ Paramount 
Chief of the plateau Tonga was, for many years, strongly opposed 
by some of the leading Chiefs, among them Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, 
Chongo, Sianjalika and Siowe before his deposition. Siamusonde 
was the most uncompromising of them all.
Ibid. Chona was elevated to the rank of Chief in 1937.
2These were Monze, Mapanza, Singani, Mwanachingwala, Siamaundu, 
Sianjalika, Nabuzoka, Naluama, Moyo, Mwenda, Ufwenuka, Mwenza,
Chona, Chikanta, Munyumbue, Sirauyobi, Chongo, Macha, Siambukululu, 
Namuswa and Siasikabole.
^In 19331 Chisuwo sent a letter to the Boma at Mazabuka asking for 
permission to use the Muchape diviners in his area. See KSB 3/l»
Kulumbwa Siamusonde, the first in ±\\\$ line of Chiefs, was 
born of Ila and Tonga parents and he became UlaanyifCa over an area 
made up of Tonga people, who were in the majority, as well as some 
Ila and Mulundwe.1 In pre-colonial times, Kulumbwa had won some 
fame through the successful resistance his area put up against the 
Lozi raider, S a n t e b e H i s  forces enjoyed the singular honour of
having once defeated the dreaded warrior's army in an encounter
2 3around Bwengwa. Because of bis superior military capabilities,
Kulumbwa is said to have received several requests from the Monzes,
Mayaba and Nchete, to help them defend their lands but it is not
h-clear whether he ever obliged. He was not known for any ritual 
powers, such as that of rain-making, but Informants pointed out 
that he never relied <n the rain-making abilities of the Monzes. He 
had his own rainmaker, one Chipani Mukunkube.^
When, therefore, the Administration decided to recognise Monze 
as Paramount, Siamusonde at first refused to serve under him al­
though later, under pressure from the Authorities, he was to accord 
the Paramount nominal recognition. His argument was that Monze's 
credentials as a ritual leader were not enough to merit his new 
status. He told the D.C. that in the past Monze was in fact his 
subordinate. When he was invited to meetings summoned by Chief 
Monze, he usually excused himself by saying that he recognised only
Z.N.A. District Notebook.
Interviews in the TJfwenuka area.
■^ The Mulundwe are people of Ila and Tonga parentage.
2
Interview with Franklin Kaluwe, 18.12.73*
•^ The martial spirit of the Siamusondes was to continue into the Colonial 
period and was clearly demonstrated in an incident in 1932 when the 
Chief despatched men armed with spears to bring an offender who worked
1the authority of Lewanika and the Government. Siamusonde had
2
had several boundary disputes with Monze, many of which re­
mained unresolved and it appears that he now feared the Paramount 
might use his new position to settle these problems in his favour.
Chiefs Siowe, Chongo and Mwanachingwala also refused to re­
cognise Monze*s authority for a long time. They saw the position 
as the creation of the Administration, which it was, and felt no 
obligation to submit to it. By 1929 the Monzeship had lost its 
mystical power as a result of the appointment to the office of 
people who were known to have no spiritual powers. After the death 
of Nchete in 1915* Petro Hamanjanji had been nominated as heir to 
the Chief*s vrives and he later became Chief Monze. This succession 
was heavily disputed for it was widely known that Petro lacked the 
necessary powers for the position. When in 1918 Petro died, many 
people were convinced that he had been struck down by the fury of 
Mayaba and Nchete whose spirits were objecting to the people’s 
attempts to secularise what had started as a purely ritual office. 
Petro's successor did not, however, possess the powers his pre­
decessor lacked. He was Longwani Munanzuki, one time messenger 
at the Kalomo Boma who later became a truck driver ione George
for a white store keeper to trial at his court. (See ZA 7/*+/30»
Z.N.A.)
A
The present Chief Siamusonde and a few other Informants in his area 
told the author that Kulumbwa obliged the Monzes on two occasions, 
but Informants in the Monze area maintained that it was only the 
Ndebele who assisted the Monzes, occasionally, in defending their lands
^Interview with Chief Siamusonde, 12.12.73*
c
KDB 1/3/8/2, Z.N.A. Memorandum attached to despatch from B.C.
Mazabuka to Provincial djjnmissioner, 21.7.31.
Ibid. B.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 11.2.31.
2
These disputes which Informants say had started in the pre-colonial 
period, continued into the 1930s. See Z.A. 5/2/2, Z.N,A.
Cookei a labour agent of the R.N.L.B. Longwani had very little
1support in the Chieftaincy. A touring official in 1932 observed
2that he was 'associating himself with a collection of undesirables'.
He discovered that the Monze had no real influence over his own
people and the Subordinate Authorities 'especially those of mixed
3Ila-Tonga origin like Mwanachingwala and Siamusonde1.
The diminution of the spiritual potential of the Monze ship was
a major factor inthe refusal of certain Chiefs to recognise the
Paramount. Also significant was the Monze's failure to take a bold
stand against the native reserves policy. His seeming acquiescence
to it was regarded as a virtual sell-out to the new forces, a strategy
to ensure the continuance of his position as head of the plateau's 
if
Chiefs. Siowe, Mwanachingwala and Chongo repeatedly absented them­
selves from meetings summoned by Monze during the thirties, and the
B.C. once noted 'that it is impossible to influence them at present,
3through that medium*. Like Siamusonde, they told officials that 
'they looked to Barotseland not to Chief Monze for leadership'.^
Monze protested repeatedly to the Boma officials about the attitude 
of these Chiefs 'claiming that they were Batonga and should acknow-
7
ledge him*, but this hardly improved the situation.
********
1ZA 7/Vo, Z.N.A. Fleming's tour report, November to December, 1932.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
It is significant that two of his leading opponents, Siowe and 
Mwanachingwala were Chiefs who had openly challenged the reserves policy
^KDB 1/5/8/2, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 11.2.31.
KDB 6/7/3* Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 31.3.31.
'KDB 6/7/3/2, Z.N.A. D.C.'s tour Feb.-March 1931. Even as late as 
1933» the Administration's attempt to get Chief Monze recognised as
The Veterinary Department's policy of introducing dipping 
tanks for cattle in the reserves during the early thirties led to 
even more violent anti-Government behaviour on the part of some 
of the plateau's Chiefs and their people. European settlers had 
reported to the Department on several occasions the dangers of 
disease to which their cattle were exposed from roaming African 
herds which, from time to time, trespassed ontheir farms. In a 
bid to solve this problem while improving animal husbandry in the 
reserves, the Administration decided to construct dipping tanks in 
the reserves and,although dipping was not to be compulsory, it was 
hoped that the Chiefs would persuade their people to use the new 
facilities.
Dipping was greeted with mixed feelings on the plateau. In 
the Ufwenuka and Chona Chieftaincies, the local Catholic Mission 
exerted its influence on the surrounding population and the people 
in these areas took to the dipping tanks with enthusiasm. At 
Chikonka village in, the Ufwenuka area it was reported in 1930 that 
3*836 head of cattle were dipped in a single week, the average 
weekly figure being in the region of 3*238 head.'1’ The dipping pro­
gramme enjoyed similar success in Siamaundu Chieftaincy which was
2
under a very energetic Chief.
The situation that prevailed in these Chieftaincies and a few 
others stood in marked contrast to that obtaining in the Siamusonde, 
Mwanachingwala and Sianjalika areas. Although they were said to
Paramount failed. Tonga chiefs voted against it. See Native Affairs 
report, 1933* p.80.
^ZA 7/3/1V  Vol. I, Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 3°.8.30 
2
In 1932, Siamaundu was described as 'young, intelligent and well 
mannered' and was considered 'perhaps the most promising Chief in 
the district'. (KDB 6/7/3/3* Z.N.A. Fleming's tour report, Nov.-Dec. 
1932). As will be seen in succeeding chapters, this Chief Siamaundu'
to have cooperated willingly with the Administration Tin most other
matters', the Chiefs of these areas were most uncompromising, even
anti-Government, when it came to the question of cattle dipping.
When in 1930 the Siamusonde area received its first dipping tank,
the Chief is reported as having said 'that he could not thank
2
Government for the tank as he did not want it,..'. His people had 
always practised transhumance, taking their herds during the dry 
season to the Kafue flats. They were brought back only after the 
land had been fired in preparation for the new cropping season.
This practice ensured, in the words of a report, that seasonally
the herds went 'down to country cleansed of ticks by flood and
3they return to country cleansed of ticks by fire'. The people
4here therefore saw no point in using the Government's dipping tanks.
\
Their refusal also appears to have been connected with an 
underlying distrust,in this and other neighbouring areas, of the 
Administration's intentions. Local officials had told the Chiefs 
that no dipping fees wouldbe charged. They knew the African farmers 
needed this kind of assurance as a number of them had been across 
to Southern Rhodesia where levies were made on African cattle that 
passed through dipping tanks. This assurance did not however dispel
(Mondeh) who succeeded to the position in 1933* was to give the 
Administration much support in its various land development poli­
cies during the thirties or forties.
^ZA 7/1/13/3* Z.N.A. Provincial Annual report, 1932.
*TCDB l/5/8/l, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for 
Native Affairs," 19*9-30.
^Native Reserves Commission Report, Vol. I, on.cit., pp. 49-50.
4In 1930* an official commenting on the strong feeling in the 
Siamusonde Chieftaincy wrote: 'One thing is perfectly obvious and 
that is that Siamusonde*s attitude is unanimously and wholeheartedly 
endorsed by his people. One sensed that even if Siamusonde did wish 
to fall in line with Government policy he would meet with consider­
able opposition from his own people.' See KDB l/5/8/l, Z.N.A.
D.C.Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 4.10.30.
the doubts and suspicions of the African farmers who feared that,
at some future date, they would be called upon to pay for the use
their cattle had made of the tanks. Governor Maxwell had commented 
1
during an Indaba in May 1929 on the subject of dipping fees,
and his words seemed to have lingered in many minds.
'At first I do not propose to ask you to pay for 
the dip. The Government will give you this and 
then when your stock improves and you get enhanced 
prices, the question of payment for dip will be 
looked into. You will be able to pay when you get 
better prices.,.'^
If in the future they would have to pay for the use of dipping 
tanks they had never asked for, the farmers saw no point in using 
the facility. No amount of reassuring by officials who insisted 
that fees would never be charged could get these people to reconsider 
the issue. Many still had fresh in their minds the grain relief 
activities of 1924, when the Administration had distributed grain 
in the Magoye area to relieve the hardship caused by the poor har­
vest of that year. Many families had received maize on the under­
standing that it was free and there had been a lot of disagreement 
when some people were later called upon to pay for what they had 
received."’ Suspicion of the Government's word was therefore deep-­
seated. One Chief in fact explained to an official the main reason 
for his refusal to use the dipping taides. Reporting their conversation, 
the official noted that 'the chief stumbling block is that he and his 
people are unaccustomed to acts of lavish generosity on the part of
^This is a meeting between officials and the African people.
2KSB l/l/l, Z.N.A. Indaba held at Mazabuka, 215.29.
^KDB l/5/8/l, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 4.10.30; 
also K.D.B. 6/7/5* Report for quarter ending 31st December, 1924.
the Government and all fear that there must be some “catch” inI
the present scheme....
The fear that cattle may die if passed through the tanks 
was also a major factor in the reluctance of the people (especially 
those of Siamusonde) to use the facility. On a European farm in 
the Lochinvar area, a few miles from Siamusonde’s village, a large 
number of cattle had died during the late twenties and the surround­
ing African population had come to the conclusion that dipping
*
2was the cause of the deaths.
In spite of opposition, the Veterinary Department was deter­
mined to get all the Tonga chiefs and their people to dip their
3
cattle. Administration pressure on the Chiefs to accept the 
dipping scheme^ , however,produced further opposition. Siamusonde tiled 
to put the officials off by claiming that he had received all his 
cattle from Lewanikaand that,since Lewanika did not dip his cattle,
ij.
he saw no reason why he should. When this failed to work, labour­
ers employed by the dipping teams in his area were ’threatened with
violence1 and many of them, out of fear, gave up their jobs and re-
5
turned to their homes. After a tour of the area in 1930’ the
District Commissioner wrote: *1 do not know the reason why, but
natives in this district have openly told me that they distrust
6the word of the Government*.
^ZA 7/3/12, Z.N.A, Mazabuka District Quarterly report, 31.3.30.
2KDB 6/7/5/3» Z.N.A. Wickins’ tour report, December, 1932.
■^Although Siamusonde was the most intractable of the Chiefs during 
the early thirties, even Monze had refused to take any interest in 
the dipping programme. See Native Affairs report, 1932, pp. 12-13.
Il
KDB 1/3/8/1, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Secretaiy for Native 
Affairs, 19.9.30;
^Ibid. Secretary for Native Affairs to Provincial Commissioner, 13-9.30 
^KDB l/3/8/l, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 17.11.30.
Under pressure from the Central Provincial Administration
which was determined to see Siamusonde punished for his behaviour,
the District Commissioner pondered the fairness of such an action
and found himself coming down on the side of the Chief:
'It is true that Siamusonde!s attitude and equally that 
of his people is obstructive in the sense that he knows 
the wishes of the Government and he does not follow 
them out, but on the other hand, the question of dipping 
is non compulsory ... All Siamusonde has done is to 
take the word of the Government at its face value. He
was told he could dip or not as he pleased and he says
he prefers not toj1
Siamusonde's continued intransigence and the hostility of 
his people to the Administration however forced the D.C. later on 
to recommend sterner measures. On a tour of the area in March 1931* 
he commented on 'the unfriendly attitude of the people' which was
3
seen in 'the exorbitant price of food charged to Government officials'. 
This unfriendliness had been clearly demonstrated during a meeting
he had had with Siamusonde, at which he invited him to a meeting to
discuss Chief Monze's position. The Chief's behaviour gave the 
District Commissioner much offence. When he was told of the pro­
posed meeting, the D.C. wrote, 'he interrupted with an emphatic 
"Pe11 n^oT*. I explained that this was an order from myself as D.C., 
not from Chief Monze. He said "Pe. I will not go.11 I replied 
that it was an order of the Government. Siamusonde turned his face
aside and made a contemptuous spitting noise. There could be no
A
doubt about the insubordinate nature of the gesture.'
1Ibid.
p
In spite of pressure from local officials, Siamusonde refused to 
allow women to divorce their husbands whenever they wanted to 
(ZA 7A/30, Z.N.A., Pacey's tour report, May-June, 1932). Neither 
would he obey orders from the Boma to get his people to establish 
proper villages instead of building their huts at random. (KDB 
1/3/S/3, Z.N.A. District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 3*11.
^KDB 1/5/8/2, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, ^.3.31.
^Ibid. D.C.’s despatch on Chief Siamusonde, 12.2.31.
As a result of this incident* the B.C. recommended the with­
holding of the Chief's subsidy for some time. By September 1932 
when Siamusonde's attitude to the Administration appeared to be 
deeply influencing the behaviour of other Chiefs, notably Sianjalika, 
Mwanachingwala and Simonga, the Governor ordered an inquiry into his 
conduct.'1"
In the Mwanachingwala area, opposition to the Administration
during the 193°s appears to have sprung largely from the land losses
which the people of the Chieftaincy had suffered at the hands of the
white officials. By 1930, Chief Mwanachingwala had acquired a
reputation for being anti-Government. In 1932 he seemed even less
willing to cooperate with local officials. During a tour of his
area in December of that year, a local official found the Chief
2
'childishly and wilfully obtuse'. Like Siamusonde's, his pecple 
practised transhumance and so they were just as indifferent to the 
cattle'-dipping policy.
Sianjalika's case was somewhat different. His people had never 
taken to the practice of transhumance, yet they shared as strong 
an aversion to the dipping scheme as Siamusonde's. Chief Sianjalika's 
objections derived partly from the fear that fees would later be 
demanded, but it appears that he was not only against this particular 
policy of the Administration, but was, in a way, telling the officials
g
to take their hands off his area. In 1932, at a meeting with Wick ins, 
the B.C., he again emphasised his opposition to dipping and on being 
asked whether he needed any dams or wells in his poorly watered area,
■^ KDB 1/3/8/3, Z.N.A. Acting Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 
29.9.32 I found no evidence of the outcome of the inquiry. It 
appears that the Chief got away with a few words of warning,
2KDB 6/7/3/3* Z.N.A. lour report of C.J.W.Fleming, Nov-Dee., 1932.
he replied in the negative. It was only after two of his Headmen
had appealed to him that he accepted the offer of two dams on
1the Itabolongola, a tributary of the Ngwezi river. Local officials 
also experienced much difficulty in getting Sianjalika to move
those sections of his people who ’were living on Crown and alienated
2lands into reserves. A District officer touring the Chief's area 
in 1932 commented on his 'mule-like obstinacy' and regretted the
fact that he was so uncooperative since 'he is one of the few
3
strong Chiefs in the district1.
The performance of the majority of the Tonga Chiefs after the
creation of the reserves and the official introduction of Indirect
Rule gave the Administration much concern. Islands of opposition
to Government policy were developing and Chiefs were failing to live
up to that reputation for 'prompt and effective response to all calls 
5made on them', A few were now decidedly hostile to the Administration. 
In 193**» Mwanachingwala and Siamusonde were described as 'useless 
and obstructive'. The people in their areas were said to 'possess 
all the shortcomings of bastard Ba-Ila tribes' and were 'badly con­
trolled'. The official saw 'no hope for any improvement as long
/ g
as their present Chiefs are in power'.
In the general exercise of their duties, a number of Chiefs 
were being, increasingly, found wanting. With the noticeable exception
1ZA 7/4/30, Z.N.A. Flemings tour report, 1932.
^ZA 7/1/15/3, Z.N.A, Provincial Annual report, 1932.
3zA 7/4/30, Z.N.A. Flemings tour report, 1932.
4One official even suggested that the Administration should consider 
the possibility of deposing Sianjalika and Siamusonde because of 
their opposition to dipping. See ZA 7/4/30, Z.N. A. Jalland to 
Chief Secretaiy, 4.1.33.
5See Chapter I, p.&$
^KDB 6/7/5/3» Z.N.A. Tour report No. 5» 1934.
of Chief Siamaundu (Mondeh) none of the plateau Tonga Chiefs had
consistently favourable reports on his conduct during the thirties
and early forties. There were reports of Chiefs who were 'inclined
1to be independent and not to assist the Government...'. Some of
the younger Chiefs were said to be showing 'keenness and progression'
2
but the older ones had as their main object 'a peaceful life'.
The majority of the Native Authorities were taking no initiative in 
the running of their various areas and when the Boma officials were
not around, they showed very little interest in the affairs of
3Government. The Southern provincial report for 1937 noted that
'apathy and lethargy are more distinguishing attributes of Chiefs
than interest and 'industry', and it added that 'in the Mazabuka
ifDistrict, the record is peculiarly bad'.
$  *  *  if  *
While the apathy shown by Tonga Chiefs during the thirties 
might have been partly due to the fact that they were finding them­
selves unequal to their present responsibility, having had nothing 
like it before white rule, their lack of zeal and in some cases open 
opposition was certainly not unconnected with the misery and frustra­
tion that the reserves policy had bred in certain Chieftaincies.
During the thirties, the limitations of the native reserves commission­
ers were becoming glaringly apparent. A commission that contained no 
trained Agriculturalist and whose decisions were made without the 
benefit of reports on African farm practice or surveys of African
1ZA 7/l/l3/2, Z.N.A. Provincial Annual report, 1930.
2The Chief who was after the 'peaceful life' was presumably the 
type that was reluctant to carry out contentious policies (such as 
the conscription of' involuntary labour) which would bring him into 
conflict with his people.
^KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
^Native Affairs report, 19371 P-39.
lands, could hardly be said to have been well placed to make the
sort of recommendations it did.
The reserves Commissioners and a few local officials had stressed
the need for the development of the reserves. Frank Melland, a
farsighted and outspoken District Commissioner of this period,1 had
noted in 1926:
•Moving the natives (many of whom have already been 
moved once) into reserves is bound to increase the 
self consciousness that already exists, a feeling 
bora of the instinct of self preservation...; it 
is essential that schemes to help the native should 
come into force simultaneously with this forced up­
heaval, not merely to be promised as a sequel to such 
movement.'2
Melland emphasised the need for better water supplies, the provision
of access roads to the railway and 'definite assistance in agriculture
3and stock raising1.
little came of whatever plans the Administration had, during 
the thirties, for developing the reserves. The Depression virtually 
wiped away the Agriculture Department which, in any case, since its 
inception, had preoccupied itself almost entirely with the problems 
of settler farmers. There were twenty-three officials serving 
under the Department in June 1932 and only five had escaped retrench­
ment by 31st December, 1933. An agricultural research station which 
had been established in Mazabuka was closed down as its specialist 
staff was reduced to only one officer. Thevaterboring team com- 
pletely disappeared. It had sunk a few wells and boreholes in
^Melland had served in Bembaland and also in Kasempa and he was 
one of the few officials who openly criticized the colour-bar.
See, Frank Melland, "Is the colour-bar to spread north?", The 
African Observer, Vol. 7, No. 3» July 19371 pp. 60-6A.
2
KDB 6/l/l/l, Z.N.A. D.C.'s annexure to report for year ending 
31.12.26. ' '
^Ibid.
L,
Pim Commission's report, on.cit., p.232.
some of the reserves, but these proved to be far from adequate.
Large areas of poorly-watered land were left uninhabited as
populations concentrated in the less arid areas. In 1938, Captain
Campbell, a Pemba settler, representing the Southern Electoral Area
in the Legislative Council, told the Council of 'large areas where
for 30 or AO miles, you can go through the reserve without a drop
1
of water and hardly see a native'.
The situation in a number of reserves on the plateau was close 
to critical during the 1930s. In the Sianjalika area in 193^» the 
Chief's 76 villages covered an area of some 300 square miles. Com­
menting on the land, a touring official observed that 'at least 63°/o
2
is uncultivable owing to hills....' The reserves Commissioners
had pledged themselves to establishing reserves that were 'suitable' 
for African habitation but surveys of the reserves during the 1930s 
strongly questioned their suitability. The Pim Commission of 1938 
reported that 'in none of the reserves can the position be described 
as satisfactory. Some reserves are definitely inadequate and re- 
quire enlargement*. The Bledisloe Commission that followed Pirn's 
stressed the need 'for the progressive execution of a systematic 
programme of development as envisaged by the Commissioners by whom 
they were originally demarcated'.
The fact that the Administration had alienated far more land 
than could be effectively occupied by the settlers who received them
^See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates (hereafter 
Hansard) 12th December, 1938, No. 311 Col. l8*f.
2KDB 6/?/3/3» Z.N.A., Tour report No. 3* 193^.
^Pim, op.cit., p.73.
^Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission', report, (Cmd. 30^9)* p.39.
had been obvious since the late 1920s. In 1928 it
had been reported that a third of the lands alienated in the 
Mazabuka sub-district were in the hands of absentee landlords 
•who contribute nothing to the present cost or work of develop­
ment in this territory*. In the circumstances, it was suggested 
that a tax be levied on alienated lands whose owners left them 
undeveloped and unoccupied.1 In the same year, Father Moreau of 
the local Catholic Mission, had criticized the Administration for 
allowing people to have very large farms. He called for a more
equitable distribution of the land and condemned what he considered
2
land wastage as seen in ranches and large farms. Moreau criticized
the pattern of land distribution which the territory was adopting
and he called for smaller land holding. This was how he saw it all:
'A few thousand white landowners each of them owning 
an estate far too large to be cultivated up to its 
bearing capacity and one million natives segregated 
(the very word suggests a leper settlement) in re­
serves will never make this a prosperous country; 
but several millions of small landowners cultivating 
their own farms will work wonders.
In 1929, reports indicated that there were in the Mazabuka
District seventeen privately owned farms which had been previously
Aoccupied but whose owners had deserted them. These farms were
quite substantial in size. In the Kaleya valley, two of these farms
were 10,188 and 7*266 acres in size and they were said to be on
5
•good agricultural land'. Another which had been sold to one F.H.
KDB 6/l/l/l, Z.N.A. Report for year ending 31.12.28. The B.S.A.C. 
had reported in 1911 that of 350*000 acres of land taken up by Euro­
peans in North-Western Rhodesia only about 7*792 acres were under 
crops, 4l9 acres being used as orchards and some 4,863 acres lying 
fallow. See BS2/137*Z.N.A. Report for year ending 31*3*11.
2
J, Moreau, "The Economic life of the Natives in relation to Land, 
Agriculture and Stock farming', Part II, in Zambesi Mission Record, 
Vol. VIII, No. 119* January, 1928, p.258.
•^Ibid., p.260.
1^ 0pa5ti?rAtoridS v/ithT,the.De^r?sSion' as wil1 %een presently. 3KDB/1/3/9, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 14.8.29.
Lowe in the area close to the Kafue river, was 5*629 acres
1and it contained excellent pastures.
A number of companies had also received large grants of land 
which they failed to occupy. The Northern Rhodesia Cotton Company 
had purchased 12,^96 acres of good ranching land in the vicinity 
of the Kafue and Nega Nega rivers, lands from which Chief Mwana­
chingwala’ s people had been evicted. For a number of years, the 
land lay unused. A cattle and land company bought 8,^15 acres
in the area west of the Monze railway station, which it never
Z
bothered to occupy.
The South African Township, Mining and Finance Company with 
Headquarters in Johannesburg, had purchased, during the early 
twenties, sixteen estates in the Kaleya valley and in the area of 
the Magoye and Ngwezi rivers. These were lands drawn from the Mwana­
chingwala and Sianjalika Chieftaincies and they totalled some 
37*997 acres. The area was described as ’good agricultural and
ranching country1 but these lands were 'locked up, unused for many
3years'.
Luring the years of the Lepression, the Administration was not 
only faced with the problem of handling vast areas that lay un­
occupied and were attracting squatters, it also had a problem finding 
bidders for available Crown Lands. In 1930, there were 127,000 acres 
of 'good farming and ranching land* available for purchase in free- 
hold in the Mazabuka District, but no settlers to take them. Farmers
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
2*
KDB 6/l/l/3» Z.N.A. Provincial report, 1930.
who had already taken up land were leaving to find work on the
Copperbelt and the Railways and they left their farms ’uncultivated
X
or run by neighbours’. The European population in the District 
which was estimated at tyO in 1929 had dropped to k56 by 1931.
By 193^t it had suffered further reduction and was reported to 
be Vf3 persons.2
Faced with the situation in which there were a number of un­
suitable and poorly-watered reserves, on the one hand, and fertile 
unoccupied lands on the other., some local officials suggested that
the pressure of the reserves should be eased by the granting of
3plots to African farmers on unoccupied farms. At the Provincial 
Commissioners' Conference of 193^» a motion strongly critical of 
the existing land situation was tabled and passed unanimously.
'All provincial Commissioners' are said to have 'deprecated the 
existing instructions by which large tracts of unoccupied land were 
being reserved from native occupation, although there was no pros-
2f
pect of their being required for European occupation.'
The demands and the condemnations of the Administration’s 
land policy brought no substantial changes in land distribution 
during the thirties. It was the problems that developed with the 
expansion of African commercial farming that were to force the 
Administration, during the forties, into a review of land policy.
It is to these problems that we now turn.
■^ KDB 6/7/1, Z.N.A. Report for year ending, 31.3.26.
2See KDB 6/l/l/2; KDB 6/l/l/?; ZA ?/l/lV3» Z.N.A.
^KDB 6/7/5A, Z.N.A. In 1938, the District Commissioner called 
for 'some system ”o£ native smallholding...' and suggested that 
'some of the unoccupied farms in European^areas might be used*.
D.C.'s notes on Tour report No. 6, 1938,
^ZA l/9/15/l, Z.N.A. Extracts from minutes of Provincial Commissioners' 
Conference of May, 193^.
Chapter III
FARMING FOR CASH
The simple hoe culture of the Tonga underwent a radical 
change during the years of Colonial Rule. While working on the 
farms of settlers within the territory or further south, or in 
training or employment at local mission stations, scores of 
Africans gathered ideas which they took back to their villages 
to revolutionise local agriculture. The tedious and time-consuming 
practice of preparing a small plot of land with a hoe soon gave 
way to the fairly widespread use of more up to date farming im­
plements which enabled certain individuals to crop much larger 
acreages than they had ever done before.
The Catholic and Seventh Day Adventist Missions on the 
plateau took a keen interest in Tonga agriculture. They were very 
active from about 1910 onwards, in advertising the value of the 
plough, although their efforts appear to have been concentrated 
largely on the villages which bordered on their stations. This 
meant, in effect, parts of Ufwenuka, Chona and Monze Chieftaincies.
In the remaining parts of the plateau, African farmers appear to 
have acquired their knowledge of the use of ploughs mainly frem 
settler farmers whom they served as labourers, either within 
the territory or in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Some of the 
early.migrant workers returning home from the Southern territories 
are said to have brought ploughs with them but most purchased ploughs 
locally: many bought second-hand ploughs from their white employers.
In advertising the value of the plough on his farm, the European 
settler made a significant contribution towards stimulating agri­
cultural improvement among the Tonga,
The commitment of some of the local missionaries to improving
the farming methods of their adherents appears to have been very
strong. Father Moreau's deliberate neglect of academic for agricultural
training did not quite meet the approval of the higher authorities
of his church. In a letter from Salisbury in 1925, he was told:
one of the complaints made against you by 
practically all those who have been with you at 
Chikuni is that you have been more a farmer than 
anything else and that on account of the farming, ^ 
you have not spread out as you might have done...1
Moreau had farming in the blood. He was born in La Bruffiere,
/ 2 Vendee, of Breton peasant parents. Caught up as he was in Africa
in a situation where the ox and plough, two of the fundamentals in 
the agricultural system in which he was raised, were unknown, he 
went all out to advertise their worth.
Moreau's enthusaism was shared by his S.D.A, counterparts 
at Rusangu. Local villagers who had connections with these missions, 
as well as those who had observed, at close quarters, the agri­
cultural practices of settier-farmers, were the pioneers of plough 
cultivation in the Tonga villages. Moreau's use of oxen on the 
lands of Chikuni impressed the cattle-keeping Tonga, who had never 
conceived of using their animals in this way. Many sent their bulls
to the priest to be yoked and trained and he was allowed to use
3
them for a while before returning them to their owners.
1BY/3/ 220, Brown to Moreau, l6._2.25. Read at Society of Jesus 
Headquarters, Farm Street, London,
2
Among the Tonga readers Moreau wrote was "Joni Milimo", which 
focussed on agriculture. The others were "Joni Mukampaila", on 
village hygiene, and "Tobias" and "The Valiant Woman", in which 
he praised domestic virtue.
3
^See Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission - How it came to be started".
Read at the Chikuni Mission in Zambia.
The first African to purchase a plough in the Tonga area
did so in He was followed by many others equally determined
to take advantage of his implement's potential which Moreau once
vividly described:
1... a furrow one foot broad and 200 yards long 
turned over as quickly as a man can walk it and if 
you repeat that 36 times, you have f^860 square yards, 
or one acre, of ground nicely turned over... do that 
in one day without much fatigue ... Do many people 
imagine what work it meant to turn over A86O yards 
of ground, even at a shallow depth of k inches? It 
meant 17^)980 strokes of the hoe, reckoning k strokes 
to the square foot. If you want to go down 8 inches 
as a good plough will do, you have to double the 
number of strokes.'2
The Tonga took very easily to the plough and I was told
3
that there was hardly a village without one by 1931. Perhaps the
main attraction of the plough for the Tonga farmer was its labour
saving value. Because the handling of oxen was .generally reserved 
A
to men, the farmer and his male helpers were usually responsible 
for both the clearing and the ploughing of the land. With the 
adoption of the plough It was now possible for the men to spend 
less time in preparing their fields for planting, and this meant 
that more time could be devoted tp hunting, fishing and wage- 
employment. There are no reliable figures for labour migration 
during the early 1920s but several Informants claimed that men were
See K.P.M.Anthony and Victor Uchendu, Agricultural Change in 
Mazabuka District, Reprinted from Food Research Institute Studies 
in Agricultural Economics, Trade and Development, Vol. IX, No. 3? 
(Stanford, 1970)i p.13.
2Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission...", op.cit.
-Z
Interview with H.Yates-Jones, 17.3.7^.
This practice continued throughout the Colonial period. See E.Colson, 
Marriage and Family among the Plateau Tonga (Manchester, 1938), 
p.109.
leaving the reserves in large numbers during this period in
order to earn some money to purchase their first ploughs. The
women-folk were very instrumental in getting their husbands to
seek employment for they were constantly comparing the time spent
by their families in preparing the land with that of families that
owned ploughs. Men who could not afford the cost of a plough came
to be looked upon as failures and many went out to work to prove 
1
they were not.
Although there is hardly any documentary evidence to support 
this, most Informants maintained that they experienced an increase 
in yield when they used ploughs in their cultivation. This is diffi­
cult to ascertain for the increase in output may have come about 
as a result of the larger fields that could now be cropped and may 
not have represented an improvement in yield per acre cultivated.
However the belief that ploughing increased output gained wide 
currency on the plateau and increased the plough's attraction.
A moderate increase in maize prices during the mid-1920s 
also appears to have acted as an incentive towards adopting the
plough. By 1926, some African farmers were being paid 8/- for a bag
2of maize. This was an improvement on the market situation pre­
vailing in the early 1920s when 3/- appears to have been the highest
3
sum offered.
In the northern and north-eastern parts of the plateau where
■^Interviews with William Kazoka (23,^.7*0 and Nelson Muyovwe (6.6.7^).
2
KDB 6/7/1, Z.N.A. Annual report for financial year ending 31st March 1926
3Interview with Jacob Hundyanga, 22.11.73.
farmers had to do very little stumping because of the relatively 
tree-less nature of the vegetation, the plough was quickly adapted.
In the more heavily-wooded south-western parts of the plateau, its 
adoption was more gradual. The adoption of the plough created the 
need for draught oxen. Although several families on the plateau 
kept their own oxen, many had no cattle of -.theifes- own,1 These tended 
to rely on kinsmen and neighbours for animals during the ploughing
season. Some owners charged rents of up to 7/- a day for the use
2
of two animals, but a farmer who was prepared to wait until a
neighbour or relative had completed his ploughing usually got oxen
free. Those who herded cattle for the more wealthy farmers were
allowed the use of animals in their keep and some even made money
3
by renting out some of these animals. In the villages, oxen came
to be valued more highly than cows. Young men who were building
herds of their own tended to start off with oxen and only after they
A
had acquired enough did they turn to buying cows.
The opening of the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt in the late 
twenties and thirties provided local farmers with markets for the 
sale of surplus produce. The Roan Antelope and Nkana mines came 
into production in 1931* By 1933 the Mufulira mine was also in
X o'As late as 19^3* Allan andothers discovered that 33 /o of the
families covered in their survey of seven Chieftaincies had no
cattle at all. See W,Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage
among the Plateau Tonga", Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. l^f, 19^3* P-
2Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7^*
3
For details of cattle herding among the Tonga, see E.Colson, The 
Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Political Studies 
(Manchester, 1962), pp. 132-1^1.
A
This came out in various interviews on the plateau.
production. The mines attracted a lot of labour and their food 
requirements gave a boost to African farming. These requirements 
were for maize. Millet, sorghums and other grains continued to 
be grown but only for subsistence. African maize production, the 
bulk of it coming from the Tonga plateau, had been calculated at 
about 13,000 bags annually between 1913 and 1920. This number had 
doubled by 19271 and was some 33,000 bags by 1932-33.2
In the years before the Depression affected produce 
prices, farming on the plateau was quite a rewarding enterprise.
Many Tonga farmers were quick to respond to the demand for maize.
By the late 1920s, that portion of output in excess of subsistence 
requirements which one may regard as a ’normal surplus' during the
mid-l890s had become a regular part of the farmer's production,
3deliberately cultivated to meet the rising demand. Apparently, 
most farmers continued to operate on a small scale although in the 
north-eastern areas, farms tended to be relatively larger. The 
conditions that Trapnell and Clothier were to describe in 1933 were,
if
apparently, already in existence. Because of land alienation, there 
was now less land than before and shifting cultivation as carried 
out in the pre-Colonial period was becoming slightly more difficult.
1Agriculture Department Annual report, 1928, p.6.
2Sec/A.G/691 Z.N.A., Anonymous minute. There are no figures for 
African agricultural production on the plateau per se during these 
years.
"Z
^The 'normal surplus1refers to that amount of food produced as a 
famine reserve which in good years is not required for subsistence.
See W.Allan, The African Husbandman (London, 1963), p.38.
4
G.C.Trapnell and J.N,Clothier, "The Soils, Vegetation and Agricultural 
Systems of North-Western Rhodesia: Report of the Ecological Survey"
(Lusaka, 1938).
In the southern parts of the plateau where farms were usually 
smaller and where the hoe was still widely used in several areas, 
land shortage was not yet a critical problem. But in the more 
advanced north-eastern areas, the pinch was already being felt ‘in 
certain Chieftaincies. More farmers were investing in ploughs 
and those who could not afford ploughs1 of their own borrowed
from relatives e*r neighbours. Some were renting ploughs, with
2
owners charging between 2 and 3 shillings a day.
By the late 1920s, with the expansion of maize production, 
the rate of labour migration from the plateau declined. Fewer men
3
than in the days of the 'Bulawayo feverwere seeking enployment
outside the territory and most tended to go away only during the
4
dry season when there was little farming activity. Many wage- 
eamers had, apparently, succeeded in securing work locally. While 
some served on European farms on the plateau, others found jobs 
as labourers or domestic servants in the three main townships, viz. 
Mazabuka, Monze and Choraa. With their places of employment so 
close to their villages, many found time during the weekends to 
visit their homes. During such visits they usually attended to
strenuous tasks on their farmes with which the womenfolk could not
5easily cope. Local agriculture did not as a result suffer because
^he cost of a plough appears to have ranged between £1 and £2.l0s. 
up to the early 1930s. Interviews on the plateau.
2Interviews in the Monze and Chongo Chieftaincies. By the early 
1930s some farmers were asking £1 a day for the use of one plough 
and a span of oxen. See Native Affairs Report, 1932, p.l8.
•^ See Chapter I, p.$\«
Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7^*
5
This practice of dividing one's time between farming and wage 
employment was described in several interviews on the plateau.
of their involvement in the wage economy. In fact, most wage-earners 
continued to be target workers who went out in search of jobs 
only when they were in need of money for some specific purpose 
such as the purchasing of cattle or some farm equipment,1 Although 
-there are hardly any reliable figures of a comparative nature for 
the rate of labour migration during the earlier years of the century,
the author got the impression from interviews that in the years im­
mediately preceding the Depression and after, far fewer men were 
leaving the villages for work than in the early 1920s. By 19291
settler farmers were complaining ’that annually it becomes more diffi-
2cult to obtain a sufficient quota of labour locally...' Commer­
cial farming brought its rewards and induced in several areas a 
strong stay-at home attitude. Writing in 1930 about the plateau's
■Z
adult population which must have been in the region of 37*668 persons,
an official made the following observations.
'Although work is plentiful, it does not appeal 
to the local native. The reason for this is not
difficult to understand. The local native is
comparatively rich. He'owns-, somewhere near 100,000 
head of cattle, nearly 1100 cycles, **5 waggons and 53 
scotch carts have been registered during the year.
He finds it suits him better to sell his surplus 
cattle and grain and thus fulfill the small obligations
1
This, perhaps, partly explains why so many Africans from other 
parts of the territory (notably the Western and Eastern Provinces) 
and from Nyasaland, obtained work in the townships during this 
period and came to feature prominently in the socio-political 
activities of these centres (see Chapter V, ) On average,
the 'Aliens' were far more stable in their jobs than the Tonga.
2KDB 6/l/l/2, Z.N.A. Annual report on Mazabuka District, 1929. This 
reluctance to leave the village was to continue after the Depression.
In 19^7 it was reported that 'owing to the homing nature of the 
population and to the fact that comparatively few go away from 
their villages for really long periods, the effect on village 
life caused by the absence of male members of the tribe is not 
serious in most parts of the Southern provinces.' See Native 
Affairs report, 19^7* p.70.
3"This is a figure supplied in 1929. It estimated the adult male 
population of the Tonga plateau to be 17,291 and the adult female 20,377 
Officials also counted 17,532 male children and 15,11^ femsile children. 
See KDB 6/l/l/2, Z.N.A. Annual report on Mazabuka District, 1929.
he h&s rather than to hire out his labour.'1 
During the late 1920s there was also a large demand for cattle 
from individual traders and Agents of the mining companies. Tonga 
farmers were constantly under pressure to sell some of thsir stock.
In 1928, the Provincial Commissioner had this to say about Tonga use 
of cattle:
'Natives sell a certain number of cattle every year 
to traders but they do not in the majority of cases 
regard their stock as an article of trade. Possession 
of cattle is rather a thing to be proud of.
In the following year, he returned to the subject and observed
that African farmers 'prize their cattle very highly and are not
3
anxious to sell them'.
The seeming reluctance of Tonga farmers to part with cattle 
during this period should be examined more closely. In several parts 
of the plateau at this time, farmers were still engaged in re-stocki ng 
their herds which had suffered severe depletion during the 19th cen­
tury raids. This was particularly the case in the eastern Chieftaincies
A
where the raids had fallen most heavily. Besides as Fielder has 
pointed out in the reference to the neighbouring Ha, a farmer's 
ability to sell cattle on a regular basis would depend on his having 
acquired a reasonable number of cattle which would make him self- 
sufficient in this commodity. Until he reaches this 'take-off' position
^DB 6/7/3, Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 30th September, 
1930. In 1929, it was reported that an African in the Mazabuka 
district had bought a motor car. See KDB 6/l/l/2, Z.N.A, Annual 
report on the Mazabuka District, 1929.
^Native Affairs Peport, 1928, p.12.
^Native Affairs Eeport, 1929, p.11.
ASee Chapter I, pj;y// — i'X j
his sales w uld be irregular and mainly limited to times of real 
need. The adoption of the plough also meant that more animals were 
now being used to provide draught power in the various villages.
The Tonga farmer’s willingness to part with his cattle during 
this period was also naturally influenced by the prevailing range 
of stock prices. These appear to have been very low and unattractive 
from the mi.d-twenties onwards. Several Informants gave low prices 
as the reason why farmers restricted their sales of cattle mainly 
to periods of drought when cattle was traded in order to purchase 
grain.
Although Few Tonga farmers were trading cattle on a regular 
animals
basis* many/were sold at the periodic sales organised by the Govern­
ment and individual traders. There were a few Headmen and large 
scale cultivators in the Chongo, ^onze, Siamaundu and Siamusonde
Chieftaincies who had relatively large herds of 40 animals and over
2and they tended to sell more often than the rest. In 1923» which 
was a bad year for the harvest* animals were purchased from the Tonga 
for between 15/- end £3 a head for mature cows and oxen. In that 
year alone, a total of 2,000 animals were traded in exchange for 
grain. In 1929i the District Commissioner reported thatafc the last 
stock sale organised in Pemba* 1,500 head of cattle were brought 
forward to be purchased at the rate of £5 to £8 for oxen and 33/6d to
J.Fielder, ’’The Role of Cattle in the Ila Economy'S African 
Social Research, 15, June, 1973, pp. 338-339.
2
Tonga Headmen usually kept large herds, part of which they loaned 
to kinsmen and friends. This was a way of gaining influence and 
popularity. See W.Allan et alia, ’’Land Holding and Land Usage 
Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes Livingstone 
Paper, No. l4, 1945, pp. 158 and 177.
7/1/6/3, Z.N.A. Mazabuka Sub-District Report, 31.3.23.
0 3
35/- per 100 lbs weight for slauglier cattle on the hoof.
By the early 1920s, a few large-scale farmers who employed 
wage labourers, had begun to emerge* One of these was Theo­
dore Kachesa. He had worked for some time in the Wankie coal 
mines and later became a driver for a Barotseland transport firm.
On leaving the firm, he worked for a while with Father Moreau 
as house servant and farm hand and began farming on his own just
before the outbreak of the 1914 war. Although a member of the
2Catholic Church, Kachesa had never been to school.
Very few farmers in the twenties or thirties operated on a 
scale comparable to Kachesa's. In 1924 he had on the farm which 
he was running in partnership with his friend, Jahaliso, two 
cultivators, three ploughs,a modern weighing machine and a 
mealie planter. He had in his employ 21 workers, each receiving
3
a monthly wage. In 1923 out of a 23 acre plot he produced 200 
bags of maize. By 1930, his output was some 800 bags and by this 
time he had built himself a brick house and was using 'up to date
4American tools' and a large mortising machine. By 1934, Kachesa 
had on his farm a 150 acre fenced paddock, two large dams, a 
wheelwright's shor a store and a dairy. His bank balance, at 
this time, was said to be far better than those of some settlers
5
and his maize farm, at 130 acres, far larger than his neighbours.
^ZA 7/1/12/3, Z.N.A. Batoka Province Annual Report, 31.12.29.
2KSB 3/-, Z.N.A. District Notebook entry.
^Zambia Mission Record (Z.M.R.), Vol. VII, No. 106, October 1924, p.428. 
Zl
Z.M.R., Vol. IX, No. 130, October 1930, pp. 106-107.
^0.0. 795/71, P.R.O. Report on problems of Agricultural Development 
among the Batonga of reserve XI, by C.G.Trapnell, 31.1.34, Also 
KSB 3/1, Z.N.A, District Notebook entry.
' ‘ -Iy
In the Pemba area, C.G.Trapnell, an official of the
Administration, described, in 193^» the operations of another
of these large scale farmers. He had ’two Kimberley brick two
roomed buildings’ on his land, ’an implement shed, two log grain
stores, three ploughs, a cultivator, a planter, a wagon, a water-
drum mounted on a sleigh and a private dam,’ Like Kachesa, this
farmer was an employer of labour and he paid his men between 8-10
shillings a month. Unlike Kachesa, he had had no mission train-
1ing and, in fact, spoke no English.
By 1933 there were ’in most villages... two or more sub­
stantial men or groups of men, who cultivate up to twenty five 
acres of maize and employ up to six people at an average wage of 
8/~ per month, ’ Most of these labourers employed on an annual 
basis were Tonga villagers, mostly unmarried young men who had not 
yet established households of their own. Therest were Africans from 
other areas within the territory, chiefly the eastern and western
3
provinces. Although the large-scale farmer employed wage labour 
he continued to rely on the assistance he received from young boys, 
most of them kinsmen, whom he attracted into his household. These 
boys did not receive regular wages but they were fed and clothed 
by the farmer and they usually received some help from him with 
their marriage payments when the time came. In most cases, these 
young men and the farmer's family constituted the primary work force
^Trapnell, C G- r ow_. "3*e ,    Of> ■ta-l •
^KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933*
■3
^ZA 5/2/2, Z.N.A. Minutes of Provincial Commissioners Conference 
of 1931*
on the farm since most adult labourers tended to stop working
1
for someone else once they established their own households.
Most of these large scale cultivators, the Mulimi 
Simpindi ('farmers for profit1) as they were called, seem to 
have raised the capital for developing their lands by selling 
their cattle, often amidst strong opposition from members of 
their matrilineal groups. Such opposition was quite common in
the eastern parts of the plateau where the relative scarcity of
2
cattle made regular sales somewhat unpopular. Unlike their counter­
parts in the western parts of the plateau, most matrilineal groups 
in the eastern areas tended to regard their small herds as an in­
surance to be turned to only in times of dire need. Such occasions 
would be periods of bad harvests when cattle will perforce be ex­
changed for grain or times of social need such as marriages, funerals
3
or some such ritual ceremony. Group members normally frowned on 
the practice of trading cattle on a regular basis simply because a 
kinsman needed some money for a third plough or a second cultivator. 
Because a number of the Mulimi Simpindi resisted this social press­
ure, they were to find themselves very unpopular within their kin 
groups, with some relatives accusing them of being self-centred. This, 
coupled with the fact that many of them had moved from iheir original 
homes in the eastern Chieftaincies to the west where land was in greater
1Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Samuel Sibanda and other large- 
scale cultivators.
2See Chapter I, p^.iM'l.
3m .This came out repeatedly in interviews carried out in the Ufwenuka, 
Chona, Mwanza and Monze Chieftaincies,
supply,"*" accentuated their individualism and strengthened 
their loyalty to their immediate households.
A question that must be looked at at this stage concerns 
the methods by which the Mulimi Simpindi acquired the relatively 
larger farms which they cultivated. In most cases these farmers 
merely took up their own fallow land. Others extended their farms 
by expanding cultivation into virgin bush which was part of the 
common pool. Up until the mid-l^Os when soil conservation measures 
came into effect, a resident farmer who was extending his cultivation 
was under no obligation to inform his Headman of his intention 
except in such cases where the new plot adjoined a neighbour’s 
fields. In cases where a dispute might occur, the Headman had to 
be informed and it was his duty to examine the plots and decide on 
an arrangement that was mutually acceptable. Failing this, the
parties would have recourse to the Chief of the area. This latter
3
step was apparently, rarely resorted to.
Other large scale cultivators extended their farms by moving 
out of their original homes either into unoccupied lands within 
the reserves or into alienated lands which were not being farmed.
As will be seenpresently, Theodore Kachesa, whose farming activities
A
we have just discussed, belonged to the latter category. Farmers 
1This Fast to West migration continued throughout the Colonial 
period. See E.Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia:
Social and Religious Studies (Manchester,1962),p.175.
2Interviews with Ellison Milambo and other large scale farmers.
3
The author, was told by Informants that most problems connected 
with the land were handled by the local Headmen.
A
The squatter problem is examined later in the chapter.
who moved into hitherto unoccupied areas within the reserves 
(such as Keemba Hill) did so after first securing the permission of 
the local Chief. Such lands which were usually in arid areas, 
required some initial capital investment to make them habitable.
In most cases, wells had to be sunk since there were no rivers or 
streams nearby. Few farmers could afford to do this. However, once 
villages had been established in the area, the Chiefs authority 
receded into the background and all future applications for plots 
in the area were handled by the local Headmen. It must be stressed 
that the Headman in this and other cases acts purely as the custod­
ian of the land. He could not distribute it as a gift for it was 
not his to give. His authority over land distribution was der­
ived from that of the Chief and ultimately, the District Commissioner. 
Although Kachesa and a few others had leases to their lands, most 
Mulimi Simpindi (like the rest of the population) held their lands 
under the rules of communal tenure. Informants claim that demands 
for the introduction of freeholding were common from the 1930s on­
wards. Farmers wanted the security of tenure which freehold titles 
2
would bring but the Administration, mindful of the outcry this 
would provoke in settle® circles, resisted these demands.
On the whole, the extension of acreages by the Mulimi Simpindi 
during this period appears to have gone unchallenged by most of the
1•W.Allan et alia» op.cit., p.93-
2
Interviews with Samuel Sibanda, l8.ll.73 and Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7^
population. One reason why land disputes were rare'1' was perhaps 
the fact that the large-scale cultivators were a small fraction 
of the population. We have no figures for this period but 
a study carried out in 19^3 was to estimate the size of this 
group of farmers as se^n in the area surveyed as only 13°/o 
of the total population. Another reason why land disputes were 
rare was that most families on the plateau lacked the means 
with which to expand their cultivations. Some Informants' ex­
plained that they were quite content to continue producing the
surplus they required from small gardens which their immediate
2families could handle on their own. However, the lack of 
capital to purchase equipment or to sink wells appears to have 
been the main constraint on acreage expansion.
In 1931* the Northern Rhodesia copper industry suffered 
a severe slunp. This was due, in part,to the world wide de­
pression but also because of the glut in the world copper market. 
The mines of the Gopperbelt were forced to lay off workers as
1W.Allan, et alia, oo.cit., p.93- The author had difficulty 
in getting files of Native Authority proceedings which would 
have shed more light on this question.
2
Interviews on the plateau. These Informants admitted though 
that their attitudes changed by the late 19*f0s and early 1930s 
as the profitability of maize farming encouraged acreage ex­
pansion in a situation o f increasing scarcity of fertile 
land.
plants were closed down. The Depression checked the expansion 
of Tonga farming for a while as maize prices dropped from around 
8/- for a 200 lb bag1 to between 3/6 and 3/-? fa areas like 
Siamusonde and Ghongo which were some distance from the railway 
and the main trading stores, farmers were reduced to bartering 
all their produce for goods, whereas hitherto they had received 
at least part of their payment in cash. In 193*1-, the marketing 
problems posed by the Depression forced Chief Siamaundu to go 
to Lusaka in an effort to secure a grain contract for his people.
kThe Chief however returned without success.
The cattle market was also affected by the slump. Prices
plunged downwards and in 1931 farmers were parting with their
5animals for £2.10s. a head, while others received bicycles in
£
exchange for bulls. In 1932 it was reported that only 780 head
^DB 6/7/1, Z.N.A* Annual report, March 1926.
2KDB 6/l/l/7, Z.N.A. Annual report, 193**.
^Interviews in the Monze and Sianjalika Chieftaincies.
^KDB 6/7/3/3, Z.N.A, Tour report No. 3, 193**. African farmers 
hardly ever succeeded in getting grain contracts during this 
period. In 1933 the Provincial Commissioner had pointed out 
that 'the native farmer receives little or no assistance in 
producing and selling his grain crops. Most contracts, including 
Government contracts, specify farm grown grain ,/jL.e. grain pro­
duced by settler farmers^.1 See KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. Provincial 
Commissioner's report, 1933.
^KDB 6/l/lA, Z.N.A, District Office report, 1931.
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of cattle were sold during the year as compared with 2,338 
1in 1931. There was very little money in circulation and xn
193*f the Provincial Commissioner wrote: 'It is unfortunate
that so much of the cattle and maize trade is carried on by barter.
Every meeting held with the Chiefs has produced requests that the
2
stores should be compelled to offer cash.'
Although the majority of Tonga farmers continued to produce
maize for the market* a number turned to seeking wage employment
in the townships and on settler farms. White farmers, caught in
the throes of the Depression, were, however, hardly in a position
to afford even the low wages they had been paying. Wages dropped
to as little as 3/~ a- month, the supply of labour being far in
excess of the demand. When to the rigours of the Depression were
added, in 1933* the hardships that came with a period of drought,
the labour market was flooded to a record level. There were ro­
il
ports of 'labourers ... willing to work for food only' and others
who had 'left their villages in hundreds to seek work and have
5
returned without success...'^ In 1933 it was estimated that 
73°/o of Tonga tax payers were at home in the villages, living 
'by the sale of cattle and maize'. The same report went on to 
say that out of a total of about 13,920 tax payers only 1,973 
were found to be in wage employment outside the reserves, the number
1Native Affairs report, 1932, p.19.
^KDB 6/l/l/7, 2.N.A. Annual report, 193^.
■^ KDB 6/1/1/6, 2.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
Ibid. Provincial Commissioner's report, 1933.
^Ibid.
1going out to work in the mines '"being veiy small'._ Revenue 
from taxation dropped sharply as the number of defaulters 
grew.2 In 1925-26, the Administration had collected some £10,025 
from Tonga taxpayers. This amount had fallen to £8,008 in 1931 
and in 193*f it dropped even further to £7,888./ This period of 
austerity produced prophet figures and in 1933 it was reported 
that 'two or three men from other districts went through the 
villages telling the people that the Americans were coming and 
that they need not pay tax'. They did not get very far, however, 
and were arrested by the Native Authorities.^
It was not until about 1933 that the territory's economic 
position improved. The mines which had been closed by the press­
ure of the economic collapse had resumed operations and the new 
mine at Mufulira, which came into operation in 193^t was now in 
active production. The Copperbelt market again presented itself 
and Tonga farmers joined other producers in renewed efforts to 
supply its requirements in farm produce.
^KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933-
2The reduction in the tax rate on the plateau and some of the 
other lint, of rail areas from 12/6d to 10/— a head was not con­
ceded until the latter half of the Depression. See ZA 
Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on Native Policy in Northern 
Rhodesia.
•^ KDB 6/7/1» Z.N.A. Annual report, March 1926.
^ZA 7/1/15/3, S.N.A. Provincial annual report,1932.
^Z.A. 7/1/17/3, Z.N.A. Annual report, 193^.
6
KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933- ^he visitors 
'appear to have been influenced by the doctrine of Watch Tower 
preachers such as are. known to have operated in various parts 
of the territory during this period. See D.H.Gann, A History 
of Northern Rhodesia (London, 196 )^.
The Squatters
The growth of African commercial farming brought with it a 
serious squatter problem. During the Depression a number of 
European farmers abandoned their lands and some Tonga villagers 
who lived in poorly watered or overcrowded reserves that were 
close to these farms moved in to take ptheir places. They did 
not pay much attention to the official status of the lands they 
were occupying and, in a number of cases, squatters established 
themselves on European farms and contiguous tracts of Crown land. 
Marked preference was shown for lands that were near the railway 
for proximity to the line of rail commercial centres meant much 
higher maize prices than could be obtained in the reserves.
A number of these squatters were farmers who had plans 
for farming on a large scale and who found the land situation in 
the reserves too limiting. Theodore Kachesa, who has already been 
mentioned, and those who lived with him on the Rusholme Settle­
ment, fall into this category. Kachesa moved in and occupied 
part of a farm which had been purchased and subsequently abandoned 
by one Mr. Rusholme. For a number of years there was a fierce .debate 
as to whether he should be evicted from the land or allowed to 
stay under a leasehold tenure. Father Moreau, who considered 
Kachesa 'an object lesson of industry', appealed on his behalf, 
asking that he be granted individual tenure 'on the same conditions 
as land is acquired by Natives in the Transkei...'1 After much
^KDB 1/3/5, Z.N.A.Moreau to Acting Administrator, 10.10.23.
vacillation, the Rusholme area was surveyed by the Administration 
and, in 1935, Kachesa and other squatters in the area received 
annual leases which were terminable on either side by 3 months' 
notice. They were requested to pay 3d an acre in annual rent 
and 'it was covenanted that improvements would become the property 
of the Crown unless removed within one month of the termination 
of the lease' and the land 'was to be used for agricultural purposes
only' with 'no assignment or subletting without the Crown's per-
. . .1mission...’
The Rusholme case was just one of two treated in this way,
2
the other being the Mujiga Matabel^ Settlement. In most other 
cases, squatters were evicted and returned to their reserves.
In 1932 there were reports of some 400 villagers with about 
000 head of cattle, who were squatting on lands belonging to 
the Central Research Station at Masabuka. _ They were accused of 
felling trees without restraint and their herds were reported
trespassing on the Research Station's pastures and infecting its
3cattle with ticks.
4
Evictions were not always easy to carry out, for once they 
were installed in their new lands, some squatters stoutly defended 
their assumed right to stay on it. In 1933, officials reported 
that some 4,500 squatters who had moved out of reserve No. XIII
p
H. Vaux, "Unusual Aspects of Native Land Tenure In Mazabuka 
District", Northern Rhodesia Journal, 2, 2, 1953, pp. 19-20.
2For detailed material on the Mujiga Settlement, see KSB 3/1,
Z.N.A.; also KDB 1/3/4, Z.N.A.
^KDB 1/3/5, Z.N.A. Letter from the Central Research Station, 4.8.32. 
4Some of the Chiefs encouraged squatters to stay on lands they had 
been asked to leave. In 1947 it was reported that "Sianjalika’s 
deputy in particular and the rest of the Chiefs in general have
been passively resistive on the vexed subject of ousting squatters 
from Crown lands..." See Sec"Nat/90, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District 
Newsletter, 4th Quarter, 19^7-
1
had been forced back into the reserve 'after much difficulty'.
The squatters had resisted eviction by the Boma Messengers and it 
was only after the ringleaders had been arrested that they de­
cided to move away, some talcing up residence as tenants on settler 
2
farms. In certain areas, the local officials, after evicting 
Tonga squatters, allowed other squatters of non-Tonga origin to
occupy the same lands. The favoured squatters were mostly from
3
Nyasaland. This discriminatory treatment of squatters embittered
relations between the Tonga squatter and the official. Reporting
on a tour of November 1940, an official drew attention to the keen
resentment 'felt by local natives who were originally removed from
their land' only to discover that the Government now permits
4
foreigners to squat on the same lands.
At their Conference of October 1954, District Commissioners 
were very critical of the practice of Africans living outside their 
reserves. They 'accepted the principle that it is not desirable 
that natives should be allowed to live on private estates, whether 
with the agreement of the landlord or not, if they are not in 
his employ'. They stressed the need for Native Authorities to keep 
an eye on their people and to prosecute them if need be for un-
3
lawful residence. The squatter problem was however to continue 
into the 1950s.
■^ Native Affairs report, 1955. In 1947? & settler-farmer reported 
that on impounding the cattle of squatters on his land, the life 
of his wife was threatened. A European builder who was erecting 
a house for him had to stop work because his staff deserted him 
after the squatters had threatened the lives of anyone working 
for the settler. See Sec/Nat/209, Z.N.A. Jenkins to Secretary, 
Department of Lands, 8,10.47.
2
The squatters involved in this encounter were mainly from Chief 
Mwanachingwala's area. Interview with Naul Moonga, 29.4.74.
%KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report, No. 9 of 1940. The favoured squatters 
were allowed oh the land in most cases by absentee landlords. In re­
turn for keeping an eye on the land and preventing other squatters from
The introduction of maize control
The farming activities of squatters and other Africans living 
in the reserves gave the settler community and the Administration 
much concern during the 1930s and was to lead to the introduction 
of a policy of maize control. In 1935? an Agricultural Advisory 
Board was formed 'to advise the Government on all matters of agri­
cultural production and its relation to local consumption and ex- 
1
port'. One of the first problems to exercise the minds of the
Board members was the growing scale of African maize farming.
During the late twenties and early thirties, the territory's
demand for maize had been greater than its producers could supply
and maize had to be imported from Southern Rhodesia to meet the
rising demand. A total of some 174,000 bags of maize were imported
2
during this period. The introduction of a flat rate on maize 
from Southern Rhodesia created problems of competition for local
settlers and there were several demands for protection from
3dumping. When in 1931 'foot and mouth disease broke out in Southern 
settling on it, they were allowed farming rights. Ibid.
4Ibid.
tr
ZA l/9/172/a, Z.N.A. Minutes of District Commissioner's Conference, 
October 1934. This cooperation was not always forthcoming. In 
1947 a Cadet complained of 'the weak and vacillating policy of 
Chief Sianjalika, who has not carried out the numerous orders 
for eviction or has allowed squatters to return after being 
evicted by others...' See Acc 21/43, Z.N.A. Maddocks to Officer 
in charge of Northern Rhodesia Police, 29.12.47.
^Hansard, 1st May, 1935? No. 24, Col. 7.
2Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Maize Control Memorandum, by C.J.Lewin, Director 
of Agriculture, 11.4.34.
3
In 1932, the Administration’s Chief Secretary commented on the 
rather paradoxical situation of a settler population calling for 
protection from Southern Rhodesian fanners while at the same time 
arguing for Amalgamation with that territory. See B&'/1, Z.N.A.
"Position of the Cattle Industry", Interview with His Excellency, 20.1.32
Rhodesia and the Union's Custons Agreement was suspended, local
producers gained a respite from Southern competition and from now
on, focussed more on the problems posed by African competition.^
In 19331 there was an exceptionally good crop and,by this time,
the crunch of the Depression was already being felt. Local demand
collapsed and the Northern Rhodesia Co-operative Society which
controlled 80°/o of settler produced maize, had to export over
70,000 bags at a low price. Settler farmers received only 6/- a
2
bag compared with 10s. lOd the previous season. African production
was increasing and settler producers who had alreatjr been advocating
such
the need for maize control,/ as was being operatedin Southern 
Rhodesia, intensified their demands. In 1932 various meetings had 
been held by farmers at Chisamba, Lusaka and Mazabuka to discuss 
the subject of maize control. After their discussions they con­
cluded that '... the deplorable condition in which producers find 
themselves as a result of their produce being sold.., at prices 
below the cost of production, the necessity of envisaging the pros­
pect of export overseas and the importance of all producers and
holders of grain bearing a share of the burden of export...1 made
3
the need for maize control inescapable. At a Maize Conference held
■^ Later, Northern Rhodesia's maize producers were protected from 
dumping by Southern Rhodesia's producers by a 'Gentleman's Agree­
ment'. fhis made it impossible for maize from the south to be 
sold at less than 12/6d a bag. See Report of the Maiza sub­
committee, 1933* Library of Mount Makulu Research Station 
(M.M.R.S.).
2Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum on Maize Control.
3
Ibid. Minutes of meeting of North-Western Rhodesia Farmers Co­
operative Society, 3-12.32.
in Livingstone in March 1933» attended by officials and farmers'
representatives, there wae a majority vote for maize control.’1'
Advocates of the policy had, however, to contend with the
opposition of G.J.Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, who had
taken a close look at the Southern Rhodesia Maize Control system
and was convinced that control, on the same lines, would not be in
the interest of the general farming community. In 193^h he
wrote: v
’In the long run, it ,/Maize Control/ will inevitably 
benefit . one section of the producers at the expense 
of another. The one pool system would benefit the 
low cost producers (i.e. the large growers and natives), 
the two pool system would benefit temporarily, at least, 
the majority of producers but would ruin the efficient 
farmers who have concentrated on maize production.’2
The Administration however decided to turn the matter over
to a maize sub-committee which was appointed by the Agricultural
Advisory Board at itsmeeting of 8th March, 1933- ^he Committee
was charged ’to consider the question of the marketing of maize
3
in Northern Rhodesia and to submit proposals’. After examining 
the situation, the Committee recommended Maize Control. Its 
views were very much in consonance with general opinion in the 
Legislative Council. Members of the Council argued stoutly in 
favour of Maize Control for many considered the measure vital for 
the protection of the settler farmer. Charles Knight, represent­
ing the Southern Electoral Area, believed that failure to adopt
^l/VAG/l/l, Z.N.A. Livingstone Maize Conference, 6th March,
1933.
2Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum in reference to proposed maize
control, 4.2.33.
3
Maize Control Memorandum, op.cit.
maize control would ’mean the elimination of the European farmer 
in this country...’ Other members tried to justify the Committee1 
suggestion that the African’s share of the internal market be 
restricted to a quarter of it, by arguing that this was necessary 
to help African producers against themselves. They believed that 
to encourage African producers to e:xpand their production was
simultaneously to encourage them to exhaust the fertility of their
r>
lands through overcropping.1' Captain Brown, representing Midland,
had this to say on the subject:
'One point which has been forcibly brought to the 
sub-comMttee1 s notice is that if natives persist 
in their present methods of cultivation, in a few 
years, owing to soil erosion... there is a great 
possibility of a considerable reduction in the pro­
duction of maize. Therefore, it is obvious that 
the natives must not be rashly encouraged to in­
crease their crops. The effect of this would be 
to ruin their gardens, rendering them useless in a 
short time, with little or no gain to themselves and 
untold loss to the territory.'
The Council had no doubts over the issue of Maize Control and it
therefore passed, unanimously, the Maize Control Ordinance No. 20
of 1933i which sought to protect white producers from the threats
posed by African competition.
Maize Control came into operation on the 1st May 1936. A
Maize Control Board was established and it was given the right to
^Hansard, 19th November, 19331 No. 29, Col. 71.
2Ibid., Col. 68.
3Ibid.
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.4.
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purchase and trade all maize at fixed prices. Two pools were
established, one for African, the other for white producers,
European producers were offered much higher prices for their maize
than their African counterparts. The internal market was divided
between theraces, the settlers having three-quarters of it, the
Africans the remaining quarter. The fixing of this ratio was
based on a review of average African maize sales during the three
years leading up to control. It was found out thah during this
period, African producers supplied only about one quarter of the
traded maize. This was quite an under-estimate of African maize
production as some officials, who demanded a review of the ratio,
and the Pim Commission,, were to point out later. At the Provincial
Commissioners Conference ofl9?6, District Commissioners criticized
the ratio as inequitable for, in their view, 'the natives had not
been allotted a fair share of the maize pool and they considered
1that the natives' share should be half1.
The Pim Commission was to criticize the ratio even more strongly 
as it demanded that it be reconsidered. It argued that maize 
purchased by traders was not a true reflection of African production 
and was, therefore, not an acceptable basis for the calculation 
of a ratio estimate. Traders, it explained, had purchased only 
as much African maize as they were sure of disposing of on the 
local market, since export facilities were not open to them. The 
Commission also criticized the Board for failing to deduct that 
substantial part of settler grown grain which was exported for,
^Sec/Nat/311, 2.N.A. Provincial Commissioner's Conference, 
1936.
by taking this to be part of the settlers' output in the local
market* it gave white producers an exaggerated lead.1
The Maize Control Boards area covered the plateau Tonga
regions stretching from Mazabuka to Choma, the Sala areas of the
East Mumtewa District, the Lenje of South Broken Hill District and
the Soli of East Lusaka District. Control provided for the dumping
of any maize surplus on the world maxket and in the event of either
pool failing to fulfil its quota* the other, if in excess, was
allowed to supply the shortage and receive credit for the part 
2
it met. African farmers had three main options for trading their 
maize*. They could surrender it to the Board, as Europeans did, 
in return for a participation certificate. This meant that they 
received payment from the Board in instalments, the final payment 
being made at the end of the pool year, after the Board had made 
all sales, closed its books and deducted its expenses from gross 
proceeds. Alternatively, they could dispose of produce for ready 
cash to traders or to the Board's staff at its local depots. The
last option was however extended only when the Board suspected
3
Traders of offering inadequate sums for grain. The majority of 
farmers in need of ready cash, or the goods and cash that some 
traders offered, went in for the last two options. Observations 
carried out during the first two seasons of Maize Control revealed
Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 
21.9.38. Also Sir Alan Pim, "Report of the Commission Appointed 
to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern 
Rhodesia", p.228.
2For details of Maize Control ., see R.E.Baldwin, Economic Development 
and Export Growth (London, 1966), p.131.
Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. "Pamphlet on Maize Control for distribution 
to Natives".
that the majority of African producers did not insist on cash 
payments for their maize, once they had received enough to pay 
their taxes and make some savings. Towards the end of the 
buying season, few farmers sold their produce to the Maize Con­
trol Board where only cash payments were made, the majority 
preferring the traders who gave both cash and goods.^ African 
farmers^appear to have preferred the traders to the Control Board 
because the trader bought maize that was less than a bagful 
if that was all the farmer could supply. The Control Board, on 
the other hand, insisted on full bags. Another factor making 
for the trader’s popularity was the fact that the Board charged 
about 7d a bag whenever the farmer had to purchase a new bag, un­
like the traders who accepted grain at a fixed price, albeit
2
at times in goods, no matter what sort of bag it was brought in.
The rising demand for grain during the mid thirties gave 
an added impetus to African maize production. Assured for the 
first time of an export outlet and ready cash for the maize they 
produced, African farmers stepped up their production and 
large turnovers were traded at the Maize Control Board’s 
depots and at trading stores. In the 1936/37 season the Board 
acquired some 23^,680 bags of African grown maize of which 
138,666 bags had been purchased by traders for £*fl,67*** A total 
of 76,01** bags were purchased by the Board direct from African 
growers and for this they received about £19,l8*f, an average of
Sec/AG/31, Z.N.A. ’’The Establishment of buying depots for the 
Maize Control Board in Native Reserves and suggesting resulting 
competition with Traders", by H.E.T.Benson.
2KDB 6/7/3A, Z.N.A. Tour report No. *f, 1936.
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1about 3/3d a bag. Total African, and European production was 
nearly three times the requirements of the local market. The
Board had to export 138,000 bags of the European crop and some
2
80,000 bags of the African."
The greater part of this African maize came from the Tonga 
plateau. This increase in production was of course due not only 
to the provision of an export outlet but also to the higher prices 
offered for maize following the revival of business activity after 
the Depression. Maize prices had risen from between 3/6d and 
3/-d a bag in 193A to 6/-d a bag in 1936-37.5 An African Boma 
clerk, Mwendaweli Lewanika, who made a tax: collection tour of the 
Monze^Cbisekesi and Pemba areas in October 1936, made the follow­
ing report:
'They sold their grain to the Maize Control Board 
for which they received cash in return and they seemed 
to appreciate it very much. There were hundreds and 
thousands of bags sold in this way not only to the 
Board but also to the local traders. Traders paid 
cash but sometimes goods. Natives brought this grain 
in new bags and sometimes in old bags and they trans­
ported them in wagons, sleighs and the like. Some of 
it was brought by women and children who carried it 
in baskets on their heads. This grain was generally 
sold to the trader and seldom to the Maize Control 
Board, who charged a fee for a new bag... From what 
I have heard natives say and from personal knowledge, 
the Maize Control Board has brought great benefit to 
the natives. Some of them who own big gardens have 
gained £3P to £100 this year which means a great deal 
to them.'
^Sec/AC/38, Z.N.A. Maize Control Board's report for 1936-37 season. 
2See Sir Alan Pim, ’’Report of the Cbfrimission Appointed to Enquire 
into the Financial and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia” 
(1938), p.13.
•^Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum on Maize Control.
StDB 6/7/3/A1 Z.N.A. Tax collection tour report, 2A.lO.36.
A Tonga farmer in a letter to Mutende, the African newspaper, 
in 1936 captured the feeling of the time when he wrote, ’This 
is a blessed year1.’*' In the bumper harvest of 1936, about 117,000 
bags of African produced maize were traded in the Mazabuka District 
and, in the following year, 92,802 bags left the reserves for the 
market.^
Farming activities between 1936 and 19A6.
The Maize Control Board had been set up primarily because 
of concern about the turn-over of African producers in the re­
serves and the fear that they would over-supply the market and 
force white producers out of business. The output of both European 
and African producers during the greater part of the late thirties 
and early forties, however, failed to live up to the glut proportions
which had been envisaged and the Control Board never acquired,
3
during these years, the surplus it was set up to regulate. The 
efforts of African and European producers to expand their maize 
outlay did not prove as rewarding as expected and total output 
failed, repeatedly, to keep pace with an ever rising commercial 
demand.
The expansion of the Copperbelt during the years after the
A
Depression provided the largest market for maize and cattle and 
total consumption almost doubled between 1933 a^ td 19^0 as the mines
*1
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.A.
^Native Affairs report, 1937, P-A2.
3
In his report for 1932-53 season, the Chairman of the Maize Con­
trol Board was to observe: ’It is quaint to recall the object
for which it //he Maize Control Board/ was established, for it 
has never once had to carry it out,’ Maize Control Board report, 
1952-3, p.3.
^In 1937, the Copper mines purchased 80°/o of the beef sold in 
the territory. See Sir Alan Pim, on.cit., p.253.
124
icontinued to attract more workers. The supply of maxze, 
however, failed to keep pace with this expansion even though 
on the Tonga plateau, for instance, more producers were taking 
to full-time farming as reflected in the decline in labour 
migration.2 This fall in output was mainly caused by a series 
of bad harvests due to adverse weather conditions beginning in 
the 1937-38 growing season. There was very little farm expansion
during this period and in 1938 the average family unit on the
■5
plateau was estimated to be only 6 acres, in spite of the 
widespread use of the plough. European growers within the 
territory suffered the additional handicap that the Government 
denied them the loans for which they had repeatedly been asking.
^Agriculture Department Annual Report, 19^0, p.l.
2In 1938, the Provincial Commissioner noted; 'Comparatively few 
seek work outside the Territory and those that do, return to 
their homes at frequent intervals, therefore the problem of 
emigrant labour is not a serious one in the Southern Province. 
There is no perceptible effect on the birth rate and farm pro­
duction is increasing.1 See Native Affairs Report, 1938, p.37.
•^ Native Affairs Report, 1938, p.2. It appears as though the six- 
acre farm was, at this time, the ideal size for a fermer and his 
family to handle on their own without having to raise much 
capital or employ extra labour. This however needs further in­
vestigation.
In 19^5» W.Allan and others were to point out that the use of 
the plough had not resulted generally in larger plots being culti­
vated. See W.Allen et alia, op.cit.« p.113.
Many of them were forced to reduce the acreages they culti­
vated.1 By 19^0* white producers found themselves incapable of supply­
ing the 260,000 bags of maize which their quota of the internal 
2
market required. The Agriculture Department's report for 1939
commented on 'the decline in European and Native production /which/
has coincided with a remarkable increase in local consumption...' 'This
it continued, 'has turned a substantial export surplus into a deficit
3
which has had to be made good by imports.' Total production within
the territory dropped from over 500,000 bags in 1936 to 2171000
bags in 1939* at a time when domestic commercial consumption had
increased from just over 200,000 bags annually to about 3^0,000 
L
bags. The decline in local production and the cost of maize import s
1In 1936 European producers planted some 13»5^1 acres; 
acres in 1937; 1^»051 in 1938 and only 131^ 65 in 1939. See 
relevant Agriculture Department Annual reports.
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 19^0, p.l. European pro­
duction for sale to the Control Board declined sharply between 
1936 and 1939. It was llA-,518 bags in 1936; 110, 729 bags in
1937; 89*^30 bags in 1938 and 80,162 bags in 1939. It rose to
over 202,000 bags in 19^0, dropped to 120,000 bags in 19^1 and 
was just over 1*5-6,000 bags in 19*+2. See relevant Agriculture 
Department Annual reports.
3
Agriculture Department Annual report, 19391 p.3.
4
1forced the territory into maize rationing in 19^ -3 and again in 
2
19*5-7. African sales to the Maize Control Board showed a steep 
and continuous decline between 1936 and 1939. During the latter 
year, there was a partial revival but 1941 sales were the lowest 
yet. Thereafter, sales rose gradually and in 19*5-3 exceeded
200,000 bags (see Table I).
Table I
Production per bag for sale to the 
Maize Control Board (Territorial)
Date « European African
1937 110/79-9 161,000*
1938 - $%  ^ 0 126,000
1939 64,000
19*f0 202,300 118,200
11941 120,000 38,000
19*5-2 l*f6,000 51,000
19*5-3 144,000 60,000
19*f*t- 212,000 115,000
19*5-5 273,000 202,000
19*5-6 268,000 172,000
Compiled frcmvarious Agriculture Department Annual reports.
* 26,000 bags of this total were a carry over from the previous season
^Agriculture Department Annual report, 19*5-3j p.l.
2Government notice No. 59 of 19*+7 asked 'every employer of 
African labour who provided his ... employees or their dependents 
with rations comprising maize or maize meal ... to reduce every 
ration by one quarter*. Maize Control Board Annual report, 19*5-6- 
V?, p.10.
Meanwhile, Tonga farmers had begun to grow another cash 
crop. The expansion of African maize cultivation in the early 
and mid thirties gave rise to some concern in the Agriculture 
Department which was aware of the dangers of monoculture. In 
1935» it began to give serious thought to the promotion of a 
rotation crop. The crop they decided on was cotton. This was 
quite a reversal of policy for the cultivation of this crop by 
Africans had been discouraged in the past by an Agriculture De­
partment which saw cotton and tobacco as crops best left in the
1hands of white producers. On the Tonga plateau* officials of
the Agriculture Department embarked on a propaganda campaign aimed
at getting more African, farmers to plant cotton. They had very
little success outside the Siamaundu and Sianjalika Chieftaincies.
In the former area the number of cultivators rose from A in 1935 
2
to 30 in 1936. By the start of the 1936-37 season there were
3
100 cotton growers in the area and 7 in the Sianjalika area.
Cotton, however, lacked the appeal of maize. It was not 
only a non-subsistence crop but, unlike maize, its cultivation re­
quired a great deal of the farmer's attention, especially for 
weeding the young crop in its seedling stage. Not only was it 
more profitable to grow maize, but the risk factor in the cultivation
"^ In 1931» Moffat Thomson had written in a despatch: 'The Agri­
culture Department is not particularly anxious for natives to 
cultivate cotton and tobacco for esqport, because of the danger 
of introducing cotton pests and the production of a tobacco so 
poor in quality that it would get Northern Rhodesia a bad name 
on the overseas markets'. See ZA 3/2/2, Z.N.A. Moffatt Thomson 
to Chief Secretary, 21.12.31.
2Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.10.
of cotton was higher in that the crop was prone to attack by-
pests. For instance, whereas in the 1936 season, the highest cotton
yield in the Siamaundu area was 260 lbs and the mean 179 lbs per
acre,'*' a severe attack of the stainer (Dysdercus fasciatus) during
the 1937 season, depressed the cotton output considerably. The
highest yield in that year in the Siamaundu area was only 91 lbs
per acre, the mean being some 2A lbs. Although the situation
improved in 1938 when a record average yield of *fl6 lbs was re-
ported, a number of would-be producers were discouraged from
growing the crop. As a result, groundnuts and beans which were
A
'equally saleable and more popular' continued to serve farmers
as rotation crops, with a handful of farmers resorting to cotton
occasionally in cases where the soil was judged incapable of yield-
15
ing an adequate maize return. In 1939* the Agriculture Depart­
ment, presumably reacting to the poor response to its campaign, 
decided to abandon its cotton promotion campaign although it con­
tinued to maintain small experimental plots in its demonstration 
gardens.6
1
Agriculture Department Annual Report, 1936, P-9-
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1937, p.9.
3
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, pp. 6-7
A
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, PP. 6-7
5^Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, P.8.
^Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, P. 7.
The overcropping ofmedze in certain parts of the reserves
was quite a serious problem for the Agriculture Department during
the late thirties and forties and, as will be seen later, it was
to be forced into promoting a soil conservation and improved
farming campaign. As maize monoculture increased, the soils, over
certain parts of the reserves, were becoming ever more unproductive
and as yields declined, African farmers were going further afield
in search of fresh lands. In 1933, Traphell and Clothier, in the
1
course of their Ecological Survey, described the agricultural 
practices of the Tonga. In the southern areas, they observed very 
little change "for farmers were still operating largely on
traditional lines. The heavily wooded nature of the area restricted 
the use of the plough and many families were still using the hoe. 
Sorghum was still the main food crop grown although the commercial 
demand for maize was making its cultivation more popular. In their 
bush and villa^ gardens, families continued to produce bulrush and 
finger millet, sweet potatoes, cassava, groundnuts and various legumes 
A bush garden was usually cultivated for about three years and then 
rested for between one to three years. After it had regained some 
of its lost fertility, it was again worked for a further two years 
before being allowed a further fallow period of about twenty years 
or more.
In the more northern areas, particularly in areas of transi­
tional and acacia-type soils, they discovered that farming practices
See relevant sections of the Report of the Ecological Survey, 
op.cit.
had moved further away from the traditional pattern. Because the 
land in these areas was comparatively more fertile and required 
relatively less stumping, large-scale maize farming with the 
use of ox-drawn ploughs was more popular. Fallow periods were 
much shorter than in the south and some fields were in a state 
of almost continuous cropping. Most fanners were responding to 
the demand for maize by putting more land under the crop. Con­
sequently they grew less of the other traditional rotation crops.
In most areas, maize had supplanted sorghum as the staple crop.
By 1937* when the findings of another survey were made 
known, it looked as though the problem of overcropping in certain 
sections of the southern and south-central parts of the plateau 
was becoming, almost as critical as in the north. This survey was 
done on 23 farms in the Siamaundu area where the standard of maize 
cultivation was slightly higher, partly because of the influence 
of the local agricultural station. The investigations revealed 
an average maize yeild of 3 /2 bags per acre and observed that 
whereas good thorn or dambo soils were capable of yielding over 
six bags to the acre after several years of cropping, the light 
transitional soils, ’the most commonly cultivated soils of this 
area', gave initially a very good yield, but thereafter output de­
clined sharply under sustained maize cropping. Some farmers working 
transitional soils were found to have realised some 9^/2 bags to 
the acre;., in their second year, and only two bags by the eighth.
Some of these farms were even yielding as little as a quarter or 
half a bag per acre after a few years cropping.^ Such evidence con­
vinced administative officials of the urgent need to check overcropping,
1
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1937» p*12.
especially in the light of the inherently poor quality of 
most of the soils in the reserves.
Although no statistical evidence appears to exist on this, it 
does seem that the number of families involved in commercial farming 
on the plateau, increased considerably between 1933 and 1945. A 
survey of African maize production in the fourteen Chieftaincies of 
the plateau revealed in 1945 that for the 1943-44 season an estimated
17,000 families produced for sale to the Maize Control Board some 
107,8l8 bags of maize. According to the survey, 9,095 of the 
families studied, who farmed primarily for subsistence and pro­
duced for sale an average of four bags each on farms that were 
usually less than 24 acres in size, turned out about 36*380 bags. 
2,431 families in the 'smallholder* category, i.e. farmers who sold 
between 11 and 100 bags and whose farms were usually over 24 acres 
in size, produced for sale to the Board about 33*913 bags. The 
third group, that of large-scale farmers, an estimated 69 families 
with holdings ranging between 40 and 200 acres or more, sold about
13*323 bags. The survey estimated that about 5*405 families sold
2
no maize at all during the season. This was not a true reflection 
of the size of the subsisrbence farming category, if one can even talk 
of one at this time, for the survey was carried out at a time when
1The Maize Control Board received 115,000 bags of maize from African 
producers throughout the territory during this season (see Agri­
culture Department Annual report, 1944, p.l). That 107,8l8 
bags of this total should come from the plateau producers alone, 
gives an idea of the scale of this area's contribution to total 
African maize production,
2
See Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage among the plateau 
Tonga of Mazabuka District", Dhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. l4,
1 9 4 5 ,  p . 84.
the plateau was just beginning to pull through a succession of 
poor seasons and farmers who would otherwise have traded grain
1
were having to use their maize mainly for domestic consumption.
Another study carried out on the plateau during the 1950s later 
revealed that the plateau Tonga farmers of Mazabuka and north
Choma Districts produced about 70°/o of the maize grown by African
2
farmers along the line of rail.
Maize farming brought relatively substantial cash rewards to many 
of the large scale farmers and it is estimated that some of them had 
gross cash incomes of between £600 and £1,000 in the years between
•z
19^ -6 and 1950. To the vast majority of African farmers who were
bconfined by residence rules introduced in 1958 to much smaller gardens 
and who lacked the capital to make the necessary investment in farming 
equipment, the return from maize sales was not as rewarding. Farmers 
in the latter group were convinced that their lot would only improve 
if the Administration made more land available to them. The Admini­
stration, on the other hand, was determined to see the African farmer 
improve his farming methods on his existing plot. As a result, no posi­
tive action was to be taken to grant more land to Africans till 19^7* 
Instead, attention was focussed on the long neglected problems of 
African land settlement, land uee and tenure and these were to be in­
vestigated during the mid-^^Os. The solutions arrived at were to have 
serious repercussions on the development of African commercial farming 
and on the growth of a political awareness on the Tonga plateau,
■^ See C.E.Johnson, ’’African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize 
Areas of Northern Rhodesia”, Agricultural Bulletin, No. 11, 1956. 
Johnson, op,cit., p.^ f.
^See K.R.M. Anthony and Victor Uchendu, Agricultural Change in Mazabuka 
District, Reprinted from Food Research Institute Studies in Agricultural 
Economics, Trade and Development, Vol. IX, No. 39(stanford, 1970'), p.49.
2|.
This is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter IV
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS 
OF TONGA AGRICULTURE
During the 19^0s, the Administration attempted to regulate 
the land problems which had arisen out of the expansion of African 
maize production on the Tonga plateau. The subject of land usage 
was fundamental in this exercise and this area being the centre 
of African grain production, it was considered vital that the work 
of land rehabilitation should start here.’1' The measures adopted 
to combat the twin problems of land misuse and soil depletion 
were to have wide ranging socio-political repercussions throughout 
the area.
The expanding demand for maize which came with the revival 
on the Copperbelt exacerbated the land settlement problems facing 
the Native Authorities in the reserves. The problem of village 
disintegration had first manifested itself during the years of the 
Depression, when large groups of villagers began to drift out of 
reserve boundaries to establish homesteads in unoccupied alienated 
or Crown lands. Even within the reserves-it became increasingly 
difficult in the early thirties to contain farmers within their 
villages. Headmen, whose responsibility it was to keep an eye on 
the movement of people into and out of their villages found great 
difficulty in performing this function. According to one report, 
there were two main classes of Africans who were involved in this
1
In 19^6 it was reported that conservation work in the Southern 
Province has been confined to some fourteen of the plateau Tonga 
Chieftaincies which'form the e&re of the native maize growing 
area and constitute, from a purely economic point of view, the 
most important native area of the territory.' See Agriculture 
Department Annual report, 19A6, p.6.
practice of establishing homesteads outside the boundaries of 
their villages. One was the tax dodger, the other the ambitious 
farmer who, caught up in a situation where the supply of good 
land was slowly dwindling, was determined to get as much of it 
as he could while the going was good.'*'
The splintering of a number of Tonga villages gave the 
Administration much concern for local officials were convinced that 
dispersed settlements would lessen ’the control of the Headmen, 
and therefore of Native Authorities, that crime is likely to go
undetected in such small settlements ... and the Authority of the
2
Chief is likely to be impaired generally'. The steadily expand­
ing market for maize exacerbated the problem of village disintegration 
for farmers now became very eagerto put as much land as possible 
under maize. This led to the widespread fragmentation of holdings 
as cultivators esspanded out of their villages, some, at the same 
time, retaining their original homesteads and farms. A class of 
Tonga farmers who were producing up to 600 bags of maize a season 
was beginning to emerge and, within this group, the desire to live 
outside the orbit of day to day social obligations to neighbour­
ing kinsmen was slowly becoming apparent. A number of these large 
scale cultivators had received their education at the Seventh Day 
Adventists’ Rusangu mission or at the Catholics' Chikuni Head­
quarters. Several of them had later served as teachers under these 
missions or as clerks to the plateau Tonga Native Authority and had
■hxUB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
2KDB 6/7/31 Z.N.A. Quarterly report, January to March, 1932.
X o) il
now retired to the traditional vocation of farming. Because they tended
to settle in areas that had been hitherto uninhabited, such as Keemba
Hill, they came to possess very large farms which they operated by
employing both family and wage labour. These farmers kept very few
dependants and were thus in a better position than most to cater for
1the needs of their immediate families.
In 1957* the Provincial report commented on the growing indivi­
dualism which was becoming so pronounced not only among the large-scale 
cultivators but also within the ranks of the less well-to-do:
'The tendency towards individualism continues and is 
due to a number of different causes. Maize control 
has engendered a demand for large acreages and is re­
sponsible for the growth of a class of Native farmers; 
the individual now acquires and retains wealth, in­
stead of sharing it with the community; the educated 
are dissociating themselves from the illiterate and 
the Christian from the pagan.12
It now appeared as if the egalitarian character of Tonga society 
was being further undermined as a result of contact with the new 
economic said social forces that were operating on the plateau. New 
social groupings were forming for the introduction of the money economy
and western education encouraged the individual to branch out on the
3road to self improvement. Tonga society was already producing its 
quota of teachers, pastors, traders, clerks etc. and a local literati 
as distinct from the majority of uneducated farmers was already 
blossoming. In the changing social climate, it was hardly surprising 
that the old way of life was being challenged in several areas. An 
official who toured the Mwanachingwala, Monze and Chongo areas in 1938 
observed that 'the old sanctions have broken down and the new freedom
^Interviews on the plateau.
2
Native Affairs report, 1937» pp. 37-38,
■^ See Chapter IV, p£>*
has brought with it something very like licence1. The people he en­
countered were 'generally rich in cattle' and he found 'small settle­
ments ranging from one to two huts to a dozen or so... widely 
scattered over the reserve'. He discovered that the 'nominal 
Headmen' had little influence and 'got the impression, especially
among the younger men and women... of disrespect for authority and
1dislike of restraint in any form'.
To check this tendency towards a proliferation of homesteads and
the continued erosion of the authority of Chiefs and Headmen, the
Administration got the Native Authorities to pass, in September, 1938, 
the Ten Tax-payer rule. This provided that any villager who did not 
intend to continue as part of the village under which he was registered, 
and decided to move out, should secure nine other people to reside with
him in the new area of his choice. Only if there were ten people in
the new settlement, would it be recognised as a village. New settle­
ments which contained anything lower than the prescribed ten villagers, 
were to be disbanded and their occupants sent back to their original homesteads.^
The recognition of their right to live wherever they chose pleased
the Tonga farmers immensely and a number of new villages were estab­
lished. Mambo village in the Gohnwe area, Kazembe village around 
Siatontola and Mpongo village in Chief Chongo's area are just a few 
of the new villages that were established after 1938.
In the new and old villages the expansion of maize cultivation imposed 
a heavy toll on the land. The greater part of reserve land was made up 
of poor plateau soils and the more fertile tracts of Upper Valley and
   —      -
1KDB 6/7/5A, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 7 1938.
^KDB 6/7/3/H, Z.N.A. S.D.Facey's tour report, May-June 1932.
3^Interviews on the plateau.
acacia/thorn soils were few and far between. The lands of the re­
serves were being subjected to much pressure, with very reduced 
fallow periods as farmers were neglecting the traditional crop 
rotations in preference for maize monoculture. This, coupled with 
the existence of very large herds, especially in some of the Chief­
taincies to the west of the railway and of erosion-prone sloping 
lands in Chieftaincies on or adjoining the escarpment, raised serious 
problems over both arable and grazing land. Lewin, the Director of 
Agriculture, noted in 1936 that ’ploughing has increased considerably...
The native has become hard of hearing if not deaf to offers for his cattle.
Even before the introduction of maize control, some touring officials 
had observed and commented upon some rather disturbing features of 
Tonga farm practice, during the late twenties and early thirties.
In 193^» C.G.Trapnell had spent some time observing the farming methods 
of a number of villages in Chief Siamaundu’s area in reserve No. XI.
His investigations revealed that African producers were taking to large 
scale farming and forsaking the traditional rotation of crops. He 
observed the tendency to expand in search of fertile land, as farmers 
left the ’traditional dense bush and woodland cultivations' for ’hook- 
thorn damboes’ and ’open transitional country’. Farmers were expand­
ing in this way,shifting ’... ten and twenty acres cultivations’, be­
cause the lands into which they moved demanded relatively little stump­
ing. But, as Trapnell panted out, the practice of shifting cultivation 
augmented ’... land shortage in belts already densely populated.’
^Agriculture Departments Annual report, 1936, p.^ +.
i J 3
His report vividly described the transformation in farm
practice that was taking place in this area and which was not
very unlike what was happening in some of the other Chieftaincies:
’The valuable Tonga cow pea or kaffir bean is.,, 
being given up in the larger open bush cultivations.
More maize is now grown than kaffir corn, European 
strains being grown more extensively for sale and 
early maturing native strains for home consumption 
only. The cultivation of finger millet, originally 
important, disappears as the dense bush areas are 
left. Its cultivation, dependent on ash, is now 
only practised as an accessory to stumping. The 
tendency is thus towards pure maize cultivations.
All gardens except the finger millet, sweet potato 
and some legume gardens are now ploughed.
In several areas over-cultivation and overgrazing led to
soil erosion. This was particularly acute in the Chieftaincies
towards the Gwembe valley, where the hilly nature of the land
made it easily susceptible. The uphill and downhill ploughing
of maize lands, in these areas, produced innumerable furrows and
2large areas were slowly rendered useless.
The type of African transport that was being widely used 
also contributed to the problem of erosion. Although some of the 
richer farmers owned scotch carts and wagons, the majority of 
Tonga producers settled for wooden sledges, which were much easier
p
See C.G.Trapnell, Report on the problems of Agricultural Develop­
ment among the Batonga of reserve XI, 31.1,3^ (C.O. 795/71? P„R.O.).
2
See Sir Alan Pirn, Re-port of the Commission Ap-pointed to Enquire 
into the Financial and Economic -position of Northern Rhodesia 
(1938), p.66. Also Native Affairs report, 1937? p.^3.
-^ Some of the richer Tonga entrepreneurs hired out their scotch- 
carts for the transporting of maize at the rate of l/- a bag.
If oxen were also required, they charged l/6d a bag. See KDB 
6/7/5A? Z.N.A. Tour report No. 5? 1938.
to come by and involved virtually no maintenance cost. The
sledges did a lot of damage to the land as they were pulled
along by oxen with their loads of maize, building poles and 
1firewood.
The deteriorating land situation in several of the reserves 
forced the Administration to take a closer interest in the prob­
lems of African agriculture. Up to the mid thirties, the 
attention of the Agriculture Department had been solely concen­
trated on the problems of settler farming. The Department, suffer­
ing from heavy retrenchment during the years of the Depression, 
had studiously avoided involvement in African farming activity.
In 1933, Lewin, its Director, had written tht 'in the interest of 
the territory as a whole, while no artificial obstacles to the
entry of the native into the maize market should be imposed, no
2
direct encouragement should be given.' African producers were 
left to their own designs and the hopes of the 1926 Deserves Com­
missioners for the supervised development of African farming in 
the reserves, were not realised. There was no policy for the develop­
ment of African farming and this was admitted by Levin in 1933* when
1Sledges were also used to transport women and children on shopping 
visits to the stores at Monze. See KDB 6/7/3/1* 2.N.A. Tour of 
Native Commissioner Hinds, May-June, 1927.
o
Sec/AG/A7* 2.N.A. "Memorandum on the future policy and organisation 
of the Department of Agriculture", 9.S.33. In 1931* the Director 
of Agriculture had attempted to justify the lack of agricultural 
assistance to Africans along the line of rail with the following re­
mark: 'If the whole of this /J-ocsX? market were taken by the
native (as it might well be, with the exception of a very few 
commodities, should deliberate attempts be made to foster the pro­
duction of crops for this purpose), the European population would 
be rapidly driven off the land and it is hard to see how the in­
dividual native would greatly be benefitted, for his share of 
the proceeds would be infinitesimal*. See Agriculture Department 
Annual report., 1931* p.l6.
he wrote: 'No organised attempt to deal with the problems of
native agriculture has been made in Northern Rhodesia; in fact
its vast field is practically unexplored. '"**
The problems posed by African farming in the mid-thirties,
however, made it impossible for the Department to continue its
detachment. In 193&* its officials tried to analyse African
ihrming methods with a view to introducing a more conservative
agriculture. In the annual report for that year, they wrote:
'More land is ploughed (and usually inefficiently 
ploughed) than can be adequately cultivated. The 
native has not been able to solve the problem of 
weeding large acreages - a problem which did not 
arise when he was content with sound home cultivation.
Where he has attempted to maintain the fertility of 
his soil with kraal manure, this has merely accentuated 
the weed problem. Finally, the demand for large gardens 
has led to ploughing of land which should have remained 
unbroken. The solution of his problems lies in "better 
crops from smaller acreages".’2
In 1936, extension work started on the plateau ina bid to arrest 
a deteriorating land situation. The Kanchomba station was opened 
in the area of Chief Siamaundu some twelve miles from Pemba and 
the so-called 'Kanchomba System* of farming was adopted. The 
Siamaundu area was the one of which Trapnell had written in 193^ 
and the presence, here, of a very co-operative Chief in the person 
of Jakr.as Mondeh Siamaundu, made the choice of area almost obvious. 
The Kanchomba system, for soil conservation, involved the use of 
kraal manure or compost and a basic rotation of crops. The Agri­
culture Department employed local farmers to demonstrate on their
^Sec/AG/^, Z.N.A, Memorandum on the future policy..., op.cit. 
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.l^.
farms the value of the new system.
The missions, which had shown great interest in the develop­
ment of local farming, were brought in by the Administration to 
help with the soil conservation programme. The Chief Education 
Officer, P.S.Tregear,and the Agricultural Officer, Kanchomba, 
J.N.Clothier, co-operated closely in the establishment of the school 
gardens programme. In various schools, demonstration gardens, 
supplied, at first, with equipment and manure by the parents of 
pupils, ^ were established. The work of supervising these gardens 
was initially in the hands of the Agriculture Departments staff 
but as demands rose, African Agricultural Assistants trained at 
Kanchomba were attached to the various missions.
In June 1937, the Governor appointed a committee 'to consider 
the most practicable means of combat/j^ erosion, particularly in 
the Southern Province' and in September, the Secretary of State
in a despatch urged the Administration to embark on a programme
2for the improvement of African agriculture. This seemed to have 
goaded the Director of Agriculture into releasing a memorandum con­
taining plans for the improvement of African farming in January 1938. 
Emphasis was to be laid on that part of the territory which he re­
ferred to as 'the Area", and which was made up of parts of re-
5serves Nos. XI and XIII, in the Tonga areas, as well as two other
1 *Later as parents recognised the benefits of scientific farming,
they became less generous with their manure and implements. By 
19^ -8, the Agriculture Department had to provide school gardens in 
the Monze and Magoye areas with oxen and implements. See Agri­
culture Department Annual report, 19^8.
2Sec/AG/V7, Z.N.A. Secretary of State's despatch No. ^89, 23rd 
September, 1937.
^Among plateau Tonga Chieftaincies in 'The Area' were those of
Naluama, Sianjalika, Mwanza, Siamaundu, Moyo, Mwanachingwala, 
Chongo, Monze and Siamusonde.
/I 9JL
reserves outside Tongaland. The area was said to be responsible
if. 2
for producing 'fully /5 of the native maize and /3 of the native
1cattle offered for sale...1 in the territory. These valuable 
lands had, therefore, to be protected from ruin. Lewin knew that 
the soil conservation programme was bound to run into some opposition 
from local farmers. He realised that difficulties were sure to be 
encountered in pushing through a programme of improved farming 
methods which was 'not likely to have any appeal whatever unless 
and until the native realizes that he can make money by their 
adoption...1 But he was fully convinced of the need for anti­
erosion works, such as contour ridges, if 'the fertility of land 
which has been protected from erosion must be maintained'. He 
called for an air survey of the Area 'to map the gardens ... to re­
cord where erosion is most serious or likely to become most serious
and to note where groups of gardens could be protected by small com- 
2
raunal schemes...'
On the question of whether farmers should be compelled to cooperate 
with the soil conservation programme, Lewin's stand was quite clear.
He ivrote: 'As far as the native farmer is concerned, it is sug­
gested that he should not only be compelled to allow the organisation 
to carry out such conservation works as are necessary on his land
3
but thereafter that he should be compelled tokeep them in repair'. 
Herein lay the seeds of the confrontations that were later to bedevil 
the soil conservation programme.
Sec/AG/^71 Z.N.A. "Memorandum on the work of the Agriculture He 
partment", by C.J.Lewin, 25.1.38.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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Within the Siamaundu area, the response of African farmers
to the Kanchomba system was rather cautious at first but the in-
1fluence of the Chief, who was a keen farmer himself, gradually 
brought some people round to 'Kolozia1s*2 ideas. By 1937-8, 
the work of the Kanchomba Instructors began to yield fruits.
One of the local demonstrators was a farmer called Kalebe. He 
received a year's training at Kanchomba after which he was ap­
pointed a Demonstrator on his farm which was just about 6 acres 
in size and situated on sloping ground which was already showing 
signs of sheet erosion. Kalebe!s garden was divided into four 
sections by contour ridges and, with his family,he cropped the land 
under the following rotation pattern: 'Maize (manured or com­
posted); Maize (unraanured); Cotton and groundnuts; Maize inter­
planted with cowpeas'. For the 1937-8 season, which was a poor 
one, Kalebe's farm was reported as having 'stood out like an island 
in a sea of poor crops'. At the Kateya Agricultural Show of 1938,
he won the first prize for maize, the judges of the competition be-
3ing 'local farmers who were unaware of his identity'. In the 
following year, several farmers turnedup at the Kanchomba station 
with requests for contour ridges and grass strips on their lands 
and they also showed willingness to follow the principles of the 
Kanchomba system. Twenty of them were selected and the Agriculture 
Department's report for 1939» commenting on their progress, observed
^In 1933, Chief Siamaundu was reported as having 'no less than 
seven crops in his lands'. See KDB 6/l/l/6, Z.N.A. District Office 
report, 1933*
2'Kolozia' was the Tonga version of Clothier, the name of the 
Chief Agricultural Officer at the Kanchomba station.
■^Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, p. 13.
that '... the results are most encouraging and the wide scatter 
of improved gardens cannot fail to pave the way to general 
improvement1
By 19 Al there were about 119 farmers practising the Kan-
chomba system, the majority coming from Chief Siamaundu*s area,
with a few from the neighbouring Chieftaincies of Monze, Ufwenuka
and Chona. Official ideas about improved farming were beginning
to capture the imagination of a section of the farming community
and some of the Chiefs, notably Siamaundu, began to punish people
who refused to heed the advice the Kanchomba station offered.
In I9A1 it was reported that 'up and down hill ploughing has
ceased over wide areas thanks to the prompt dealing with offenders
3
by the more enlightened Native Authorities'.
The main attraction o f the Kanchomba system appears to have 
been in the radical increase in yields it showed. A sample survey 
of turnover before and after certain farmers had adopted the system 
was carried out in 19A0, It revealed that, before adoption, they 
realised an average yield of something in the region of A36 lbs 
per acre, whereas after practising rotations, their production rose
Ato some 1,176 lbs to the acre.
The impact of the Kanchomba system up to I9A0 was very limited
The majority of farmers outside Chief Siamaundu*s area never heard 
about it and they continued to farm uninfluenced by its new ideas.
1Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939» p.10.
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 19 Al, p.2. 
•^Ibid.
AAgriculture Department Annual report, 19A0, p .A.
In 19AO it was, however, decided to spread the system and
p
Agricultural stations were opened at Monze and Magoye. By the
end of that year, some 6A miles of contour ridges' and 18 miles
of grass strips had been laid out, mainly in the Chisekesi and
Pemba regions of Ufwenuka and Siamaundu Chieftaincies. These
works protected about 3,700 acres of farmland. The Agriculture
Department had also embarked on the demarcation of permanent
grazing and forest areas. By the end of I9A0 about 8,700 acres
had been assigned to these categories. Of this, some 600 acres
\tfere badly situated gardens which were on erosion prone sites and
2
whose owners were told to cease cultivating them.
The Agriculture Departments land improvement drive also 
covered the question of African transport. Efforts were made to 
discourage the use of sledges and a sledge tax was even contemplated
although it was never imposed, partly because of the spirited opposition
3
of some of the Chiefs,notably Sianjalika, and their people. The 
existence of a wheel tax of 3/- per wheel on scotch carts and
Awagons, appears to have discouraged a lot of farmers from going 
in for these vehicles and increased the popularity of sledge 
transport. The Kanchomba station endeavoured to meet the needs 
of the bigger farmers for wheeled transport and at its 1939 Agri­
cultural Show, vehicles ranging, in price, from £9.10/- to £18 were
In 1930 and 1932, Agricultural Stations were opened at Mapangazia 
and Mapanza respectively.
2Agriculture Department Annual report, 19A0, p.A. Between 19A0 and 
19AA, AA,300 acres of cultivated land was protected by contour 
ridges and grass strips in the Southern province (see Agriculture 
Department Annual report, 19A3i p.7). By I9A7, the area under 
protection was some 62,000 acres. Agriculture Department Annual 
report, 19A7, p.9.
■^ KDB 6/7/3/A, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1938.
Asec/AG/31, Z.N.A. Minute by one K.B., A.11.38.
put on display. Few farmers were, however, prepared to go to 
such expense and it was reported that 'enquiries were many but 
money was short and buyers were coy1.'*'
A pamphlet containing improved farming instructions, compiled 
by the Rev. A.M.Jones of St. Marks College, Mapanza, and Mr. Lewin, 
the Director of Agriculture, was published in 19^ and made avail­
able to interested farmers and schools. It provided information 
on such subjects as the maintenance of contour ridges, the pro­
tection of land from furrows, the preparation of manure, the use
2
of green manure and the protection of harvested crops from pests.
In the same year the Plateau Tonga Native Authority was in­
duced into passing the 7th of January lav/ which prohibited the plant­
ing of maize or corn after the 7th of January in any year. This 
was designed to check the enthusiasm of undercapitalised producers 
who depended on the use of their neighbour's ploughs and v/hose 
lands were always cultivated very late in the.season, when the 
cereals had very little hope of coming to maturity. It v/as hoped 
that the law would encourage the planting of beans v/hich was usually
3
carried out at the end of the formal maize planting period.
To enforce this and other conservation orders, a force of Land
Messengers was recruited, trained and handed over to the Native
Authorities, who met their wages out of a grant from the Maize
h
Pools Stabilization Fund. The problem of enforcement was to be a
"''Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939) p. 10. Although the 
Plateau Tonga Native Authority gave an undertaking to discourage 
the use of sledges, it achieved little success. Sledge transport 
is still widely used.
2
See "Agriculture for Africans in the maize belt of northern 
Rhodesia", M.M.R.S.
Agriculture Department Annual report, 19^, p.3-
^Ibid.
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crucial one for the future for the conservation programme was 
not expected to be popular with the African farmers. Some 
scholars have even questioned'the need for such a policy during 
the 19^ +0s. How serious, for instance, was the problem of land mis­
use? How widespread was the overcropping and overcultivation that 
officials referred to, considering the fact that most African 
farmers were operating on a small scale? Baldwin has even argued 
that the problem of overcropping must have been exaggerated or the 
ability of African farmers to improve their farming methods under­
rated since we know that agricultural output in Northern Rhodesia 
showed a substantial increase during the 1940s and 1950s. An area 
that had suffered widespread land misuse could bardly have recorded 
such returns.'*' Because we do not have reliable production statistics 
for the Tonga plateau's African farmers, it is difficult to estimate 
the extent to which grain output was affected by land misuse over 
the years. There was obviously a measure of overcultivation in some 
of the reserves but this was largely the work of a small fraction of 
the area's population. Besides, as the 1957 survey had indicated,
2
different soils responded in different ways to continuous cropping.
Whereas this practice may have presented a serious threat in areas 
with poor plateau soils, it would have had far less serious repercussions, 
at least in the short-term, in those areas covered in rich Hpper Valley 
and thorn soils. Although it was in the long-term interest of Tonga 
agriculture that farming methods should be improved, there was, perhaps, 
a need for a more selective application of the conservation policy.
This is however a question that requires further investigation.
■*"R.E.Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth (Los Angeles,
1966), p.161; "
2
See above, p.130 *
The work of the land survey commissions.
The work of three land survey commissions which operated 
within the territory in the forties brought about a number of 
policy changes in the soil conservation and land distribution 
situations on the plateau, which made quite an impact on certain 
sections of the Tonga farming community. The first of these con­
cerned itself with the problems of land allocation review, as the 
Administration attempted to ease the pressure on lands in the re- 
servesjLf the territory by making available to the African population 
some of the lands outside reserve boundaries.
The idea of demarcating Native Trust Lands within the terri­
tory had been introduced around 1935 by Sir Hubert Young, the 
1then Governor, who had introduced a similar measure in Nyasaland 
in 1933» while he was Governor there. Young's proposal received 
the approval of the Secretary of State in 1937 and both the Pim 
and Bledisloe Commissions of the late thirties supported the call 
for providing more lands for African occupation. With the outbreak 
of war in 1939i the Native Trust Lands idea was shelved but in 
19^2, a Land Commission was set up to survey the possibility of 
dividing lands that were not already alienated or declared as re­
serves, into Crown Land and Native Trust Land. The Commission, in 
the course of its travels within the Territory, heard evidence from 
settler and African representatives on the Tonga plateau. The
Tonga Chiefs, who struck the Commissioners as 'the most intelligent
2
and progressive that they had met', drew attention to the pressing 
need formore land for African occupation and they 'all wished to be
q
ZA A/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on Native policy in Northern 
Rhodesia.
2Sec/S.L/118, Z.N.A. Report of the Land Commission on Mazabuka 
District.
allowed back as far as possible to that land which they formerly
used to occupy1 Chiefs Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala and Siamaundu
pcsnted out that their areas were overcrowded. They also stressed
’the shortage of water ... and asked if something could not be
2
done to improve the position*. The Commissioners found the land 
situation in the Tonga reserves very unsatisfactory. Reserve No.
XI which contained the peoples of some seven Chiefs, including some 
of the relatively densely populated villages of Sianjalika and 
Siamaundu, was in a pretty serious condition. A tour of the re­
serve convinced the Commissioners that 'the arable proportion is
certainly appreciably less than the fifty per cent upon which the
3
Native Reserves Commission based their calculations'. Due to the
shortage of good land, 2*960 of Chief Moyo's people had moved out
of the reserve to squat on Crown land and the survey revealed that
there was 'certainly no room for them in the reserve'. In reserve
No. XII they observed 'definite congestion in Mwanachingwala's area'
and large numbers of squatters living outside the reserve in the
Pemba Forest area and around the Siatontola dam. In all, the
Commissioners estimated that some 16,300 villagers were living as .
5squatters outside their reserves.
The bulk of the local settler community was not well disposed 
to the idea of giving more land to the Africans and this came out 
clearly in evidence, oral and written, presented to the Commission.
1.31
G.S„ Joseph, a local farmer i*ho was once Director of the Rusangu 
Mission* in his letter to the inquiry, wrote: 'No good purpose
would be served by bringing the natives into closer contact with 
European farmers. Owing to the carelessness of natives in allow­
ing cattle to stray, there would be considerable trouble between 
native owners and Europeans'. He went on to argue that by allow­
ing Africans to settle on land that was very close to the railway, 
the values of these lands would depreciate and that 'any policy to 
bring natives out of the reserves, where they belong, and allow
them to destroy more land on the watershed along the railway line
1is detrimental to the best interests of the country'.
In spite of settler protests, the Commission, after completing
its work in ±9kk, recommended that a total of 5*739 sq. miles of
land be provided as Native Trust land in the Mazabuka District
although it was made quite clear that such lands must be unsuitable
for settler occupation and must not include any mineral deposits.
Squatters were not to be evicted from Crown land 'except in cases
2where their continued presence is actually harmful to the land'.
The Commission had been charged to make 'full provision... 
for the agricultural requirements of the natives and for their
access from Native Trust land and Native reserves to existing and
3prospective railway lines and main roads'. It therefore recommended 
the provision of three corridors to the railway, at Nega Nega,
Tambero and Pemba. This proposal met with strong criticism from
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
^Ibid.
the settler community, for farmers maintained that ’they 
did not want to see the area between Nega Nega and the Kafue be­
come Native Trust land' and they pointed out ’that the vacant land 
by Tambero Siding was supposed to contain excellent tobacco 
soil and they regarded tobacco as a most important crop for the 
Europeans, particularly in view of the uncertainty in respect of 
the future of maize as a European crop...'.1 The Commissioners' 
decision to include in Trust Lands a 195 sq. miles area which 
they called Area to the south west of Pemba, provoked even 
stronger criticism from local settler farmers who regarded this 
area as extremely rich tobacco lands. A Commission, made up of 
settlers and a few officials, which was at this time examining 
the future of the European farming industry, strongly criticized 
this and other aspects of the Trust land proposals. Its members 
feared that 'the final and irrevocable limitation of European 
settlement to so small a proportion of the country will obviously 
designate Northern Rhodesia as "a black man's country11 in which 
the European will hold so restricted a place that the policy of
complementary development which Gfftfaernment has so lately pro-
2
fessed... will be definitely abandoned. They called on the 
Administration to give up the Trust land idea.
When the Legislative Council debated and passed into law the 
Native Trust Lands Ordinance in 19^7 ♦ the controversial Area 
south-west of Pemba, was left out of the bill pending an enquiry 
into settler claims. However, after an investigation into the 
area which was already occupied by some ^,867 squatters, the
1Ibid.
2
Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Development
of the European farming'Industry (Lusaka, 19*1-6), Appendix I.
%hese were 2,385 of Chief Siamaundu1s people, 2,026 of Chief Monze'
Commissioners’ recommendations were approved and the area became 
Trust land.
The Trust Lands Ordinance, while maintaining that these 
lands were basically designed for African occupation, provided 
that in conditions where the taking up of land by non-Africans 
within the Trust land areas would not lead to friction such alloca­
tions should be allowed, on the condition that no more than 6,000
1acres were alienated in this i^ ay m  any one provance.
2
The creation of Trust lands in the Tonga areas did not 
radically alleviate the land shortage problem, for some of the 
areas that v/ere declared Trust land were already being occupied 
by squatters, whose rights of occupancy were now acknowledged.
The lack of water in some of the demarcated Trust lands made people 
reluctant to move into them. The soils over the greater part of
and A56 of Chief Singani's. See Acc 21/^3 Z.N.A. Report on Area 
4 by Department of Agriculture, Pemba, 29.*f.^ 7.
1Sec/S.L./ll8, Z.N.A. General Notice No. *K1.6 of 19^8. This provision 
allowing non-Africans to take up land grants in the Trust areas 
was to come under heavy attack from the politicians of the late 
forties and fifties.
2
After the creation of Trust lands, the land distribution situation 
in the Mazabuka District was as follows:
Trust Land - 1,225 square miles
Native Reserves - 3»525 M M
Veterinary
Research Station - 100 11 u
European farms, 
townships, railway
reserves, etc. - 2,600 !f n
(See Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District 
Office report, 1951)-
Por the entire territory, the figures were as follows by the late 
19^0s:
Native Trust Lands -170,810 11
Barotseland - ^5,980
Native Reserves - 50,2^0 n
Alienated land - 6,060 ”
Crown lands - 10,550 1
(See Acc 21/^3, Z.N.A. Pamphlets on land situation printed in 19^9)
the Trust lands were hardly any more fertile than those in the 
1reserves. A few of the large-scale farmers were able to get 
plots in the Trust lands* but these lands were no real substitutes 
in quality for the more fertile Crown lands and unoccupied alien­
ated farms they had set their sights on. Africans on Trust lands 
held their lands under customary tenure arrangements as obtained 
in the reserves and Headmen exercised just as much authority over 
land distribution here as in the reserves. The main distinction 
between Trust lands and reserves appears to have been in the 
fact that the Agriculture Department, whenever possibles maintained 
some kind of control over farming practice in some of the newly 
settled areas, as will be seen later. The tenure of farmers in 
Trust lands was, however, no more secure than those in the reserves
and demands for tenurial security and the provision of more land
for African occupation were to be continuously expressed in the
forties and fifties.
$he need for an intensification of the soil conservation pro­
gramme and for a general review of Tonga land settlement rules, 
was revealed by the other two land survey Commissions which operated 
simultaneously on the plateau in 19^5. One was a Land Tenure 
Committee, which was chaired by Sir Stewart Gore-Brown, who since 
1938 had been representing African interests in the Legislative
1The Agriculture Department estimated that excluding Barotseland 
and the various game and forest reserves within the territory, only 
7°/o of the soils in the native reserves and Trust lands were 
’good' for agricultural crops. It considered only 2?°/o of these 
soils really "cultivable". See J. Hadfield, "Aspects of African 
agrarian economy in Northern Rhodesia", Agriculture Department 
Bulletin, No. 17 (Lusaka, i960), pp. 2-3.
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Council. The Committee had been asked to investigate the exist­
ing systems of land tenure in the territory and to make recommendations
’for bringing such systems into line with modern requirements,
1
if this should seem desirable...’ In its investigations on the 
plateau, the Committee observed that the practice imposed by the 
Administration, which required villagers to apply to their Head­
men for residential plots within villages, was not being followed 
and that the ten tax payer rule had encouraged much village dis­
integration. Tonga villages were reverting to the traditional 
'Katongo' system of settlement where 'in the matter of land, in­
dividuals seem to have taken what they required for themselves
2and their families \Tfithout reference to anyone else1. It was no 
longer practicable, therefore, to insist on the village being the 
smallest administrative unit. The Committee was of the view that 
administrative changes had to be made to accommodate this popular 
desire to break out of village boundaries. The establishment of 
Parishes was therefore recommended in an attempt to provide a resi­
dential situation that approximated closely to the traditional 
Katongo system. The Committee argued that Parishes would be ideal
here, for the Katongo '... which still exists is in fact a ready
3
made parish...1.
A Parish was toconsist of a number of villages and parish 
boundaries were to be drawn ’with due regard to kinship ties or
^Sec/Nat/205, 2.N.A. Land Tenure Committee report. (Lusaka, 19^5)*
2
Ibid. Draft of Land Tenure report, part II. (Lusaka, 19V?).
^Ibid.
natural features...'. Within a Parish, a villager, un­
restricted by the ten tax payer rule, was to be allowed to move 
his homestead from village to village at will, so long as he 
fulfilled the minimum building requirements laid down by the 
Native Authority orders. If he intended to move from one
Parish to another, he had to get permission from the Native
Authorities who would see to it that he be registered under his 
X
new parrsh. Parish registration was therefore to take the place
of village registration and the ten tax payer rule was to be 
2
revoked.
The question of providing land for African farmers who were 
operating on a fairly large scale also received attention from 
the Land Tenure Committee. The need to accommodate these socalled 
detribalised Africans on leasehold plots outside the reserves, 
under individual tenure conditions, had apparently been recognised 
for a long time but little progress had been made in effecting 
it. In 1936, the Provincial Commissioner had discouraged the idea 
by explaining that there was no guarantee that Africans would not 
misuse any Crown lands they were offered through over-ploughing.
His view was not widely shared by other officials who saw, in the 
plan, one way of regulating the squatter problem and utilising lands
b cithat lay unused. In 1938, Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, was
^Sec/Nat/210, Z.N.A. Chief Secretary's despatch to all Provincial 
and District Commissioners, on the parish system.
2
The ten tax payer rule was revoked on 22nd October, 19^3 but 
Chiefs continued to insist on residence within village boundaries.
See Sec/Nat/203 for Chief Secretary's relevant despatch.
Z
/Sec/AG/A3, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 31.8.36
^See KDB 6/7/3/^* Z.N.A. District Commissioners comments on tour 
report No. 6, 1938.
forced to consider this problem of culling progressive farmers
out of the reserves. While agreeing 'that large scale native
farmers ... could be encouraged to move out of the reserves into
tenant settlements sited on vacant farms in Crown land', he cautioned
that 'only one such settlement should be established... and that
it should be sufficiently near the Agricultural station at Pemba
to enable fairly close supervision to be maintained.^*
Little however materialised from this policy projection and
in 19^0 the Legislative Council was told of the difficulties which
the Agriculture Department had encountered in bringing the proposals
to fruition. The Department, it was pointed out, had found great
difficulty in getting suitable lands for the scheme as these could
be acquired only by expropriation of private property or negotiations
with owners willing to sell. The Council was told that there were
doubts as to whether Africans would be willing to pay for the use
of such lands for since 'it is possible ... for a native to acquire
the right to cultivate large areas of land in the reserves for which
he pays nothing ... he would be unlikely to be willing to go out
2
and pay rent outside the reserve'. This doubt was not borne out 
by the author's field interviews for a number of Keemba Hill in­
formants, in particular, explained that they would have agreed to
3
pay if only the lands were made available to them. In fact, in 
19^2, a group of farmers on the plateau,described as 'the more
1
Sec/AG/^7» 2.N.A. Memorandum on work of the Agriculture Department. 
^Hansard, 22nd January, 19^C, No. 39» Col. 268.
3
Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi, Sixpence 
(Chelo) Kahulukutu and other large scale cultivators of this 
period.
educated natives and messengers *, laid their demands before the 
Land Commission and requested that they be allowed to occupy 
lands ’lying immediately to the north of the block of European 
farms on the west of the railway at Kaleya Siding’, The Chiefs 
were in favour of the demands so long as the new farms were not 
within the reserves.'1'
In 19^, a Land Tenure sub-committee of the Legislative 
Council had recommended conditions under which African farmers 
along the line of rail should hold land outside the reserves.
They were to be allowed no less than 200 acres each and no more 
than 1,000 acres. The farmers were to utilize no more than 20°/o 
of the land for cultivation, the rest to be reserved for grazing 
cattle. They were to desist from felling trees at random and were 
to observe anti-erosion and improved farming rules. It was stated 
that except with the consent of the Crown, buildings should be 
’limited to a dwelling house for the tenant, two huts for depend­
ents and, per 100 acres of holding, one labourer’s hut'. Tenants 
who were evicted were to receive compensation not exceeding £35 
on a 200 acre holding or £100 on a 1,000 acre plot and any other 
compensation for development•of the land had to be based 'on the 
assessment of the agricultural officer'. Tenants were required
to pay a capital qualification of about 10/~ an acre, whatever
2the size of the holding.
When, in 19^5* the Land Tenure Committee embarked on work in 
the Tonga areas, it was instructed to concentrate, specifically,
1
Report of the Land Commission, op.cit.
^Sec/Nat/20A, Z.N.A. Report of the Native Land Tenure Sub­
committee (Lusaka, 19^*0.
It 60
on problems of land settlement for ex-Askari and ... advanced Africans...', 
the latter being local large scale farmers. The Committee endorsed the 
recommendations of the Sub-committee for the resettling of advanced 
Cultivators on lands outside the reserves and suggested that such settle­
ments should preferably be located on Native Trust lands and should be 
'under strict agricultural c o n t r o l P l a n s  for the transfer of these 
farmers out of the reserves into new settlements were, however, to be 
shattered by the recommendations of a Land Usage Survey Commission, which 
also carried out its investigations at this time.
The Land Usage Survey team, made up of three agriculturists and 
a sociologist, examined, fairly closely, the state of Tonga farming in
the forties and the impact of the Kanchomba system on local farm pract-
2
ice. Reports on the shortage of land in some reserves had been quite 
common during the late thirties and forties. The effects of land alien­
ation were being increasingly felt in some of the reserves, notably 
SianJ^likaand Mwanachingwala. It was becoming quite clear that the ex­
tension work of the Agriculture Department was failing to meet the 
problems raised by the growth of African commercial farming. In 19^1» 
Captain Campbell, representing the Southern Electoral area, had tabled a 
motion in the Legislative Council requesting 'that Government should take
3
steps to stop the deterioration and exploitation of the land'. He 
drew attention to over-cultivation and over-stocking, in a number 
of areas, with resultant soil erosion and singled out two Tonga
^Land Tenure Committee report, op.cit.
2For full details of survey, see W.Allan et alia, "Land Holding and 
Land Usage among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes- 
Living stone Paper, No* l4, 19^5.
^Hansard, l8th March , 19^1, No. 39* Col. 318.
Chiefs whose people occupied a total area of about 100,000 acres 
and kept on it some 20,000 head of cattle. These problems 
were especially acute in areas that were comparatively densely 
populated, such as Mwanachingwala, Sianjalika, Monze and Chongo.
These areas also happened to be among those with the heaviest 
cattle populations.
From investigations carried out in seven of the Tonga 
Chieftaincies, the survey team observed that the problems of 
overstocking and land misuse due to maize monoculture were not 
being adequately tackled by the Kanchomba system, as then implemented 
The team observed much indifference to the work of the conservation 
demonstrators. It was clear that 'although many of the demonstrators 
gardens attain a high standard and are strikingly superior to those 
around them, the Tonga are not impressed and they have been in­
fluenced little if at all1. Very few of the demonstrators were 
showing any real dedication to the scheme. The survey revealed 
that 'many of them, after completing the four year period for which 
■they are paid, tend to allow their gardens to degenerate and even 
to abandon their improved housing for a dilapidated hut'.'*’ The 
survey team enumerated a number of factors which in their view 
were responsible for the failure of progressive farming ideas to 
take root. Among these they listed the obligations of kinship 
which deprived the individual of some of the fruits of his effort 
and thus discouraged him from using his capital to improve his 
holding. The lack of equipment and organising skill, widespread
lnLand Holding..." etc. report, op.cit., p.3.
apathy and the suspicion and distrust of the Administration which 
land alienation had engendered in a number of areas, were some 
of the other reasons that were offered.
To combat the situation, a number of recommendations were 
made. Agricultural Officers were to embark on propaganda cam­
paigns. to allay Tonga suspicions and more emphasis was to be 
placed on establishing and maintaining school gardens. A closer 
inspection of cattle:land ratios, in various Chieftaincies,
was called for, as a step towards checking overstocking. The 
Land Tenure Committeefe recommendation of Parishes was supported.
The proposal to take advanced farmers out of the reserves was, 
however, rejected. The survey team suggested that these farmers, 
who. were only a small proportion of the population, were to remain 
within their areas to 'provide a valuable object lesson to others, 
both in agricultural methods and standard of living'. They argued 
that 'removing them would mean culling the best from the District'.1 
It was recommended, instead, that their holdings be surveyed and 
registered over the years and that they be made to follow the Kan- 
chomba system.
Those farming on a much smaller scale were to be grouped 
into so-called Social-Agricultural units. These were to be made 
up of a village or a group of villages, within a parish framework, 
whose inhabitants were willing to farm on cooperative lines. There 
was to be 'no serious break with traditional land tenure...1 and
1Ibid., pp. 6-7-
land required for cultivation within the units was to be divided
into plots and farmed, under the rules of the Kanchomba system.
The communal ownership of farming equipment was also recommended.
What then was the outcome of the recommendations of the
various land survey commissions? Nothing substantial came from
the advocated parish system. The Tonga Chiefs opposed the creation
of Parishes, in spite of the popular support their people showed 
1for it. They saw in the scheme an attempt to encourage their
people to evade their control as they established homesteads at
random, within the new Administrative units and they feared the
2
scheme would substantial^ undermine their authority. There was
also the fear that with the formation of parishes, the movement
3
of cattle, from one area to the next, would be restricted.
The Department of Native Education also had its reasons for 
not wanting the Parish plan pushed through. The Central Advisory 
Board of the Department explained to the Chief Secretary ’that 
it viewed with grave concern the splitting up of villages into 
small units as seriously hindering educational and social work 
and discouraging the development of a corporate life, besides
if
being a hindrance to any form of progress'.
The Chairman of the Land Tenure Committee had made note of the 
enthusiasm of the rank and file for the parish system. See Sec/ 
Nat/20^, Vol. II, Z.N.A. nNote on meetings in the Tonga country...’ 
by Gore-Brown <g 22.3. ^6.
2Sec/Nat/210, Z.N.A. Chief Secretary to all Provincial and District 
Commissioners, 16.12.^7.
■^ This was Chief Chongo’s main fear. See Sec/Nat/366. N/083^» Z.N.A. 
Tour report No. 6, 19^9-
^Sec/faat/210, Z.N.A. Director of Native Education to Chief Secretary 
5.8.37.
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There was only one serious attempt to implement the Parish
plan and this was in Chief Siamaundu's area. In 19^71 the
Provincial Newsletter reported that all Chiefs, except Siamaundu,
were opposed to the Parish system. Siamaundu was reported as
having 'gone to the opposite extreme and put up concrete proposals
for three parishes and ... permitted a few people to leave their
villages already...1 By 19^8 there were five Parishes in his 
2area.
Efforts to establish Social Agricultural Units also failed 
to make any headway. An attempt to implement the group farming 
idea in the Chalimbana area near Magoye in 19^5-6 revealed that, 
while some farmers welcomed the Administration's efforts to ease 
congestion in some of the reserves, they were not prepared for 
the commune that the Adranistration had in mind. The Mbiya settle­
ment, as the experimental area was called, was established on 2,000
acres of Native Trust land, which adjoined an area that was 'densely
3
populated and heavily overstocked...' The Agriculture Department
maintained a firm hold over immigration into the area and by the
end of 19^8,when settlement was completed, there were '.thirty four
families representing a population of nearly 200 with over *f00 head 
A
of cattle...' According to Informants, the selection of farmers
^Sec/Nat/90, Z.N.A. Newsletter for 1st quarter, 19^7* 
^Hansard, l6th March, 19^8, No. 60, Col. 190.
^Agriculture Department Annual report, 19^8, p.12.
L
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for the new settlement was based mainly on their interest in
the Kanchomba system and those who were using manure and observing
1basic rotations were given preference.
The cultivable land wqs divided into two blocks and these
were further divided into four fields, protected by contour
ridges. Each family on the settlement was given a strip of land
in each of the four fields and officials hoped that cooperative
farming would be practised, while farmers retained individual owner
ship of their crops. The settlement did not, however, measure up
to this expectation and there were reports of farmers being
2
'strongly individualistic' and showing much preference for crop­
ping their holdings individually. The Agriculture Department sub­
sequently abandoned this cooperative farming experiment, although 
resident farmers were allowed to retain their lands and it \ifas 
hoped that they would continue observing the Kanchomba rules.
The Administration’s inability to solve the land problem 
created by commercial farming and, in particular, its failure to 
meet the demands of the large scale farmers for land outside the 
Trust lands and reserves, caused much discontent. The breakdown 
of plans to make more land available caused a lot of ill-feeling, 
especially in areas like Keemba Hill, where large scale cultivators
had organised a number of delegations to the Boma at Mazabuka, to
3lobby officials on this issue. It was not going to be easy for
^Interviews with Naul Moonga (29.4.74) and ThomasChingLla (30.4.74) 
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1948, p.12,
■2
Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74. Chief Siamaundu had 
even proposed in 1946 that his treasury would bear part of the 
cost of buying back some of the alienated land, if the Government 
would supply the rest of the capital. See Sec/Nat/204, Vol. II, 
Z.N.A. Gore-Browne's "Notes on Meetings in the Tonga country...1, 
22.3.46.
these farmers to forget the disappointments of this period.
Commenting on the need for a re-orientation of Tonga farming 
methods, the Land Usage Survey had noted:
'The only possible solution is the general adoption 
of a conservative agriculture which will effectively check the 
present process of land degeneration and bring about a progressive 
increase in the crop bearing capacity of the arable land.'^
The need for supervised farming controls had now received 
more emphasis than at any time before. This was to lead to the 
launching on the plateau of an Improved Farming Scheme, which took 
the soil conservation programme a stage further, while promoting 
more-socialdivision within the firming community.
The rise of the Improved Farmer
2The Improved Farming Scheme, which was inaugurated on the 
plateau in the mid forties^was a direct outcome of one of the 
recommendations of the 194,5 Land Usage Survey Team for the improve­
ment of Tonga agriculture. Conscious of the problems involved in 
getting farmers to observe a conservation programme which offered 
no direct financial rewards, the team recommended a system of 
differential prices which was to be used to attract farmers who 
were willing to practise the Kanchomba system. It was suggested 
that 'all members of a community who have adopted the system ... 
and who are carrying it out to the best of their ability and re­
sources, should be entitled to receive a higher price for the maize
lf,Land Holding and Land Usage... etc.', report, op.cit., p.3.
2
For a detailed discussion of the scheme, see C.E.Johnson, "African 
Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize Area of Northern 
Rhodesia", Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Bulletin, No, 11, 1956,
they sell and the difference should be at least 5^°/o . T h i s ,
they argued, v/ould be a way 'of punishing the poor farmer to en- 
2courage the good'.
The Administration accepted this proposal and during the 
1946-47 planting season officials were sent round the reserves 
to acquaint Tonga farmers with the principles of the Improved 
Farming Scheme and those interested were called upon to register 
under it.
A farmer who joined the scheme was expected to cultivate his 
land according to the rules of the Kanchomba system. He had to 
use kraal manure on one quarter of his land and follow a crop rotation 
of maize (manured), maize, legumes, maize. He was expected to
practise \^ eed control and maintain the contour ridges or grass
strips which^Agriculture Department might instal on his lands.
Periodic visits for the purposes of farm inspection and for offer­
ing advice would be paid by Land Messengers and other members of the 
Department's staff and farmers whose lands, when inspected,
the required standards, were to receive a certificate, which 
entitled them to receive a cash bonus on every bag of maize that
came out of their Improved plots.
The Administration financed the general programme of soil 
conservation, and the payment of bonuses, out of a price stabilisation 
fund which had been started in 1935 with maize control. African 
producers who sold their maize to the Board had received a price 
that was somewhat below the real value of the maize and this levy 
was paid Into the fund. As a result of the stabilisation fund, it
^W. Allan et al, "Land Holding and Land Usage among the Plateau Tonga 
of Mazabuka District", Rhodes-Living stone Paper, No. l4, 1948, p.10.
2Ibid.
^An Agricultural Training School for Africans was to be opened at
now became possible to pay the Improved Farmer the full price of his 
crop without any deduction, while the money withheld from the
p 1’non Improved i1armer', went towards meeting these expenses. The
scheme was, therefore, according to Johnson, 'one of compulsory
saving imposed on the unimproved farmer while the maize price is
2
high, the improved farmer being exempted'.
The scheme met with some enthusiasm in severa 1 reserves on
the plateau and especially in the Ufwenuka, Chona and Siamaundu 
3Chieftaincies, but generally, the reception was one of grave
caution. In the Ufwenuka and Chona areas, the influence of the
Missionaries on the surrounding populations caused many farmers
to register with the scheme in its very early days. Jojo Chisenge,
who was one of the four youths Moreau had received from Chief Monze
4
in 1902, explained that 'Kolozia' was never seen in the Ufwenuka 
area, although he made frequent trips to Monze, Chongo and other 
areas to explain the workings of the scheme. In the Ufwenuka 
area, according to Jojo, it was the priests of Chikuni who, at
5
church gatherings, persistently emphasised the merits of the scheme.
Monze in 19^9 and in 1950 the first group of students who had com­
pleted the 18 month course were appointed African agricultural 
assistants and employed on the soil conservation programme. See 
Agriculture Department Annual report, 19^9, p.5; also Agriculture 
Department Annual report, 1950, p.l4.
1This term used to denote the farmer who did not register with the 
Scheme. The term 'unimproved farmer', which Johnson and others 
have used in references to this category of farmers is a misnomer, 
considering the fact (admitted by Johnson) that a number of these 
were farming with up to date, 'improved',methods.
2Johnson, op.cit., p.11.
^Interviews on the plateau. In the Siamaundu area, the enthusiasm of the Chief 
and the impact made by the Kanchomba system ensured the scheme some success.
A
The Tonga rendition of Clothier, the name of the Chief Agricultural 
Officer at the Kanchomba station.
^Interview with Jojo Chisenge, 16.11.73.
The offer of cash bonuses was the main attraction for most 
villagers and farmers who joined the scheme came from all the 
three farming categories that the 1943 Land Survey had identified, 
viz., the ’Farmer1, the 'Smallholder' and the 'Subsistence Culti­
vator'.^ The scheme attracted both the educated and the uneducated, 
the Church member as well as his non-Church-going neighbour.
Most i--Tonga farmers however decided to have 
nothing to do with the scheme and this attitude was to continue 
for a number of years. In an area with a population of over 
16,800 males, there were only 95 Improved Farmers in 1946-47,
503 in 1947-48 and 362 in 1948-49.2 Some of the large-scale farmers 
who had had connections with Father Moreau and Pastor Anderson con­
sidered the scheme a waste of time, for they were fully convinced 
that the missions had taught them all there was to learn about 
Improved Farming. One of these farmers on being asked why he didn't
join the scheme retorted: 'How could I join this, when I already
3
knew farming. We were already improved.'
Theodore Kachesa, whose farming operations in the twenties 
and thirties had given officials and missionaries so much to be 
proud of, never registered with the scheme. His son explained
^The survey team, operating on the plateau at a time when the 
harvest was poor, had grossly exaggerated the size of the sub­
sistence farming category, i.e. farmers who soldlLO bags of maize 
or less (they estimated this to be 85°/o of the farming population). 
See Allan et al, op.cit., p.l. Johnson (op.cit., p.7) later pointed 
this out. See also Chapter ill*
2Johnson, op.cit., p.8,
3
Interview with John Hauma Nyiimba, 19.11.73. This response was 
encountered in several other interviews with Catholic and S.D.A. 
Informants.
1 ? J
that he used to boast about his success in his meetings with
Clothier and other Agriculture Department Officials* and
was always inviting them round to his farm, so that they could
1see what he had achieved without the aid of any scheme. His success 
made Kachesa very independent and a touring official once recorded
that 'he neither willingly submits to any local Chief nor takes
2
much account of the Agricultural Officers'. The scheme's rigidity^ 
and its emphasis on periodic farm inspection, was another reason 
why it failed to catch on. Farmers strongly disliked this inter­
ference from Agricultural Staff and those who joined the scheme 
even recommended a system wherein established Improved Farmers would 
be exempted from further inspections once they had been in the scheme 
for some time. This was never conceded.
The rules of the scheme meant very hard work, weeding the 
land and maintaining the contours, and as Morgan~Rees later pointed
out, the firmer was not often sufficiently compensated in the yields
A
from his improved plot. -The majority of Tonga farmers had not seen
the need for contour ridges or grass strips on their lands. On this
question an Informant explained:
'When Kolozia came, he tried to give us advice on
good methods of farming. He introduced ridges in our
fields. After the ridges were made, people were forced 
to keep them clean. We did not like this.*3
1Interview with Peter Kachesa, 22.11.73.
^Acc. 78/39* Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2, 19^8. Kachesa's ability as 
a progressive farmer was, however, widely recognised and from the 
beginning of 19^9 to his death in 1932* he served as a nominated 
Agricultural Councillor on the Plateau Tonga Native Authority.
See, H.Vaux, "Unusual Aspects of Native Land Tenure in the Mazabuka 
District", Northern Rhodesia Journal, No. 2, Vol. II, 1933* pp. 20-21.
Johnson, op.cit., p.17#
^A.M.Morgan-Rees, "An Economic Survey of the Plateau Tonga Improved 
Farmers", Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Bulletin No. I*f, 1938, p.23.
^Interview with Stephen Ngandu, 22.11.73.
To compel obedience to the contour-ridging policy, heavy
fines, in some cases as much as £3* were imposed on farmers who 
repair ^
failed to clean 01/ damaged ridges. This only made the soil
conservation policy more unpopular and the Improved Farming 
Scheme more strongly detested.
Perhaps the most significant reason for the smallness of 
the scheme's membership, in the years up to 19^9* was the exist­
ence of a general climate of suspicion and distrust of the Ad­
ministration's motives, in the various reserves. This was created
2
by the policy of land alienation. Farmers, especially in areas
like Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala, which had suffered much land
loss, had strong doubts about the seemingly altruistic nature of
the scheme and feared that it was a cover for planned land take-
overs in the future. One farmer, who not only stayed / of the
scheme, but campaigned in his section of Sianjalika Chieftaincy
against it, had this to say on his people's fears:
'The White Man had taken large areas of our land 
without paying us and we now feared they were 7 
going to pay us and take even larger pieces...'-'’
The 19^3 land survey team had worked within this atmosphere
of suspicion, especially in the Sianjalika area. Tonga farmers
had a deep feeling of insecurity over their land tenure and feared
that,in spite of the land alienations of the past, Europeans were
determined to take some more. When the survey team started measuring
^Allan et al, op.cit., p.69.
2
Chief Mwanachingwala clearly voiced this suspicion in the twenties 
when he said: 'Even if we leave this land here and give it to white 
men and find a good place and get good crops, you will again come 
and say, "We want this land, go out, we want it".' See KDB 1/3/6, 
Z.N.A. Interview with Mwanachingwala and others near their village, 
2nd-3rd September, 1921.
3
That is, payment in the form of bonuses. Interview with Naul Moonga, 
29.4.7^ .
gardens and counting cattle, many suspected that they would soon
be dismissed from their lands, which Europeans were only waiting 
1
to occupy. In certain areas, farmers were openly hostile to the 
2
investigation. The survey team observed that because of this
fear of land loss, the Tonga ’deliberately do not want to show
3
that they have fruitful lands’. A scheme which emphasised 
higher yields was, therefore, unlikely to succeed in such an at­
mosphere. To the majority of farmers, there seemed to be only 
one way of solving the land problem, and this was to make more 
land available for African occupation.
The early history of the Improved Farming Scheme in the Keemba 
Hill area of Chongo Chieftaincy was slightly different from that 
of the rest of the plateau. This area was first settled in 192^ - 
by two teachers of the Rusangu S.D.A. Mission, Gideon Mankapwi
and Matthew Kasuku, who were due for retirement. They started
k
farming in the area in 1928. During the mid thirties, there was
a major dispute at the Rusangu Mission between the authorities
S
and resident Tonga and Ndebele teachers and pastors, who were 
accused of keeping very large herds of cattle on the mission’s 
lands, thereby substantially reducing the grazing available to the
^Allan et al., op.cit., p.69.
2
This strong opposition was encountered at Keemba Hill. Ibid., p.33.
^Ibid., p.67.
I^CSB 3/1, Z.N.A. District Notebook. Tour report No. 1951.
^From the late 1920s’ onwards,, some Ndebele students who had been'trdmeJ? 
at the S.D.A.’s Mission in Bulawayo, took up 
appointments at Rusangu and other S.D.A. mission stations on the 
plateau.
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Mission’s animals. The authorities told the Africans that they
would have to reduce their herds or move off the mission’s
lands. Unwilling to destock, the Tonga teachers and pastors
decided to take up farming in the Keemba Hill area'*' and by
19^2, there were over 12 individual plot holders in the settle- 
2
raent. The S.D.A. farmers here operated on a much larger scale 
than the surrounding African population and they invested far more 
in farming equipment than the rest of the African community. 
Sheltered from some of the demands from kinsmen they would other­
wise have had to face in their home areas, the farmers here were 
able to raise more capital for investment, employed wage labour 
and kept around only a few kinsmen who helped in the running of 
their farms. They belonged to a church that did not look too kindly 
on the extended family system because, it claimed, the system en­
couraged laziness and parasitism. Their church also preached a 
very strict moral code, discouraging practices like smoking and 
drinking,among its members. As a result, most S.D.A., and those of
Keemba Hill in particular, tended to live in relative frugality and,
A
as a consequence, made quite a success of farming. The Keemba
Interviews with Amos Walubita (12.11.73), Samuel Sibanda (l8.ll.73) 
and Ellison Milambo (10.2.7^). The Ndebele teachers who left Rusangu 
at this time went over to settle in the Mujiga area of Mwanza Chief- 
tancy.
^Tour report No. 1951, op.cit.
^An inspection tour of Sixpence Chelo Kahulakutu’s farm, in the 
settlement, by an official in 1931 revealed the following farming 
implements on the estate: 1 disc plough, 3 cultivators, 2 planters,
2 disc harrows, 1 tractor, 1 wagon, 1 spring harrow, 1 two furlough 
plough, 1 single plough, 1 tractor cultivator, 2 grinding machines,
1 drilling machine, 1 wheel barrow, 1 pit saw, 13 chains, k drilling 
balls, k shovels and 8 picks. Others in the settlement, like Paul 
Siamusiya and Ellison Milambo, had comparable collections. See Tour 
report, No. 1951, op.cit.
A .
This was pointed out by the 19^5 survey team which, however, grossly
underplayed the success and achievements of farmers of other de­
nominations, notably the Catholics. See Allan et al, op.cit.., p. 178.
Hill community, because of the quality and size of its maize out­
put, was even allowed the unique privilege of participation in the 
European pool of the Maize Control Board. This meant that from 
19^2-3^ when the concession was granted, farmers in the settlement
became Registered Maize Producers and received the same price .for
1
their produce as European farmers.
However, in 19^6-^7» when the Improved Farming Scheme was
inaugurated, the farmers of Keemba Hill were deprived of their
places within the European pool and were forced to fall in line
2
with the rest of the African farming community. This caused much 
dissatisfaction in the area and robbed the Improved Farming Scheme 
of whatever chances it had of making an impact here. Out of a total 
of some 25 large scale farmers in the area, only l^ f registered with 
the scheme up to 19^9. Agricultural Staff made several trips to 
Keemba Hill in the hope of stimulating interest in the scheme, 
but these did not achieve the desired results. Their emulsion 
from the European pool lingered for long in the minds of the farmers' 
and influenced their future behaviour in all dealings with the Ad­
ministration.
The Improved Farming Scheme worked without any major policy 
change until 19^ 9* Seasonal bonus payments were consistently on the
■''Tour report No. A, 1931» QT>.cit.
2Ibid.
^Ibid.
A 1
Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7^.
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increase and in 19^9 about £2,2^6 was paid out to registered farmers 
in the maize area.1 In the 19^6-4? season, the bonus paid was b/- 
a bag but, for the 19^7-48 season, an attempt was made to make 
the scheme more attractive. Two types of bonuses were now to be 
observed. Improved Farmers who produced more than 6 bags of maize 
an acre received a higher bonus of 9/- a bag, while those whose 
output was less than 6 bags received V~. There was, however, 
a more comprehensive review of the scheme in the following season.
In 19^9-50 the Administration decided to review the rules of 
the scheme, in an attempt to regulate certain anomalies within it.
One of these was the problem of estimating the precise crop output 
of an Improved Farmer's holding, an estimate that was necessary if 
unscrupulous scheme members were not to receive bonuses on maize 
that came out of ' unimproved plots. The second main problem v/as 
that^with the post-war expansion of maize production, the Kanchomba 
system was proving inadequate as a measure of soil conservation.
The system emphasised the use of kraal manure, but with the growing 
reduction of pastures as more grazing land was farmed, the dangers 
of over-reliance on kraal manure were being slowly revealed. It was, 
therefore, decided that the rules should be revised to provide 
for the use of fertilisers and green manure and also for the creation 
of two grades of Improved Farmers.
To qualify for the first grade, a farmer had to observe a 
rotation in which he used only two of his four plots for maize,
■  1
See R.Howard's report on Improved Farmers in the Monze area, January, 
m  1952. Mount Makulu Research Station (M.M.R.S.).
2Ibid.
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the remaining two to he cropped with legumes. He had to plough in 
one of the legume crops as green manure and the maize cultivated 
after the green manure crop was to be treated with fertiliser.
He was also required to use kraal manure on the maize he culti­
vated after the legume crop. Continued attention was to be paid
to weed control and stumping and he had to set up a part of the maize
crop in stooks. Ploughing during the cold season was also required. 
The second grade was very much like the first except that green 
manure was not insisted on, a legume crop allowed in its place 
and the use of fertiliser was not compulsory.
In 1950 a special 'Smallholder' grade was created to meet 
the requirements of the small scale farmer who had no trouble main­
taining his land on kraal manure and who was therefore reluctant 
to radically reduce his maize outlay to allow for green manure. He 
was allowed, under the scheme, to devote three of his plots to
maize and one to legumes, but he had to use kraal manure on two
of the maize plots and fertiliser on the third. The smallholder's 
improved plot .was not to exceed ten acres.
The bonus system v/as changed to allow payment per acre of 
Improved land, rather than per bag, although the bonuses to the 
first grade farmer and the smallholder were calculated to be equi­
valent, on average, to the bonus per bag that had been offered till 
now. The bonus was lower for the second grade farmer. A scheme for 
the distribution at subsidised prices of wheeled transport was 
embarked on and the distribution of green manure seed and fertilisers 
to Improved Farmers was also undertaken. To check the movement 
of squatters to the lands that were nearer to the commercial 
centres on the railway, where higher maize prices were paid, the
Administration decided to equate line of rail and reserves maize
prices. A rural marketing organisation of the Maize Control
Board was also established, in the hope of improving marketing
facilities. The general conservation drive was expanded and the
development of water supplies, through the provision of weirs
and dams, was stepped up.1
To finance the new measures, an African Farming Improvements
Fund was established. The money that had accumulated in the maize
pools stabilization fund was now transferred into the new fund. A
Committee on which African farmers were represented was set up to
administer the fund, although it was given no special instructions
2
as to how money from the fund should be disbursed. How then were 
the 19^9-30 proposals received on the plateau? What reaction did 
these provoke among the Improved Farmers and the vast majority 
of farmers who had avoided enrolling in it?
The review of the scheme substantially undermined the con­
fidence many Improved Farmers had put in it, in spite of the doubts 
and fears expressed by their more cautious neighbours. To many, 
the imposition of more stringent qualifications without consultation 
with farmers was yet another case of the white man failing to 
honour his obligations to the African community. One farmer, who 
immediately resigned from the scheme in 19^9 told the author:
1
By 1938 the Agriculture Department had constructed 33 dams and 
sunk 3^ wells in the Mazabuka District, but only 13 dams and 11 
wells were in really good condition (see Pirn Financial Commission 
report, p.67). Of the l*f6 dams and weirs built in the Southern 
Province from 19^7 onwards, 70 were in the Mazabuka District but, 
as was pointed out at the time, 'the provision of water supplies 
in the Tonga country has not kept pace with the demand'. See 
I.H.Muchangwe's "Tonga Land Utilisation Survey, Mazabuka District", 
M.M.'R.S.
2
Johnson, op.cit., p.10.
’We had allowed ourselves to be treated like 
fools by the Bwanas /^white men/ and our brothers 
and friends who never joined were laughing at us 
for our mistake. We had trusted people they had 
told us not to trust,’I
Large scale farmers were particularly annoyed by the new rule 
which provided that Grade ’A ’ farmers should cultivate only two 
plots of maize, at a time when the bonus paid out had risen from 
four shillings a bag in 19^6-7 to nine shillings in 19^7-8. It 
was at this time very much.in the large scale farmer’s interest to 
expand his maize production to take advantage of rising bonuses.
The review caused a lot of ill-feeling among these producers. (
At Keemba Hill in 19^9 * large scale farmers were still smart­
ing from the expulsion from the European pool which they had suf­
fered. Although some of them had become Improved Farmers, it was 
observed that they ’never at any time took much interest in the
'Z
Improved Farmer Scheme...1. In 19^8 dissatisfaction among farmers
in the area over the treatment they had received at the hands of
the Administration's officials came to the notice of Sir Stewart
Gore-Browne, who represented African interests in the Legislative
Council. Gore-Browne had visited the area and had listened to the
b
farmers’ complaints. His attempts to get them reinstated in the
1.
Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7 .^
2Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi and Sixpence 
(Chelo) Kahulukutu.
^Sec/Nat/66F, N/0006/3. Vol. Ill, Z.N.A. District Office report 
1930.
^Hansard, 22nd June, 19^ -8, No. 6l, Cols. 318-319»
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European pool were, however, unsuccessful. When the 19^9 review 
was announced, Keemba Hill's Improved Farmers replied by de­
registering from the scheme. At the end of 19^9» of the fourteen 
Improved Farmers in the area, only one (Sixpence Kahulukutu) 
was still in the scheme.*^
Among the majority of small-scale cultivators who were in 
the scheme, the reaction to theieview was not so dramatic. The 
acre.a^ bonus system secured for them a reasonable bonus, regard­
less of the number of bags they produced even in poor seasons,
and so the change of bonus emphasis from bag to acre did not pose
2
any great threat to their cash returns.
Following the 19^9 review, membership of the scheme which 
had been on the increase since 19^ -6 declined sharply. In the Monze 
area,where there were about 172 Improved Farmers in 19^-8-^9i only
Z
80 registered for the 19^9-3° season. The total membership of
the scheme dropped considerably. For the 19^8-^9 season it was
A
362; it dropped to 262 in 19^9-30. Several farmers who had been
thinking of joining the scheme were put off by the review, especially
former c
when they saw some of its/doughty defenders deregistering from it.
XTour report No. h, 1931* op.cit. Seven of the area's 1^3 farmers 
were to join Sixpence in the scheme in 1931. See Sec/Nat/366, Z.N.A. 
Tour report No. 7 of 1931; also KSB 3/l> District Note-book. Tour 
report No. A of 1931.
2
Interviews with a number of small scale farmers.
3
Howard, op.cit.
A
Johnson, op.cit., p.9.
5Interviews revealed this.
In the years after the review, the scheme continued to win 
new members, most of them attracted by the offer of wheeled trans­
port at subsidised prices, although, as before, the majority of 
farmers stayed clear of it. As will be seen later, the politicians 
of the fifties played a major role in further promoting this aloof­
ness and in working up feeling against the general soil conservation 
programme. The Improved Farmers cultivated, on average, much larger 
holdings than the majority of non-Improved Farmers. In most cases 
they expanded their holdings simply by taking up resting land, at 
times in poorly watered areas, where they had to sink wells at
their own expense.'1' A number of them preferred to live at least
2three miles from their villages and they contributed more than any
single group within the farming community to village disintegration
and farm land fragmentation. The amount of land they cultivated
was always directly related to the extent of land alienation in
the Chieftaincy, with farmers in areas like Monze and Chongo
farming much larger areas than their counterparts in, say Mwana-
cbingwala and Sianjalika. The Improved Farmer kept more cattle,
A
on average, then the non-Improved Farmer, and, chiefly because
^Morgan-Rees (op.cit.) in 1953 discovered that only 35°/o of the 
land farmed by the improved Farmers in a sample survey had been 
acquired by inheritance or transfer. 65°/o of It was acquired 
by bush clearance.
‘ASec/Nat/366 N./083if, Z.N.a. Tour report No. 7> 19^9.
3
See Johnson, op.cit., p.20.
A
Johnson observed during his survey that all the Improved Farmers 
had some cattle and that 9C°/o of them had six head or more.
He also observed that about 3C°/o of the non-Improved Farmers had 
no cattle at all and that nearly half of them had less than six 
head. See Johnson, op.cit., p.21.
of implement subsidies, his farm was also, on the whole, better 
equipped.1
African Farmers Associations
To promote and protect the interests of the African farming
community the Improved Farmers formed Farmers Associations in the
late forties. The idea appears to have originated from Keemba
Hill and the late Pastor Samuel Chilumbi, a local resident, was
identified as having conceived it. Chilumbi got Chief Benjamin
Chongo who, like him, had studied at Rusangu, to support his plan
and, with Nelson Liyanda, another Keemba Hill farmer, they approached
officials with their plan to start an African Farmers Association.
After officials had given their consent, a constitution was drafted
2
and the Monze African Farmers Association was inaugurated.
The Association's Constitution provided for an executive to 
run its affairs and stipulated that only Improved Farmers or non­
improved farmers who were aspiring to membership of the scheme,
3
should be allowed ta become members. No formal subscriptions 
were asked of members, the main reason being the fear that sub­
scriptions might be interpreted as some kind of tax and this would
^Ibid., p.21.
^Interviews with Samuel Sibanda (l8.11.73), Nelson Liyanda (9-12.73) 
and Lazarus Chiabi (lA.3-7^) provided most of the material on the 
activities of Farmers Associations,there being virtually nothing 
on this in various archives. Their accounts were later checked 
against those of less prominent Association members.
^This proviso was included mainly because the Association was 
designed to bring advanced cultivators together and organisers 
believed the Association would be in a stronger bargaining position 
if its membership was thus restricted.
make the Association unpopular. The organisers settled in­
stead for voluntary contributions and these were used mainly to 
meet the travelling expenses of Executive Officers whenever they 
made trips to meet Administration Officials. Branches of the
Monze parent Association were opened at Pemba, Mazabuka, Nega 
1Nega and Bwengwa.
At Association meetings, which were held once monthly,
although emergency meetings could also be summoned, discussions
centred chiefly on maize and cattle prices and on demands for
better water and communications facilities in the reserves. The
Improved Farmers saw themselves as the spokesmen of the general^
farming community and at meetings demands for more dams and wells,
better roads and higher prices for produce were quite common.
Various petitions were prepared on these subjects and presented
to officials at the Mazabuka Boma, although, according to Informants,
these did not achieve very much.
The Administration used the Farmers Associations as an
intermediary in its dealings with the general farming community
and unpopular policies were, at times, channelled through them.
Several efforts, for instance, were made to win support for the
soil conservation programme and for cattle dipping, by campaigning
2through the Improved Farmers.
The Agriculture Department showed much interest in the acti­
vities of the Farmers Associations and this increased when after
1An Association was also formed much later in the Demu area of 
Siamaundu Chieftaincy. The Organising Secretary, L.H.Chiabi, in­
formed the Administration in November 1931 of its formation. See 
Acc 73/23, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Chiabi to D.C.Mazabuka, 27.ll.3i.
2Interview with Nelson Liyanda, 9.12.73.
1the formation of the Natural Resources-Board in 19^9s Con­
servation Committees were set up in some areas of the plateau, 
notably Monze and Siamaundu Chieftaincies, and some Improved 
Farmers were invited to serve on them. Local officials received 
invitations to most meetings of the Farmers Associations and re­
presentatives from the Veterinary and Agriculture Departments 
usually attended, pen in hand, to make notes of African demands, 
while assessing the mood of the farmers' leaders. On the whole, 
the Associations got on well with the Administration and, by 19^9- 
90, 'sitting fees' of £8 a time were being paid to the main Monze 
Association out of the African Farming Improvement Fund to provide 
refreshments for members at meetings and, later, at their ex- 
hibitory Farmers Days.2
The only Farmers Association I encountered, on the plateau, 
which was strongly critical of Administration policy was that formed 
in 19^7 at Keemba Hill. The founder of this Association was Ellison 
Milambo, a retired Headmaster of Rusangu primaiy school, whom an 
official once referred to as 'the staunch leader and protagonist' 
of the Keemba Hill settlement. Milambo and others decided on the 
need for a local Farmers Association after they had been expelled 
from the European maize pool. The role of their Association was
1The Natural Resources Board was set up 'to exercise general super­
vision over natural resources, to stimulate public interest in con­
servation, to recommend appropriate legislation and to ensure co­
ordination between the various bodies concerned'. See S.M.Makings, 
Agricultural Change in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, 19^9-65 (Stanford; 
1966), p.229.
2Interview with Nelson Liyanda (9-12.73) who for a number of years 
(about eight in all) was leader of the Monze Association.
■^ Native Affairs report, 19^8, p.99.
if-
■ Tour report No. *f, 19515 op.cit.
to be that of a watchdog on the Administration, especially
its Agriculture Department, and for this reason they maintained
very little official contact with the Monze Association which
was always on fairly good terms with the Administration. An
official once described the Keemba Hill Farmers Association as
one 'which carefully avoids any contact with the Agricultural
/sic/ Department1,^  and the Association's activities, mainly
of a protest nature, did little to endear its members to local
Administration officials. Administration officials were never
invited to meetings of the Association and 'sitting fees' were
2
never offered to its members.
In 19^8, in a letter to the District Commissioner, Mazabuka, 
and copied to the Secretary for Native Affairs and Sir Stewart Gore 
Browne, the Association showed clearly the watchdog role it in­
tended to play. In the letter, the question of increased Improved 
farming bonuses for the 19^8 season was raised and the Association' 
determination to see that African farmers received what they de­
served, was unequivocally stated. It read, in part:
'The Association held its meeting on 22nd March 19^8, 
to hear the report from the Secretary of African Farmers 
Association, as instructed by the Secretary of Native 
Affairs to inform all members ... After a considerable 
discussion /sic/ the Association decided it necessary 
to write and inform the Government officials that we as 
members of African Farmers Association will simply 
watch as to how the Agriculture Department is going to 
work on the estimation /sic/ of the African farmers.
And if there will be injustice, the Association shall
^Sec/Nat/386 N/083^/^, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 16, 1953. 
2Interview with Ellison Milambo, 20.2.7A.
report to the Government for the further consideration 
on the matter
The Improved Farmers and their Associations were to take on
much greater significance during the fifties. With the rise of
nationalist politicians who openly criticised the Administration
and anything associated with it, the Improved Farmers came under
strong pressure. How they fared under this barrage of criticism
and how successful the organisers of the Improved Farming scheme
were in retaining their confidence during this trying period will
be seen later on.
The rise of the Improved Farmer took the process of social
differentiation on the Tonga plateau one stage further. Although
2
it may be difficult to talk of class formation in the area, various 
social groupings emerged under white rule. By the late 1940s, the 
egalitarian character of Tonga society still noticeable on the eve 
of colonial rule had been modified considerably. Apart from the 
growth of a political hierarchy of Chiefs, Headmen, Councillors 
etc., economic forces and the spread of western education encouraged 
the emergence of a group of individuals whose knowledge and success 
in farming allowed them a slightly higher standard of living than 
the res.t of the African population. Out of a population largely
3
made up of subsistence farmers in the mid-19th century, a peasantry
^Acc 75/2j?» Vol. I, Z.N.A. Ellison Milambo to D.C., Mazabuka, 28.3.4-8
2Ken Vickery has drawn attention to the difficulties of studying 
'Glass formation1 on the Tonga plateau. See his paper, "Aspects 
of Plateau Tonga Economic History", p.I.
3
This term is used in the sense in which it was discussed by Saul 
and Woods in T.D.Shanin (Ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies 
(Bucks, 1971). pp. 103-114-• ~
had emerged by the late 1920s and there were several teachers, 
artisans, pastors, traders etc. by the early 1930s. Several of 
these men were to play leading roles in the political activities 
of the African National Congress. By 194-3* about 13°/o of the 
plateau's farmers were producing grain and selling cattle on a 
fairly large scale.1 One may be tempted to see these farmers, 
the Mulimi Simpindi as they were called, as a class thrown up by 
economic forces and occupying a well defined social position within 
the society. Such a conclusion would however be incorrect for the 
Mulimi Simpindi were never a class in isolation. They were subject
2
to and the majority accepted the authority of the Chiefs and Headmen. 
Their higher standard of living did not make them an exclusive group 
capable of generally exploiting the less well-to-do majority. Be­
cause they did not control vast expanses of land, which may have 
given them a greater influence on the plateau, they were forced to 
operate more in a 'primus inter pares’ position within the farming 
community. Few had enough land to be able to operate anything like 
the landlord-tenant relationship which some settler farmers indulged 
in. The absence of any great disparities in income between the Mulimi 
Simpindi and his not so rich neighbour also meant that there were no 
radical differences in life-styles. As Jones has rightly pointed out,
See W.Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage among the Plateau 
Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. 14, 194f?i 
p.l.
2
Colson has drawn attention to the tendency for some of the wealthy 
farmers to bypass the Native Authority Courts and seek satisfaction 
fro m the Officials in the District Office. This was not, however, 
a common occurrence. See E.Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern 
Rhodesia (Manchester, 1962), p.227.
the large-scale farmer lacked 'the pre-eminence, the corporate 
right which is not open to everyone, and the recognition of general 
superiority operating over an area much wider than one sphere of 
knowledge or skills.11 The Mulimi Simpindi*s inability to amass a 
substantial fortune may have been due to the fact that his wealth 
attracted needy relatives who sought him out no matter ho® -distant 
his homestead was. He was never totally free of the demands of 
his poorer relatives. His individualism as seen in his preference 
for living at some distance from his kinsmen and his demands for 
the right to make Wills (a direct threat to the matrilineal group) may 
have outraged many relatives, but this did not, in most cases, lead 
to a break in family ties. Poorer kinsmen continued to look up to 
him for assistance and at his death, they claimed the greater part 
of the inheritance. The Mulimi Simpindi,with a few exceptions, were
therefore very much a part of the general social stream, albeit a
2
reluctant part.
1A.D.Jones, "Social Networks of Farmers among the Plateau Tonga of 
Zambia" in P.C.Lloyd (ed.), The New Elites of Tro-pical Africa 
('Oxford, 1966), p.282. Allan and others had made a similar ob­
servation in 19^5. Allan et alia, op.cit., p.l82.
2
Social differentiation has continued on the plateau in the post­
independence period and the large-scale African farmers of today, 
several of whom have acquired huge farms that once belonged to 
white settlers are very much on the way to constituting a class.
. Their possession of substantial forms on State lands is deeply re­
sented by the poorer sections of the community. The author did 
not however investigate this question in any detail.
Steai tx
m e  GROVCT Of AFRICA!! r c u n c s
. . V J
aettler factor
So far this study has concentrated for the aost part on
economic and social chance on the Tonga plateau* We cuct now try
to eoe how these changes were reflected in political developments
also
In the area* African life on the plateau was/affected by certain 
issues such an Amalgamation, around which crystallised European 
political ambitions* This chapter will look into certain aspects 
of the <4aalganation controversy and will also examine the circur*. 
stances surrounding the formation on the plateau of African Welfare 
Associations and the first African Congress in Northern Rhodesia* 
during the 1930c* The formation of these African associations has 
to be viewed against a background of settler political opinion 
ud activities during this period*
taring the first decode of tko twentieth centuxy, various 
attempts were cado to secure the closer union of the two Ehodccias*
The British Couth Africa Company (B*0*A«C«) considered that anal- 
carnation would strengthen its political position*^ In its efforts* 
particularly between 1915 cad 1917* the Company failed to carry 
*ith it the majority of the settlor populations of the two terri­
tories, who* for various reasons, were not prepared to forego their 
*clitical ambitions in the interest of a united Rhodesia* The 
British Colonial Office was in no Dood to force the issue through
v«- • ti-blor» British - cuth fricn C c m m y  proposals for
•■■-•algauation of the Ahodesias, 1915-1937? The horthem ihoccsian 
faction*’, African AocfrJ. I'.cscarch, 7% dune 1969» pp. 7.
and its reluctance to press the settlers into acceptance of the
B.S.A.C. recommendations was to lead some of the Company officials 
to accuse it of indifference when the proposals were rejected hy 
the elected representatives of the Legislative Council in Southern 
Rhodesia.*^ This defeat was not however to spell the end of the 
Amalgamation movement. In Northern Rhodesia, a substantial part 
of the white farming community had always supported the idea of 
Amalgamation. Under the Crown Administration, these farmers, 
joined after 1930 by some of the white traders who had hitherto 
opposed Amalgamation, were to champion the cause of closer union 
with Southern Rhodesia. They were convinced that only a united 
Rhodesia would guarantee their socio-political dominance over the 
African population while at the same time protecting their economic 
interests. All too conscious of their political insecurity in the 
midst of a large and burgeoning African population, the settlers 
were to resort to the discriminatory practices that were being 
used against Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Various 
measures were adopted to keep African advancement in check. Among 
other things, the education of the African was restricted and checks 
xvere placed on his physical as well as his occupational mobility.
Various pass laws similar to those operating in the southern 
territories were to be introduced. These attempts by the settlers 
to consolidate their political supremacy forced the African popu­
lation, which was.chafing under the discriminatory laws, to search
^Ibid., p.322.
2
The opposition of the white traders of Livingstone was partly due 
to the fear that local business would suffer in an Amalgamated 
Rhodesia, since a number of civil servants would have to leave.
There would therefore be fewer customers. Ibid., p.307*
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for representation of its interests. Africans within the 
territory were not completely unaware o f the realities of sett­
ler rule in Southern Rhodesia and they were determined that 
Northern Rhodesia should not be handed over to the political con­
trol of the Government across the Zambesi. In the Welfare Associ­
ations formed by the Africans themselves during the 1930s and also 
in the African representative Assemblies that were later sponsored 
by the Administration, African representatives came to grips with 
the problems of settler domination throughout the 193.0s and 19^Os.
On the Tonga plateau where in 1937 the veiy first African Congress 
within the territory was formed, these political activities brought 
to the fore a number of African immigrants, mostly from Nyasaland 
and the Western province, whose contribution to the inchoate 
African protest movement was to be quite significant. Under the 
influence of these 'Aliens', who were comparatively better educated, 
the indigenous Tonga were to be gradually mobilised into a local 
challenge of settlerdom.
The majority of the settler immigrants saw in Northern Rhodesia
a territory which, with proper handling, could be moulded into that
'white man’s country' of which the Duke of Connaught had spoken in
November 1910. During a visit to the territory, the Duke had made
the following remark in reply to an address of welcome presented
by the settlers of North-western Rhodesia: 'You have come here to
stay and future generations will tell their children and children's
children of the names of those who first made Rhodesia into a
white man's country and will teach them to be grateful to that
1greatest of pioneers from whom the country takes its name'. The
1BS2/l37, Z.N.A. General report for year ended 31st March, 1911-
settlers on the Tonga plateau, mainly farmers and traders, 
were an active and influential group within the general white 
community. A Mazabuka Settler farmers Associationwas formed 
around 1908 in order to give voice to settler political opinion. 
Some of the older African and settler farmers on the plateau today 
still remember its prominent members, Tom King, Major Darling, 
Horace Ilsley, D.J.Gray, N.Micklem, Morris Dent, Tim Haslett, Ben 
Woest and a few others.
The majority of the early settler farmers had been atracted 
to the territory by the very favourable terms on which vast amounts 
of land could be acquired. Very few of them had any substantial 
capital, the majority looking forward to getting financial assist­
ance from the British South Africa Company's Administration. This, 
however, was hardly forthcoming, for the Company's main concern 
was the protection of the financial interests of its shareholders. 
The settler community thus became very critical of its admini- 
stration and looked increasingly towards Southern Rhodesia, where 
farmers were comparatively better off. Settler-farmers came to see 
Northern Rhodesia's future as part of some political union with 
Southern Rhodesia and demands for Amalgamation between the two 
territories were quite common in Farmers Association meetings by 
1918.
In 1919, the North-Western Rhodesia Political Association 
(N„W.R.P.A.) was formed. The Association was meant to take over 
the political responsibilities which the Farmers Associations had
■4>ee Chapter I.
been shouldering, and its membership was to include Civil Servants,
Railwayman, Farmers 'and everybody who has any interest... in
1the future destiny of this territory.1 There was much talk, 
at this time, about changing the Government of Northern Rhodesia 
and the settlers intended to use their new Association to exert 
some influence on the discussions concerning the territory's 
future. They began to complain about the inadequacies of the
Advisory Council and to insist on their right to 'assume control
2
of their own destiny through a popularly elected Council'. .In the 
very year of rie inception, the Association established formal contact 
with certain members of the Legislative Council in Southern Rhodesia,
to sound out their, views on possible Amalgamation between the two
3territories. The replies from the south showed that there was 
very little support for any Amalgamation plan, for most of the
A
settlers believed that 'Northern Rhodesia had everything to gain...1' 
from such a union. Besides, there were, within the N.W.R.P.A. it­
self, certain influential members who were seriously questioning 
the wisdom of amalgamation and who considered responsible Government 
a better alternative. This group was led by Leopold Moore, a very 
influential settler-spokesman, who also served on the Advisory Council.
“Ssee The Livingstone Mail, 28.3.19) in BS3/Vf3, Z.N.A.
2
BS3/AA3, Z.N.A. Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, South 
Africa, 12.3.19.
"Z
The Association contacted prominent members of the Southern Rhodesian 
Legislative Council, among them, Messrs. Longden and Jobling.
See Ibid.
ZfIbid. Southern Rhodesia's politicians feared that Amalgamation, 
while lacking in economic attraction, would also delay the granting 
of Self-Governmentto the territory.
^See Resident Cosjmissioner to High Commissioner, 12.3.19, BS3/Vf3, 
Z.N.A.
The settler farmers of the Magoye area, led by Tom King and 
Tyndale Roscoe and those around Mazabuka, very much under the 
influence of a local farmer, Haslett, were firmly opposed to 
Moore's stand,^ and at various meetings held in Mazabuka, they 
passed resolutions condemning the responsible Government proposals. 
When, however, a conference of 'leading settlers' was held at 
Mazabuka, in October 1921, to discuss the territory's future,
the majority of those present favoured Crown Colony Government
2
over Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. During 
the 1922 election of members to the Advisory Council, the question 
of Amalgamation was put before the electorate and, while 310 voters 
favoured it, l,Al7 voted against it. It soon became clear to the 
Administration that in spite of the demands of the farmers, the 
greater part of the settler community preferred a form of Crown 
Colony Government, operating around a local Legislative Council.
The Amalgamationists had lost the first round for, in 19231 after 
a referendum, Southern Rhodesia received Responsible Government 
and in July of the same year the Northern Rhodesia Advisory Council 
requested that the territory be declared a Crown Colony. This was 
granted in 192^ - and a Legislative Council was established.
OP
The early yearsv Crown rule did not quite provide the sort
i\
of changes that would have mollified the Amalgamationists. Hopes 
that farming conditions would show some improvement under the new
H i.  Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter (Oxford, 
1961), p.139.
H 3S3/509, Z.N.A. "Proceedings of a Conference held at the Court 
House, Mazabuka on Sunday October 2nd, 1921".
■^Gelfand, ou.cit., p.lAO.
Administration were not realised and it was not long before
frustration in settler circles produced a torrent of criticism
of government. Commenting on the state of the settler farming
community in 1923, the District Commissioner observed "a mood and
an outlook caused by a trying and disappointing time’. He could
only hope that 'it should prove to be temporary1 although he feared
'it may be a distinct factor for some months to come'.'*'
Representatives of the various Farmer Associations within
the territory had presented, in 1923, a Memorandum outlining some
of the questions to which farmers were hoping the new administration
would give urgent attention. Among these, they listed the need for
a Land Bank, 'conducted in a similar manner to that in operation
in the Union of South Africa, to assist in the development of the
Agricultural industry'. They stressed the need for the re-establishment
of the Agriculture Department, 'with a fully qualified technical...
head in addition to the cotton expert' and the upgrading of veterinary
services so as 'to combat the unknown cattle diseases which are
2
causing enormous losses among the livestock in the country...'
In spite of settler representations, the services provided by 
the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments continued to fall below 
farmer requirements and the credit facilities open to them were far
3
from adequate for their needs. In the absence of a Land Bank, 
settlers received loans from an Agricultural Loans Board and also
^Z.A./7/l/8/3, Z.N.A. Report on Batoka District for year ending 
31st March, 1923.
o
BS3/A58, Z.N.A."Memorandum from Elected Delegates representing 
the Central Farmers Association, the Southern Farmers Association, 
North-Western Rhodesia Farmers Co-operative Society, Cattle Owners 
Associations etc..."
■'’The Administration did not provide a Land Bank. In 1929 it 
was reported: 'His Excellency considers the establishment of a
Land Bank premature...'. See Carter to Chief Secretary, 16A . 29, 
in BlA/EIN/6/l, Z.N.A. -
from the North-Western Rhodesia Co-operative Society. The 
Board provided loans for investment in dipping tanks, fencing, 
the erection of farm buildings, the importation of stock from 
abroad and for similar development needs. It was not, however, 
easy to qualify for any of these loans, for the security the 
Board requested, viz. the title deed to the farmer's land, was 
one few farmers could afford, until they had resided in the 
territory for some time. The Co-operative Society's terms were 
less demanding but it offered much lower sums than the Board.
The loss of the Katanga market during the early 1920s created 
serious marketing problems for the territory's farmers. After the 
first world war, the expansion of mining activity in the Congo 
had provided a large market for the maize and cattle traded by the 
Northern Rhodesia farmers. The Congo maize market was however 
lost in 1923 when the maize price in Northern Rhodesia dropped 
to b/6d a bag. Although beef exports continued for a while, the 
opening of the Congo to Southern Rhodesia's cattle farmers in 1922 
after the spell of East Coast fever in that territory had ended,
gave the Southern Rhodesians a virtual monopoly of the cattle
2
trade. To add to the farmers* difficulties, the labour-problems'.posdd 
by the recruiting activities of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
In the late forties, farmers were to request that 'the loan 
arrangements administered by the ... Cooperative Society ... be 
extended... in that the length of terms given might be increased 
and ... the amount available to an individual at any one time... 
be increased to a maximux of £1,000...' See Memorandum of Mazabuka 
Farmers Association, Sec/Dev/A2,Z.N.A.
% e e  Sir Alan Pirn, "Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire 
into the Financial and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia"
(1938), pp. 210-211.
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(R.N.L.B.) continued to disrupt his supply of labourers. The 
frustration of the settler farmer during these years can be 
clearly seen in a letter sent to the Administration in 1927 by 
S. Harris Wroth, one of the leading settler spokesmen on the 
plateau.
'It is with very great regret I feel compelled to 
write complaints at any time but as an old farmer 
and cattle breeder of ^0 years experience, I think 
it my duty to point out to Government, the hopeless 
state of affairs in connection with the Veterinary 
Department... in this district. Cattle have died 
all round here this season of skin disease and as 
far as I can see, no real effort has been made to 
tackle the problem. I asked our Vet. why some of 
these cattle were hot taken to Chilanga and ex­
perimented on and, of course, got the usual reply 
"No facilities". If that is so, what is all the 
money spent in connection with veterinary research?
... The Vet. doesn't feel the loss, neither does 
it affect his personal comfort. The poor devil of 
a farmer is told by the Government he is having 
a big sum of money spent on him every year... and 
he should feel very grateful for such services.
Caught .up in a situation where a number of them were in no
3
position to meet the interest payments on their lands, settler 
farmers increasingly complained of their needs being neglected 
by the Administration. More and more they compared their situation 
to that of their counterparts across the Zambesi in Southern Rhodesia 
who, on the whole, enjoyed much better services from their Agri­
culture and Veterinary Departments as well as more flexible credit 
terms. This gave rise to renewed demands for Amalgamation, for 
the farmers were convinced that their situation would only improve
1Competition for labour between the E.N.L.B. and the territory's 
farmers had started during the days of Company rule. See Chapter 1A ^ .4^
*TJl/l A.1906, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Chief Secretary, 10.7.27,
^In 1927 farmers owed the Administration some £8,^7^; this sum 
was made up of '£6,233 in respect of the purchase price of land 
alienated under permit of occupation and £2,2Al in respect of 
lease rents owing1. Knowing the financial situation of most farmers, 
the Administration had to consider the possibility of writing off the 
debts. C,0.793/l6 (P.R,0.),Governor to Colonial Office, *f.2.27.
-si*.
J
if they gained access to the technical and financial assistance 
offered by the Southern Rhodesian Authorities. Apart from the 
purely economic considerations, there was apparently the popular 
political argument that the settler community would be better 
placed to meet the threats that might emanate from the African 
population if Northern Rhodesia was amalgamated with Southern 
Rhodesia and its larger white population. The limited white 
population in the North would cease to be a real pnfolem for, in 
the amalgamated Rhodesia, the whites of the South would be actively 
involved in the affairs of the northern territory and would do all 
they could to protect settler interests by resisting African 
demands for political equality. The settlers’ monopoly of 
political power would therefore be fully guaranteed.
The Hilton. Young Commission
In 1928 the Hilton Young Commission, which was investigating
the possibility of closer union of the British dependencies in
Eastern and Central Africa,^ arrived on the plateau. Settler
farmers were quick to seize the opportunity to make their views
known. In a memorandum, jointly submitted by a Lusaka and Maza- 
2
buka delegation, the settlers made it clear that they were 'totally
opposed to any form of Federation with the north until Amalgamation
3
with Southern Rhodesia is an accomplished fact'. The Memorandum
See Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies 
in Eastern and Central Africa, Cmd. 32jh (London, 1929)«
2
Representing Mazabuka were four prominent farmers: T. King,
L.J.Marston, G. Burdett and H. Ilsley.
■^ Bl/3/36, Z.N.A. Memo, of evidence to be given by the combined 
Lusaka and Mazabuka delegations to the Hilton Young Commission.
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listed the reasons why such Amalgamation was felt to be in the 
territory's interest. It emphasised the 'superiority of the 
Veterinary and Agricultural facilities in Southern Rhodesia', and 
pointed out that with Amalgamation 'Land Bank and other specialised 
loan facilities will be available'. Settler farmers found parti­
cularly attractive the fact that 'Southern Rhodesia possesses 
dairying, pig, fruit, poultry sheep, sericulture, cotton plant, 
tobacco breeding and dry-farming esqperts', whereas in Northern 
Rhodesia there were 'no such facilities'. Amalgamation* they con­
cluded in their enthusiasm, would 'relieve the British Government
%
of all financial liability for Northern Rhodesia and the development 
of its resources will no longer be at the mercy of changes in the 
home political situation'.
Although evidence heard by the Commission weighed heavily in 
favour of Amalgamation, its members were not to be easily swayed. 
They rejected any possibilities of Federation between the terri­
tories outright because of the fear that it 'affords no solution 
of the problems of the non self governing Dependencies in the 
Northern group' and also because they were convinced that a self- 
governing Southern Rhodesia would try to dominate the union. Amal­
gamation was also ruled out because of African opposition to it
2
in various parts of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
St % sit + %
1Ibid.
2See Cmd. , op.cit., pp. 282-28.5.
The years of the Depression gave added impetus to the drive 
for Amalgamation. The period saw the ruin of a number of settler 
farmers, who had to abandon their farms to go southwards or join 
the public service as produce prices fell and loans became ever 
more scarce. Those who continued to farm during the slump complained 
that although 'individual cases of farming prosperity occur ... 
the farming population certainly does not increase, disappointment 
and dissatisfaction are rife and have their inevitable effect in 
retarding economic progress'. They drew the Administration's 
attention to th^nuch healthier Administration/Farmer relations 
that obtained in the Southern territories, where 'governments 
closely and continuously associate themselves with every branch of 
farming production,..' To end the uncertainty, the Authorities 
were called upon to outline 'a clear, public and unequivocal 
statement of their attitude and intention with regard to the pre­
sence in Northern Rhodesia of a permanent farming community...'.'1'
The controversy generated by the publication, in 1930i of
2
the Passfield Memorandum, was to quicken the momentum of the 
Amalgamation drive. Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, maintained 
in this memorandum that Britain was determined to pursue the policy 
which was created for Kenya in 19^3) viz. 'that the interests of 
the African natives must be paramount and that if, and when, those 
interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict,
^Sec/SL/33, Z.N.A. Memorandum to Chief Secretary from the Northern 
Rhodesia Farmers Association, 11.3-39.
Memorandum on Native policy in East Africa, Cmd. 3373 (London, 
1930).
ithe former should prevail*. This was the biggest official threat 
that settlerdom had ever faced, for its implementation would have 
subverted the work which the^segregative policy of containment had 
done and was still doing. To say that African interests were to be 
paramount when in conflict with that of the whites was to make 
irrelevant the instruments of social control which had been im­
ported from the South and introduced with strong settler support 
to ensure settler dominance over the other races in the territory. 
For instance, by 1930, apart from the native reserves policy, the 
pass system which rigidly regulated the movements of Africans in 
areas of European settlement, especially the townships along the 
line of rail, was already in force. The various townships were 
under the control of Town Management Boards which were dominated 
by the settlers. The Boards saw to it that African movement within 
the Townships was kept under constant check. The line of rail 
towns were considered European areas and the African was allowed 
urban residence only if he was in the employ of the Government 
or some other private employer. Africans who were not so employed 
were considered loafers and whenever the local police toured the
locations in which urban Africans lived, those who failed to produce
2
evidence of gainful employment were ordered back to the reserves.
-|
Memorandum on Indians in Kenya, Cmd. 1922 (London, 1923)» p.9.
2
This harassment of Africans, some of whom were classified as 
loafers . even though they were engaged in petty trading in the 
locations, was to be taken up by the Mazabuka Welfare Association 
during the mid 1930s. (See KDB 4/2/4, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting 
£f the Mazabuka Welfare Association held on 23rd February 1934). 
Some of the Association's activities are discussed later on in 
this chapter.
Within the townships, Africans had to carry identification certi­
ficates. Up to 1930» this certificate took the form of a pass 
for all Africans. While visiting relations or working in the town­
ships they were required to carry the pass, especially at night, 
and failure to produce the document when it was requested by an
officer of the law usually brought fines of up to £10 or the equi-
1valent in imprisonment. As from September 1930, Africans working 
in the townships were allowed to use their certificates of employ-
orgqnised on colour-bar lines. Africans in these areas were, by 
1930, already experiencing a variety of discriminatory practices 
in the Post Offices, eating places, shops, butcheries and other 
public places where the races were likely to come into contact.
In the prevailing atmosphere, the Passfield Memorandum was 
therefore strongly criticized by the settlers. Meetings were 
called at Mazabuka and Choma on the plateau and in other parts 
of the territory, at which settler leaders outlined the dangers 
in the declaration and the need to challenge it. In protesting 
against the Memorandum, the settlers argued that the British Empire 
should be 'primarily concerned with the furtherance of the interests 
of British subjects of British race and only thereafter with other 
British subjects, protected races and the nationals of other countries 
They maintained that the British Government's intention ’to sub­
ordinate the interests of civilized Britons to the development of
n
Interviews in various Chieftaincies on the plateau.
^ZA2/2, Z.N.A. Official circular No. 1191/6^ of 29th May, 1930 
on the subject of native registration.
ment townships was strictly
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alien races whose capability of substantial further advancement 
has not been demonstrated, appears to be contrary to natural 
law1
Demands for Amalgamation with the South were renewed, for more
than at any time before, settlers felt a need to tie in their
fortunes with their counterparts across the Zambesi. A number of
settlers who had, till now, not quite made up their minds about the
wisdom of Amalgamation, decided, at this stage, that Amalgamation,
in spite of its disadvantages, xtfould definitely procure that
security which the whites needed. They therefore decided to
support the Amalgamationists. One very prominent settler in this
group of converts was Leopold Moore, perhaps the most outspoken
2
settler in the territory at this time.
Attempts by the Governor of the territory, Sir James Maxwell 
and his successor, Sir Hubert Young, to reassure the settlers that 
the Passfield Memorandum did not mean any radical change in the 
Colonial Office's policy, failed to rid settlers of their suspicions 
After the election of 1935i a motion was introduced in the Legis­
lative Council demanding the union of Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
It was, however, defeated by the official majority. This setback, 
however, only strengthened the resolve of the Amalgamationists.
In January 1936, all the elected members of the Northern Rhodesia 
Legislative Assembly met with' representatives of the three political
See Correspondence with regard to Native Policy in Northern 
Rhodesia. Cmd. 3731 (London, 1930).
2
Leopold Moore was to move a motion in favour of Amalgamation 
between the two territories, in the Legislative Council on 1st 
June, 1936. See Hansard, No. 30, Col. 280.
parties of the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly at the 
Victoria Falls. The attitude of the Southern Rhodesians to Amal­
gamation with the North had changed considerably for, with the 
expansion of copper mining in Northern Rhodesia after the Depression, 
the territory seemed at last capable of offering something to her 
partner in union. At this Victoria Falls meeting, the two sides 
agreed to a resolution which declared that 'the early amalgamation 
of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a constitution conferring
the right of complete self-Government is in the interests of all
1the inhabitants of both Colonies.' Increased demands for Amalgamation 
were to lead to the appointment of a commission of enquiry under 
Lord Bledisloe, in 19371 to investigate the possibilities of closer 
union. However, before examining the work and recommendations of 
this commission as well as the political activities of the forties, 
it itj necessary, at this stage, to examine the initial African re 
action on the plateau to the settler challenge.
African Welfare Associations on the plateau
The challenge posed by the settlers during this period was 
anxiously taken up by some members of the African population in the 
townships of the plateau. The townships were a meeting place for 
Africans from various areas within and outside the southern province. 
During the slump of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the African popu­
lation in the townships was to increase considerably. Faced with 
the social problems of the urban areas, these Africans decided to
"See Cmd. 59^9, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report (London, 
1939).
form Associations to present their grievances to the Admini­
stration. The immigrant population was to feature prominently 
in these efforts at political organisation.
During the years of the Depression, farming on the plateau 
suffered a serious slump and the number of migrant labourers leaving 
the reserves in search of wage employment in the townships of the
1
territory and further south into Khodesia, increased considerably. 
Most of the able-bodied men were attracted to the main townships, 
Mazabuka, Monze and Choraa in particular, where there were possi­
bilities of employment, mainly unskilled, with the railways and 
in various Departments of Government. The majority of migrants 
had little or no education and they served, mainly, as messengers 
and odd job labourers. A few who had been educated at local missions 
to Std V or VI level served as clerks and also in minor supervisory 
jobs. The townships also attracted many Africans from outside 
the Southern province, most of them coming from the Western and 
Eastern provinces and from neighbouring Nyasaland. Quite a large 
percentage of the Lozi and Nyasalanders who took up jobs in the 
townships had acquired a comparatively higher standard of education 
than their Tonga counterparts. Many of them, therefore, qualified 
for clerical jobs and were often the leaders of African opinion 
in the various townships. In the African Welfare Associations that 
were formed on the plateau during the early 1930s, these immigrants, 
several of whom had lived on the plateau for many years, were to 
play a very prominent role. They were also conspicuous in later
^See Chapter III^ p. 11 o, .
efforts to organise Africans in the reserves for political action 
as will be seen presently. With some of the plateau's Chiefs al­
ready mentioned,'1' these immigrants pioneered the cause of African 
protest on the Tonga plateau during the 1930s. At a time when the
vast majority of the local Tonga were facing up to the economic
2
realities of the Depression, these immigrants, several of whom 
were lucky to retain their jobs in the townships, in spite of the 
slump, found time to address themselves to the social problems 
that had beset the African community. Although their activities 
never attracted much local support, they were to provide some of 
the inspiration behind the formation of a Northern Rhodesia African 
Congress in one of the Chieftaincies of the plateau in 1937.
By the late 1920s and early thirties, African workers in the 
two main townships on the plateau, Mazabuka and Choma, decided 
to organise themselves into Welfare Associations to protect their 
interests. These Associations were to address themselves to the 
grievances of the African population which had accumulated with 
the years. They would then make representations to the Administration 
in the hope that action would be taken to alleviate the situation. 
African Welfare Associations were by no means a new idea in 1930. 
There had been several Welfare Associations in Nyasaland, the
3
original impetus for their formation came from Livingstonia. These
^See Chapter II*
^Ibid.
3
See John Cook, "The influence of Livingstonia Mission upon the 
Formation of Welfare Associations in Zambia, 1912-1931", in 
T.O.Ranger and J.Weller (Eds.), Themes in the Christian History 
of Central Africa (London, 1973).
Associations had no immediate imitators in Northern Rhodesia
but in 1912 a group of Africans who had been in contact with
Livingstonia decided to start a welfare association at Mwenzo
in the northern part of the territory. After functioning for
some time, the Mwenzo Association collapsed around 191^» although it
1was to be revived later. In 1930 about five Nyasa Civil Servants
2
formed a similar Association in Livingstone and the Mazabuka 
Welfare Association ,which was formed on the Tonga plateau in July 
1930, derived its inspiration directly from the Livingstone move­
ment.
The Mazabuka Association was formed as a result of the efforts
of William Mfoone, a clerk of the Native Education Department,
who on his transfer from Livingstone to Mazabuka was requested by
the leaders ofthe Livingstone Association to examine the possibility
of starting an Association there.^ On arrival Mhone, who was a
Nyasalander, contacted a leading Lozi resident, Josiah Imbowa.
Josiah, who was the son of the Lozi Induna, Mbowa, was at the time
A
a clerk at the Central Research Station. At a meeting held at the 
Nakambala Compound in Julyl93°i the Association was inaugurated 
and from its inception its .executive was dominated by immigrant 
Africans. The Association had a number of Tonga members but, according
q
Cook, op. cit., pp. 106-111. See also ’'Autobiographical sketch" 
by Donald Siwale, in Africa Social Research, No. 191 June 1973 j p.366.
2Cookt, p.129.
Sec/Nat/323j Z.N.A. Mazabuka Welfare Association to Provincial 
Commissioner, 23.9«30-
A
Ibid. Minutes of meeting of Mazabuka Welfare Association, 22.9,91.
to Informants, they did not show any strong commitment to its 
programme and their attendance at meetings was very irregular.
One Informant gave the following explanation: 'They^/lhe
Tonga members^1 attended meetings on Sundays when they were not 
going home to the village to visit their relatives. They paid 
their subscriptions regularly but few would sit in front at 
meetings. Most of them were usually at the back. Few said any­
thing.
This reluctance to get too deeply involved in Association 
activities could, perhaps, partly be e:xplained by the fact that 
most, if not all of the Tonga members, were target workers who 
were in the township but not of it. Most of them regarded their 
stay in the urban environment as a sojourn during which they 
would accumulate as much capital as possible to take back to their 
villages for the improvement of their farming activities. Very 
few considered themselves long term residents. The vast majority 
therefore maintained a very superficial interest in the local 
Welfare Association whose programme tended naturally to focus more 
on urban than rural problems. The Tonga in the township were quite 
content to leave the task of managing the Association in the hands 
of the enthusiastic immigrants and it is significant that the
fourteen executive members elected to run the Mazabuka Association
2
in 1931 were all Immigrants. In June 19311 a Welfare Association 
was officially inaugurated in Choma. Here again the immigrant
1Intervlew with Nelson Liyanda, 9.12.73.
^Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. Mazabuka Welfare Association Meeting of 22.9.31
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population was allowed a monopoly of executive positions, the 
being ^
local Tonga/content to play a subordinate role.
At Association, meetings members highlighted their various
grievances which arose from the treatment Africans, in general,
were receiving in the townships. An Association meeting held in
Mazabuka in July 1931 started off with a member tabling a motion
condemning the way African customers were being treated at the
local butcheries. He pointed out that Africans were not allowed
to purchase meat of their choice in the butcheries and that in
most cases they had to content themselves with bony, even
decomposing meat, which was handed to them through hatches, as
2
they were not alloxved into the shops.
Another drew attention to the molestation Africans suffered 
at the hands of whites when using the townships' pavements and 
suggested that 'it would be a good thing if streets were enlarged 
so as to allow natives a space in which they could walk in safety 
and away from fear and danger of traffics /si c/'. There v&s 
also a great deal of dissatisfaction over the abuse of Africans 
by whites at the Mazabuka railway station. The practice of man- 
handling and insulting ticket-buyers was strongly condemned.
Metoers also criticized those settlers who insisted that African 
cyclists should always dismount when they came across a white 
cyclist and those officials who forced Africans to take off their
1Sec/Nat/333» Z.N.A. The Choma Association was formed, apparently, 
around August, 1930* but official recognition was first sought in 
1931. ^ee Amafumba's letter in appendix.
^Sec/Nat/323* Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting held on 31.7*31*
3lbid.
shoes before entering Government offices,"''
The Choma Association*which met more regularly than 
2the Mazabuka body* discussed at meetings problems very similar 
to those of the Mazabuka Africans. Some of its members were 
however slightly more radical than their Mazabuka counterparts.
For instance, in August 1930* Hichard Amafumba, a resident Lozi, 
addressed a letter to the members of the Kafue Native Warfare 
Association, as he called it, in which he emphasised the need 
for Africans to shake off their cowardice and unite. 'Cowardice1, 
he wrote, 'is a defect, a deficiency, a blight, and has its roots 
in all that which makes for deterioration and depravity of humanity, 
He stressed the need for increased awareness among Africans:
'If you keep reading various papers, you will be assured of the 
struggle that is now going on in the world among nations for com­
plete freedom. As we do not aspire for freedom in every sense 
,/sic/, we will not be a free people ... Do you realise the position 
in which you are? Do you realise that the death is staring us in 
the face, economically, industrially and otherwise Qhi my Afri­
cans, there is no use crying to be redeemed by Americans from the 
Exterior without having interior foundation of strength /sic/'.
He called for alertness, for 'Great Britain is bringing her own 
doom, so be watchful...'. In conclusion, he e;xpressed the hope
Ibid. Minutes of Association meeting held $11 22,9.31. Members 
also criticized the practice of prosecuting unemployed Africans, 
who were accused of being loafers though they engaged in petty 
trading, as well as the illtreatment of African customers at the 
Townships1 beerhalls. See KDB k/2/k, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting 
held on 23.2.3 +^.
2Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. Minutes of Association meeting, 13.8.31.
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that all Association branches within the teritory would
'participate in this indispensable co-operative movement by-
subscribing to this powerful effort toward the industrial eman-
1
cipation of our race1.
The Administration kept a close watch on the discussions
2of the Welfare Associations and, especially, on the activities 
of influential Africans, like Amafumba, who were the leaders of 
African opinion in the townships. It is interesting to note 
that, by August 1931* Amafumba had been arraigned on a charge of
3
stock theft and sentenced to two years imprisonment, a very
k
heavy penalty, it seems, for such a crime in those days.
ZA l/ll/l, Z.N.A. For full text of Amafumba's letter, see Appendix
One detects a strong Ethiopianist element in Amafumba's ideas. His 
reference to Americans was presumably a criticism of the effects 
of contemporary Watch Tower preaching. Watch Tower did not, however 
attract much support on the plateau. It had a few members in the 
Nakambala compound in Mazabuka who organised meetings and sold 
tracts but they made hardly any impact. In 1937 the work of the 
Watch Tower adherents was described as 'laudably uncontroversial 
and unobtrusive*. See Zk 7/1/17/31 KDB l/5/ll and KDB 6/l/l/6, 
Z.N.A. Also Native Affairs report, 1937* P*38.
2For instance, the Secretary for Native Affairs instructed in the 
thirties that 'the Amalgamation of the two Ehodesias is a political 
matter which native employees of Government should not be per­
mitted to discuss' and, he went on, 'I would suggest that the Wel­
fare Associations delete the subject from their Agenda...'. See, 
Sec/Nat/332, Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Secretary 
(undated).
-^Sec/Nat/333» Z.N.A. Comments by the B.C. Kalomo on Choma Welfare 
Association Minutes.
^Informants told the author that offenders of this soft usually 
received sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year.
Josiah Imbowa of the Mazabuka Association was also under
official surveillance during the early thirties, because District
officials were convinced he would be a bad influence on Africans.
In a despatch to the Governor, one official noted: 'I think
that at Mazabuka, the leading spirit, Josiah Imbowa will be
definitely a nuisance. He is related to the Barotse royal family,
1
he is extremely intelligent and, I fear, entirely disloyal.1
Imbowa1s influence within the Association, however, continued 
to grow and by the beginning of 1933* he had led so many delegations 
of protest to the Mazabuka Boma, that he was recognised by both 
whites and Africans as the undisputed leader of the African com­
munity. He was now clearly a threat to the Administration and 
so, in July 1933* he was transferred to Mkushi, in the Central 
Province.^
The members of the Welfare Associations came under much press­
ure from their kinsmen who lived in the reserves and who had prob­
lems and grievances of their own which they wanted the Associations 
to articulate. These were essentially rural problems, connected 
with farming activities. Several Association members, who still 
maintained their ties with their villages in the reserves, felt 
that the Associations could do something about rural grievances,
^Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. D.M.Kennedy to Governor, 13.10.3G.
2
Ibid. Minutes of Mazabuka. Welfare Association meeting, held 
4-. 10.33. The 'transfer1 weapon was repeatedly employed by the 
Administration to break the Association. In 1933* a Mazabuka 
delegate to a Conference of Welfare Assocations all over the 
territory told of the loss, since 1932, of 'prominent members' 
through transfer. As a result, 'We have at present a small number 
of members who are interested in the Association', he told the 
gathering. See Sec/Wat/311, Z.N.A. Proceedings of General meeting 
of United African Welfare Associations, 10-11th July, 1933.
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by way of representations to the Administration, so that living
conditions in the reserves could be improved. At a meeting
of representatives of several Welfare Associations, held at
Kafue in July, 1933’, & motion demanding that 'the Government
should be requested to permit our Assocktion's wings to stretch
out in the villages for the common good of the people',^ was
passed unanimously. When, however, the text of this resolution
reached Moffat Thompson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, he
made it quite clear that the Administration was not prepared to
see the Associations extending their activities into the reserves.
In a despatch to the Chief Secretary he wrote: 'I recommend...
that the Welfare Assocations be told definitely once and for all
that they are not permitted to carry on their activities in the
villages, that Native Authorities, under the guidance of District
Officers, are much more capable of attending to their own affairs
than any group of alien or detribalised natives and that disciplinary
action will be taken against the members in Government employment
2
of any Association that ignores this warning.'
Provincial Commissioners were accordingly informed through 
a despatch from the Chief Secretary in September, 1933, ' 
that - Associations would only enjoy the Administration's
recognition if they restricted themselves to looking after 'the 
non-political interests of detribalised natives resident in the 
various townships' and gave up any ideas of speaking 'on behalf of
1Sec/Nat/311, Z.N.A. Proceedings of General Meeting of United 
African Welfare Associations, July 1933.
2
Ibid. Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Secretary, 29.8.33.
1
the people in the tribal areas.1
The Administration also singled out the most influential 
group of Africans within the Associations, viz., the Civil Ser­
vants, for special mention. Their views expressed at Association 
meetings were becoming a source of great embarrassment to officials.
It was the Civil Servant, for instance, who was always spear­
heading discussions of such sensitive subjects as Amalgamation, 
an issue the Administration wanted Africans to let alone. The 
excesses of the Civil Servant had, therefore, to be curbed. At 
a meeting with the District Commissioner in September 1933* mem­
bers of the Mazabuka Association were told quite bluntly that 
Government employees should not address their meetings any more,
2
although they were free to attend and offer advice in the background.
The Administration's clampdowncn the activities of Welfare 
Associations on the Tonga plateau had a two-fold effect on the 
local African population. It killed much of the interest that 
town dwellers had shown in the Association's activities. Attendance 
at meetings dropped sharply by the end of 1933 aud the District
report for 193^ observed that 'the Mazabuka ... Association...
3
is very inactive as none of the members are very interested'.
Officials were now convinced that the Administration's efforts to 
check the rapid politicization of the Associations had been a success.
Ibid. Chief Secretary to all Provincial Commissioners, ^.9.33.
2KDB k/2/A, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting of Mazabuka Welfare Association 
held on 3.9.33.
^Zk 7/1/17/3, Z.N.A. Annual report, 193^.
In 193^ it was reported that 'the tendency of African Welfare
Associations to develop into political bodies with members of
1the Native Civil Service in their van has ceased'.
the ^
The second major effect of the clampdown on/Welfare Associations
activity was the development, within the rural areas, of a reali­
sation of the urgent need for a representative organ, that would 
span both urban and rural areas. In 1937 an attempt was made to 
supply this need for, in March of that year, the Northern Rhodesia
African Congress (N.R.A.C.) was formed in the area of the widely
2
respected Chief Benjamin Chongo.
The Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.) of 1937.
The N.R.A.C. was formed in Chief Chongo1s village, during
celebrations to mark the award of a Certificate of Honour to M m
3by the Administration. The founder members of the Congress were
five farmers, all of them ex-teachers, who were living in different
4
parts of the plateau. They were Ellison Milambo, of Keemba Hill, 
the retired Headmaster of Rusangu Mission primary school; Samuel 
Sibanda, a resident Ndebele of Mujika; Daniel Muhwahwi, a farmer 
in CMef Monze's area; George Kaluwa, a resident Nyasalander who 
lived at Munenga in CMef MwanacMngwala's area, and Gideon Ndan- 
dala Mankapwi, a farmer in CMef Chongo's area. Apart from Kaluwa
"4vDB 6/l/l/7, Z.N.A. Annual Report on Southern Province, 193^.
p
Chongo had been described in 1936 by an official as 'the best and 
most capable chief whom I have yet come into contact with ... and 
the most enlightened*. In 1935 he had served, for a while, as 
Deputy for Chief Monze. See KDB 6/7/5/3» Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2, 
1936 and Sec/Nat/196, Vol.II, District Veterinary Officer to D.C., 
Mazabuka, 15.6.35.
3Hiis was in recognition of his servies during the inoculation cam­
paign of 1935 to combat Foot and Mouth disease. Sec/Nat/196, Vol. II, 
Foung to Ormsby-Gore, 29.7.36.
^Milambo was the leader of the Farming Community at Keemba Hill and 
Head of the local Farmers Association. See Chapter 153^ .
^The author had interviev/s with all three surviving members of tMs 
Congress: Milambo, Mankapwi and Sibanda.
who was a Methodist, the others were all members of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church. With the exception of Mankapwi,
all had had direct experience of the conditions under which Africans
3
lived in Southern Rhodesia, either while they were underoing teacher
A
training at the S.D.a Js Solusi Mission in Bulawayo or while in 
local employment. As a result, they returned to Northern Rhodesia 
fully apprised of the frustrations settler policies had created 
among the Africans of that territory and their decision to form a 
Congress was, in the main, prompted by a determination to protect 
Northern Rhodesia’s Africans from a similar fate. This was how one 
of the surviving founder members put it: 'We had seen what it
was like to be a slave in one’s country. Xou had all the worst 
jobs, all the poor, sandy land and you were kicked and pushed around. 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia were nothing but slaves to the bwanas. 
We did not want this to happen to us.
The two immigrant founder members of the Congress, Kaluwa and 
Sibanda, appear to have played a major role in getting the movement 
started. The author was told by the surviving founder members of
the Congress that Charles Kaluwa, the Nyasalander, was the main
Z
driving force behind the N.R.A.C.'s formation. Kaluwa, whose father 
had settled on the plateau as a trader and farmer, was educated at 
Waddilove in Southern Rhodesia and he later trained to become a 
teacher. After working in various schools in Bulawayo and Salisbury 
he returned to Northern Rhodesia and was later to become the first
■^Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7A.
2. .
Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi and Samugl 
Sibanda.
African Headmaster of the Jeanes school in Mazabuka. For a long 
time he was also to serve as an Assessor in one of the Native
Authority Courts.?; By the time of the N.R.A.C.'s formation
/'
Kaluwa had apparently given up teaching and was actively engaged
in farrang a plot he owned in Munenga while at the same time
2
operating a little store. He was widely respected on the plateau
for his education and achievements and people remember him as a
3persuasive speaker and a brilliant organiser. In spite of his
popularity, Kaluwa appears to have been quite conscious of his awkward
position as an immigrant in a Northern Rhodesia Congress. Accord­
ing to informants, this was the main reason itfhy he insisted on
Milambo becoming the movement's President, although the other
L
fouhder members wanted him- to occupy that position.
Sibanda, the Ndebele founder member of the N.R.A.C., was the
son of Jacob Detcha Sibanda, an immigrant who had accompanied
Pastor Anderson of the Seventh Pay Adventists when he set out from
e
Southern Rhodesia to begin missionary work among the Tonga. The 
young Sibanda received the greater part of his education in Bula­
wayo and he later qualified as a teacher. After teaching in Bula­
wayo for a year, he returned to Northern Rhodesia where he taught 
at the Rusangu (S.D.A.) Mission for some time before taking up 
farming.^ Sibanda's control of the English language was very
Interviews on the plateau. Also, N/OOOl/2/8, Z.N.A, Confidential 
Correspondence on George Kaluwa and Chief Mpezeni, 6.11.32, and 
evidence collected by Lord Bledisloe's Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal 
Commission. Cmd. 59^9 (London, 1939)i Vol. IV, part A.
2Interviews.
3
While he was Headmaster of the Jeanes school he spent a lot of time 
organising various social activities for African children and 
adults on the plateau. Interviews.
^Interviews with Sibanda (l8.ll.73), Mankapwi (28.11.73) and Milambo (10.2.7A). 
^Interviews. Also BS3/A58, Z.N.A. District Commissioner Mazabuka to
k.17
much above the local average and it was on him that the main
1
responsibility for the drafting of the N.R.A.C.'s constitution fell.
After their constitution had been drafted, the Congress' 
members organised themselves into an executive. Ellison Milambo 
became the President with Sibanda as Vice-President. Kaluwa 
occupied the position of Secretary-General with Daniel Muhwahwi 
as his deputy. The post of Treasurer went to Gideon Mankapwi. Al­
though the Congress' founders were full of praise for some of the
2
policies of the Northern Rhodesia Government, they had no doubts 
about the need to keep a wary eye on the Administration. In their 
constitution, they spelt out the aims of their movement. These 
were:
'(a) To keep and promote the welfare and interests
of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.
(b) To assist in every way necessary the Government
and Mission bodies in Northern Rhodesia, for the 
good of the country.
(c) To enquire and report any matter tending to
injure the welfare and interests of Africans in 
Northern Rhodesia.
(d) To keep in touch with all Congress meetings and
Welfare meetings in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland 
and South Africa.
Provincial Commissioner, 2k,11.50, and evidence collected by 
Lord Bledisloe's Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission. Cmd. 59^9 
(London, 1939)» Vol. IV, part A.
^Interviews.
2
They expressed their gratitude over the Jeanes school in Mazabuka, 
the Trades school in Lusaka, the Maize Control Board, the Native 
Authority system and the Administration's Health facilities. 
Sec/Nat/3^-8, Northern Rhodesia African Congress to B.C. Mazabuka, 
25.6.37.
z
Ibid. Constitution of the N.R.A.C. For full text, see Appendix.
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The Administration was here being asked to recognise a
movement which, though initially organised in a small part of
the territory, was designed to protect Africans throughout the
country while, at the same time, maintaining .contacts with .African
Associations in some of the neighbouring territories.. . The link
with the Southern territories, in particular, was decisive in
the movement’s formation. The fact that much of the inspiration
came from the South can be clearly seen in the repeated rendition,
by the S.D.A. primary school choir and the people present of the
1
song 'Baiti-lani-na-nazi, Ba Ka Congress', at the movement's
inauguration, a song which, among other things, paid tribute to
Mafukuzela, who was a spokesman for African rights in South Africa
and had made trips abroad to win support for his people's struggle
2
for their political rights. The Northern Rhodesia African Congress 
drew much inspiration from the African National Congress of South 
Africa and its founders believed that their movement would come 
to perform similar services for the territory's African population.
In an attempt to strengthen the N.R.A.C,'s position and en­
hance its appeal, the Congress' founder members appealed to various 
influential Chiefs on the Tonga plateau for support. They met 
with a warm response for the Chiefs who, on the whole, had very 
little education and who saw this as a good opportunity to join
See full text of this song in the appendix. That the S.D.A. 
primary school choir under its African leader, Job Koko, was 
rendering songs with strong political undertones as early 
as 1937 was, perhaps, a pointer to the leading role the African 
members of the church were to play in the politics of the plateau.
^Mafufeuzela could well have been a praise name for Clements Kadalie, 
a Nyasalander who started the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union of South Africa in 1919. Or perhaps it was used in reference 
to James Gumede or Pixley Seme, leaders of the African National
cause with the more educated villagers.1 Among the Chiefs who gave
their support to the movement were Monze, Mwanachingwala, Chongo,
2
Siamusonde, Sianjalika, Mwanza, Siamaundu and Chisuv;o. The Con­
gress leaders then decided to approach the Administration for 
official recognition of their movement. A delegation, headed by 
Milambo, left Keemba Hill, the official home of Congress, to see 
the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, K.S,Hudson. According 
to Milambo's account of the meeting, Hudson tried to discourage 
the Congress idea by telling the delegation of its political con­
notations. He warned the farmers against getting involved in 
political activity, advised them to leave the Job of protecting 
African interests in the hands of the Chiefs and Native Authorities 
and told them not to be ’troublesome1.”^
The Administration had no intention whatever of recognising 
the Congress and this was clearly revealed in an anonymous minute 
written by an official on the matter. After condemning the Southern 
province's’system of Intelligence ... in regard to Native Affairs' 
for not getting news of the inaugural March meeting of the Congress 
till June, he wrote:
'This Congress appears to cut right across the scheme 
of local Self-Government through the tribal Authorities.
It is unfortunate but understandable that the Chiefs did
Congress of South Africa. See Mary Benson, South Africa; The 
Struggle for a Birthright (London, 1966), pp. 37-55-
^There was, at this time, some strain in relations between the 
Chiefs and the morepducated villagers. In 1937* it was reported: 
'The educated Native is beginning to ask himself what is the 
purpose of education when those holding the highest posts remain 
themselves uneducated. Conversely, the elderly and ignorant 
Chief is diffident in passing Judgement upon Natives more know­
ledgeable than himself.1 See Native Affairs JReport, 1937» p.39-
Sec/Nat/3^8, Z.N.A., Northern Rhodesia African Congress to 
District Commissioner, 23.6.37.
^Interview with Milambo, 10.2.7^.
0not realize that they were putting themselves in the 
hands of a Super Authority who would dictate to them 
and endeavour to get between them and Government. I 
recommend that the Congress shall not be recognised.
All its functdcns can be carried out by the Native 
Authorities which a member of the Congress can help 
as an individual...'1
Thus, under the pretext that it was out to protect unsuspect­
ing Chiefs, who had no idea of what they were letting themselves 
in for, the Administration refused to recognise Congress. Offi­
cials argued that the movement ‘would interfere both with the 
policy of controlling natives in tribal areas through Native
Authorities and of obtaining the views of natives in non-tribal
2
areas through Native Councils....1
Because it had failed to gain the necessary official approval, 
Congress’ activities were substantially curtailed and it became 
impossible to organise meetings openly or to go around recruiting
new members. However, contrary to the official view that Congress
3
had been dissolved or was dormant by the end of 19371 the leaders 
of the movement and a few close supporters continued to meet, 
occasionally, under cover, in Chief Chongo's home to discuss ways
kand means of combating the problems facing the African population. 
Settler demands for Amalgamation, so persistent during the late 
thirties, featured prominently in these secret me tings. Whenever 
Administration officials came round on tour of their various areas
1Sec/Nat/3^8, Z.N.A. Anonymous Official’s comments on N.R.A.C.
2
Ibid. Acting Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 12.8.37. 
■^ See Native Affairs Report, 1937 j pp. ^O^Al.
^ Interviews with Sibanda, Milambo and Mankapwi.
Congress officials would, individually, acquaint them with African
opposition to the settler proposals. The Movement's leaders were
still together in 1938 when the Bledisloe Commission of Inquiry-
arrived to hear evidence on the plateau and three of them appeared
before the Commission to condemn Amalgamation, Congress, however,
finally collapsed during the early years^of 1939? partly because its
members saw no point in carrying on a movement that could not
operate openly and was not recognised by the Government, but also
because of certain personal disagreements between the Immigrant 
1
and Tonga members.
The Bledisloe Commission and after
African attempts on the Tonga plateau to organise themselves 
to meet the challenge they faced from the settler minority had thus 
come to nought by the time that the Bledisloe Commission arrived on 
the plateau in July 1938. The Welfare Associations had succumbed 
to the pressures exerted on them by the Administration and dis­
content and frustration continued to be widespread among Africans 
in both urban and rural areas of the plateau. The settlers too, 
had their share of frustration, for the British Government's refusal 
to give in to their demands for Amalgamation meant that they risked 
losing their socio-political dominance within the territory.
The mood of the African population, during the late thirties 
and forties, was clearly reflected in their reaction to mounting
^"Interview with Ellison Milambo (10.2.74),
settler demands for Responsible Government or Amalgamation. In 
the evidence they gave before the Bledisloe Commission and in 
letters to officials on the subject, the Chiefs and their people 
were to explain the reasons why they were so passionately opposed 
to Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.
In anticipation of the Commission's arrival on the plateau, 
District officials were instructed to sound the views of the Chiefs 
and their people on the settlers' Amalgamation proposals. In 
their replies the Chiefs of the Tonga plateau voiced their ob­
jections to any form of union with Southern Rhodesia and advanced 
various reasons for this. Chief Mwanza informed the District 
Commissioners of the strong objections of his people to closer 
union: 'We people of this country cannot manage the laws of Southern
Rhodesia...','1' he wrote. Chief Moyo, in his letter, explained, 
people have refused to be joined to these countries... All my 
people have refused to join Southern Rhodesia to people who 
sheded ,/sic/' blood when they first faced with Englishra^i . We
here are women and we refuse. My people refused even to join to
2
Nyasaland...'
Other Chiefs went even further than this and pointed out the 
loss which the African populations of the South had suffered as a 
result of settler rule. Chief Chongo, for instance, drew attention
^Sec/E.A./ll, Z.N.A. Chief Mwanza to D.C.Mazabuka, 30.5.38.
to the privations under which Africans were living in Southern
Rhodesia, something he had himself observed while in employment 
1in the territory. He wrote: 'All good lands were taken by
white people, the natives were given only sandsoil, so they dont 
get enough food.1 Besides, he noted, cattle dipping, a very con­
troversial subject on the plateau, was compulsory in Southern 
Rhodesia and taxes for bicycles and dogs were higher than in 
Northern Rhodesia. He touched also on the popular Tonga fear 
that with Amalgamation there would certainly be an accompanying 
influx of Afrikaner Immigrants. He wrote: 'We have got our own
guns and spears so we enjoy ourselves to kill game as we like.
So if we join, "Dutch" farmers will come and distab us ^sic/on our 
living and they v/ill take all the lands...'
The Chief compared the state of the Civil Service in both 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and criticized the latter because 
it provided employment foronly a handful of African^. In Southern 
Rhodesia, he wrote, 'all the important jobs are occupied by white 
people, they dont allow natives hold important jobs. If you go 
in office in Southern Rhodesia, you will, find only white people, 
this shows that Southern Rhodesia people are having bad treatment
The leading figures of the 1937 Congress movement, joined 
by two prominent residents of Mazabuka Township, also wrote to
1Judah Bbuka, The Chief's Assessor and close friend for many 
years, told the author of Chongo's trips to Southern Rhodesia. 
Interview 13.12.73*
2Sec/EA/ll, Z.N.A. Chief Chongo to D.C. Mazabuka, 2.6.38.
District officials, condemning the Amalgamation demands. They
had all had direct experience of living conditions in the South-
1
ern territories, for varying periods of time, and so could talk 
confidently of the Southern territory's Pass laws, higher taxes 
and prosecutions of farmers who failed to dip their cattle.
The letters sent to local officials on the Amalgamation issue 
clearly showed how alive African migrants had been to the social 
situation prevailing in the South and how rich their experience 
was of African living conditions in the territory. This had en­
gendered a remarkable political awareness in many areas. The 
Native Affairs report for 1938 commentedcn this growing conscious­
ness. It noted: 'It is not generally realised the extreme interest
that natives 'take in political questions, particularly those who 
move outside the territory for the purpose of seeking employment 
and who come Into contact with other forms of Government. On their 
return to their villages, they undoubtedly discuss their adventures 
abroad, and no doubt, discuss the treatment they have received and
the laws they are required to comply with, comparing them favourably
3
or otherwise with the Government in this country.' What the migrant
Kaluwa had served in Bulawayo and Salisbury as a teacher for 10 
years; Sibqnda, as a student and teacher in Bulawayo for 9 years; 
Milambo, as student and teacher in Bulawayo for 2 years; Kalindawqlo 
as medical orderly in Bulawayo for lV years, and Inyama as Police 
Kaseni in Mafeking and Bechuanaland. See, Record of oral evidence 
to Bledisloe Commission, Vol. IV (Part A).
2Sec/EA/ll, Z.N.A. Letter to D.C.Mazabuka signed by five African 
leaders. Undated but presumably June 1938.
^Native Affairs report, 1938, p.29.
labourer had found across the Zambesi had made him aware of the 
fact that tie Africans' condition in the north was slightly better 
in certain important respects. He was, therefore, determined 
to resist any attempts to force the standard down to the Southern 
Rhodesia level.
African objections to closer union clearly centred around 
the land question. There was the fear of losing more land not 
only to incoming Afrikaner settlers, but also to the enemy of the
past, the Matabele, who they believed would seize on Amalgamation
1as an excuse for moving northwards. Colonial rule had not com­
pletely resolved the differences between the Tonga and Ndebele.
The resident community of Immigrant Ndebele at Mujika, in Chief 
Mwanza's area, were at loggerheads with the surrounding Tonga
2
population for the greater part of the twenties and thirties.
The Ndebele at Mujika occupied an area of about 10,500 acres of 
land and for this they paid rent to District officials at a rate
3
of Id per head of cattle and 3d per bag of crops reaped, annually.
1See, Capt. Campbell's speech in Legislative Council on 6th June, 
19391 during discussion of Bledisloe report. Also Native Affairs 
report, 1951j p.67.
2Speaking before the 1926 Reserves Commission, a settler-farmer, 
talking about the Mujika Matabele, said: 'These people are a 
pest. They have so trodden down the local native that the local 
Chief is frightened of them.' (See Evidence of H.C.Savory in 
Native Reserves Commission evidence, Vol. II). Vaux wrote later: 
'Disputes and quarrels betv/een the Matabele and the indigenous 
Tonga over land and grazing and water rights had been continual 
since 1921' - H. Vaux, •'Unusual Aspects of Native Land Tenure 
in Mazabuka District", Northern Rhodesia Journal, No. 2, Vol.
II, 1953.
^KSB.3/l» Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Notebook.
fc/» /■*
^  /Ci 0
Because they paid rent for the land, they demanded the right 
to exclusive use of it and strongly resented any Tonga inter­
ference.
The Tonga, on the other hand, were always accusing the Ndebele
of failing to behave like guests, of regarding the lands they
occupied as their own and of chasing off Tonga cattle, grazing 
1in their pastures. Touring officials who openly described the 
industrious Matabele farmers of the area as superior to their
Tonga neighbours, did nothing to defuse the tensions operating
2
in the area. The District Commissioner, for instance, wrote in 
1930 after a tour of the/^.ujika settlement: 'I found all these
people of a superior type and I consider they are an asset to 
the countxy, obviously industrious and an example to indigenous
3natives as to what can be done.’
Amalgamation was, therefore, undesirable, if, among other 
things, it was to mean the loss of more land to Immigrants, black 
or white. More than their fear of the possible extension of harsher
~*~Ibid. Entry by Cadet C.J.W.Fleming.
2
Interview, on 18.11.73* with Samuel Sibanda, a resident Ndebele, 
whose family has lived in Mujika for many years.
■z
^KDB l/3/*f. B.C.Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 3.P.30*
This practice continued into the fifties. In 1933, an official 
commenting on the Mujika Matabele, wrote: ’It is quite refreshing 
to meet these people of a higher civilization .... It is perhaps 
unfortunate that they have not intermarried with the Tonga in 
order to introduce some better blood into the Tonga tribe*. See 
Tour report No. 18, 1953 in Sec/Nat 366, N/083V^» Z.N.A.
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discriminatory .laws from the South, the likelihood of further land 
loss, strengthened African determination to fight the settlers' 
Amalgamation proposals.^
By the 13th July,1938, vjhen the Bledisloe Commission arrived 
in Mazabuka to record the views of African and settler representa­
tives, it was a foregone conclusion that Africans would reject 
the settlers' demands. Three prominent Chiefs, Naluama, Siamaunda 
and Chongo, represented the plateau Tonga Native Authorities be­
fore the C.ehimission and withthem were five other representatives
2
drawn from urban and rural areas within the District. Among these 
were the President, the Vice President and Secretary-General of
the unrecognised 1937 Congress movement, who, after malting several
3representations to the officials in Mazabuka, had been allowed to 
state their views about Amalgamation before the Commissioners.
A
Again, they criticised the proposals and the Chiefs did the same.
As was ejected, the settler community came out strongly in 
support of Amalgamation, The Northern Rhodesia Traders Association 
branch in Pemba held a meeting on May 29th, 1938 at which they passed
In 19^3, Capt. Campbell, representing the Southern Electoral Area, 
was to tell the Legislative Council of a deep feeling of insecurity 
among natives as to the land they occupied. See Hansard, 1st 
December, 19^3» No. -^6, Cols. 383-366.
2The Mazabuka District representatives were not all 'urban natives' 
as the Record of Oral Evidence (op.cit.) would have us believe.
3
Interviews with Sibanda and Milambo.
A
See Record of Oral Evidence, op.cit.
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the following resolution unanimously: 'This meeting requests the
Royal Commission to recommend to the Imperial Government that
amalgamation between the two countries is imperative at the
earliest possible moment, and compatible with the mutual interests
1
of both Natives and Europeans.'
Farmers1 representatives repeated their reasons for advocating
Amalgamation and some of them took advantage of the Commission's
presence to criticize the Administration for failing to respond
to their calls for assistance. Harris Wroth, one of the leading
farmer spokesmen around Mazabuka, condemned what he regarded as
*a system of Government which appears to be only concerned with
seeing the mines get their good supplies as near the cost of pro-
duction as possible'. He criticized the Administration for being
'apathetic' and for consisting of 'temporary officials who hold
no interest whatever in the territory and nothing in common with
2
settlers or progress'.
After weighing the evidence heard on the plateau and other 
parts of the territory, the Commissioners, in their report, drew 
attention to the remarkable differences between native policy in 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia. They highlighted the existence 
in the southern territory of various forms of racial legislation 
such as the Industrial Conciliation Act, which virtually excluded 
Africans from skilled employment in certain vocations. They,
ZP/2/l/8, Z.N.A. Northern Rhodesia Traders Association to Secretary, 
Royal Commission, 2.6.38.
2Sec/EA/lO, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Secretary, Royal Commission, 
1938.
therefore, 'accepted the idea of Amalgamation in principle but
refused to recommend it... because of the racial policy of Southern
Rhodesia and because of African opposition to the idea'. The
Commissioners were convinced that 'if so large a proportion of
the population of the combined territory were brought unwillingly
under a unified Government, it would prejudice the prospect of co-
1
operation in ordered development under such a government1. They 
did, however, recommend increased cooperation between the terri­
tories and, for this purpose, urged the setting up of an Inter- 
Territorial Council to co-ordinate the existing services of the 
three territories and to plan for the region's economic development.
The Commission's rejection of the settlers' demands only 
served to infuriate the white farmers. Their spokesmen repeatedly 
criticized the Administration and the Commission for paying attention 
to African views on the subject of Amalgamation. At Farmers Associ­
ation meetings, there was talk of settler interests being subord­
inated to that of the Africans. In June 1939 Leopold Moore, one 
of the settlers1 most outspoken representatives in the Legislative 
Council, cautioned a colleague during the Council's discussion 
of the Bledisloe Report, for bothering to pay attention to African 
fears about Amalgamation. He told the House: 'There Is not one
intelligent native in this country. Their opinion is not worth 
anything at all. In fact, they do not understand the problem which 
was shown in the evidence they gave ... Well, the Natives have got
■^ See, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 59^9 
(London, 1939)» PP- 215-219.
no grounds for liking or disliking it Amalgamation proposals/''.
We are running the show and we shall he running it for at least a 
generation and possibly two or three.
This was not the first time that settler leaders were dis­
playing such contempt for African opinion. As early as 1921, 
during Amalgamation discussions in Mazabuka, Tom King, a leading 
local farmer and member of the North-western Rhodesia Political Associ­
ation, had argued that there was no need to consult Africans on the 
question of Amalgamation. He maintained that since no such con­
sultations had been carried out before the Amalgamation, in 1911, 
of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, he saw no reason why
Africans should be consulted over the question of closer union be-
2
tween the Rhodesias . His views were to be re-echoed seventeen
years later by another farmer leader, Harris Wroth, when he said;
’I cannot see why so much importance is given to native opinion on
the question of Amalgamation as I think there are only a veiy, very
few natives who take the slightest interest in the matter and in
my opinion it is the voice of the Missionaries speaking for natives
and pushing forward their private opinions as to what natives
3
should ask for.. „ ’.
The settlers strongly resented the fact that obstacles were 
being put.in their way by the Colonial Office and local Administration 
officials. To them, the concern that was being shown for the views
^Hansard, 6th June, 1939, No. 33, Col'. 301.
2BS3/309, Z.N.A. L.F.Moore to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury,
f^.10.21.
3
Sec/EA/lO, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Secretary. Royal Commission. 
- 1938.
of the African population was in a way the practical implementation 
of the Paramountcy Doctrine. The report of the Bledisloe Com­
mission did not, however, discourage them from the pursuit of 
their ambition. If anything, it strengthened their determination 
to strive towards the creation of that 'White Man's country' 
which was their ultimate goal. During the war years, settlers 
continued to put pressure on the British Government and the local 
Administration, for Amalgamation and their representatives tabled
X
a' number of motions on the subject in the Legislative Council.
On each occasion, the motion was rejected, with settler representa­
tives of African interests and Government officials voting against 
them. By the end of the war, Amalgamation was still just a dream.
The Assemblies of the forties
The war years also saw attempts by the Administration to 
provide representative assemblies for the territory's African popu­
lation, where their leaders could air their views within earshot 
of Government officials. The Bledisloe Commission of inquiry 
had stressed the need for the representation of African interests
in the Legislative Council and had also called for the creation of
2
African representative bodies. In 1938 the Administration went 
some way in meeting these recommendations by appointing Lieutenant- 
Colonel Gore-Browne, a settler in the Northern Province, to repre­
sent African interests in the Legislative Council. In the same
X
For some of the Amalgamation debates, see Hansard, l8th March, 
19^1» 23th November, 19^3 and 28th August, 19^5.
Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission report, Cmd. 39^9 (London, 
1939), pp. 220 and 232.
year? Urban Advisory Councils were established on the Copperbelt.
Some Administration officials returned to their argument in
1936 that Welfare Associations 'were not representative of
all classes of natives' and that they 'represented chiefly the
1views of the Intelligentsia1. They proposed that representative 
councils* which would be more widely based*should be set up 
in areas that were outside the control of the Native Authorities.
The Administration now accepted these proposals and it agreed 
to the creation of Urban Advisory Councils in all the major urban 
areas. Africans who sat on these Councils were to be appointed
by the District Commissioner. It was hoped that the Councils
2
would serve as the 'eyes* ears and mouth' of the District Admini­
stration. Once they had been created* these councils, quite amen­
able to control by officials of the Provincial Administration, 
became the legitimate centres of African political discussion.
In 19A3-AA» the Administration's experiment with representative 
councils for Africans was pushed a stage further when regional 
councils, one in each province, were established. The need for
these councils had been argued quite persuasively in the Legislative
3
Council by the member representing African interests, Gore-Browne. 
The Administration saw the Provincial Councils as they came to be 
called as an insurance against the growth of African nationalism.
^Sec/Nat/311, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner's Conference, 1936.
2
Sec/Nat/751 Z.N.A. Minutes of first meeting of the Nkana Native 
Advisory Committee, 11.11.38.
/See Hansard, 17th September, 19^2, No. A3, Cols. IA8-I5A.
In the words of Rotberg, the Administration, by according to the 
members of Provincial Councils 'a measure of verbal freedom ... 
believed that together with the urban Assemblies, they would 
provide an alternative sufficiently meaningful to satisfy 
the political passions of refractory Africans'. In 19^6, it 
was decided to establish a third Council, the African Representa­
tive Council (A.R.C.), to round off the Administration's conciliar 
experiment. This decision was largely a reaction to the racial tensions 
that were mushrooming within the territory, as African representatives 
in various provincial Councils began ‘to give priority to the dis­
cussion of political subjects at their meetings. Apparently the 
A.R.C. was expected to bring the cream of the African leadership 
throughout the territory, under one .;roof, thus making it easier 
for the Administration to keep a check on the various stirrings 
within the African population. The Provincial Councils had the 
responsibility of electing members to the A.R.C. and representation 
was weighted heavily on the side of the rural areas. The role of 
the A.R.C. was to be purely advisory and this was spelt out quite
clearly by the Governor at the opening of the Council's first 
2
session in 19^6.
The representative Councils, on the plateau and elsewhere, did 
not quite live up to the expectations of the officials who had 
created them. In flagrant disregard of official surveillance, 
their discussions which verged, for the most part, on the political
q
Rotberg, op.cit., p.200.
2
African Representative Council proceedings, No. 1 (19^ -6), 
cols. 3” -^
criticized both settlers and Administration. Increasingly,
the
they laid stress on the rights of Africans and/Aeed for their 
protection from settler designs. Most of the talking in these 
Assemblies was being done by Africans who were no strangers to 
political debate for, in several parts of the country, including 
the Tonga plateau, the newly created Councils absorbed a number 
of those who once worked, or were still engaged in African Welfare 
Associations.
In Mazabuka, the Urban Advisory Council which presumably was
established in the early 19^0s did not excite much interest during
1
its early years of operation. This was, perhaps, due in part 
to the fact that the collapse of the local Welfare Association had 
bred much disillusionment. It could also have been a result of the 
feeling that an Assembly initiated by the officials could achieve 
very little for Africans. Anyway, by the mid forties, in the ab­
sence of an active Welfare Association, local leaders who sat on 
them used the Councils to register their views on a plethora of sub­
jects concerning race relations. Issues such as the colour-bar 
situation in the township, and Settler demands for Amalgamation 
and Responsible Government tended to dominate their agenda and 
frequently recurred In the minutes of their discussions. Repeatedly, 
members criticized what they considered the settler strategy of 
moving towards Amalgamation through the attainment of Responsible 
Government.
'There is hardly any documentary evidence on its activities before 
the mid 19^0s. There are therefore doubts about the actual date 
of its creation.
One of the most persistent critics of the settlers was 
Esau Tembo. He was an immigrant from Nyasaland who had lived 
in the Mazabuka area for several years during which he had 
taken a keen interest in the problems of the African community. 
Tembo was at this time a store keeper and he also operated a 
tea-room in the Mazabuka township area. After serving in the 
Urban Advisory Council for a while, he was to work his way up 
through the Southern Provincial Council into the African Repre­
sentative Council. Tembo was the architect of the Mazabuka Urban 
Advisory Council's resolution of the 11th April, 19^ -8, in which 
settler demands for Responsible Government were strongly opposed. 
The Council gave the follovdng reasons for its rejection of the 
proposals:
'1. Government will have no power and full power will 
be in the hands of settlers of which many of them 
are anti-Africans.
2. The new scheme will bring domination of white people 
over Africans as it is the case of Southern Rhodesia 
and the Union of South Africa, where Africans are de­
prived of their privileges.
3. The ruling from the Colonial Office that Amalgamation
is impracticable was a great shock to white settlers 
but was a great relief to Africans. The new scheme of 
Government is a trick or bait to Amalgamation.
4. The Colonial policy to train colonial dependencies 
politically and give them responsibility of ruling 
themselves, which Africans of this territory would 
have in future, will be stamped down. The power of 
African Chiefs or Native Authorities will be abolished. 
Immigration of white people will be encouraged and 
Africans will have no land.
3. We are satisfied with the Colonial Government from 
which African interests are safeguarded ^ sic/. The 
letter of appeal from Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and a 
letter of challenge from the Honourable R. Wglensky 
forcing Africans to accept the Constitutions of Self- 
Government are unanimously ignored.
^Sec/Nat/lO^, Z.N.A. Enclosure in Minutes of 3th Meeting of Southern
The atmosphere was hardly different in the Southern Provincial 
Council. Here, Mazabuka District representatives, drawn from 
both the rural and urban areas, teamed up with those from other 
Districts within the province, to discuss the grievances of the 
African population and examine the political issues of the day.
From the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, Chiefs Sianjalika 
and Chongo were selected to sit on the Provincial Council and 
represent the interests of rural Africans in Mazabuka District. 
Together with two of the most articulate Africans on the plateau
p
at this time, viz. Esau Tembo and Amos Walubita, they worked hard
to highlight their people's grievances. These covered a host of
subjects. The Chiefs and other members of Council were united in
condemning the virtual monopoly which Indian traders enjoyed in
the reserves, mainly because Africans who applied for trading
licences were having great difficulty in securing them from
2
District officials. Africans who succeeded in getting trading 
licences were reported to be having great difficulty in purchasing 
goods at wholesale prices from European traders. This was strongly
Provincial Council, held lst-2nd June, 1948. The letter from 
Gore-Browne referred to in 3 was, according to Informants, one 
he addressed to several Welfare Associations in which he em­
phasised his opposition to Amalgamation but appealed to Africans 
to consider the Responsible Government proposals. Memory was 
not so reliable on the Wplensky letter.
1 1 Amos Walubita served the Plateau Tonga Native Authority for many
years and was later to sit in the A.R.C.
^Sec/Nat/lOA, Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, l4th- 
15th June, 194-5. '
condemned, Esau Tembo observing in 19^ that ’there is too much 
colour bar, although Africans have the same money'.^
Various grievances arising from the colour-bar were dis­
cussed at meetings. Members demanded the substitution of the 
word 'native' by the honorific Bantu prefix ’Ba', in the address­
ing of correspondence to Africans. Many took strong exception
2to the settler practice of referring to elderly Africans as ’boy', 
l&iey criticized discriminatory treatment in shops, at the railway 
station, at the butcheries and even at the Boma where 'Africans 
sit all the morning waiting for their business to be attended to, 
but the white man is attended to as soon as he comes'. This kind
of treatment, they argued, left Africans with 'the general feeling..
3
that this is all due to the black skin...'. Esau Tembo repeatedly 
appealed for African unity, within the territory, to meet the prob­
lems of settler domination. Pie stressed the need for a clearly 
defined African leadership. In June 19^8 he told his colleagues 
that the African people of Northern Rhodesia 'should be united 
into three groups under the leadership of Babemba, Balozi and Angoni.
because, he pointed out, this alone would rid the African cause of
h
the 'many cooks who spoil the soup...'.
Acc/90/37t Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council. 30.5.^. 
This difficulty was even bro^ g^ht to the attention of the Legis­
lative Council by Capt. Campbell. See Hansard, 10th August, 19^1 
No. A8, Cols. 250-291.
o
Sec/Nat/lO^, Z.N.A. Meeting of the Southern Provincial Council, 
lAth-15th June, 19^5-
^Ibid.
h
Ibid. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, he$:d lst-2nd June, 
19^8.
In the African Representative Council members from the 
1
Tonga plateau played a very active part in the struggle for 
better conditions for the general African population. As will 
be seen later, criticism of settler land and other policies was 
common within this body, in the late forties and fifties. Poli­
tical issues tended to dominate the discussions of the A.R.C.
and, In December 19^ -6, a member of the Legislative Council described
2
their debates as 'a little hysterical and a little fanatical’.
)(t *  sj: >J; !j<
By the end of 19^6 it was quite clear that the majority of 
Africans In the various representative assemblies within the 
territory were chafing under the controls which the Administration 
exercised over these bodies. In the Urban Advisory Councils and 
the A.R.C.V for instance, the Agenda for meetings had to be sub­
mitted in advance for official approval and the Secretary for 
Native Affairs had the right to strike off subjects whose dis­
cussion he considered undesirable. Even more frustrating to Afri­
cans was the fact that the Administration appeared to be paying 
very little attention to the demands that were being made at 
Assembly meetings. In June 19^ -6, Esau Tembo confessed to this 
frustration v/hich his electorate in Mazabuka felt. He told the 
Provincial Council: ’The people I am representing at Mazabuka
told me that It was useless to send me to this Council to report
1During the forties and fifties the most articulate of these were 
Esau Tembo, Amos Walubita and Peter Habumbu.
^See Hansard, 3rd December, 19^6, No. 56, Col. 71* Speech by 
Major McKee.
their views, when the fruits of the words which were spoken last 
year had not yet been seen.
This feeling of purposelessness was not confined to the 
Southern Provincial Council, There was mounting frustration through­
out the territory over the ineffectiveness of the new Assemblies 
and African leaders felt a pressing need for some medium, unham­
pered by official control, which would express the views of the 
African population. The late forties, therefore, saw attempts at 
reviving the Welfare Association in several parts of the territory, 
including Mazabuka, To achieve that African unity which many de­
sired, African leaders came up with suggestions for the Amalgamation 
of the various Welfare Associations within the territory, to form one 
Federation. This was no nev; idea. In Julyl933i when representatives 
of various Welfare Associations met at Kafue, during the Rhodes 
and Founders Days holidays, the suggestion had cropped up and had 
been accepted by all present. Vvihen, however, the African leaders 
approached the Administration for permission to form a Federation 
of African Societies, the idea was discouraged outright. The Governor 
had instructed that ’it should be pointed out ... to the Welfare 
Associations that their value is in their representation of local
interests and that any amalgamation such as they propose would be
2
liable to defeat the main object of these Associations'. Permission 
was, therefore, withheld. In 19^6, however, the political climate 
had changed considerably and Africans were far less quiescent 
than they were in 1933- When, therefore, in May 19^6, representatives
^Sec/Nat/lOA, 3^ rd Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, 10th-12th 
June, 19^6.
^Sec/Nat/321, Z.N.A. Governor to Chief Secretary. -
of fourteen Welfare Associations met at Broken Hill and decided
to make another attempt at forming a Federation* the Administration
appears to have considered it inpolitic to try and stop them,
The Federation of African Societies was formed at this meeting
and a new era in African political organisation began. Although
one official dismissed the Federation as a 'movement ,,, conceived
and controlled by a group of disgruntled intelligentsia .,, who
have found themselves on the wrong side of the fence for one reason 
1or a n o t h e r . n o  serious attempts were made by the Administration
to stop the movement from operating.
With the formation of the Federation of African Societies,
the Welfare Associations, at last, realised their ambition of
articulating rural as well as urban grievances. Unlike the majority
of the individual Welfare Societies whose members were drawn al-
2
most entirely from urban residents, the Federation attracted 
people who lived in the rural areas. To them the Federation was 
an ideal platform for the articulation of the grievances of the 
maize and cattle farmers as well as the needs of urban wage earners.
Delegates from the rural areas had attended the Broken Hill 
Conference. Among those, George Kaluwa, the farmer who had served
Sec/Nat/333» 2.N.A. Anonymous official minute, on formation 
of Federation of African Societies, to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 29.10.A6.
2
Of the fifteen members covered in a survey of the Mazabuka Wel­
fare Association in 1933i five were clerks. There were two arti­
sans, six traders and storekeepers, a teacher and a messenger.
These were all urban residents. There was not a single farmer from 
the reserves. See Sec/Nat 3H» 2.N.A. Acting Provincial 
Commissioner to Chief Secretary, A.12.35.
as Secretary-General to the Congress formed in 1937 in Chief
Chongo's area. Also present was another farmer, Nelson Liyanda,
living at the time at Keemba Hill. Kaluwa played a major role
in getting the Federation started and he became its organising 
1secretary. Liyanda was also elected to the Executive as Treasurer, 
which post he held until July 1918.
During its first few months of operation, the Federation 
made several attempts to gain official recognition. Its leaders
also.'.lobbied the Administration for five seats on the A.R.C.
2
These efforrs, however, never succeeded. Over the years, the 
Administration’s refusal to accede to these and other political 
demands of the Federation caused a great deal of dissatisfaction 
among the Federation's members. As settler demands for Responsible 
Government and Amalgamation increased, in 1917-8, African leaders 
began to think seriously of forming a political party. One in­
cident which, perhaps more than any other, induced the Federation's 
leaders to declare the Federation a Congress was the declaration 
by Gore-Browne in January 1918 of his support for Responsible 
Government. Gore-Browne had served as a representative of African
Southern Province officials tried to discredit Kaluwa, and the 
Federation with him, by accusing him of having obtained goods 
under false pretences in the past. (See Sec/Nat/333» 2.N.A. 
Anonymous Minute No. 21; also Provincial Commissioner to Chief 
Secretary, 30.9.16). However, it was later revealed that it 
was Kaluwa's late father, with whom he shared the same initials, 
who had committed the offence. Acc N/OOOl/2/8, Z.N.A. Confidential 
Correspondence to the Colonial Office on the background of George 
Kaluwa and Chief Mpezeni, 6.11.32.
p
The Government said that it 'could not afford* to recognise the 
Federation officially. See Sec/Nat/333. Minutes of meeting 
with the Secretary for Native Affairs, 19.12.16.
2i2
interests in the Legislative Council for many years and his con­
duct had earned him the respect and admiration of many 
Africans. When he joined those settlers who were demanding Res­
ponsible Government, Africans felt betrayed.
Gore-Browne*s statement provoked sharp criticism from 
Welfare Associations as well as from the official, representative 
Assemblies. In the Southern Provincial Council, Mazabuka District 
representative, Amos Walubita, and others demanded that he should 
resign his seat as an African representative in the Legislative 
Council and be replaced by an African.^
At the third annual general meeting of the Federation of 
African Societies, held in Lusaka in July 19^8, at which George 
Kaluwa, Nelson Liyanda and Esau Tembo were among representatives 
from the Tonga plateau, steps were taken towards the creation of 
an African political party. After condemning settler demands for 
Responsible Government, Amalgamation and Federation, the movement’s
membership demanded that the country be made 'a protectorate in the
2truest sense of the world...'. The idea of forming a Northern 
Rhodesia African Congress, born on the Tonga plateau in the mid 
thirties, was now revived and the Federation was transformed into 
an organisation bearing the same name. Although the leaders of the 
movement hastened to assure the Administration that Congress was 
not an anti-Government organisation, it was quite clear from the 
Constitution they adopted that they intended to play a very active
Interviews with Milambo and Sibanda. Later confirmed m  interview 
with Walubita, 12,11.73. Africans i^ ere not allowed into the Legis­
lative Council till late 19^8; the first two African members 
made their maiden speeches on the 2^th November of that year.
See Hansard, No. 62, Cols. 219-221 and 22A-223.
2.'Sec/Nat/333i Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting between Secretary for Native 
Affairs and fficers of the Federation of African Societies,
29.6.A8.
role in safeguarding African interests within the territory.
The Constitution e:xpressed their determination 'to promote the 
educational, political, economic and social advancement of 
the Africans in full co-operation with the Government ... and to 
serve as a mouth piece of the Africans.
The formation of Congress posed serious problems for the 
Administration. For some time it was at a loss as to whether it 
should disregard the new movement or try to come to terms with 
its unwelcome existence. In July 19^8, the Secretary for Native 
Affairs expressed his views on the situation to his Provincial 
Commissioners and stressed the need for official channelling of 
this growng African consciousness. He wrote: 'They /y,he Africans^
are entering a difficult phase of race consciousness and it is 
more important than ever that we should hold their trust and con­
fidence and maintain the closest contact \,d.th all classes not ex­
cluding the rising middle class. We may deplore the fact that this 
class is becoming politically-minded but we cannot ignore it and 
must take every opportunity to retain its trust and to guide it 
into safe c h a n nels.J~
As late as September, 19^8, the Administration had still not 
arrived at a definite policy regarding the Congress movement. One 
official's view was that the Administration 'must avoid snubbing
^Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia 
African Congress. For full text of Constitution, see Appendix.
2Sec/Nat/l09, Z.N.A. Secretary of Native Affairs' Quarterly 
Newsletter (17.7.^8) to Provincial Commissioners.
the members, but at the same time do nothing to give the Con­
gress official recognition as a representative body which it 
is not1. He believed that many of the movement's supporters 
were 'well meaning members of the Intelligentsia1 but a number 
of them were 'politically ambitious' and had 'rather wild ideas'. 
He warned however that unless Congress v/as 'carefully handled
it will be a focus for political agitation and... might become
1
an embarrassment...1.
The Administration had already placed restrictions on the 
activities of African Civil Servants within the Welfare Associ­
ations; it now extended these restrictions to the new Congress.
In November, 19^8, in reply to a letter fxm the Congress'
Secretary General in which he sought clarification of the position 
of African Civil Servants within the new movement, the Admini­
stration made its views quite clear. Although it was prepared to 
allow Civil Servants to join the Congress, it pointed out that
they should not become office-bearers nor should they participate
2in political discussions. In the coming years, very few Civil 
Servants were to take much notice of these constraints.
By the end of 19^8, Northern Rhodesia's African population 
had at last secured the vehicle of expression which many had been 
longing for. The representatives of African farmers on the Tonga 
plateau had participated effectively in organising both the 
Federation of African Societies and the Congress itself. What
^Sec/Nat/333i Z.N.A. Anonymous Minute to Governor, 23.9.^8. 
2Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. Extract from African Weekly, 17.11.^8.
happened in 19^8 was, in a way, the fulfilment of the dream of
1937. George Kaluwa, the main architect of the Congress of
1
1937 became the new Congress’ first deputy treasurer.
The people of the plateau now looked up to the Congress move­
ment, under its leader Godwin Lewanika Mbikusita, to take up their 
grievances, in both the urban and rural areas and attempt to win 
the desired solutions. We enter into a fuller discussion of Lewanika' 
position in the next chapter but it should be stated here that 
he was a Lozi who had close connectins with the privileged royal 
household of Barotseland. Congress which was essentially a pro­
test movement bent on changing the status quo was thus led by a 
scion of a ruling family which, more than any other, had a vested 
interest in preserving the status quo. In the next chapter we 
shall see how Lewanika responded to the challenge presented by this 
paradox.
■*"Sec/Nat/333i Z.N.A. Nabulyato to Secretary for Native Affairs, 
17.9.^8.
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Chapter VI 
THE POLITICS OF FEDERATION
The political life of Northern Rhodesia was to he dominated 
during the years following the publication of the Bledisloe 
Commission's Closer Union report by a highly charged campaign 
for Federation. The Commission's rejection of outright Amal­
gamation and the British Government's acceptance of its proposals 
were to force the settler population into the pursuit of a more 
acceptable alternative, which would still achieve their main ob­
jective of Closer Union. In this, they ran into a great deal of 
opposition from an African population which was on the threshold 
of its Nationalist struggle against Colonial rule. Although very 
little has been said about it, the Africans of the Tonga plateau 
played a fairly active part in standing up against not just the 
settlers, who were intent on consolidating their political dominance, 
but also the Administration, which was showing itself incapable 
of resisting settler pressures.
The settleik campaign was led by their elected representatives
in the Legislative Council. In 19*1-6, the leadership of the settler
unofficial members of the Legislative Council changed hands. Gore
Browne, whose position as representative of African interests made
it impossible for him to vote with other unofficial members in
favour of Amalgamation'} was replaced by Roy Welensky, an uncompromising
2opponent of Colonial Office rule. Welensky was widely known for 
1When, for instance, Welensky introduced a notion in the Legislative 
Council in November 19**3 in which he called for Amalgamation, Gore 
Browne, though leader of the unofficial members, had to vote against 
it to register African opinion* This was an undesirable situation 
for the majority of the official members favoured Amalgamation,
See Hansard, 25th November, 19*t3,
p
See Hansard, 3rd November, 196*f, No. 56, Col. 60.
his viei»J3 on Amalgamation. He had stoutly supported motions calling 
for Closer Union with Southern Rhodesia and had revealed, on 
a number of occasions, his firm opposition to the Government 
that governed from *8,000 miles away'0'*‘
During Welensky's visit to London in July 19^8, he discovered 
that there was hardly any likelihood of the British Government 
assenting to the Amalgamation proposals of Northern Rhodesia's 
settlers. In fact, the Colonial Secretary at this time, Arthur 
Creech Jones, appeared to be determined to check the speed at which 
power was being transferred into the hands of the settlers. Creech 
Jones was, however, aware of the benefits that would accrue from 
closer economic cooperation between the Central African territories
and, according to Welensky*s account, he hinted that a loose Feder-
2
ation might be acceptable to the British Government. At the Common­
wealth African Conference held in London in October, 19^8, Welensky 
succeeded in convincing Sir Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia 
that Federation could still be a way to Amalgamation and ultimate 
Dominion status."'’ The leaders of the settler populations of the 
Rhodesias thus agreed to change their tactics.
In February, 19^9i at a meeting at the Victoria Falls, settler 
representatives from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland affirmed their
■^ See Welensky*s speech in favour of Responsible Government. Hansard, 
9th March, 19*1-8, No. 60, Col. 22.
2Welensky, R., A000 Days (London, 196*0* p.2*K
commitment to the pursuit of Federation and a Committee 
was set up to draft a Federal Constitution. In November of the 
same year* Welensky tabled a motion in-the Northern Rhodesia 
Legislative Council, calling on the British Government to allow 
the creation of a Federal structure in Central Africa.^ Unlike 
previous occasions when officials in the Legislative Council, who 
were drawn from the Administration, had always voted against the 
settlers Closer Union demands, they abstained from this vote.
This was their way of saying that the Government had an open 
mind on the question and was still awaiting official directives 
from London. Only five members . :of the Legislative Council, two 
African and three whites, opposed the motion.
By the beginning of 1950» settlers in both territories were 
becoming desperate over the British Government's unwillingness to 
meet their political demands. This reluctance on the part of London 
was, as will be seen shortly, closely connected with continued 
African opposition to the idea of Closer Union. In Southern 
Rhodesia, Huggins began to threaten to take his territory out of 
the Central African Council, which had been responsible for co­
ordinating a number of cooperative ventures between the Central
2
African territories. Welensky: tand Huggins continued to press the 
Colonial Office to convene a meeting to examine their Federation 
proposals. These pressures forced James Griffiths, who had replaced 
Creech-Jones as Colonial Secretary, and Patrick Gordon-Walker, the
"4see Hansard, 2Ath November, 19^9t Wo. 66, Cols. 522-3^9.
2
The Central African Council which had no Exenutive powers was 
formed in 19^ to promote the cooperation advocated by the Bledisloe 
Commisssion.
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Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, to agree to the appointment 
of a Committee of Central African and British Civil Servants 
to examine the feasibility of Federations The twenty-seven 
officials of the Committee concluded that Closer Union would 
confer substantial advantages on the territories. They also 
recognised African opposition to the settlers' proposals and > 
therefore stressed the need for 'adequate provision for African
1
representation and adequate protection for African interests...'.
To protect African interests, they recommended certain safeguards, 
including an African Affairs Board.
The Committee's recommendations fired the imagination of some 
of the officials in London and kindled some hope among the sett­
lers of Northern Rhodesia. Those in the Southern Province who,
2with the exception of a few Afrikaner farmers, had remained solidly
behind the drive for union with Southern Rhodesia, welcomed the
report with cautious optimism. In a confidential Memorandum to
the Secretary for Native Affairs, Phillips, the Acting Provincial
Commissioner^detailed this reaction in June, 1951:
'Reactions amongst Europeans to the proposals can be 
summed up briefly - they are good, but do not go far 
enough. It is said that the Government Officials who 
took part in the discussions, have been more pro­
gressive and bolder than anyone expected, but that 
the limitations imposed on them by their official 
outlook still made them err on the side of caution.''9
1Report of the Conference on Closer Association, Cmd. 8233i p.10.
2
’"’Touring Officials were to comment, during the early fifties, 
on the indifference shown In political matters by 'narrow Nation­
alists from South Africa', who, it appears, were more interested 
in Union with South Africa, by now a remote possibility. See 
SecAat/366 N/083V3. Z.N.A. Tour reports Nos. 9 and 12 of 1952.
^N/000l/2/3, Vol. 1, Z.N.A. Phillips to Secretary for Native Affairs, 
28.6.51.
He reported that although the Southern Province settlers were
now willing to discuss Federation, it was ‘Amalgamation rather
than Federation* which was ’the ultimate object*. While supporting
the acceptance of the Committee's recommendations, they insisted
that it should be 'regarded only as a temporary - very temporary
stage in the progress towards full unity.' To them Federation
1was 'only... a means to an end*.
£>
In September 1951* the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretaries 
visited Central Africa to observe the general reaction to the pro­
posals of the Conference of Officials. During his tour of Northern 
Rhodesia, Griffiths encountered strong African opposition. Al­
though his efforts to get African leaders to the Victoria Falls 
for a discussion of the Federation proposals succeeded, he could 
not persuade them to agree to Federation. The Victoria Falls Con­
ference of the l8th-2lst September ended with the release of a 
statement which pledged the four Governments involved to the prin­
ciple of Federation, based on partnership between the races. It 
also included an undertaking by the Africans present to consider 
the Federation proposals once a policy of partnership had been
defined and stressed the need for further discussions at a Con-
2ference to be held in 1952. The Labour Government was not, how­
ever, to have the opportunity of fulfilling its pledge. In the 
General Flections of October, 1951? it was defeated by the Con­
servatives. Oliver Lyttleton (later Lord Chandos) who now assumed 
the office of Colonial Secretary, was to have far fewer doubts
1Ibid.
2Closer Association in Central Africa: Statement by H.M. Government 
in the United Kingdom, 2lst Nov. 1951® Cmd. 8^11 (London, 1951).
than his predecessor as to the wisdom of Federation.
* * m * # * ^
Meanwhile, Northern Rhodesia's African population continued 
its firm opposition to the political demands of the settlers.
The Northern Rhodesia African Congress, under the leadership of 
Mbilcusita Lewanika, the erstwhile President of the Kitwe Welfare 
Association, on the Copperbelt, was the official mouthpiece of 
African protest. Lewanika led his Executive in discussions with 
Administration officials, at which African demands were presented 
and the reasons for African opposition put across. At one such 
meeting, in December, 1948, the Congress leaders raised a number 
of issues pertaining to African political representation and 
African welfare. Congress demanded representation on the Exe­
cutive Council and the African Representative Council and complained
about the very low salaries offered to educated Africans who served
B
in the Native Authority Councils. They condemned the Std VI 
Education policy which 'only served to retard a boy's education by 
making him spend two years in Std VI instead of one year1, and 
demanded a more equitable distribution of scholarships for study­
ing abroad.^
In the political sphere, Congress rejected outright the sett­
ler proposal of partnership between the races in a Federation. Its 
leaders believed that Federation would inevitably lead to Dominion 
status, which would mean the loss of Colonial Office protection of
^Sec/Nat/3f>3, Z.N.A. Meeting between Secretary for Native Affairs 
and a delegation of the AFRICAN CONGRESS, 28.12.48.
African rights. Robinson Nabulyato, the movement's Secretary 
General, summed up Congress' views on the matter in December, 19^8, 
when he wrote: 'Partnership ... is a ladder for Europeans in
Northern Rhodesia to climb on us'.1
When in 19^9, Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, visited Northern Rhodesia, Lewanika presented
him with a petition detailing Congress objections to Federation.
He replied by assuring the Africans that the British Government
would not stint in its 'solemn obligation1 to protect them.
'We shall honour the responsibilities we have entered into and
shall not transfer our responsibilities or abrogate them1, he
2told an African gathering in Lusaka. Congress' dependence on 
London increased after the important Federation vote of 19^9.
The abstention of the Official members of the Legislative Council 
from the vote raised serious doubts in the minds of Congress' 
leaders over the ability of local officials to protect African 
interests. The action of the officials was seen as a sell out and 
the British Government v/as, from now on, looked on as the only 
possible ally the Africans could trust in their fight against 
the settlers.
Under Lewanika's leadership, Congress operations were mainly 
confined to the urban areas. Whatever efforts were made to organise
1Ibid. Confidential Memorandum drafted by Robinson Nabulyato at 
a meeting of the African Congress, on December 28th, 19^8. The 
public utterances of settler leaders like Welensky was to con­
firm Africans in this view. In 1950 Welensky was reported as 
saying during a discussion of the Partnership proposals: 'As
far forward as I can see, the European, with his energy, initiative 
and capital, will be the senior partner'. See Bulawayo Chronicle, 
13th April, 1950; also African Weekly, 22nd March, 1950.
^Quoted in R.I.Rotberg (1965), p.226.
Africans in opposition to Federation were concentrated, for the 
most part, on Lusaka and the towns of the Copperbelt. Al­
though there was much anti-Federation and anti-settler feeling 
in the rural areas, the Congress leadership did not seriously 
address itself to the question of branch formation in these 
areas, to serve the needs of the farmers and migrant labourers 
who spent most of their lives away from the townships of the 
line of rail. On the Tonga plateau, for instance, there was 
a great deal of discontent among Africans, arising mainly from 
dealings with settlers and local officials and, as will be seen 
presently, certain chiefs and their people were already registering 
their disapproval of white rule by withholding their cooperation 
on various matters. Yet, up to 1951, there were no official Con­
gress leaders on the plateau, charged with the responsibility of 
canalising this discontent. The leaders of the 1957 Congress 
movement followed Congress’ activities closely during this period, 
but in the absence of encouragement from Congress Headquarters,
they could do little to organise mass protest against Federation
1in their various areas.
By 1951, some Congress members began to take a more radical 
view of the political situation. In the various provinces of the 
territory, several politicians who were to play leading roles in 
the nationalist struggle were beginning to make their Impact on 
the political scene. Perhaps the most outspoken and dedicated of
^This inability to organise the movement locally was admitted 
by all three surviving founder members interviewed by the author.
Politicians on the Tonga plateau at this time was Job Michello.
Born in Pemba, Michello had lived for many yeas in the
Munenga area of Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy. A Seventh Day
Adventist, he had undergone teacher training at the Solusi
Mission in Bulawayo. After a brief spell of teaching in Southern
Rhodesia, he returned to Northern Rhodesia and taught at the
Eusangu mission school for some time before giving up teaching
in 19^5. He then became a building contractor and was also
X
involved in selling poultry to the Copperbelt.
Other Africans in the plateau who shared Michello's radical
view of the political situation included Ellison Milambo and
2
Amos Walubita who have already been mentioned. There were also 
Job Mayanda, an S.D.A. of Chief Chongo's area who was an ex­
teacher of Rusangu mission; Simon Maambo, also an ex-teacher 
of Munenga; Peter Mwiinga, an S.D.A. businessman at Mapangazia; 
Peter Habumbu, another S.D.A. who left teaching to serve the
Plateau Tonga Native Authority and Simon Mulindi, of Mutama in
3Chief Monae's area, also an ex-S.D.A. teacher.
These men were among the leading members of the Congress 
leadership on the plateau and, as we can see, they were largely 
drawn from the local literati. They had all received some training
^Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.?A.
2See Chapter V.
•3
^Interviews on the plateau.
at one of the local mission schools and a few had proceeded 
to qualify as teachers or pastors. They were the most vocal 
group within the African community and their knowledge of 
English made them the natural spokesmen of "heir people in deal­
ings with the white Administration or settlers. Because of 
their education, they commanded much respect among Africans on 
the plateau. By 1950, most of them had given up their jobs 
with the local missions and were devoting their time to farming 
and/or trading. Some, like Ellison Milambo, were by this time 
very successful farmers. They had a considerable influence on 
the local Chiefs and Headmen, some of whom had been their colleagues 
at school, and since they belonged to the same churches, they 
came together very often at church gatherings. The social base 
of the Congress movement on the plateau could therefore be said 
to have consisted of two main strata: the Tonga literati and
like-minded Chiefs and Headmen on the one hand and the rank and 
file, mainly small-scale farmers, on the other.
The challenge to Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership of the 
Congress movement in 1950-51 was to come from these articulate 
politicians on the Tonga plateau and elsewhere within the terri­
tory. Many of them regarded Lewanika as a moderate, who was in­
capable of leading Congress in a strong challenge of the settlers 
and whose views always verged on some kind of compromise.1
interview with Job Michello, 28.6.7^«
Perhaps because of the sort of political ambitions he had, 
the Congress leader was always very restrained in his criti­
cisms of the Administration. He was as it were determined 
to do nothing that would bring his name into disrepute and 
jeopardise his claims to high office in his native Barotse- 
land. Several Congress members found the President’s public 
utterances most embarassing. For instance, in July 1951* 
he gave the Congress' Annual Conference an insight into the 
way he wanted the movement's members to carry on the struggle 
against Federation. He told them: 'Fight does not mean using
abusive language, making fiery speeches and passing strongly
worded and threatening resolutions which mean nothing and which
1cannot be carried out.'
He condemned confrontation and assured the audience of 
the effectiveness of passive protest. 'You need not worry, 
there is great hope that African opinion on anything, properly 
interpreted to Government, will be heard with sympathy', he 
assured the audience. This was exactly the kind of approach 
that most African politicians had come to regard as futile.
For many, the time was ripe for fiery speeches and threatening 
resolutions.
*^F.C.B. 101/3/65. Presidential Address to annual Conference of 
Congress, 21st July 1951*
2Ibid.
African politicians and their supporters on the Tonga plateau 
found Lewanika's views on Immigration particularly disturbing. 
Although he shared their opposition to White Immigration, he 
seemed to look more kindly on African Immigration from the South. 
During the July Conference, he had made ..'the .following remarks:
'We do h^ bt believe that European peasants can make a living on 
average Northern Rhodesia soils. We should oppose any scheme of 
picking out the best land at present unoccupied to give to them.
If peasants are to be brought in to cultivate part of the Native 
Trust lands, we should prefer that they should be Africans from 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa who have been dispossessed 
of their own tribal lands.
To the people of the plateau, this altruism, which could 
easily lead to increased immigration of the despised Matabele
and other Africans from the Southern territories, was tantamount
2
to a betrayal of trust. They were determined that the lands of 
the plateau should remain the property of the African population 
and if they were unwilling to share it with white settlers, they 
were no less opposed to offering plots to Africans from across 
the Zambesi.
Most Congress supporters therefore began the search for a 
more militant leader. In 1951 » they found one in the pei'son of 
Harry Nkumbula, an Ila, whose people’s lands adjoined the Tonga
^Ibid.
2Interviews with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74, and Job Michello, 
19.6.74.
plateau. Job Michello and other politicians of the Southern
province joined forces with Congress politicians from other
provinces to secure his election as President, during the Annual
1
Conference of July 1951- Nkumbula had previously served as a
teacher with the United Missions on the Copperbelt and had risen
to the position of Headmaster. After a spell of training at
the Chalimbana Teachers Training College and at Makerere College
in Uganda, he went to England on a bursary in 19^ +6. He, however,
neglected his studies, involving himself in the political debate
on Centi’al Africa's future, among other things, and, in 195^1 he
returned to Northern Rhodesia without successfully completing
his studies at the London School of Economics. He joined the
Congress movement in the same year and, in 1951» was appointed
Chairman of a Congress Working Committee as well as the Movement’s
organising Secretary. Although he didn't succeed in doing much
2
organising, he quickly distinguished himself as a tough talker, 
and as a leader fully aware of the problems of the rural as well 
as the urban areas and determined to articulate them.
By taking a keen interest in such rural problems as white 
immigration and agricultural discrimination (which are discussed 
later on in this chapter) Nkumbula had won the hearts of the 
people of the Tonga plateau, among other rural Africans. As 
Congress' organising Secretary, based at Maala, in Ila country,
T.
Michello who had met Nkumbula several times while he (Nkumbula) 
was the Secretary of the Director of Education at Mazabuka, was 
one of the movers of his nomination.
2
This comes out quite strongly in a letter Nkumbula sent to Marjorie 
Nicholson of the Fabian Bureau in November 1950* in which he said, 
among other things: 'Colonialism is a thoroughly wicked business - 
its present form discredits all the English persons in the eyes 
of the Colonials and their sympathisers. Why not do an honest 
job? Shoot us all or leave us alone. 1 See FCB lOl/3/ll.
he had had a number ofmeetings with local Southern province
Chiefs and some of their people, during which he showed much
concern over these twin problems. In 1950 he had written, in
strong terms, to Marjorie Nicholson of the Fabian Colonial Bureau
on the subject of Afrikaner immigration. He wrote:
’With regard to South African settlers, I am in 
the blue as to the reply of the Secretary of State.
How many are they? They must be ?/b of the white 
population in the Protectorate. They are arriving every 
day, almost without exception. The Boer Trek of 1836 
is being revived. What has happened to our treaties 
of protection? The Boers are now being protected 
against us by the Colonial Government. Our treaties 
are dead letters.
In the same letter, he also raised the vexed question of
differential produce prices, a problem which, as will be seen
presently, for long exercised the minds of the Chiefs and people
of the Tonga plateau. He wrote:
'No esqplanation has been given why there is a dis-
/•estock owned
Africans are non-grade and sell at a different 
price from those owned by Europeans - let the price 
of meat at the butcheries is the same for all cattle...
This all boils down to the protection of Europeans 
against the supposed protected African native.'2
Once Nkumbula had succeeded to the Congress leadership, he
attempted for the first time to transform the movement into a
truly national one, reflecting the views of both urban and rural
Africans. Nkumbula changed the name of the movement in 1951 from
the Northern Rhodesia African Congress to the African National
by Africans andJSuropeans. All cattle owned by
Congress^ and, in 1952, he appointed the first Provincial
Organizing Secretaries0 The work of directly involving the 
Chiefs and people of the various province^Ln Congress' acti­
vities had officially begun. Job Mayanda was appointed Provincial 
Organising Secretary in the Southern province. Mayanda lived 
at Keemba Hill in Chief Chongo's area and his appointment only 
increased the importance of this settlement as the centre of 
African political organisation on the Tonga plateau.
Mayanda's appointment was warmly v/elcomed on the Tonga 
plateau for at last it seemed Congress was going to address it­
self to the grievances of the people and highlight their needs 
before the Administration. The grievances arose as much from 
settler actions as from those of the official Administrators.
Most of the grievances centred around the land question. Land 
Alienation had created a great deal of resentment within the 
African population and the people were fully convinced that Feder­
ation would only result in further land loss to incoming settlers. 
That settler farmers had come into possession of the most fertile 
tracts of land was deeply resented and this had come out, quite 
strongly, during the inquiries of the land tenure committee of
s of the plateau's African population
-*-See Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia shall be free (New York, 1963)1 p.97.
119^6. An African witness who appeared before the Committee
during its sittings on the Tonga plateau had complained bitterly:
'I do not understand this land question... I 
cannot understand this matter of Crown land and 
Native Reserves. What is reserved for Natives?
An aeroplane flew over his land, mailing a map of
it. When good land was found, it was European land.
When a steep hill was found, vie were told it belonged 
to us. It is for this reason we are puzzled, as to
what is a reserve and what is not. To us native
reserve means where the soil is poor and Crown land 
where it is rich. Our population has increased to 
the stage where we have no land because Europeans 
have taken the best from us. I ask if it was not 
a mistake to let them do this. I do not ask that 
they should be driven away. They are here and they 
'will stay, but it was a mistake to let them come.'2
Africans were worried over the insecurity of their land tenur^' 
and were particularly resentful of the fact that Europeans could,
if they wished, hold leases in the Native Trust land areas. Re­
porting in 19^6 on his observations on the Tonga plateau while 
serving on the Land Tenure Committee, Gore Browne had warned that 
’the present day African resents the fact that Europeans have in 
many cases got all the best land and that he himself is now feeling
the pinch’. He pointed out that 'the further fact that in certain
9
instances the land is not being used adds to this resentment’.
In a number of Chieftaincies, touring officials observed, 
throughout the fifties, cases of serious land shortage and resultant 
overcrowding. As the human and cattle populations rose, especially 
in Chieftaincies like Chongo, Siamaundu, Sianjalika and Mwanaching- 
wala, the pressure on arable and grazing lands increased and sheet
1The Committee’s work referred to in Chapter IV.
2
Reported Verbatim by Gore Browne in the Legislative Council. See 
Hansard, 6th April I9A6, No. 93> Cols. 4A-9-A50.
3
It is interesting to note that when this point was made in the Legislative 
Council by Mr. Moffat, representing African interests, his colleagues re­
garded his speech as alarmist and he was strongly criticized for'.it.
^ee Hansard, 29th June 1951» No. 71, Cols. 371-37^ for reaction to
and gully erosion resulted. During a tour of the Mwanachingwala 
Chieftaincy in 19^9» the District Commissioner had observed an 
. uneven distribution of water ... excessive grazing’ and a ’mal­
distribution of population’. He also noted that ’the European 
farms on the south-eastern boundaries occupy not on the whole 
very efficiently the best land and have pushed the original 
occupants out into the swamps’. He observed much overcrowding,
’the land above, the flood level... scarcely sufficient for the 
population’. The average density was about kk persons to the
sqiiare mile and he noticed that ’every pocket of arable land is 
1
tilled'. The land situation in the Mwanachingwala area was to
worsen during the early fifties, with some 8,200 people and about
23,000 head of cattle occupying an area of about 85 square miles
in which overstocking was said to be ’rampant' and ’large scale
2
erosion' quite common. In the neighbouring area of Chongo 
Chieftaincy, the land situation, though not as acute as in the 
Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala Chieftaincies, was hardly better.
A report on the area in 1933 observed that 'virtually all the 
grass has been grazed a^ay’ and 'great areas of erosion surround the
^Moffat Leg. Co. speeches of 2nd July 1951.
See Chapter I
■?Sec/Nat/20A, Vol. II, Z.N.A. "Notes on meetings in the Tonga 
country...', 22.3.^6. For drawing attention to this problem, 
Gore Browne had to face a motion of censure from his colleagues. 
^ee Hansard, 6th and 7th May, 19^6, No. 5^j Cols. 3-lOA.
"^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^t Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2 of 19^9- 
^Sec/Nat/366 N/O83A/A, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 1953.
four dams in the area. .
During the late frties and early fifties, farmers in areas
that were experiencing land shortages began tofence the few
unoccupied plots around. These areas experienced a race for
land that had never been known before. Because of the attractions
of maize farming, African farmers began to think in terms of
storing up land for the future. In several Chieftaincies, Improved
Farmers reacted to the bonus change of 19^9, by increasing the
number of acres they cultivated, to ensure that the bonus payments
they received would not drop sharply because of the change.J
In 1990 it was reported that 'the astute few are increasing their
4holdings at the expense of the apathetic majority'. Officials 
considered this a serious problem for 'not only are land shortages 
thus aggravated but land grabbers are occupying more land than
-9they can farm by improved methods'. The Native Affairs report 
for 1951 disclosed that both Improved and non-Improved Farmers 
were equally involved in the race for land. While pointing out 
that the Improved Farming system had led to larger acreages being
^Ibid. Tour report, No. 16 of 1993.
^See Chapter IV, p. IIS’- l'7'7*
Makings, Agricultural Change in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia 
1943-63 (Stamford, 1966)', p.220.
^5ec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. Ill, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Office 
report, 1930.
^Ibid.
^ 6 4
cultivated, it noted that ’many unimproved farmers also have extensive 
holdings ... the most remarkable example ... a trader and nominated 
Councillor who farms acres with a tractor...1 The report ex­
plained that 'the maize boom has got to a point whenpressure on the 
land can definitely be felt, but it will not be long before a class 
emerges which cannot get land even for subsistence agriculture because
p
it is all earmarked'. The 'land-grabbers' referred to here were 
those large-scale cultivators who fenced in virgin bush for future use.
This was quite common in the Chongo and Siamaundu Chieftaincies. Al­
though this practice may have been resented by those small-scale farmers 
who had plans to expand their operations some time in the future, there 
appears to have been no great outcry against it. Neither is there evi­
dence to suggest that the farmers involved secured the permission of the 
Native Authorities before fencing these plots. The Chiefs and Headmen 
appear largely to have turned a blindeye to their activities, partly
3
for political reasons as we will see presently.
In a situation where land available for African settlement was 
being rapidly taken up, needy farmers could not resist the temptation 
to move out of the reserves into unoccupied alienated or Crown lands.
The squatter problem, therefore, increased during the late forties and 
fifties. There was much land lying fallow. In 19^3 Gore-Browne told 
the Legislative Council of 800,000 acres of land along the line of rail
A
which had been alienated but still remained unoccupied and undeveloped.
"^ Native Affairs report, 19511 p.70.
2Ibid.
3See below, pp.'ll 7 and . However, when by 1959 the practice of fencing 
land had increased considerably, the Native Authorities began to give 
thought to the land tenure implications of such actions. We do not, how­
ever, know what decisions were made. See Native Affairs report, 1959» p.68.
ifjSee Hansard, 31st May, 19^31 No. **5» Gol. 153.
When, however, some African farmers from the reserves of the plateau 
moved in and occupied these lands, the Administration replied by 
evicting the majority of them. Between 19^^ and 1952 some 7,530 African
squatters were evicted from various farms they were occupying within the
2
Mazabuka District. This caused much ill feeling. In 195° official 
commenting on the problems of squatter eviction from Grown lands wrote:
'It now appears to have been a grave mistake to have allowed occupation of 
unalienated Crown lands by Africans to continue until the lands were leased.
A thorough going evacuation should have been organised at the time ths 
Crown lands were demarcated. The subsequent evictions, small in themselves 
but continuing over a period, have instilled into the African mind the idea 
that Government and the European settler attach no importance to African
3
land rights and are prepared to ignore previous undertakings...'
The land problem was therefore central in the grievances of the Afri­
can population of the Tonga plateau. As will be detailed shortly,it was to 
be exploited, though perhaps not sufficiently, by Nkumbula and other Con­
gress leaders, in their efforts to win support for Congress' challenge of 
the settlers' proposals. A movement which promised to safeguard the land 
rights of the African population, stood a fairly good change of beingheard 
in the area, for most Africans had lost all faith in the Administration's 
willingness to respond to their land needs. The 1951 report summed it up 
quite well when it said: 'The question of land takes precedence of all others 
when the African is thinking politically, and it must be said that the year
1951 witnessed a decided diminution of his faith in the good intentions of
A
his European neighbours and indeed of the Government'.
■] + 
Some were overlooked if the land they occupied was not particularly fertile
and, therefore, not likely to attract speculators. Interviews on the plateau, 
^Hansard, 17th July, 1952, No. 73» Col. 501-
^Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Annual Report on the Southern 
Province, 195°-
^Native Affairs report, 1951» p.65.
The land scarcity problem apart, there were other allied 
grievances, on the plateau, which the politicians were to work 
on during the Federation struggle. Most of these had their 
roots in the Agricultural and labour policies of the Administration 
as well as in the ill-treatment suffered at the hands of local 
settler farmers. There was a fair amount of agricultural dis­
crimination. As already pointed out, the Agriculture Department 
consistently offered higher prices for the produce of white farmers 
and in spite of repeated representations by the African Farmers 
Associations, nothing was done to provide a more equitable price
structure. The majority of African Farmers disapproved of the
1
existence of the African Farming Improvement Fund to which all
African producers contributed but from which only a few derived
2
direct financial benefits.
There was also much racial discrimination in the application 
of the soil conservation rules of the Agriculture Department.
While African farmers i^ rere forced to observe the rules of improved 
husbandry or face court fines, European settler farmers, in several 
areas, violated these rules with impunity. In the 1930s, for in­
stance, when African Chiefs and their people were being pressurised 
into the observance of cattle dipping rules, it was reported that
"''See Chapter IV, p./“7 7 ,
2
In 19^2 Capt. Campbell had told the Legislative Council that 
Africans on the plateau wanted to know what was being done with 
the Stabilisation Fund (which later became the African Farming 
Improvement Fund). See Hansard, 17th September, 19A2, No. A3, 
Col. 180.
3•See Chapter I I - <f6 -
'there has been no attempt on the part of the European cattle
1owners to take advantage of the dipping ordinance'. The 
dipping of cattle owned by Europeans was purely a discretionary 
matter. When in the forties and fifties, the Agriculture Depart­
ment embarked on its Improved Farming drive, African farmers who 
failed to observe soil conservation rules were punished for com­
mitting breaches of the rules at a time when certain European 
farmers were doing the same and getting away with it. In 1930, 
for instance, it was reported that 'there is no doubt that many 
non-native ... groxvers in the line of rail areas are paying little 
or no attention to the conservation of soil and fertility. In
the non-native areas ... the area under green manure is only a
» . 2fraction of what is ^jsic/ should be to maintain fertility1.
In 19511 the Agricultural Supervisor in Monze, wrote about 
'large numbers of African farmers in the reserves' who had been 
'convicted during the season because of violation of the Native 
Authority's Agricultural laws'. 'In the majority of cases', he 
wrote, 'the maximum penalties have been imposed'. Most offenders 
had been found guilty of 'ploughing up and down the slope of a 
hill despite directions by the Agricultural Assistants to follow 
the contours as near as possible where grass strips or contour 
ridges have not yet been marked'. The Supervisor, however, 
noticed that Africans were not alone in committing this offence.
1See Governor's Address to Legislative Council, 13th March, 1931? 
Hansard No. 13, p.13.
2
Agriculture Department Annual report, 1930? pp. 10-11.
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He drew attention to 'two near-by European farms' where 'lands 
have recently been "broken11 near the roadways leading from the 
reserves and the ploughing and planting of crops is quite ob­
viously up and down the slope of the hill without any regard 
whatsoever for soil conservation'. He pointed out that 'African 
cultivators who have been punished for this same offence have 
been quick to notice this bad practice and ... have been asking 
the African assistants why Europeans are being allowed to continue 
this practice while the Africans are being dealt with so severely.1 
It was, he said, 'becoming increasingly difficult to get the Afri­
cans to understand the necessity of rotating their crops when 
some... Europeans who are purported to be "leaders", plant maize 
in the same lands for a known period of seven years in succession'. 
In conclusion, he observed that 'the time is obviously coming 
when these differences can no longer be overlooked and there is a 
danger that they may be used to good effect as political capital'.^ 
Apart from agricultural discrimination which affected everyone, 
the majority of African farmers found the soil conservation rules 
too burdensome. Most of the contour ridges had been installed 
without the prior approval of the farmers concerned, who were now 
being asked to maintain and keep them clean. This many objected to. 
Soil conservation was seen as an escape from the problem of land 
inadequacy, which African farmers believed could only be solved 
when more land was made available to them, especially the vast 
tracts which European farmers were not making any use of.
^Acc/7?/25> Vol. II, Z.N.A. Agricultural Supervisor to Senior 
Agricultural Officer, 12.2.51.
In 19^6, during the sittings on the plateau of the Land 
Tenure Committee, Gore Browne had observed that 'the cleaning of 
contour ridges was objected to...' In 19^8, the Agriculture 
Department reported that 'most conservation work is looked on as
an unnecessary disturbance causing hard work, imposed on the people
2
by Government against their will... '. In the Mwanachingwala
Chieftaincy, which had suffered much land alienation and was
relatively overcrowded by the late forties, officials reported in
19^9, 'a stubborn refusal to accept improved methods of Agriculture'
Although an Agricultural Station had operated in the area for 8*^ /2
years, it had made 'very little impression on the Mwanachingwala
peopleOfficials observed very strong resentment of settlers
in the area and their investigations led them to believe that
'the feeling of being arrogantly dispossessed Is perhaps more
k
marked here than elsewhere in the District]
The soil conservation programme was also opposed vigorously 
in the Mapangazia and Keemba Hill areas. V/hen, in 1950, the Agri­
culture Department attempted to salvage the 'badly over-cultivated 
and overgrazed' Mapangazia area, 'passive resistance had to be 
broken down'. At Keemba Hill, In Chief Chongo's area, in 1951i
1
Sec/Nat/20*1-, Z.N.A. Vol. II, Gore Brovme, 'Notes...' op.cit.
2Agriculture Department Annual report, 19^8, p.?
■^Sec/Nat/566 N/083^, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2 of 19^9- 
Ibid.
^Sec/Nat/66F, N/0006/3, Vol. Ill, Z.N.A. Southern Province 
Annual report, 1950.
19 farmers protested against the installing of grass strips on 
their farms without their permission by ploughing over them.'*'
This group of protesting farmers was led by Ellison Milambo, the
2
leader of the area's Farmers Association.
The farmers of the plateau repeatedly criticized the Ad­
ministration's attempts to regulate their cropping operations
3through the 7th of January law. They considered the date too
if,
early and demanded that the restriction be lifted. The Admini­
stration's efforts in 19^9 and 1950 to get the people on the plateau
5
to grow cassava 'as a stand-by crop for use in lean years' met 
with very little success. Farmers saw no point in preparing for 
famines which did not occur on the plateau as often as in the
6Zambesi valley. Certain Chiefs, notably Siamusonde and Sianjalika, 
and their people refused to set up nurseries and the Agriculture De­
partment later abandoned the idea.
African farmers also had their differences with white farmers 
on the plateau. Complaints about the very high pound fees imposed 
by settler farmers on straying African cattle continued into the
^KSB 3/1, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Notebook. Tour report, No. 4, 
of 1951.
2See Chapter IV, p-1 »
^See Chapter IV, p. ^ 7*
h.
Sec/Nat/w04, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Gore Browne, 'Notes...'. The Rev. 
Nightingale, representing "African interests in the "Legislative " 
Council, also drew attention to this opposition of Africans to 
the 7th of January law, and recommended that' the date of plant­
ing maize should be controlled not by the Calendar but by the 
weather'. See Hansard, 3th April, 1946, No. 53» Col. 403.
Native Affairs report, 19^9, p.73*
Interviews in these Chieftaincies.
7„
See, for instance, the complaints of Mwanachingwala's people in
District Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 3.9.21, 
in KDB 1/3/6, Z.N.A.
late forties and fifties, for the majority of white farms were
still unfenced. The Chiefs 'complained that scarcely any
farms were fenced nor the boundaries marked in any way. Under
these circumstances it was impossible for them to know when they,
or their cattle were trespassing and alleged trespassing often
resulted in the impounding of their cattle... They urged that
1Government should compel Europeans to fence their farms.1
The- problem of forced labour (Cibalo) \tfas yet another of 
the main grievances of the African population, a problem which 
derived directly from the relative scarcity of voluntary as well 
as wage labour. By the early fifties, it was reported that 
the majority of Tonga adult males were at home in the 
villages, engaged in various agricultural pursuits. Most of those 
who were still leaving the reserves in search of wage employment 
came from the poorer Chieftaincies to the east of the line of rail. 
It was reported that inthe latter areas between ^0 and 40°/o of 
the able bodied males were at any one time engaged in wage employ­
ment. However, in the cattle owning areas, the number of wage
earners dropped to as little as ten per cent of the adult male 
2population. Many men stayed in the villages also because of 
the hardships they were likely to suffer if through failure to 
obtain alternative employment, they found themselves working on 
the farms of some of the less tolerant settler farmers. A number 
of these used whips (sjamboks) on their employees, whenever they 
erred, and apart from the pain this inflicted, many potential farm
1Sec/SXi/ll8, Z.N.A. Report of the Land Commission on Mazabuka
District
2
See Native Affairs report, 1951» p«76.
1
workers considered this most humiliating. In 19^8, a 
Mazabuka District Farmer, C.T.Kelly, was reported as having 
chased some of his farm employees on horseback and having 
beaten them with a sjambok.^ In 1952, a District Official made 
notes on the subject of labour illtreatment during a tour of some 
white farms east of the Magoye river. He wrote: 'It is indeed
a pity that at least two of these farmers were alloted farms 
bordering on the native reserve. According to their own state­
ments, their treatment of the African leaves much to be desired.
One farmer literally boasted to me that he caned the son of one
3
of the Chiefs and took him back to his father personally1.
To avoid such treatment, most young men stayed at home, only 
to find themselves victims of cibalo from time to time. The forced 
labour problem in the forties and fifties did not arise as much 
from the labour needs of the settler farmers as from those of the 
Administration. Although In the earlier years of white settlement 
some farmers had attempted to use the Administration in the acquiring 
of involuntary labour, these had had very little success and, as 
a result, had settled down to the employment of regular wage 
labourers. The Administration, however, continued to require free 
labour for such tasks as road construction, the building of Govern­
ment offices and porterage when officials were on tour, even though
*1
Interviews on the plateau.
2Sec/Lab/65, Z.N.A. Report on the value and conduct of the 
African labour c®$ps for June 19^ +8.
-^ Sec/Nat/366 N/O83V 3 * Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 1952. The ill- 
treatment of African labourers by some' settler, farmers was, ,apparently,
not a new. thing. '■
JLl ‘
See Chapter I, pp.s>-Ss<>
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this was very difficult to come by.^ V/henever labour was
needed, Chiefs had to send their messengers (kapasus) into the
villages to round up the required number of able bodied males.
People on the plateau today still talk about the excesses of
some of the Kapasus, many of whom seldom hesitated to use their
sjamboks and knoblcerries on unwilling recruits,, The recruiting
drives, in the forties and fifties, of the Kapasus Hagwagwa and
Maila in the Chisuwo area of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy and of Lutaka
(Sianjalika Chieftaincy) and Halube (Mwenda Chieftaincy) are
2still remembered with much shaking of the head. In spite of
assurances from the Administration that Cibalo would end in
3 ^19^6, it continued well into the mid fifties, on the plateau
3and in other parts of the Southern province.
sj: $ ^  sS * iii
Prom the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that by the 
time that Job Mayanda began his job of organising the Congress 
movement in the Southern province, there was a great deal of strong 
anti-settler and anti-Administration feeling in several parts of 
the plateau. Isolated pockets of resistance were beginning to 
emerge. Many Africans on the plateau believed that their problems 
would increase under Federation and were therefore determined to 
oppose it. In 1930, the Southern Provincial Commissioner commented 
on 'the new wave of unity that had appeared in the Southern Province,
In 1930, for instance, it was reported that ’there is practically 
no labour offered voluntarily but all Government1s requirements 
have been filled without much difficulty'. ZA 7/3/1^» Vol. I Z.N.A.
Quarterly report for period ending 30th September, 1930.
^Interviews on the plateau.
-^ See Gore Browne, "Notes...", op.cit.
hInterviews on the plateau.
5
As late as July, 1933» Nkumbula brought to the attention of the Fabi&ti 
Colonial Bureau, the existence of Cibalo in the Gwembe valley. See FCB 10l/2/vSl
something that was hitherto unknown...'. He remarked that 'the 
feeling of unity which the need to resist Federation has evoked 
may be a good thing if it can be steered away from National- 
ism'.
Frustration over living conditions gave rise to an attitude 
of non-cooperation in some of the reserves. Although the majority 
of the areals Chiefs avoided any confrontation with the Admini­
stration, some were, by 19511 already showing their determination 
not to do some of the Administration's bidding. In 1951? when 
19 farmers at Keemba Hill ploughed over the Agriculture Depart­
ment's grass strips, Chief Chongo, in whose area they lived, re­
fused to prosecute them. A District Official, commenting on the 
impasse, noted: 'Chief Chongo had shown reluctance to prosecute 
them and I had to draw his attention to his duties... I have al­
ways suspected that Chief Chongo has shorn partiality and that
his evasion of responsibility is at the root of more trouble than
2
Keemba Hill intransigence'.
At about the same time, Chief Siamus©nde also refused to 
prosecute 32 villagers, in his area, who had moved out of their 
villages and established new homesteads in areas outside the 
jurisdiction of their Headmen. In spite of pressures from the 
Mazabuka Boma, Siamusonde remained adamant and, in the end, offi­
cials had to send their kapasus to burn down the houses of the 
offenders „-J
^Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol.IV, Provincial report on the Southern 
Province, 1950. The majority of Africans, had, for instance, never 
been united in support of the Administration's schemes such as cattle 
dipping or contour ridging.
2KSB /l, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Notebook. Tour report No. h of 1951.
^Interview with Franklin Kaluwe, l8.12.73- Also Unpublished M.A.thesis 
of M.Muntemba, "The Evolution of Political Systems in South-Centnal 
Zambia 1894-1953"» P.l80» University of Zambia.
Dlhe Plateau Tonga Native Authority was also, by 1951i 
refusing to respond to some of the proposals of the Administration. 
This new radicalism which was making itself felt within the Native 
Authority was no doubt connected with the 19*1-8 reorganisation of 
the Native Authority System within the territory. The Admini­
stration, in an endeavour to involve educated Africans in the work 
of the Native Authorities, allowed, among other things, for the
nomination or election of 'Progressives' to sitin council with 
1
the Chiefs. Traditional Councillors were replaced by five pro­
gressives who had taken an 'interest in matters concerning the
2
Welfare of the tribe and progress in general'. The new members 
were known as 'honorary Councillors', not to be confused with the 
Departmental Councillors, who also took their places in the Native 
Authorities for the first time in 19*+8, and were responsible for 
carrying out various departmental duties. Although the new 
rules stated quite clearly that the Progressives 'would take no
3
executive part in the government of the individual Chief's areas',
they came to wield a great deal of influence within the Native
Authorities to the extent that, ift 19*^ 9» it was reported of the
Mazabuka District that 'there is a certain fear among the Chiefs
A
that their poi^ ers are being usurped by the Councillors...'
^Sec/Nat/271, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting of the Plateau Tonga 
Native Authority, 2*f.6.*f8.
^Native Affairs report, 19^8, pp. 57-58.
JSec/Nat/271, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting of the Plateau Tonga 
Native Authority, 2A.6.A8.
^Native Affairs Report, 19**9i p.70.
This fear of being overshadowed did not however persist
for long. The Chiefs were quick to realise that little would be
gained in a confrontation,.with the more educated newcomers and
so, in a number of areas, they were, during the early fifties,
allowing the Progressives free rein within the Native Authority
Councils, especially in the formulation of policy dealing with
such sensitive issues as soil conservation. In 1951 the Native
Affairs report on the Southern Province commented on this new
development within the Native Authority.
'The most striking feature was the consolidation of 
their positions by the non traditional elements, the 
Departmental and Nominated Councillors. They took the 
lead in discussion at every meeting and far from being 
jealous, the Chiefs appeared to acquiesce in their lead­
ership and in some cases to be content to take a back 
seat. The concentration on politics rather than admini­
stration during the year no doubt had something to do 
with this. But one cannot but suspect that the Chiefs 
regard the newcomers as having providentially taken 
over some of the more distasteful of the Chief's own 
duties, leaving them to sit back and enjoy the privileges 
of Chieftain^kip.P -L
A1though during the late forties and early fifties, a few
of these new Councillors were to eschew any serious involvement
2
in protest politics, the majority were politically inclined and 
very influential. It iirould not be wrong to say that a number 
of hitherto indifferent Chiefs who were later to play an active 
part ijrthe activities of the Congress movement were influenced by 
these Councillors. Among the most influential were Simon Mulindi,^
^Native Affairs report, 1951, p.67.
2
One of them, William Kazoka, was even to move a motion calling 
for the banning of the A.N.C. on the plateau, during the late 
fifties. See Chapter VII,,
Mulindi was dismissed from the Native Authority in 1953 for his 
political activities and 1 for querying decisins of the Native 
Authority and the Government'. See SEC/Nat/66l' N/OOO6/3, Mazabuka 
District report for 1953*
of whom mention has been made before; Chugwa, Chief Sianjalika's
1 2 energetic junior councillor of the late forties Peter Habumbu,
another of the plateau's young politicians of whom mention has 
also been made. These were active Congress members and their acti­
vities within the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and in the Mazabuka 
District in general, were to force District officials into the con­
clusion that 'many of the progressives are more interested in poli-
3
tics than in development'.
That the politically-minded Councillors within the Plateau 
Tonga Native Authority were getting their way in a number of things 
was seen quite clearly in the Authority's refusal to cooperate with 
the Administration on certain crucial matters during the early fifties. 
When the Native Authority was called upon to aid the administration 
in solving the land-grabbing problem of these years, the 
Chiefs and Councillors showed very little interest. An official 
commenting on the situation observed that 'the Native Authority ap­
preciates the situation and has tice debated proposals to secure 
an even division of communal land, and have twice evaded the issue 
and sought a facile popularity by implying that Government must have 
forseen the difficulty when land was alienated tn Europeans'.^
A
*^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^j Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 19^9.
2Habumbu retired temporarily from the Native Authority in 1930 (see 
Sec/Nat/366 N/083V3* Z.N.A, Tour reprt No. 3, 1932), but later 
resumed his position from which he was to be suspended in 1937 
mainly because of his political activities as a Congress Deputy 
Provincial President in the Southern Province. See Chapter VII.
/See Native Affairs Report, 1952, p.72.
^Sec/Nat/66F N/QOO6/3. Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Office 
report, 1951.
Around 1950 the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.) 
also began to take actinn over the virtual monopoly of retail 
trading in the reserves which was enjoyed by European and Asian 
traders. For long, a number of Africans with plans for the set­
ting up of retail stores in the urban■ andrural areas had encountered 
great difficulty in securing trading licences**" and many had given 
up in frustration. To protect the rights of the African population, 
established traders on the plateau began to think in terms of an 
African Traders Union. In March 19*15» about thirty of the licensed
African traders in the Mazabuka District formedfthe Mazabuka Afri-
2
can Traders Association. They explained that they planned 'to start 
in a small way by organising joint purchases of trade goods from
wholesalers' and 'hoped eventually to develop into a Wholesale Co-
%operative Society...1?  The Association's members approached the 
Native Authority for protection of the interests of African traders 
and this the Chiefs and Councillors willingly offered by malting it 
almost impossible for intending non-Africans to trade in the re­
serves. In 1950 the District Commissioner commented on the in­
creasing refusal of the P.T.N.A. to allow more European traders 
into the reserves: 'The Native Authority still continued to prevent
the expansion of European trade in the reserves. The ostensible 
reason is a wish to foster African trade but there is no conceal­
ment of the political argument.that since Europeans have taken up
In June 19^51 Esau Tembo told the Southern Provinc ial Council of 
the case of 25 Africans who wanted to open up trading stores but 
could not secure licences because the Administrators insisted that 
they should wait until the Askaris came back from the war. See 
Sec/Nat/lO^f, Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, l*fth- 
15th June, 19^5. Also Chapter V.
2
We have few. details about the* membership pf this Association, but it 
appears that Esau Tembo and some of the other immigrant traders around 
Mazabuka were deeply involved in its activities. See Chapter V, p.
^Sec/Nat/90, Z.N.A. Quarterly Newsletter, 51st March, 19*15.
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farmland once occupied by the Batonga, they must stay where
1they are and keep out of the reserves’. The Chiefs, especially 
2
Mwanachingwala, repeatedly refused to make land available for 
the building of new European stores and, as a result, European 
retail trading in the reserves suffered a marked contraction during 
the fifties.
It can therefore be seen from the foregoing that although, 
for the first four years of its existence, the Congress movement 
had made no serious attempts to organise Africans, on the Tonga 
plateau, for protest against white rule, there was by the end of 
1951 much grass root political awareness in the area. Although 
deriving mainly from the grievances that Africans had, this alert­
ness was also partly the result of Nkumbula's trips to the plateau 
during the first few months of his election as Congress President.
No stranger to the majority of the area's Chiefs, he addressed 
several meetings of Chiefs and their people and expressed concern 
for the problems of the African population. This departure from 
the days of Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership was to engender a 
lively political consciousness in the Mazabuka District. This did 
not escape the attention of District officials. In 1951j the 
District Commissioner wrote: 'The issues arising from the question
of Closer Association of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland has had 
a profound effect upon everyone and is likely to last. The poli­
tical structure culminating in Representative Council which before
■hsec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. Ill, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Office 
report, 1950.
2See Sec/Nat/366 N/083V3i Z.N.A. Tour report No. 7 of 1952-
was just a new toy of the professional intelligentsia has become
a real machine for a real purpose, known about and to some extent
1understood by even the most remote backwoodsmen...1.
It now remained to be seen how efficient the African National 
Congress, under its new leadership, would be in organising this 
mass consciousness to serve the needs of its struggle against 
Federation.
* * >it *
When Harry Nkumbula assumed the leadership of Congress in 
19519 there was no organising machinery to inherit. Years later 
a Congress Secretary-General writing of this period was to make 
the following remark: 'When Mr. Lewanika left there was nothing
handed over to the new President. There were no books of accounts
2
no files, no office, no branch and not a single registered member'.
Congress’ new President now had to address himself to the 
problems of organising the movement, especially in the rural areas 
where very little had been done. In keeping with its image, the 
new Congress leadership called for more radical political activity 
in the rural areas. The Freedom Newsletter, Congress' bulletin, 
called in February 1992 for the extension of mass action from the 
Copperbelt towns to those 'along the line of rail and then to the 
rural areas...1 'The bravest and most militant leaders', the paper
^Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Office Annual 
report, 1951.
2
See Kenneth Kaunda's speech, as Congress Secretary General, 
during the Annual Conference of October, 1956. FCB 103/1.
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urged, ’must be elected; the appeasers, the stooges and 
those who are scared of losing their jobs or their trading 
licences must be removed from leading posts' for 'Freedom has 
never been won under leadership of cowards /sic/'. To the Con- 
gress leaders the rural areas were first and foremost a source 
of funds. They did not see themselves as setting out systematically 
to politicize the people living in the reserves. Whatever admini­
strative machinery was set up in the villages was to be geared 
primarily towards the raising of badly needed funds. The A.N.C. 
branch Chairman and Secretaries who were to be appointed in the 
various chieftaincies on the plateau did hardly anything besides 
collect money.
In December, 19511 the Congress leaders spelled out their 
proposals for the African challenge to the Settlers Federation 
Campaign. They had decided that the struggle should be waged on 
both the home front and in London and they now requested financial 
support for a planned delegation to the United Kingdom. The 
movement's officials were determined to attract the support of 
the fairly well to do Chiefs and farmers in the rural areas, es­
pecially those on the Tonga plateau, the centre of African commer­
cial farming activity. In wooing this support, Nkumbula 
and his officials emphasised Congress' concern about the status 
of African Chiefs and the various problems connected with African 
farming in the rural areas, especially the prime' issue of land
^FCB IOI///136. Freedom Newsletter, 17-2.52.
alienation,, To counter the official propaganda that Congress
was solely the work of the African Intelligentsia and that the
African Chiefs were indifferent to the movement's activities,
Congress sought to involve the Chiefs directly in its anti-
Federation campaign. The Chiefs were called upon, in December
1951* 'to lead an All African delegation to England, to speak
of our protection for which you signed treaties with the British 
1
Government'. They were informed that 'going to England re­
quires money1 and were implored to tell their people 1 to give
money for this battle' from which they stood to gain since 'Con-
2gress believed in 'the preservation of the Chiefs' status'.
Nkumbu.1 a knew that land loss through alienation was a sore 
point in the reserves. In December, 19511 he criticized this 
policy of the administration in very strong terms, during a meet­
ing of Congress' Working Committee: 'The worsening race relations
has been brought about by the schemes designed to rob the African 
of his rights to the ownership of his land. In actual fact, he 
has been robbed of his land by his benevolent protector. What 
legal rights has His Majesty's Government to dispossess the in­
digenous African of his land? Hundred thousands of Africans have 
been removed from the most fertile and arable lands... back into 
infertile and remote areas in order to make room for land grubbing 
white settlers /sic/1.^
*1
FCB 101/5/121. Robinson Nabulyato, Congress' Secretary General, 
to all Chiefs in Northern Rhodesia, 28.12.51.
^Ibid.
/Address delivered by the General President of ... Congress at 
a meeting of the Working Committee held at Kitwe on Xmas Day, 
1951. A.N.C.Hies. Macpherson Collection.
Congress1 overtures met with much success on the Tonga 
plateau. Most of the Chiefs and their people contributed towards 
the expenses of the 1952 delegation and were very pleased to dis­
cover on its return that the question of land alienation had been 
taken up with officials in London. In his report on the dele­
gation's activities, Nkumbula told the Chiefs and their people 
that the delegates did everything they could 1 to inform the 
British public how the Protectorate Government is taking land 
away from the Africans and that the Africans wanted that land 
given back to them'.'1' He explained that they had stressed the
point that these lands 'were sold to white people by the Govern-
2ment without the owners knowing anything about it'. He also in­
formed them that Congress had 'placed this matter in the hands 
of a distinguished lawyer in. London'"' and that he was 'going 
through the whole land question in Northern Rhodesia'. In con­
clusion, he stressed the need for financial support if Congress 
was to succeed in its campaign for the restoration of African 
land rights. He told .the Chiefs: 'a great sum of money to
settle this matter in the Rhodesian and English courts will be
necessary. So please raise more money. Each one of you with
A
your people should have a target of £500...'.
Local Congress leaders on the plateau reacted promptly to 
the President's appeal. Job Mayanda, from his Headquarters at
^Ihe General President's report on the 1st Delegation to Britain 
to canpaign against Federation. July, 1952, A.N.C. Files* Mac- 
pherson Collection.
^Ibid.
^Congress ' Solicitors were: Messrs A.C.Bryden and Williams, of
55 Victoria Street, London, S.W.l. See President's Statement 
on the White Paper of January, 1955- A.N.C. Files./Macpherson’'Collection,
I
^fhe General President's report on the 1st Delegation...., pp.-cijb^
Keemba Hill, issued instructions to Congress supporters, in the 
various reserves of the plateau, for the formation of branches 
of the movement, A few meetings were arranged in some Chiefs' 
areas and, according to Informants, no Chief on the plateau re­
fused Congress permission to organise in his area, although, as 
will be seen presently, some showed more enthusiasm than others.
Congress branch officials went about the reserves collecting money 
1for the movement and, at times, even claiming that they were em­
ployees of the Government, sent out to collect a special levy.
In October 19^2, a District Assistant on a tour of European farms 
east of Mazabuka, reported fthat a certain amount of money collect­
ing has taken place /among African workers/ and unfortunately
it would appear that Government was quoted in some areas as
2
Authority for the collection..„' On the farm of J.C.Shenton, he 
was told that 'one African collected money dressed in some sort 
of a uniform resembling that of a District Messenger and told the 
employees of Mr. Shenton that the collection is a special levy 
imposed by the Government...' It appears that wherever Congress 
officials suspected a reluctance to contribute to their coffers, 
they employed the habit and the voice of the acknowledged Authority 
to achieve their objective.
During the course of^ongress' policy of non-cooperation in 
the face of the Settlers' Federation demands, which was already
^Nkumbula himself collected money for Congress in the Sianjalika 
area in 1952. See Sec/Nat/366 N/083V3i Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 
of 1952.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
being implemented in the sit-ins and boycotts on the Copperbelt 
townships and in Lusaka, was officially introduced on the Tonga 
plateau. Congress' principal target here was the soil con­
servation programme, especially its Improved Farming Scheme,
Congress' programme of non-cooperation on the Tonga plateau
Although the 19^9 review of the Improved Farming Scheme
1
had checked its expansion, the number of farmers enrolled in
the scheme rose from 262 in the 1949/50 season to 4f>0 in 1990/51.
For the 195-i /52 season, there we re 706 registered Improved Farmers,
The majority of African farmers within Mazabuka District still
had their doubts about the scheme but there was a small, but 
fairly well to do, minority, who found the attraction of bonus 
payments irresistible. The message of the Congress movement, 
stridently anti-Government and anti-Settler, appealed almost 
instantly to the majority of non-Improved Farmers but few Im­
proved Farmers were prepared to jeopardise their positions within 
the scheme by openly associating with a movement that was so 
passionately opposed to the Administration and its policies.
During the late forties and fifties, most Improved Farmers there­
fore showed more interest in the non-political activities of
4
their Farmers Associations, In Association meetings, they 
eschewed political discussion and concentrated on passive protest
1See Chapter IV,
2
C.E,Johnson, "African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga 
Maize Areas of Northern Rhodesia", Agricultural Bulletin, No,11 
(Lusaka, 1956), p.9.
^Ibid,
4There were however a number of Improved Farmers, like Amos 
Wqlubita and Gideon Mankapwi (of the 1957 Congress movement) 
who were prominent 'Congressmen1.
whenever there was cause to approach the Administration on such
questions as produce prices and poor communications
in the reserves. Although a number of them contributed, in secret,
to Congress’ coffers and occasionally attended Congress meetings,
they did not play an active part in the movement's activities
during this period.
Because the Improved Farmers got on well with the Administration
and some of the settler farmers, who would even give them loans
and invite them to such social gatherings as weddings and christen- 
1ings, they fell foul of Congress organisers and non-Improved
Farmers and their families. To these people, the Improved Farmers
were nothing but collaborators with white oppression. Many openly
2
accused them of this. V/ithin the local Congress movement there 
were strong doubts about the sincerity and the loyalty of Improved 
Farmers who attended Congress meetings. Many believed they were 
only there to take word to the Administration. Very few Improved 
Farmers were allowed into the Councils where policy decisions were 
made. Indeed, up to the declaration of Federation, very few 
Improved Farmers were elected to Executive positions In the 
Congress branches on the plateau.
The majority of the Improved Farmers responded with a stoic 
indifference to the attacks and criticism that emanated from the 
ranks of local Congress officials and their supporters. A district 
Cadet on tour of the TJfwenuka area in the fifties observed, 'the
■^Interviews on the plateau. A.D. Jones in his article "Social 
Networks of Farmers among the Plateau Tonga of Zambia” In A.C.
Lloyd (Ed.), The New Elites of Tropical Africa (O.U.P., 1966), 
also makes tbisfobservation.
2Interviews on the plateau.
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indifference of those converted to systems of improved agriculture
1
for the welfare of those who have not seen the light'. The 
District Commissioner, commenting on -this observation#, elaborated 
on the circumstances surrounding the operation of the scheme on 
the plateau:
'The Improved Farmer is regarded with suspicion...
The common view shows him as a tribal enemy either 
building up the fertility of the land so that Euro­
pean Farmers can find it worthwhile to appropriate 
the land or salving the conscience of the government 
in making less land produce more and thus deferring 
the day when more land must be reserved for African 
occupation.1^
In June 1952, Congress' campaign to win the support of the 
uncommitted Improved Farmers began. The movement was very much 
in need of their financial support. Local Congress leaders were 
determined to bring the Improved Farmers into active membership 
of the movement. They held up the Farmers Associations as in­
effective protest organs which stood no serious chance of gain­
ing for African farmers the changes they sought and enjoined 
the Improved Farmers to fuse their Associations with the Congress 
movement.
The relatively heavily populated Sianjalika Chieftaincy, 
which had suffered a great deal from land alienation, was one of 
the main areas where Congress did a great deal of campaigning 
against the Improved Farming Scheme and allied matters. Local 
officials knew that they stood a very good chance of being heard
1Sec/Nat/366, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1951- 
^Ibid.
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here. The Chief was a very active Congress supporter. When in 
July 1952) Congress waited to hold a public meeting in his area? 
he was very instrumental in getting the people together. This
1
meeting which was held, allegedly) ’at Harry Nkumbula's instruction) 
was addressed by local politicians) all of whom were members of 
the Seventh Pay Adventist Church. According to the Provincial ■ 
Agricultural Officerfe account of the meeting, the following in­
structions were given to the people in connection with Congress' 
policy of non-cooperation:
'1. Taxes should not be paid, cattle should not be 
sold over the Veterinary scales or be allowed 
to be inoculated against anthrax or quarter evil.
2. None should join the Improved Farmers' Scheme.
All Improved Farmers should stop taking any advice 
from the Agricultural Department.
3. All Africans should oppose all conservations /sic/ 
methods and marking of grass strips injfcheir new 
gardens. '
2
*t. The people should plough and plant as they like.'
Money was collected at the meeting, 'for the purpose of 
paying a European lawyer to bring a case which they hope will 
evict the Europeans from the Ngwesi /river/' and to work up feel­
ing against Federation, the people were told that after union 
with Southern Rhodesia had been achieved by the settlers, African 
'cattle will be taken away ... and all the Africans would be 
castrated by the Europeans'.
The Provincial Agricultural Officer condemned 'the kind of 
propaganda and threats that are being put over at meetings which
^N/00Gl/2/8, Z.N.A. Provincial Agricultural Officer to D.C.
Mazabuka, 12.8.52.
2Ibid.
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are sponsored by the Chief' and pointed out that 'this has 
happened at other areas bisides Sianjalika's...1„ He called 
on the Government 'to take a strong hand and state what its 
policy .will be in a case of non-cooperation...' and even sug­
gested that 'maize buying depots be closed „ „ „ ' should opposition
1
to the Agriculture Department persist.
Congress' Charter of non-cooperation which its leaders 
on thJjTonga plateau had expounded in the Sianjalika area was cited
at meetings in other Chieftaincies and although it made hardly
2
any impression in some areas, it succeeded in stimulating further 
opposition to the settlers and the Administration in other parts 
of the District. The central Congress leadership did not leave 
the campaign against the Improved Farming Scheme entirely in the 
hands of organisers on the plateau. Harry Nkumbula himself played 
an active part in it. In August 1952, in an address to a Chiefs 
and Delegates Conference organised by Congress in Lusaka, he con­
demned the differential pricing system of Agricultural produce 
and attacked the Improved Farming Scheme. He criticized a situation 
wherein African producers not only received lower prices for their 
produce, but were forced to contribute towards an Improvement fund, 
from which only a few derived direct financial benefits. He argued 
that the farming bonus system, looked at carefully, offered no 
bonus at all and was a case of outright trickery. He told the
^Ibid.
2Notably Ufwenuka and Chona Chieftaincies.
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gathering: 'Most of these Improved Farmers in the Maize con­
trolled area produce an average of 200 bags for each crop 
season which they sell at a loss of 12/9d per bag. This means 
that each of these farmers puts into the ... Fund an average 
of £125. From this sum, he is paid the £50 bonus. The answer 
is that he has actually received no bonus. The £50 bonus he has 
received is part of the money he has lost,
In spite of Congress' criticism of the scheme, the majority 
of the Improved Farmers, skeptical of the movement's propaganda, 
continued to operate within the scheme. To the annoyance of 
Congress, officials, they also persisted in running their Farmers 
Associations independently of the Congress movement. There were, 
however, a few who gave in to Congress' call and deregistered 
from the scheme. In the Sianjalika area, for instance, it was 
reported in November 1952, that of the area's 100 Improved Farmers, 
many will not qualify for bonuses because of 'the suddep opposition
to the purchase of fertiliser of which a little under half the
2
bags ordered were not taken up by those who ordered them'. District 
officials believed that this was 'partly due to the unfortunate 
propaganda from certain emissaries of Congress' which had raised
'a lot of doubt ... in the minds of many Improved Farmers as to
3
the security of their tenure 1. To further undermine confidence
^Presidential Address to the Chiefs and Delegates Conference held 
in August 1952, A.N.C. Files. N^ jpksu~so». -
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/3 , Z.N.A. Tour report No. 10 of 1952.
^Ibid.
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in the Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.) and .stampede memhers 
into deregistering from it, Congress, it was reported, had also 
put about 'untrue stories . „. that some headmen had evicted 
Improved Farmers and that Government had seized some of the land 
and implements of an Improved Farmers /sic/ who died recently.„. ' 
Apparently, Congress' propaganda against the I.F.S. in the 
Sianjalika area went down quite we11. The author's interviews in 
the area revealed that even within the local Improved Farming
2group, whose membership rose from 100 in 1952 to 132 in 1953>
only a few were seriously committed to the scheme, the majority
participating in it simply because it was the surest way to the
acquisition of equipment at subsidised prices.^ The Chief himself,
an active politician, who skilfully combined his positions as
A
Administration representative and Congress leader and who, in
q
19^9? had got most of his people to boycott the scheme, re­
gistered under it in 1952.^ Neither he nor the majority of Im­
proved Farmers in his area participated in the activities of any 
Farmers Association. In fact, most Informants were agreed that 
no such Associations were formed, in the area, and that Improved 
Farmers interested in Farmers Associations had to join the Monze
branch. The local Congress branch, basedjln the Chief's village,
7was said to be quite 'militant' and it appears to have enjoyed 
1Ibid.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/o83V^i Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1953»
"’interviews in Sianjalika Chieftaincy.
A
The District Commissioner remarked, in 1952, on the Chief's ability 
to 'run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'. See Sec/Nat/366 
N/083V3j Z.N.A. Tour report No. 10 of 1952.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 19^9.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/3i Z.N.A. Tour report No. 10 of 1952.
7 Ibid.
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much support from both Improved and non-Improved Farmers.
A number of farmers also deregistered from the I.F.S. in 
the Monze Chieftaincy during the early fifties. The area was in 
the fifties under the radical Chief Mugodi Monze, an incessant 
critic of the Administration who was to be deposed during the 
Federal years. Congress1 campaign against the I.F.S. here met 
with a great deal of success. In 1952, of 6l villages visited 
during an agricultural survey, only 106 men in a total male popu­
lation of 122k were Improved Farmers.^ In March of the following 
year, a touring District Official counted only 30 Improved Farmers
in the Monze area, 'some 30 having left the scheme for various 
2
reasons.,.1. One farmer who had left the scheme explained that
he had been disturbed by rumours 'that the land v/as to be handed
3over to the Europeans when Federation came about1. In his report 
for 1952, the Provincial Commissioner commented on the campaign 
of non-cooperation which Congress was waging on the plateau in 
connection with the I.F.S. He observed that although the number 
of Improved Farmers who registered within the province for the 
1932/33 season had risen above that of the previous season, there 
were political and other setbacks to the scheme 1 towards the end 
of the year, when many Africans who had ordered fertilizers were 
misled by lies and refused to take up their order...1. He pointed 
out that although 'both the Provincial Administration and the
^R.Howard, "Improved Farmers in the Southern Province", January, 
1932. M.M.R.S.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/^1 Z.N.A. Tour report No. 3i 1933.
^Ibid.
Agricultural Department have worked hard to counteract such lies'
in 'Monze and Kanch&mba, the numbers /of Improved Farmers/71 have
1fallen considerably...'.
The S.D.A. settlement at Keemba Hill, the official Head­
quarters of the Congress movement in Mazabuka District, was another
area where African farmers defiantly resisted the Administration's
policies. The areas disenchantment with the Administration had
2
increased over the years and the majority of its farmers took
The
gladly to the Congress movement./ Congress policy of non-cooperation 
was studiously observed by many in the area. In 1951 j when some 
Keemba Hill farmers refused to observe the rules of the soil con­
servation programme, District officials talked about the need for 
firmness In handling the dissenters. The Provincial Commissioner 
minuted:
'One point is clear and that is that the farmers
must not be allowed to gain the impression that
they are outside tribal control and can flout 
agricultural orders.... In effect, we should 
try conciliatory measures, but it should be made 
quite clear to the men concerned that if they do 
not play their part, there will be n^ hesitation 
in employing much sterner measures'.-^
As Keemba Hill's intransigence increased during the years 
leading up to Federation, so the Administration continued to in­
sist on the need to get this group of educated and progressive 
farmers to set an example, through compliance v/ith the soil con­
servation programme, for the rest of the African population to 
follow. Ellison Milambo, the leading spokesman of the settlement
^Native .Affairs report, 1952, pp. 75-76.
^See Chapter IV.
/Acc 75/25, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Annexure III in Tour report No. 4 
of 1951.
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and a strong Congress leader, vividly remembers the activities of
these years. He told the author; 'They tried to get us to
agree to contour ridges and we refused. Then they brought grass
^strips^ but again Mayanda and Michello warned us not to agree.
Bwanas from the Boma in Mazabuka came to see us several times
and although some people agreed to join the scheme, and care for
ridges, most of us refused. We had planted for many years without
]
ridges. We did not want them now.1
Officials were not however to be put off by this un­
compromising attitude. In January 1953? a touring official again 
raised the controversial question of enrolment with the I.F.S., 
while at Keemba Hill. He was jeered at and derided by the area's 
confident and successful, though non-Improved, Farmers. In his 
report he noted, inter alia: 'Some of the Keemba Hill farmers
said they would become Improved Farmers provided I could show 
them an improved farm on the hill with superior crops to their
own; unfortunately this was an impossibility at this time of
2the year in this particdLarly fertile area...1. Keemba Hill's 
opposition to white rule and its policies was to continue into 
the years of Federation, as will be detailed later. It came to 
feature even more prominently as Congress' brain centre on the 
plateau.
"^Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.7^ -.
2Sec/Nat/366 N/08AA, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 1 of 1933.
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The Capricorn Africa Society on the Plateau
A very significant feature of the anti-Federation campaign 
in Mazabuka District, during the early fifties, was the clash 
between Congress officials and supporters on the one hand, and 
Africans suspected of being sympathisersj/d-ththe Capricorn African 
Society, on the other. The Society was started, in 19^9 j by Colonel 
David Stirling, the ’Phantom Major1, who had distinguished himself 
in fighting the Germans. Stirling tiled to bring the liberal 
whites and Africans of Central Africa into an organisation designed 
to foster racial harmony. The movement aimed at creating a society 
in which there xrould be 'no discrimination on racial grounds' 
and where opportunities would be 'open to all and human capacity 
and merit will be the only criteria for responsible participation 
in public a f f a i r s T h e  movement employed African and European 
Agents, who went about its business, recruiting interested moder­
ates who were in favour of racial partnership in a Central African 
Federation. This recruiting was not however carried out in a very 
scrupulous fashion, and in a number of cases, over-enthusiastic 
Agents of the movement forwarded names of Africans whose support
they believed they had enlisted, though, in fact, these people had
2
no intention of joining the movement. The Capricorn Society con­
demned the strident nationalism of the African National Congress 
and, as a result, it brought on itself frequent attacks from 
Congress leaders at all levels. Congress was always on the lookout
1
FOB 108/1/69t Circular on the Capricorn Africa Society.
2
Nkumbula was claimed as a sympathiser in 1992 by an Agent Abel 
Nyirenda and the Congress President had to make speeches and 
write letters to clear his name. See, FCB 101/3/2151 Nkumbula 
to P.Sikota, 12.11.52.
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for moderate Africans, whom it believed were victims of the
A
Capricorn Society’s propaganda and, as one would expect, a number 
of people were accused, during the early fifties, of being in 
sympathy with the Society because they did not participate 
actively in Congress' activities.
On the Tonga plateau, in the early months of 1953i when the 
campaign against Federation was veiy much under way, charges 
of collaboration with the Capricorn Society were quite frequent. 
Tilings came to a head in March of that year when local Congress 
officials accused Chief Mwanachingwala (Chisoraa), a long-standing 
Congress supporter, of sympathy for the Capricorn movement.^ The 
accusation was prompted by the fact that the Chief, in spite of 
pressures from Congress, refused to ostracise a well known Capri­
corn supporter who lived in his Chieftaincy. The man involved 
was one Frank Kaluwa. He was the brother of George Kaluwa, the 
Congress official, and had lived in Southern Bhodesia for a few 
years. In 1952, Harry Nkumbula had accused Frank Kaluwa of pre­
tending to be a member of the African National Congress and clairm-
ing that he had been authorised by the Congress President to have
2
food and drinks at the Chilambwe tea-room on credit. Kaluwa 
resided in the Munenga area of Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy and 
had openly admitted that he was a member of the Capricorn Africa 
Society. Local Congress leaders were angered by the fact that
The accusation and harassment of Chief Mwanachingwala that 
followed might not have been unconnected with Mwanachingwala's 
role in a land dispute involving the Congress leader George 
Kaluwa. This dispute is mentioned later in this chapter.
2See Nkumbula to P.Sokot.a, 12.11.32, in F.C.B. 101/3/213.
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Chief Mwanachingwala not only permitted Kaluwa to reside in 
his area but also encouraged him to pay visits to his house.
Because they associated openly with Kaluwa, the Chief and his 
son, Peter Chisoma, were accused of deserting the Congress 
movement.'*'
A protest meeting was held by Congress at the Munenga 
Mission, about four miles south of the Chief's village on 
the 1st March, 1953- Job Michello, who until February 193B
had been Congress' Branch Secretary in the Munenga area, but was
2
now serving as 'Accountant-General' in the movement's Lusaka
office, was present at this meeting. A vehement critic of the
Administration and settlers, Michello had by this time acquired
a reputation for being !a well known hothead'.^ He wasjkne of
those Congress politicians on the plateau who had regularly
attended Native Authority meetings and had attempted to influence
the Chiefs and Councillors in their deliberations, in spite of
A
the fact that they had no right to speak at these meetings.
With Michello at the Munenga Mission meeting were four pro­
minent local Congress leaders, Wilson Chimbulu, Enoch Mundunda,
Simon Maambo and Moses Nam-Weleba. According to a report on
^N/OOOl/2/lO Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from B.C. Mazabuka to 
Provincial Commissioner, 4.3.53.
2
Michello was given responsibility for supervising Congress' 
contacts with the rural areas, especially in financial matters.
■%/0001/2/10, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from D.C.Mazabuka 
to Provincial Commissioner, 4.3-53-
4Ibid. As will be seen later, Congress was to make much use 
of the Native Authority meetings, on the plateau, to make its 
views known during the Federal years. See Chapter VII.
the meeting,"** 'Maambo supported by ... Michello said that there 
were four or six Capricorns in the Munenga area and asked for 
suggestions as to what should be done v/ith them1* Congress sup­
porters present demanded that ’they should be killed'. 'Maambo 
then stood up and said, Federation would not come1 and supported 
the view that 'the members of the Capricorn must be killed'.
This evoked a response of 'Down with them' from the crowd. One 
Congress supporter, Aron Chilembe, 'then got up and said that 
the Chief should be taken away because he has joined the Capricorn'. 
Next, the Headmaster of Kalama School, a fellow called Kamwa, 
suggested that Congress members should approach the Chief and 
discuss with him his supposed membership of the Capricorn Society. 
Jacob Nangamba, a teacher at Munenga, then 'said that the head­
men of the Chief \^ ere very foolish' and 'suggested that they had 
a meeting to see the Chief... about changing his Councillors...'. 
'These remarks', the report continued, 'met with the approval of 
the people.' It was at this stage that Maambo insisted that Con­
gress should choose new Councillors for the area without consult­
ing the Chief. He argued that he was the local organising secretary 
of the Congress and that he, therefore, had the right to assist in 
the choosing of Councillors. The meeting then proceeded to choose 
three new Councillors. After a while, Sixpence Monga, a farmer 
from Chiwala's village, Judan Bbumba and Wilson Chimbulu were 
chosen. According to Informants, all three new Councillors were
'^N/000l/2/l0, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from D.C. Mazabuka 
to Provincial Commissioner, *f.3.53.
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Seventh Day Adventists and local farmers* Chimbulix had served as 
a Mission teacher for several years and Bbumba had even -undergone 
teacher training at the S.D.A.'s Solusi mission in Bulawayo, after 
which he taught in Salisbury and Johannesburg for some time.'*'
The meeting ended in commotion with the people calling for the 
death of the Chief's son, Peter, and Maambo accusing him of 'selling 
the country to the Europeans'. He also accused Peter and his 
father 'of having been given a lot of money by the Capricorn move­
ment. .. 1
Although Chief Mwanachingwala and his son repeatedly denied
the accusation that they were members of the Capricorn African
Society, the local Congress movement lost confidence in the Chief's
leadership and tried to have him deposed. A dispute had for some
time surrounded the Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy, in which a strong
Congress supporter, Nathan Kabunda, son of Nabimba, one-time Chief
of the area, challenged the claims of the present incumbent.
if
Kabunda, who was a very prosperous farmer, had tried unsuccessfully 
on previous occasions to win official Congress support for his 
claims. He had, however, made no impression on a Congress leader­
ship which saw no point in opposing a Chief v/hose support for the 
movement was without question. Things however changed when Chief 
Mwanachingwala came under accusations of sympathy with the Capri­
corn movement. The official Congress branch now offered its sup­
port to Kabunda. Enjoying the backing of his clan and Congress,
1 ' '
Interviews in the Mwanachingwala area and with Job Michello,
19.6.?^.
^N/0Q0l/2/l0, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch, op.cit.
'A
Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.7^.
If
During the Agricultural Survey of 19^51 Allan and others reported 
that Kabunda had some '220 acres of cultivation', the 'farmer 
with the largest acreage... encountered'. See Allan et alia,
"Land Holding etc...11, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. iTT, 19^5»
p.110.
0Kabunda now filed a case against Chief Mwanachingwala in the
Plateau Tonga Native Author!ty. He claimed that the Chief
had no rights to the position, because he was not a native of
the area. He argued that the Chief had come from Chief Sina-
dambwe's area towards the Gwembe valley and that he was not a
1pure Tonga but a Goba. After hearing both sides, however, the 
Native Authority upheld Chief Mwanachingwala1s claims and
p
Kabunda was later to be asked by the Chief to leave the area.
sjt #
Congress' activities in Chief Mwanachingwala1s area aroused 
much interest among the Chiefs and farmers on the plateau, es­
pecially the moderates who had always had their doubts about the 
movement's motives and real objectives. Many Chiefs now began to 
fear for their positions which seemed threatened by a movement 
determined to press the claims of its own candidates against
Chiefs of whose loyalty it was in doubt. Indeed, it was reported
3m  1933 that in four Chieftaincies on the plateau, Congress 'caused
considerable annoyance' by attempting to champion the claims of
if
'rivals of the Chiefs' and 'disappointed candidates'. Such be­
haviour on the part of some Congress officials and supporters 
left many Chiefs in doubt as to the wisdom of supporting a move­
ment that seemed as capable of harassing its own sympathisers who
^Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.7^.
2
This was during the late fifties. See C.M.N.White's Land Tenure 
Report on the Tonga Plateau (Southern Province), M.M.R.S.
3
Mwanachingwala must have been one of them.
if
Officials believed that this would alienate the Chiefs from 
Congress. In the same report, the D.C. noted: 'Fortunately this
had the effect of making clear to the Chiefs generally what were 
the true aims of Congress - namely their own self advancement at the 
expense of the Chiefs and this in the end had an adverse effect on 
Congress ambitions. See Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3 Vol. IV, Masabuka 
District Annual report, 1933.
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had fallen out of favour, as it did the white man.
Concern among moderates became even more acute after the 
A.N.C. Southern Provincial Conference of May, 1953» at which Con­
gress made attempts to strengthen its organisation within the 
Southern province and improve on its campaign against Federation
in the area. It was attended by 2.5 Chiefs from within the
1
province and 7i000 people. Most of the leading Congress officials 
on the plateau were present, among them Michello, Mayanda, Maambo 
and Milambo. Meetings were opened v/ith the chanting of Congress 
songs, most of them in praise of Nkumbula, and the use of popular 
slogans like *Muntu Omwe-Kusala Komwe* (one man, one vote) . Con­
gress used the occasion to raise more funds for the land suit, 
which was still in the hands of London solicitors, and for other
expenses. An estimated 100 head of cattle were donated by Con-
3
gress sympathisers to help defray expenses. A very important
feature of the Conference was the attempt made to capture Improved
Farmer support by inviting Paul Mulendema, the President of the
A
African Farmers Union vo address the gathering and appeal for
5
more involvement in Congress' activities.
Equally significant were Congress' attempts to strengthen 
its protest network during this conference. Under the direction 
of Job Michello and Job Mayanda, Congress ran a seminar for
1See "A Statement on the Imposition of Federationty the President- 
General", 2nd June, 1953. A.N.C. Files, Madpherson Collection.
2
Some of these songs - . are supplied in the appendix.
3,"A Statement on the Imposition...", op.c 
A
This was an attempt at Federating all African Farmers Associations 
within the territory. Mulendema. was a successful farmer in the 
Central Province.
Interview with Job Michello, 19.5.7^.
Southern province organisers, 'Suggestion boxes1 were provided 
so that participants could make their ideas known. The Congress 
leadership briefed organisers on various aspects of the non­
cooperation struggle and despatched fifteen teams, each made up
of two organisers, to various parts of the province to acquaint
1
Congress branches with the new strategies.
# # sk
Congress and the Chiefs
The Chiefs of the plateau reacted in various ways to the
activities of the Congress movement. Although every one of them
allowed the movement to organise branches and hold|frieetings in
their areas, and placed no serious obstacles in its way as some
2
of their counterparts in other provinces were inclined to do, 
their commitment to its programme varied from area to area. Most 
of the plateau's Chiefs were moderates, who, while supporting Con­
gress, did not lose sight of the fact that they held their posi­
tions at the pleasure of the Administration. Most of them con­
tributed to Congress' coffers and found time to attend its Con­
ferences, ^  but few ventured to speak publicly in favour of the 
movement's anti-Government programme^ There I'/ere two clearly dis­
cernible groups of Chiefs^ one, outspoken and \ery pro-Congress,
the other largely indifferent to the political turbulence which 
Congress' activities were generating. In the former group were
■^Interviews with Ellison Milambo (10.2.7^) and Job Michello (19.6.7^).
2
Certain Chiefs in the Northern Province were 'repeatedly reported 
to the Central Congress leadership because of their harassment of 
Congress officials in their area. This continued into the late 
fifties (see FCB IO3/I/V7). Provincial President, Northern Pro­
vince to Provincial Commissioner Kasama, 2.10.57)o Lozi Chiefs in 
the Western Province also opposed the movement for a number of years.
TFor instance, at the Congress Conference held in Lusaka in August 1952, 
thirty-five of the ninety-two Chiefs present were from the Southern Province. 
See Report on Congress Conference of August 1952, A.N.C.Files,Macpherson 
Collection. All Chiefs on the plateau attended this conference.
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Chiefs like Chongo, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Monze (Mugodi) 
and Naluama and in the latter and clearly the smaller group,
Chiefs like Ufwenuka and Chona.
Former Congress leaders who were interviewed by the author 
spoke highly of the support, both moral and financial, which they 
received from Chiefs like Chongo during the anti-Federation 
struggle, but observed that the Ufwenukas and Chonas were always 
more lukewarm in their support.^ Chief Ufwenuka (Malila) who died 
in 1951 never overcame his suspicions about Congress 'bona fides'. 
His successor, Wilson Hakamba, did not find much time for Congress 
either, perhaps a result of the fact that his claims were being 
strongly challenged by people whom he believed enjoyed Congress' 
backing. Hakamba was subsequently replaced by the Native Authority 
after serving as Chief for less than a year and Shadreck Nyanga 
became Chief Ufwenuka. He showed a little more interest in Con­
gress' activities than his predecessor but, as one Informant ex-
2
plained, 'he did not do much'.
In the case of Congress' failure to make an impression on 
Hameja Chona, who was head of the Chona Chieftaincy for a number 
of years before he was killed by a lion in the 1960s, it was very 
much a conflict between the forces of change as typified by Con­
gress and those of continuity as seen in the old Ghief. ■ :
Apart from other reasons for not talcing Congress seriously, the 
Chief had no faith in Nkumbula's leadership and he regarded the
"^Interviews with Congress officials.
2
Interview with Paul Mwiindwa (15.8.7^) and others in the Ufwenuka 
area.
Congress President and his aides as inexperienced and over- 
adventurous young men. He believed strongly that nothing could
1be gained through the course of action Congress was advocating.
Although it is dangerous to generalise on this point, the 
evidence of Chiefly support for Congress on the plateau seems 
to suggest that, in the majority of cases, Chiefs and people in 
areas that had suffered much land loss were more forthcoming in 
their support for the movement than, those who had not been deprived 
to the same extent. For instance, the Mwanachingwalas and Sian- 
jalikas, whose areas had lost vast tracts of land to incoming 
white settlers were dedicated to the Congress programme, while
the Ufwenukas and Chonas, who, apart from the land taken up by
2
missionary societies, lost nothing to white farmer settlers, 
continued to be very lukewarm in their support of political pro-
A
test into the sixties. Congress' non-cooperation programme tended
to have more appeal in the former than in the latter areas.
Unlike the case in the Sianjalika area, where many Improved Farmers
participated openly in Congress' activities, the majority of the
Zj.
115 Improved Farmers in the Ufwenuka area by 1953 showed no real
^Interview with Chief Chona, 28.^.7^.
2
The Chona Chieftaincy lies on the escarpment and is very hilly.
The Ufwenuka area also slopes down to the escarpment.
•^Describing the Ufwenuka/Chona area in 1983) Muchangwe wrote: 
'Politically, the area has been comparatively quiet. There are 
no strong branches of either the main African parties. Much of 
this is due to the influence of the Missions but largely due to 
the presence of an intelligent and energetic Chief who is generally 
liked by his people for being a firm and „.. impartial administrator 
. See I.H.Muchangwe, "Ufwenuka/Chona Regional plan", p.^ -., 
M.M.R.S. The relatively low population of the Chona area might 
also have been a factor In its lack of prominence in the protest 
movement.
Ll
Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/^) Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1953.
interest in the movement. Although there was a 'feeling of
dissatisfaction' in their ranks, which, in 1953i some Congress
1officials tried to exploit," the area's Improved Farmers remained 
steadfast in their preference of Farmers Association to Congress.
&  >JC 5!= t|c sjt ^
The Administration was for long perturbed by the support that 
the majority of the Mazabuka District Chiefs were giving to the 
Congress movement. Many of them were openly associating with 
the movement in disregarding Administrative fiat. The 
Government was determined to attract the allegiance of the Chiefs 
and to win them away from the Congress politicians. During the 
early fifties, no pains were spared to achieve this end. In July, 
1952, when the various Chiefs within the territory were on the 
verge of leaving their respective Chieftaincies to attend the 
Congress Conference that was scheduled for August of that year, 
the Secretary for Native Affairs issued directives to all Provincial 
Commissioners on the subject of Chiefly involvement in non-official 
activities. Among other things, he emphasised that Chiefs were 
'integral parts of the Native Authority1 and 'as such they should 
not normally leave their districts without the knowledge and con­
sent of their District Commissioners'. He also stressed that 'a 
Chief travelling to attend ... a ^ /Congress/ meeting should be re­
garded as talcing local leave' and 'should not be considered eligible 
for any travelling allowances from his Native Treasury or Central
Government funds'. District Commissioners were instructed to 
'take full advantage of this journey hy their Chiefs to meet 
them both before and after their meeting 1 so that1any misappre­
hension' can be corrected 'and in particular any mistake in fact...
1set right'. The Administration was determined to take no chances 
in ensuring that any further persuasion of Chiefs by Congress 
would not succeed.
On the Tonga plateau, this determination to undermine the 
rapport between Chief and Congress was seen quite clearly in 
July 1952. The occasion was a land dispute involving George 
Kaluwa, the Congress official. The land in question, a 30 acre 
plot, had been leased since September 1939 ty the late father of 
Kaluwa. The Kaluwa family's claim to the land was now being con­
tested and they were being threatened with eviction by the Admini­
stration, acting through Chief Mwanachingwala. Local District 
officials saw this as a marvellous opportunity to promote a rift 
between Congress and the Chief, whc^ /as a known supporter of the 
movement. The District Commissioner regarded Kaluwa as 'politi­
cally one of the most dangerous Africans^Ln this district' who 
'from being a mere district organiser of Congress... is now a
member of the Central organisation and frequently accompanies
2
Nkumbula on his journeys'. He was, therefore, very pleased by 
the prospect of a confrontation between the Chief and the Congress 
leader. He minuted: 'Provided that the move £lo evict Iialuv/a/
■*'N/000l/2/3 Vol. I, Z.N.A. Secretary of Native Affairs to Provincial 
Commissioners, 23.7.52.
2N/13O5, Vol. I, District Commissioner's annexure to Tour report 
No.7 of 1952.
comes from the Native Authority and is initiated by Chief Mwanaching­
wala, I regard this as an excellent opportunity to develop a split 
between the Chief and Congress. The intimidation which will un­
doubtedly follow Mwanachingwala's action should bring home to him
and to his fellow Chiefs the type of persons with whom they are 
1
dealing.'
During the August 1952 Congress Conference, the Secretary for
Native Affairs again attempted to attract the Chiefs away from the
politicians, telling them, among other things, that the monies they
contributed to the movement's funds were only being frittered
away on luxuries for the Congress officials. He did not quite succeed
in this, for, if anything, most of the Chiefs only reaffirmed their
2
commitment to Congress objectives.
* hi h* $ $ $ $
Throughout 1950-5 the African National Congress maintained 
its campaign against Federation. Although there was much political 
activity in urban areas such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt, there 
was hardly any organised protest in the townships of the Tonga 
plateau. Congress knew that the townships of the platea would not 
produce as much money as the reserves which contained the bulk of 
the African population. Its local organisers therefore concentrated 
most of their fund raising efforts on the villages. Like their 
counterparts in the other provinces, the members of the Southern
1Ibid.
2
See President's Statement on the White Paper of January, 1953. 
A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.
Provincial Council continued to express their opposition to
Closer Union.'1' In the African Representative Council, the mood
was even more uncompromising, with members like Walubita even
2
indicating a willingness to die for the African cause. African 
opposition was not, however, to deter British Parliamentarians 
at Westminster from approving the Federation bill. On the 2^th 
of June, 1953, the House of Commons voted by 188 to l6^f in 
favour of the creation of a Federation in Central Africa. On 
the 1st of August, 1953* the Federation came into formal existence.
ijt Hi :{* *
Congress' campaign on the plateau and elsewhere had proved 
unequal to the persistence of the settlers and their sympathisers 
in Britain. In retrospect, the Federation campaign on the plateau 
revealed some of the organisational deficiencies of the Congress 
movement. It had failed to tap efficiently the potential re­
serves of goodv/ill that conditions on the plateau had placed at 
its disposal. Its very organisational strategy was in error.
Although the Congress leadership which assumed responsibility in 
1952 encouraged the formation of branches of the movement in the 
rural areas, formal registration of branches did not commence 
till 195ZK"> The movement took African support, outside the ranks 
of the Improved Farmers, for granted and only the barest minimum
■4?he views of Walubita and others can be seen in the record of the
Council's meeting of 22nd August 1952. N/2212/l, Z.N.A.
2In January 1951 Walubita said, among other things: 'The Africans will
fight for their interests in the Council and in all Councils where such 
liberty is given. I would end this speech by saying a Latin proverb: 
'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori' - it is not inglorious to die
for one's country.' See AFRICAN Representative Council debates,
25th January, 19511 Bo. 5i Cols. 186-187.
3See Secretary General's address to Annual Conference of October 
1956, in FCB 103/1.
of attention was paid to the all important problems of politici­
zation at branch level. For instance, it was only after the 
declaration of Federation that Congress addressed itself to the 
question of printing and selling membership cards, one very 
rewarding means of raising funds, while promoting a feeling of 
belongingness among the people.
Before the Southern Provincial Conference of May 1953t 
Congress had never taken to organising meetings on any systematic 
basis. Apart from the occasional summons to meet in the villages 
of Chiefs of proven sympathy, such as Sianjalika, the local leader 
ship allowed the indifference of the Ufwenukas and the Chonas to 
limit its operations in these marginal Chieftaincies. Partly 
as a result of the campaign of abuse directed at Improved Farmers 
and their Farmers Associations, and for other reasons already 
enumerated, the moement never enjoyed the active support of the 
majority of Improved Farmers. Nor did its pursuit of vendettas 
against unfavoured Chiefs improve its appeal among skeptical moder 
ate s.
Nkumbula's leadership, though attractive to the majority
among
of Africans, failed to inspire confidence / certain influential 
Africans on the plateau. His love of the good life, clearly 
manifest in the years before Federation, caused many to doubt 
his ability and question M s  commitment. Many believed that the 
money Congress raised went, In substantial part, towards servicing 
the desires of the President-General. His apparent lack of frugal 
ity caused much resentment. In August 1953 workers on a European 
farm near Mazabuka were, reportedly, dissatisfied with the fact 
that Nkumbula always preferred to leside at the house of one Mr.
s i  a
Valant, an Indian storekeeper of Lubombo, whenever he was on 
tour of the Mazabuka area. They pointed out that this was
1
wrong and demanded that 'Nkumbula should stay with his own people'* 
During the years of Federation, Congress was to identify some of 
the weakness in its organisation and efforts were to be made to 
rectify them.
The Federation - to the end, of 19^3»
The declaration of a Federation of Central Africa was greeted 
with mixed feelings by Congress supporters throughout the terri­
tory. in many areas It produced a striking ambivalence. On the 
plateau and elsewhere, Congress' failure to avert what now looked 
like the inevitable, created much disillusionment. African moder­
ates who had taken no active part in the struggle against Feder­
ation now talked of the futility of the exercise and commiserated 
with those who had allowed themselves to be talked into partici­
pating in a cause that was bound to fail. Many an Improved Farmer 
who had refused to be influenced by Congress' propaganda and had 
persisted in supporting the local Farmers Associations, reflected on 
how wise a choice he had made. Certain Improved Farmers who, 
under pressure from Congress, had deregistered from the I.F.S., 
began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of their actions. 
There was much heart searching among farmers.in this group, 
especially as the Administration, determined to consolidate its
"^Sec/Nat/366 N/O8 3 * 2.N.A. Tour report No. lj> of 1933.
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gains, embarked on the novel action of offering loans for
1development purposes to registered Improved Farmers. Many of
these farmers were to find the temptation to re-register with the
scheme irresistible. Although for the 1952/53 season, the number
of farmers had dropped considerably, Congress' propaganda against
this scheme being one of the main reasons, registrations with
the I.F.S., in some areas, were to show a sharp upturn during
2
the early years of Federation. In areas like TJfwenuka Chieftaincy, 
certain Improved Farmers who had left the scheme and their Farmers 
Associations during the years leading up to Federation to join 
the Congress movement, now give up their positions within Congress 
and reverted to their former activities. A very prominent case
was Paul Mv/iindwa, who had served for some time as Congress Branch
3Secretary in the area.
The Central Congress leadership was quite ai^ are of the
danger of supporters losing faith in the raison d'dtre of the
movement and so^, to arrest a growing tendency towards backsliding,
it decided in October 1955 to reaffirm th^movement1s commitment
to a policy of non-cooperation without violence. The non-cooperation
programme was defined as ’Thou shalt not cooperate with anybody
Ain any scheme which is detrimental to African interests'. It 
called for the 'withdrawal of African labour from European farms' 
and 'farm building contractors engaged in building houses for
■^ During the first two seasons of the loan scheme, nearly £1,500 
was paid out to Registered Improved Farmers. Native Affairs 
report, 195^? p. 91.
2
Between 1955 Etfid 1956 Improved Farmer figures for Monze area 
rose from 196 registered farmers to 375; in the Magoye area, 
from 190 to 256; in the Mapangazia area from six to eighty-five. 
See Southern Province 'Stocktaking', 1900, -M.M.R,S.
-'’interview with Paul Mwiindwa, 21,11.75.
FCB 101/3/265j K.D.Kaunda's press communique, "Nationalism and 
Parliamentary Democracy", 15th October, 1955.
European Immigrants!. It also demanded the continuation of the 
anti-colour-bar campaign in hotels, restaurants, public lavatories, 
churches, post offices, shops etc. The Congress leadership pledged 
itself to the pursuit of the following objectives:
1 i) Increased enrolment of Congress men and women.
ii) More integration or combination of all African 
organisations in the Protectorate.
iii) Need for creation of a Central African National 
Council, i.e. the African National Congresses 
of Central Africa should be brought together to 
achieve their common objective.
iv) ... the establishment of a regional Pan African 
council for Africa south of the Sahara.'-L
:jt >;< :;s >j<
The Declaration of Federation brought the townships of 
the Tonga plateau into active participation in the non-cooperation 
effort. In the years preceding Federation, the Congress leader­
ship, in both the urban and rural areas, had concentrated their 
campaign efforts mainly in the rural areas of the plateau. Nov/ 
it was decided to bring the local townships within the network 
of urban protest. During the final months of 1953 Congress sup­
porters were instructed to boycott the shops of Europeans and
2
certain Asian traders. The Administration did not however allow
1Ibid.
2
Interviews with Michello and other Congress leaders revealed that 
there were a number of Asian traders who sympathised with the 
African cause. A number of them were to play an active part in 
Congress during the Federal years. Among these were the Naiks 
of Magoye and Pemba, the Patels of Monze, Pemba and Choma and 
the Desais of Bwengwa and Pemba.
this form of protest to go very far. Its officials rounded up
and imprisoned a number of the local Congress leaders involved
in the campaign,^ among them Naul Moonga, a leading organiser
who lived in the Sianjalika Chieftaincy.
In certain Chieftaincies, the non-cooperation campaign,
very much under the directinn of the farmer/politicians of Keemba
Hill, became even more intense under Federation. Congress continued
to attack the Improved Farming Scheme using 'the propaganda that
the land was only being improved in order to hand it over to 
2
Europeans'. Local Congress leaders encouraged people to destroy 
contour ridges and grass strips. Labour boycotts, which the Cen-
ktral Congress leadership had advocated in June 1953> were now, for 
the first time, officially organised among African workers on the 
plateau's European farms. Farm workers in various Chieftaincies 
were urged to withdraw their labour. Congress argued that by with­
drawing their labour, Africans would succeed in crippling the oper­
ations of settler farmers who would then have no alternative but
P
Sikalumbi Manuscript, op.cit., p.?6, and Interviews with Naul Moonga 
(29.^.7^) and others.
^Sec/Nat/66F N/OOO6/3, Vol. IV, District Office Annual report, 1993.
JIbid.
1+
In June 19331 Nkumbula had issued the order: 'There is no need
for any able-bodied African to sell his labour to a white man 
for wages. I have given six months notice to all African working 
population to get ready for gardening during the next rainy
season. ... Get back to the land before the land-grubbing /pic/ 
settlers have taken the last inch of your soil.' FCB.101/3/2^8.
A statement on the imposition of Federation by the President- 
General, 2nd June, 1953.
i. ;1
to abandon their farms for eventual African occupation.^
As in the case of the anti-improved Farming campaign. Con­
gress1 appeal to farm workers met with varying degrees of success.
2
The appeal made no impression in the majority of Chieftaincies. 
However, in areas like Mwenda, Mwanachingwala and Sianjalika, 
where Congress was comparatively quite popular, there were re­
ports of labour withdrawals. Between November and December, 1953i 
the District Commissioner made a tour of Chief Mwenda1s area, 
'generally considered to be one of the worst for Congress agi­
tation'^ and the home of such Congress leaders as Paul Mwene,
Seth Sialube and Peter Mwiinga. His tour was mainly directed 
towards 'showing the flag again in the area and firmly asserting 
Government and Native Authority Control...'. He observed 'a 
considerable drift of farm labour back to the reserves, sponsored 
by Congress...1 and noted that 'in the case of several farms 
on the Chief Mwenda and Sianjalika borders, the exodus has been 
such that these /settler/1 farmers are desperately short of labour 
and profoundly worried...1.
The Congress leaders on the plateau also promoted an Agri-
5
cultural produce boycott, in a bid to ’starve the Copperbelt',
^Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3. Vol. IV, Mazabuka DistrictAnnual report, 1953.
2
The District Commissioner noted at the end of 1955 that Congress 
had had 'very little success1 with its labour boycott programme.
Ibid.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/08AA» 2.N.A. Tour report No. 20 of 1953. 
kIbid.
ec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV. Mazabuka District Annual report, 1953.
the territory’s industrial power house. African farmers v/ere 
told not to sell their cattle and this resulted in a marked 
contraction in the number of animals offered for sale; whereas, 
in 1952s three thousand and five head of cattle v/ere sold to 
individual traders, only 2,065 v/ere offered for sale in 1953.
At sales organised by the Veterinary. Department, 5,621 head of 
cattle v/ere soldkn 1951» hut only 2,823 in 1352 and 1,201 in
p
1953. A District Officer who toured Chief Chongo’s area between 
September and October, 1953, accused the farmers of Keemba Hill, 
who were ‘against the Government’, of organising the cattle boy­
cotts as v/ell as preventing ’the sale of poultry when destined
2
for the Copperbelt’,
Rumour played a very significant part in the non-cooperation 
campaign during this period. When, during the final months of 1953, 
there was an outbreak of trypanosomiasis in the Banakaila area 
of Chongo Chieftaincy, the Veterinary Department experienced a 
lot of difficulty in getting local African farmers to bring their 
cattle forward for inoculation. This was mainly due to the work 
of the Keemba Hill politicians who put it about that Veterinary 
officials were trying to carry out a destocking exercise in dis­
guise and were therefore injecting poison with the vaccines.^ In 
several other areas where cattle diseases were to show up during 
the Federal years, belief in this rumour was to make inoculation
~*'Ibid.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/ii-, Z0N»A0 Tour report Ho. l6 of 1953. Maize w^as 
not,apparently included in the embargo.
■^ Ibid.
work extremely difficult, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
^eemba Hill was also very instrumental in the dissemination of 
the poisoned sugar story"*" which led to a decline in sugar con­
sumption in many households during this period.
If Coigpess was posing problems for the Administration, so 
also was the Plateau Tonga Native Authority(P.T.N„A.). The 
majority of the Chiefs and Councillors in Council- continued to 
refuse the Administration their support in the handling of problems 
connected with African land use and soil rehabilitation. Native 
Authority support was far from forthcoming for the Administration*s 
intended destocking and land-use restriction programmes. The 
District Office report at the end of 1953 commented on this 
situation: 'The members /of the P.T.N.A^/ almost completely re­
fuse to see the need for better and more restricted use of the 
land and motions to reduce cattle numbers to the holding capacity 
of the land or to control the opening up of further land for arable
have to come from Government and are regularly turned down by the
2
members of the Native Authority.1
The Mapangazia soil conservation programme^ also ran into 
bottlenecks created by the N.A. The majority of the Chiefs and 
Councillors refused to give an undertaking to enforce the soil 
conservation rules that were necessary for the carrying out of 
the land reclamation scheme. Although after a visit to the site 
'several of the more intelligent members e:xpressed themselves as
i
Ibid. It was rumoured that the Administration wanted to wipe out 
the African population by selling them poisoned sugar.
2Sec/Nat/663T. N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Mazabuka District Annual report 
for 1953»
-^Mentioned earlier in-this chapter.
satisfied of the need for the scheme and stated that they would 
persuade the Native Authority to make the necessary rules1, it was 
reported that ’they failed ... due to suspicion of Government’s 
motives'. In the end the Government had ’to proceed with the im­
plementation of the scheme on its own'.^
The Chiefs under Federation
Although the majority of the plateau’s Chiefs and Headmen 
continued to eschew any direct confrontation with the Administration 
some, who had struck out in active support of Congress during the 
years before Federation, were to persist in their involvement in 
the movement's activities, during the Federal years. The Admini­
stration continued to court the Chiefs for their support and to 
win them away from Congress, As will be seen in the next chapter, 
certain Chiefs who turned out to be too" Intransigent, were deposed.
In 1955  ^ Chief Sianjalika, a fervent Congress supporter, was pre­
sented with a coronation medal. This was reported as being 'greatly
appreciated' and the District Commissioner believed that 'the award,,.
2
has... strengthened his loyalty'.
Chief Benjamin Chongo continued to be the most articulate 
Congress supporter among the Chiefs. He was very active in organis­
ing the movement in his and neighbouring Chieftaincies and had cam- 
paigned openly for financial support of Congress' land suit,'" During
^Sec/Mat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Mazabuka District Annual report 
for 1953.
2Ibid.
3At the Congress Conference of August 1952, Chief Chongo had told 
his fellow Chiefs and others present: 'We are to dig out all
what we have been burying for years to support our land rights 
case.' See Minutes of Chiefs and Delegates Conference, August 
1952. A.N.C.Files, Macpherson Collection.
the Congress Provincial Conference of May 1953? which was held 
in his village, he had left no one in doubt as to his firm commit­
ment to the movement's objectives. In December 1953? during a 
Pan-African Conference organised by Congress,^ Chief Chongo 
reaffirmed his faith in a non-violent struggle under Congress' 
leadership. Among other things, he said: 'To my own thinking...
1 take the Congress as the only organisation which will push the 
people of this country to freedom..„ We know fully well that our
2
fight for freedom is not by guns, but by an honest word of mouth.'
The Chief's open involvement in the activities of the Congress 
movement was quite an embarrassment to the Administration. In 
October 1953 it was reported that 'one of the largest Congress
meetings ever to be held in the territory was held... at his
3
village', an obvious reference to the Provincial Conference of
May, 1953. The Provincial Commissioner who regarded Chief Chongo
as 'the outstanding Congress adherent among the Chiefs in the
Province', got the District Commissioner to keep a close watch
on his activities. He was even prepared to recommend that the
Chief's Certificate of Honour be withdrawn, should he persist in
his political activities. This, he believed, 'might bring him to 
5his senses'.
^Restrictions placed by the Administration on the entry of invited 
delegates to the Conference, robbed it of several representatives 
from neighbouring African countries.
2
Minutes of Regional Pan-African Council held in the Ex-Askaris 
Memorial Hall on lOth-llth Dec. 1953. A.N.C. Piles, Macpherson Collection.
^Sec/Nat/366 N/083^/^? 2.N.A. Tour report No. 16 of 1953.
ij.
Ibid. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs,
30.12.53.
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During the first four months of the Central African Federation, 
the African population on the Tonga plateau was very much divided 
on the question of continued opposition to the settler and the 
Administration. Moderate Chiefs and farmers, some of the latter 
already reaping the financial rewards of Federation in the loans 
policy of the I.F.S., were prepared to give the settlers' partner- 
ship proposals a try. On the other side was Congress and its sup­
porters, pledged to the destruction of a Federation that was still 
in its infancy. Congress had lost some of its members who saw no
point in continued opposition, but the majority of the population
1
continued to believe in and support its goals. It had suffered 
defeat in its campaign to prevent the formation of a Federation.
Now it was determined to make the Federation unworkable. On the 
Tonga plateau, the articulation of its continued opposition was 
to lead, among other things, to the deposition of prominent Chiefs, 
mass arrest of defiant supporters, even confrontations with the 
mobile police.
"An estimated a&VOOO was collected for Congress within the Mazabuka 
District in 1953. See Mazabuka District Annual report, 1953. Sec/ 
Nat/66F N/0006/3i Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Congress concentrated its fund 
raising efforts in the reserves of the plateau where the wealthy 
African farmers lived. See Chapter VI, p.
Chapter VII
CONGRESS AND THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE UNDER FEDERATION
This chapter will examine African protest on the Tonga 
plateau during the Federal years up to the end of the 1950s, As 
I have already stated in the introduction, the material on which 
this chapter is based suffers from a lack of depth since I was 
unable to consult any records in the National Archives more 
recent than 195**. Needless to say, certain conclusions reached 
at this stage will have to be revised later on as we become more 
knowledgeable, but a tentative discussion of the events of these 
years cannot be postponed for a future date in an account such as 
this. It Is important, for instance, that we should continue to 
examine for the post-1953 period, the nature of the support given 
to the African National Congress by the people of the Tonga 
plateau, support that was to be put to the test in 1958 when 
various tensions which had been operating within the Congress 
leadership surfaced to divide the movement's leaders. From 1958 
onwards the Congress movement though enjoying some support in 
various parts of the territory, including parts of the Copperbelt, 
Eastern and Luapula provinces, came to be increasingly identified 
with the Southern province from which it drew its most consistent 
support. As in the pre-Federation period, the Tonga plateau was 
to continue to be the hub around which this support revolved.
The early years of Federation saw a determined effort by 
liberal whites such as John Moffat, a Member representing African 
interests in the Legislative Council, to foster better race re-
P
lations in Northern Rhodesia. The events of the final months of
1953 had left even the most indifferent observer of Northern 
Rhodesian politics in no doubt as to the refusal of the African 
National Congress1 leadership to accept a Federal arrangement 
which to them was only a step away from Dominion status and 
virtual independence from Colonial Office control. There was 
therefore an urgent need to reassure the African population that 
conditions under Federation need not be as bad as their leaders 
feared. If the Federation were to have any chance of proving it­
self, the African leaders and their supporters had to be convinced 
of the Settlers' willingness to implement racial partnership. The 
Settler had to disprove the popular belief that Federation would 
only mean the consolidation of European political domination and 
the entrenchment of the colour bar. When therefore in July 195**» 
Moffat moved in the Legislative Council what was to become the 
'Moffat Resolutions', he gave formal expression to this desire to 
mollify an already outraged African population.
Moffat, in sentiments that echoed the views of certain liberal 
settlers within the territory, called for the removal from each 
race of the 'fear that the other might dominate for its own racial 
benefit' and urged a change 'from the present system of racial re­
presentation in the territorial legislature towards a franchise 
with no separate representation for the races'. Until such time as 
the desired form of political representation is achieved, he called 
for the introduction of 'special arrangements' in the Executive and 
Legislative Councils to ensure that 'no race can use either the 
preponderance of its numbers or its more advanced stage of develop­
ment to dominate the other for its own racial benefit*. In conclusion, 
Moffat expressed the view that 'every lawful inhabitant of Northern
Rhodesia has the right to progress according to his character,
qualifications, training, ability and industry, without distinction
1
of race, colour or creed'.
The Moffat Resolutions were very well received in the Legis­
lative Council, where the majority of members were, seemingly,7deter­
mined to use the opportunity to register their willingness to work
for better race relations. Only one of them refused to vote in
2
favour of the proposals. Once they had been accepted by the 
Legislative Council, the Administration proceeded to give the Re­
solutions wide publicity. For maximum effect, the text and a pre­
pared summary of Moffat's speech were printed in English and in 
the four official vernacular languages and then distributed through-
3
out the various provinces of the territory. How then were the 
overtures of the white community received by the African leaders 
and their supporters? How willing, for instance, were those Africans 
on the Tonga plateau who had participated actively in the protest 
movement, to accept the hand of compromise which was now being ex­
tended in their direction?
The Moffat Resolutions rang hollow in the ears of most of 
the African leaders. Unaccustomed to taking too seriously the 
seemingly liberal pronouncements of some of the Settler leaders 
over the years, they saw no reason why they should now. Many be­
lieved that the tabling of the Resolutions was purely a ruse aimed 
at undermining the Congress movement which was slowly recovering
^Hansard, 29th July 195^♦ No. 82, Cols. 6l6-617.
2Ibid.
3
Northern Rhodesia Cololial Reports, 195^* p.3.
from the demoralising effect of the declaration of Federation.
Harry Nkumbula, the Congress' leader* believed that although 
there was a handful of well-meaning settlers within the territory, 
who sincerely believed in the sentiments expressed in the Re­
solutions, the majority were offering no more than lip service 
to them* He therefore called for an intensification of the non­
cooperation campaign in both the urban and rural areas to demonstrate 
the fact that the African community was far from reconciled to the 
existence of the Federation. As far as Congress was concerned,
little had changed. The Federation was an imposition and was not
2
therefore to be suffered in silence. Throughout the fifties, Con­
gress was to openly organise Africans in various parts of the territory 
in continued opposition to the Administration and the Settler minority.
In the Mazabuka and the newly created Choma District^ of the 
Tonga plateau, opposition to the soil conservation policies of the 
administration continued during the course of 195^* Although in 
certain chieftaincies, District Officials reported 'unsolicited re­
quests from African farmers for contour ridges.', the Plateau Tonga
■^ It must have been very difficult to judge, for instance, the sin­
cerity of a Member like Rendall, who in April of the same year 
had been arguing strongly in favour of 'discriminations that we 
must have because of physical and moral reasons'. See Hansard,
15th April,195^* No. 8l, Col. 9^.
2Interview with Harry Nkumbula, 20.1.7^.
3
In November 19531 the Choma District was created to reduce Ad­
ministrative pressure within the Mazabuka District. The new District 
was made up of Choma Township and the areas of five Chiefs, pre­
viously within the Mazabuka District. See Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3,
Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Mazabuka Provincial Report, 1953.
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Native Authority (P.T.N.A.) 'as a body ... continued to give no 
support1. Commenting on the attitude of the Chiefs and Councillors 
in his annual report for 195^i the Provincial Commissioner explained 
some of the difficulties his administration was experiencing from 
this quarter. He pointed out that the Native Authority was deter­
mined to repeal its own rule which placed 'the responsibility for 
the cleaning and upkeep of contour ridges, where they pass through
individual gardens on the owner' and had failed 'to see that a con-
2
tour ridge filled with grass and bushes ... is useless'.
The Administration also failed in trying to persuade the 
P.T.N.A. to restrict the use of land on the plateau in a bid to arrest 
the land grabbing problem. The Provincial Commissioner also high­
lighted this difficulty in his 195k report. He explained that when 
the Government asked the Native Authorities 'to make an order to pro­
hibit the opening up of any further land for cultivation in certain 
Chiefs' areas which were already overcropped, they refused and said
3
their sons must always have new land.'
Throughout 195k* the efforts of the Agriculture Department's 
personnel to get African farmers in Chieftaincies with high cattle 
populations, such as Chongo, Sianjalika and Siamaundu, to sell some 
of their herds and thereby reduce the pressure on available grazing, 
were repeatedly jeopardised by Congress propaganda. Congress leaders 
warned fanners against allowing themselves to be cajoled into parting 
with their vital cattle wealth, which was their only insurance against 
destitution. Members of the African Representative Council rejected
■^ Native Affairs Report, 195^» p.90.
2Ibid., p.91.
^Ibid.
a motion which had been placed on the Council '£ agenda by the Ad­
ministration* in which officials sought their approval for the 
introduction of regulations 'to control the grazing of cattle in
native reserves and native trust lands by those who had rights in
1these areas'. W.F. Stubbs, the Secretary for Native Affairs^re­
ported that the African representatives refused to accept the
motion 'largely because it was the firm opinion ... that all
2
native trust land should be converted into native reserves', a
view that had been formally expressed before, only to be rejected
3
by the Administration.
Although in certain parts of the plateau, the momentum of 
African opposition to the Federation was maintained during the 
course of 195^ » overall protest activity in the area was, for the 
most part, half-hearted. Local congress organisers continued to 
call for an intensification of the non-cooperation struggle for 
they realised that many were beginning to acquiesce in the Federation 
The ranks of the moderates continued to swell with fresh additions 
of those who had come to accept that the Federation was there to
if
stay. The widely publicised arrest in March 195*f and subsequent 
imprisonment for three years of two Congress officials who had 
addressed a meeting in Mazabuka and had called for an escalation 
of protest activity, did much to lower morale. As already pointed
^Ibid.t p.5.
2Ibid.
3
In August 19531 Sokota had raised the question in the African Re­
presentative Council only to be told by Bush, the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, that the Government was not prepared to recommend 
such a change. See African Representative Council debates, l*fth 
August, 1953*’
if
Interviews with former Congress organisers on the plateau.
3
"see W.K.Sikalumbi, "On Zambia's Independence Struggle", ed. H.W. 
Langworthy, p.79* Manuscript Collection for African Studies, 
University of "Zambia.
out, the number of Farmers registered with the Improved Farming 
Scheme (I.F.S.) rose sharply during the early years of Federation, 
and there was a concomitant upsurge in the activities of local 
African Farmers Associations, One informant who for many years was 
a member of the I.F,S, told the author that Improved Farmers in 
general were quick to spot the advantages of Federation, Unlike 
previous years when periodic shortages were not unknown, they now 
had no difficulty in getting spare parts for their farm machinery 
at reasonable prices. In addition, the loans that were being granted 
by the I.F.S, meant that ambitious Improved Farmers could now expand 
their operations and, thereby, increase their profits from maize
production. Many of them therefore turned a blind eye to the politics
2
of Congress which they considered sheer humbug.
Towards the end of 1955* Kenneth Kaunda, the Secretary-General 
of the A.N.C., who with Harry Nkumbula, the movements president,
had just completed a term of imprisonment for possession of banned
3
literature, decided to make another attempt to strengthen Congress' 
position within the territory. Like the other Congress leaders,
Kaunda was rather disappointed by the movement's performance. It 
had been very difficult to sustain enthusiasm for the programme of 
non-cooperation in the various provinces, for with several provincial
^See Chapter VI, p.SH, fa.ti.
2Interview with Miles Musumbwe, 20.11.73. Musumbwe even lamented 
the recent closure of the border with Khodesia which has caused 
periodic shortages of various consumer goods including farm machinery 
and spare parts. One could detect throughout this interview, a 
longing for a return to the economic conditions operating during 
the Federal years.
The publication in question was Africa and the Colonial World, copies 
of which had been sent by Fenner Brockway, a British Member of Parlia­
ment, to the Congress leaders. Kaunda and Nkurabula were sentenced to 
two months imprisonment with hard labour for this offence.
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organisers serving prison terms for their involvement in boycotts
and other acts of protest, branch registration and organisation
had declined considerably. Although financial contributions to­
l
wards Congress' expenses continued to flow in from certain areas,
the overall response left much to be desired. To revitalize the
African protest movement, Kaunda and other Congress leaders now
2sketched out a five year growth plan for the A.N.C.
To attract more members into the movement, Kaunda, in a 
circular distributed throughout the territory some time in 1955* 
highlighted Congress' goals. Among other things, he reaffirmed 
the movement's determination to secure the franchise for all Africans 
and to continue the struggle 'against colour discrimination in public 
places...'. Congress would continue to press the Administration to 
allow Africans to occupy 'higher posts ... in the Protectorates 
and Federal Civil Services and in military and police forces accord­
ing to merit...' and was determined to put an end to 'all intimidation 
and ill treatment of Chiefs and their Native Authority servants by 
the Government'. Kaunda called on Africans throughout the territory 
to 'fight against the final stage of this dreadful monster, Federation, 
which is intended to be a Central African Dominion...' and he em­
phasised the Congress' view that Northern Rhodesia should remain a 
protectorate 'under the direct control of the Colonial Office until
■l
In July, 1955i lor instance, the people of Chongo and Mwenda Chief- 
tancies on the plateau, contributed £H2.^s.6d. and £101.5s.3d. 
respectively, towards Congress' land suit which was being handled 
by London solicitors. See Congress News Circular, Vol. VI, No. 1$ ‘ 
25th July, 1955» Macpherson Collection. In the end Congress had 
to abandon the land case on the advice of its solicitors,
2K. Kaunda, Zambia shall be free (London, 1962), p.60.
we are ready to participate fully in the running of our protectorate's
affairs,1. In conclusion, he urged Africans who were not members of
Congress to join the '103 Chiefs, $00 Native Authorities' servants,
3000 village Headmen and 37*000 men, women and children* who were
1
already registered members.
The appeal from the Congress Secretariat led to a resurgence
of political protest in several parts of the territoxy. In the
Northern Province, for instance, by the end of 1955* there were
six action groups of Gongress operating in the various Chiefs1 areas.
These itinerant politicians incited the people against touring white
officials as well as local Chiefs who had refused to identify with
2Congress' objectives.
In the Southern Province, there were also signs of renewed 
protest. Congress officials on the Tonga plateau made much of the 
Federal Government's decision of February 1955 to evacuate some 29,000 
Africans who lived on the northern bank of the Zambesiin the neigh­
bouring Gwembe District, and resettle them elsewhere to make way
3for the Kariba Hydro-electric scheme. An estimated 925 square 
miles of the District were to be flooded in the construction of a 
dam. The valley Tonga people who were affected by the decision 
opposed the idea of the move, for some of them were being asked to 
move long distances to new sites. The situation was ripe for ex­
ploitation by local politicians. The Gwembe Tonga Native Authority 
had, however, imposed a ban on Congress activities in the area
^Quoted in Ibid., pp. 65-66.
p
D.C.Mulford, Zambia, The Politics of Independence (O.U.P., 1967)*
P*59.
3
Interviews on the plateau.
since 1953- In the circumstances, the ban did not deter some of 
the local Congress organisers who were in touch with Job Michello 
and other Congress leaders on the pleateau, from stoking the fires 
of protest in the affected parts of the Gwembe District. In various 
meetings on the plateau, Congress leaders joined cause with the 
valley Tonga people. They accused the Administration of seizing 
yet more African land and of imposing further hardship on the African 
population. They argued that an Administration which could deprive 
so many people in the Gwembe District of their ancestral lands would 
have no compunction in taking over some more land on the plateau, 
at some future date, especially that of Improved Farmers who had 
been deceived over the years into accepting piecemeal payments (i.e. 
bonuses) for their lands.^
Throughout the latter half of 1955* Congress Officials on the 
plateau made frequent appearances at meetings of the Plateau Tonga 
Native Authority (P.T.N.A.). The most prominent of these officials 
was Job Michello, who was now back at Munenga in Chief Mwanachingwala's 
area after a tour of duty in the Lusaka offices of Congress. When­
ever the P.T.N.A. was in session, Michello and some of his colleagues, 
notably Simon Maambo, Ellison Milambo and Job Mayanda would attend 
and try to influence the Chiefs and Councillors. At every possible 
opportunity, they would make their unsolicited views known to the 
annoyance of white officials present. When, for instance, in Nov­
ember 1955, the Native Authority discussed the Administration's 
proposals for the introduction of grazing fees of 6d per head of 
cattle owned by Africans on the plateau, these 'Congressmen' campaigned
1Interviews in various Chieftaincies.
against the idea both in and out of the Native Authority's meetings. 
Job Michello had had direct experience of the operation of grazing 
rules in Southern Rhodesia while he was teaching at the Solusi 
mission. He had seen the way in which Ndebele farmers who de­
faulted in the payment of their grazing dues were treated by the 
Rhodesian officials. In the majority of cases, some of the cattle 
of defaulters were seized by the mounted police until dues v/ere paid 
and farmers who could not raise the required sums parted with some 
animals for good.1 Local Congress leaders were therefore deter­
mined to prevent similar harassment from occuring on the Tonga 
plateau. They added their protests to that of the majority of
Chiefs and Councillors who were also against the idea and, in the
2end, the Administration had to withdraw its proposal.
After the grazing fee controversy, local District officials 
tried to discourage Congress leaders from attending P.T.N.A. meetings 
The Chiefs and Councillors were asked to pass a resolution which 
would deny Congress officials access to Authority meetings. Although 
some of their number supported this line of action, the majority 
of African representatives within the P.T.N.A. opposed it. The 
District Administration therefore decided to introduce the 'red 
ribbon' system. A red ribbon was installed around the seats of the 
Chiefs and Councillors and all Africans who were outside this de­
marcated zone were forbidden from participating in the Authority's 
deliberations. The Congress intruders now deprived of the right
Interview with Job Michello, 19.6*7^.
^Interview with Ellison Milambo (10.2,7^) and Job Michello,
19.6.7**.
■^Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.7^*
to air their views resorted to heckling whenever they disapproved 
of something* and this brought them some stern rebukes from District 
officials.1 Within the Native Authority itself* there were a number 
of ardent Congress supporters to whom now fell the task of making 
the movement's presence felt in the Authority's activities. The 
uncompromising attitude of some of these Chiefs and Councillors was 
a major bottleneck for District officials,, who needed their support 
for the successful execution of Administration policy in the area.
In his annual report for 1955* the Provincial Commissioner observed
2
that 'the Plateau Tonga Native Authority did not have a good year'.
He drew attention to meetings which were 'marred by obstruction and
political harangues from a few Councillors who bitterly opposed
3
any suggestions emanating from Government'.
The small group of educated young Africans on the plateau who 
were a @ery influential part of the Congress’ vanguard, also came in 
for special mention in the report on political activities during 
1955. Unlike the much older Congress leaders like Milambo* Michello 
and Mahkapwi, who had had very little post primary education, many 
of the younger men who were now talcing an interest in Congress had 
undergone some secondary training. Some of them had studied at the 
Canisius College, a junior Secondary School established by the Catholic
ij.
Church at their Chikuni mission in 19^9 and others at another junior 
Secondary School run by the Universities Mission to Central Africa
1Ibid.
2Native Affairs Report, 1955i p.78.
3lbid.
ij.
Northern Rhodesia Colonial Reports, 19^9» p.3$.
1
in Mapanza, from 1950 onwards. Some of the local students had 
even ventured further afield to study at the Munali Training Centre, 
a Government school in Lusaka which for a long time was the only 
Institution providing full secondary education for Africans, Al­
though while in training students were discouraged by some of the
Authorities, such as those at Canisius College, from taking part in
2
political discussion, many could not resist the temptation to join 
in once their studies were completed. They .infused, a radical spirit 
into Congress' activities and created a lot of problems for the 
District Administration,
Commenting on the relative calm that had prevailed within the 
Southern province during the course of 1955i the Provincial Commissioner 
noted that 'only in Mazabuka and to a lesser extent Choma Districts 
was there political activity which took the form of opposition to 
measures and proposals necessary for the general improvement of the 
Native Authority area'. He went on to explain that 'while the great 
mass of people throughout the province are little interested in ex­
ternal politics, the more educated young men are now suffering from
the growing pains of the socially teen-aged which are generally pain-
3
ful both to those who suffer them and to those with whom they live,' 
During the latter half of the year, these educated young men 
had been very conspicuous in Congress' efforts to expand the network 
of A.N.C, branches on the plateau and the rest of the Southern province. 
Attempts were made to open up branches in hitherto neglected areas
^Northern Rhodesia Colon ial Reports, 1950* p.**0.
p
Father Max Prokoph,who was Principal at Canisius College between 19**0 
and 1951* told the author that the students were not even allowed to 
read newspapers like Mutende and the Bantu Mirror, because these papers 
focussed too much attention on political matters. Interview with Max 
Prokoph, 1.8.7**.
^Native Affairs Report, 1955» P*78.
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like Ufwenuka and Chona which had not evinced much interest in the 
movement's activities. The persistence of local organisers was 
to give the Southern province the highest number of registered 
A.N.C. branches within the territory by early 1956. In November 
1955i there were only thirty registered Congress branches in the 
entire Southern province as compared to 55 in the Eastern province,
2k in the Central province, 20 in the Western province and 7 in
the Northern province. However, by March 1956, the Southern province
2
was to take the lead with thirty-eight registered branches.
The Congress movement had to intensify its operations within 
the African population if it was to thwart the Government's deter­
mination to undermine its position. For to counter Congress' propa­
ganda, especially the widely popularised description of the Admini­
stration as a callous Authority which had no real concern for the 
welfare of the African community, the Government tried to meet some 
of the long standing demands of the African people, during the early 
years of Federation. The granting of loans to Improved Farmers was 
one aspect of this strategy. So too was the decision taken sometime* 
in 1955 to provide loan facilities for African traders within the 
territory. As we have noted, African leaders on the plateau had 
repeatedly criticized the conditions under which retail trading in
3
the reserves was undertaken, and the virtual non-existence of credit 
facilities for African enterprise had even been highlighted during
^Congress Circular, Vol. I, No. IX, 15th November, 1955* Macphersson 
Collection.
2Congress Circular, Vol. II, No. 3» 31st March, 1956. Macpherson 
Collection. The figures for the other provinces were as follows: 
Eastern - 35; Central - 30; Western - 2*f; Northern - 11; and 
Nortn-Western - 2.
■^ See Chapter V, p^ >,
a general debate in the Legislative Council by Captain Campbell,
the representative of the Southern Electoral Area which covered 
1the Tonga plateau. On the 7th June, 1955* a motion 'that Native
Authorities, should be authorised to grant loans to deserving
traders and businessmen when funds permit', was passed in the
2
African Representative Council with only one abstention. As 
Congress continued to whip up support by emphasising the Admini­
stration's indifference to the needs of African-Entrepreneurs, the 
Government decided it was time to act. An amendment to the Native 
Authority Ordinance was passed in the Legislative Council empower­
ing some of 'the more wealthy ^ative/ Treasuries to allocate 
some of their funds towards helping private enterprise to develop 
in their areas,,,,'. The Administration also contributed directly 
to the Traders’ loans fund by making available the sum of £15*000
if
to assist needy businessmen.
The granting of piece-meal concessions by an Administration 
bent on sabotaging Congress' platform only served to inspire the 
A.N.C. leadership into demanding more anti-Government activity in 
both the rural and urban areas. On the Tonga plateau, Congress 
organised more meetings in the reserves, during the course of 1956,
5
than it had ever done before and in spite of the fact that some
Chapter V, p.Tl'7 / fn ./.
2
Debates of the African Representative Council, 7th June, 1955?
No. 13, Col. 124.
^The Secretary for Native Affairs' foreward to the Native Affairs 
Report of 1955, p.III.
if
Ibid.
5
Interview with Michello and other Congress organisers.
of the local leaders were still in prison, township boycotts of
certain shops and eating houses were resumed. In April 1956,
officials organised shop boycotts in Mazabuka and Monze townships
and a number of Indian traders, who were known to ill-treat African
1customers, were affected. The boycotts were not, however, well 
organised and so they lasted for just a few days before they were 
called off.^
In the rural areas of the Tonga plateau, one of the Admini­
stration's proposals that was vehemently opposed by the local Con­
gress movement during the course of 1956 was the planned land usage 
survey. The survey was expected to cover some 53*000 acres of 
land in the area around Monze and its main object, according to 
the Agriculture Department, was 'to collect field data as a basis
for regional land use planning in an endeavour to obtain a better
3
balance between arable and grassland'. A similar survey had been
4
carried out in 19^5 by a team of Agriculturists and a Sociologist. 
That survey team had operated in an atmosphere of strong suspicion 
of its real intentions and areas like Keemba Hill had been openly 
hostile to its investigations. The fears of the African farmers 
that they were going to be deprived of some more land after the 
completion of the survey had, however, proved groundless for no such 
land alienations occured. When, however, the Administration mooted 
the idea of yet another land usage survey in 1956, Congress officials
1Harry Franklin, a Member for African Interests, pointed this out 
in the Legislative Council. See Hansard, 2*fth July, 1956, No. 88, 
Col. 7^8.
2
Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.8l.
3Agriculture Department Annual Report, 1957* p.13. 
k
See Chapter IV, p£*
told the people that in contrast to 1945» the Administration was 
now searching for more land for prospective immigrants from South­
ern Rhodesia and South Africa. The survey, they argued, would 
certainly be followed by the appropriation of a sizeable amount 
of land to accommodate the incoming whites.'*' Congress' version 
of the intentions behind the survey fired the imagination of African 
farmers, who, in a .situation of increasing land shortage, were deter­
mined to keep the lands in the reserves in African possession. With 
Congress, they denounced the proposed land usage survey and packed 
the A.N.C. meetings summoned on the plateau to discuss the Admini­
stration's intentions. In one such meeting organised by 'the
2younger elements among the plateau Tonga', some time in 1956, the 
land usage survey was said to have been discussed in a very noisy 
atmosphere. Officials also reported similar 'disorderly mass meet- 
ings', organised by Congress in the other Chieftaincies.
In his annual report for 1956, Gervas Clay, the Southern Pro­
vincial Commissioner, observed that while the year was 'quieter ... 
than usual ... African extremists' activities still interfered with 
development whenever possible...', although most Africans in the 
province have not allowed themselves to be 'led astray by political 
claptrap'. He noted that political extremists had been particularly 
active in the Mazabuka District. Here, he continued, 'political
1
Interviews.
^Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.84.
^Ibid.
li,
Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.73.
reactionaries ... tried to impede constructive measures for the
good government and welfare of the people in furtherance of their
t
partisan interests', Things were to toe no better during the succeed­
ing year.
During the course of 1957i Congress leaders and their supporters 
in several Chieftaincies on the plateau maintained the current of 
protest. Within the Mazabuka District, the land usage survey con­
tinued to run into difficulties,especially in areas where Congress 
was well organised. In certain Chieftaincies where Congress had no 
real footing, the survey progressed unhampered and agricultural 
and demographic data were obtained from an area of approximately 
4,000 acres. However, in the remaining 49,000 acres that were also 
to be investigated, the survey team ran into a great deal of opposition 
This forced the administration to put an end to the survey. In his 
1957 annual report, the Provincial Commissioner explained that 'the 
proposed land usage survey for the Mazabuka District, first sug­
gested by the African Provincial Council was abandoned after strong 
and determined opposition had been organised against it and the survey 
which depended on the cooperation of the people, had no legal backing
3
to push it through'.
The A.N.C. and the Improved Husbandry Scheme. .
Congress also campaigned against the Cattle Improvement Scheme 
(C.I.S.) which was introduced in various Districts within the terri­
tory some time in 1956. This was to be the corollary of the Improved
1Ibid.
2
Agricultural Department Annual Report, 1957* p.15*
■^ Native Affairs Report, 1957* P*?8.
Farming Scheme. The need for a scheme of this nature had been
stressed by Johnson in his report on a survey carried out between
1953 and 1955 on Improved Farming activity on the Tonga plateau.
Johnson had written, inter alia:
’The major effort has been concentrated on the arable 
lands and no place has yet been found in the improved 
Farming7' scheme for the improvement of animal husbandry 
or for the arrest of the deterioration of pastures 
caught in a pincermovement between extension of culti­
vation and multiplication of stock.
The new scheme was basically a destocking measure, a projection 
of the cattle culling order which the Administration had put into 
effect in certain parts of the territory during the early months 
of 1956. In the Mazabuka District, for instance, Veterinary De­
partment Officials branded some ninety-two head of cattle under 
the order between March and June, 1956. Of these, one was dis­
posed of at a Government sale, two were purchased by local buyers
and orders were given by the Officials for the rest to be slaughtered
kThis the farmers concerned had done very reluctantly.
The C.I.S. was thus introduced at a time when a number of 
farmers in the Mazabuka District were still smarting from losses 
they had suffered as a result of the compulsory culling order. To 
register with the C.I.S., a farmer had to own a bull that was ap­
proved by the Veterinary Department’s Officials, and he was also
■^C.E.Johnson, 'African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga 
Miize Areas...', Agricultural Bulletin, No^ 11, p.^5.
^Hansard, 11th July, 1956, No. 88, Cols. 267-268.
3Ibid.
^Interviews
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required to have 'an adequate kraal and a calf house...'. Once 
a member, he was under an obligation to have his herd innoculated 
annually against anthrax and quarter-evil and even more importantly, 
he was to dispose of W o  of his stock every year. A member of 
the scheme who satisfied all the stipulated conditions was to re­
ceive a cash bonus for his efforts.^-
A scheme of this nature was bound to excite doubts and create 
misapprehension in the African farming community on the Tonga
plateau. Cattle had always been of special significance in the
2social system ooperating in the area. Although it was now fairly 
common practice for farmers to sell an animal or two when they felt
•5
the need, few could afford to part with animals on a regular basis.
Most farmers kept small herds of less than fifteen animals and their 
ability to sell any of these was limited by the demands of kinsmen 
for assistance with marriage and other social payments. A scheme 
that insisted on compulsory sales could hardly be expected to appeal 
to a farmer who kept a small herd. When, therefore, the Veterinary De­
partment's staff explained to cattle owners that membership of the new 
scheme would impose on the individual anobligation to sell a few animals 
every year, the vast majority of African farmers in the area, among 
them several Improved Farmers, refused to register with the C.I.S. Local 
Congress leaders were to exploit this reluctance to part with cattle in 
their canpaign against the scheme. In meeting after meeting, they amplified 
the threats that were now being posed by the white Administration to the 
very foundations of African property.
^Native Affairs Report, 195&, p.79*
^See E.Colson, The plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia - Social and 
Religious Studies (Manchester, 1962), pp. 122-171.
3
See Chapter III, ppfO I ~i0\.
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Another factor which contributed to the lackof enthusiasm for 
the C.I.S. was the fear that was being expressed at this time that 
the Improved Farming Scheme was soon to be terminated. Local Congress 
organisers did a lot to feed the fires of speculation on this subject.
It was put about that the C.I.S. which would be a lighter burden on 
Administration funds was designed to eventually take the place of the 
much more expensive Improved Farming Scheme, whose membership and level 
of bonus payments had risen sharply with Federation beyond all official 
expectations (see Tables I and II). The number of Improved Farmers con­
tinued to rise in spite of the fact that the rules of the scheme were
now more rigidly enforced with the result that Improved Farmers were
1
having to reduce the size of their improved gardens. ' This is seen
quite clearly in the sharp fall in cultivated acreage of improved gardens
in the 1957/58 and 1958/59 seasons, although weather conditions were
3
also partly to blame. Congress urged Africans who had registered with the
Table I. Number of Improved Farmers in the whole of the
Southern province and acreages cultivated between 
1955 &nd 1959 in their improved gardens.
Planting
season
Number of farmers Total Acreage cultivated 
in improved gardens
1953/54 60*f -
195^/55 775 -
1955/56 1,077 18,769
1956/57 1,155 19*128
1957/58 1,^58 2,300
1958/59 2,208 3*^00
Compiled from various Agriculture Department Annual Reports
_____ and Native Affairs Report for 1959.__________________________
^"Native Affairs Report, 1957* P*79« See also Chapter IV#
2See Table I.
"Z
Weather conditions were particularly bad during the 1957/58 season, 
although things improved in the following year. See Native Affairs 
Report, 1958, p.69.
Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.J) to deregister before the whites 
abandoned them.^ Although African representatives in the Legis­
lative Council were being urged to lend their voices in support 
of the I.F.S. , Nkumbula, the Congress leader continued his attacks 
on the scheme. At the seventh Annual Conference of Congress 
held in Lusaka in October 1956* he criticized the structure of 
the I.F.S, and accused the Authorities of confining the use of 
the African Farplng Improvement Fund to a small section of the 
African population, which alone enjoyed direct financial assistance 
from it. He told the gathering:
'There's a fund known as the African agricultural 
Improvement fund ..... This fund v/as built and is 
still being built 'from money accruing from sales of 
African produce, mainly maize. When this fund reached 
the target of some £^00,000 the ... Government started 
employing European agricultural experts, built up 
agricultural stations, employed an army of ill-trained 
African Agricultural Assistants, bought tractors, jeeps, 
cars etc. But no African farmer has benefited from this 
fund except a few they are giving bonuses. The fund has ^ 
not been used for subsidising the African peasant farmers.1
Congress' continued denunciation of the I.F.S. and the wide­
spread feeling that its leaders could be right in their speculations 
as to the scheme's possible termination, raised doubts in the minds 
of many farmers who would otherwise have registered with the C.I.S. 
When in November, 1957* Watmore, the Member for Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, hinted in the Legislative Council on the Ad­
ministration’s plans to phase out the Improved Farming bonus system 
in the future, he confirmed the fears of many and, in a way, sealed 
the fate of the Cattle Improvement Scheme in the Mazabuka and Choma
1Interviews on the plateau.
2FCB 103/l/itera 15. President's speech at the Seventh Annual 
Congress Conference of October, 1956.
Table II. Bonuses (per acre) paid out to Improved 
Farmers in the Southern province between 
195*f and 1959.
Flanting
Season
Grade I
Farmers
<£rade II 
Farmers
Total amount paid out
195V55 27/- 17/- £15*915
1955/56 27/6 l8/~ 22,158
1956/57 27/6 18/ - 2^,361
1957/58 27/6 17/- -
1958/59 - - 40,500
Compiled from Agriculture Department Annual reports.
Districts. In moving the African Farming Improvement Fund bill*
Watmore drew his colleagues’ attention to the rapid rise in 
the number of Improved Farmers and pointed out that as at November
1
1957* there were about 1,100 such farmers in the Southern province.
He went on to explain that 'as these increase in number, so will
the levy and the Improved Farming bonus fall away because the
necessity for the levy will diminish as the number of men who are
2
Improved Farmers are established /sic/1. In other words, a stage 
will be reached when there will be so many Improved Fanners in the 
Southern province who were cultivating their holdings in the manner 
the Agriculture Department has been advocating since 1936, that 
there will be no further need for the I.F.S. This, apparently, had 
been administrative thinking all along. But was it shared by the
^Hansard, ?th November, 1957* No. 93* Col. 131.
2Ibid.
Improved Farmers?
Congress seized on Watmore-'* n words .and at
meeting after meeting in the Chieftaincies ofthe plateau* they
were amplified* embellished, even distorted to serve the ends of
1the non-cooperation programme. Local Congress officials de­
scribed the Administration as consisting of officials who had no 
genuine interest in African welfare and who could not be relied 
upon to honour their commitments to the African population. 
Commenting on Congress1 activities on the plateau during this 
period, one Improved Farmer told the author;
•Those who were in the Improved Farming Scheme were 
told to get out now, before they lost their land to 
the Boers who were coming when the bonuses ended.
Many Improved Farmers were worried, some wanted to 
leave the scheme, but many did not listen. We were sure 
j Congress was cheating us and we refused^to believe 
them.’2
Another, a Congress Official, said:
•We worked hard from village to village, finding 
the Improved Farmers and telling them the bad news.
Many people believed us. They did not want the whites 
to take their land. They agreed to stop taking bonuses.' ^
In the prevailing atmosphere, the Cattle Improvement Scheme 
did not stand a chance. In spite of the persistence of the Vetin- 
erary Department’s Staff, it failed to make much of an impression 
either in the Mazabuka or the Choma District. In his annual re­
port on the Southern province for 19571 Gervas Clay, the Provincial 
Commissioner, observed that ’the Cattle Improvement Scheme in 
Mazabuka made no progress and only limited success is reported
1Interviews.
2
Interview with William Kazoka, 26.*f.?4.
3
Interview with Paul Cifula Maambo, 30.^.7^ .
1from Choma where nine applicants have been accepted.*.' In fact,
not surprisingly, the scheme came to enjoy more success in areas
like Kalomo District, where the Toka-Leya Native Authority had
imposed a ban on Congress activity. In areas where Congress was
still allowed to operate, it made no headway. In his annual report
of 1958, the Provincial Commissioner had this to say about the
response to the C.I.S.:
'The... scheme appears to have made considerable 
progress in the Kalomo District and eighty-eight 
more cattle owners applied to register during the 
year. In Mazabuka and Namwala this scheme has not 
however been so successful.,2
The beginnings of the anti-CJLnoculation campaign
At the same time that Congress was opposing the Cattle 
Improvement Scheme, its organisers on the Tonga plateau were also 
involved in a campaign directed at sabotaging the efforts of the 
Veterinary Department's personnel who had the responsibility for 
inoculating African cattle against disease. African farmers were 
warned by A.N.C. organisers against putting their animals at the 
disposal of unscrupulous officials who had been instructed to 
si©$i.l£s© the cows and kill the bulls. Congress was here exploit­
ing the deep seated distrust of the Administration which existed 
in the area, a feeling that dated back to the first two decades 
of the century when a number of farmers were evicted and re­
evicted from their lands, in spite of official promises that their
A
tenure would be permanent. Talking about the anti-inoculation
^Native Affairs Report, 1957 > p.80.
^Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.71.
3
Interviews.
L
See Chapter IX, pp- *
campaign that was now being waged, an Informant in the Pemba area
told the author that,
’The people were told that the white men wanted to 
kill all their cattle so that Africans will only 
need land for growing maize. White men from Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa will then take over fertile
portions of the former grazing lands and even some
lands in the reserves.' 1
Although several African farmers were skeptical of Congress’
prognostications, some believed them and so supported the movement's
call for a boycott of the inoculating teams. In several parts of
the plateau, during 1957» African farmers under Congress' influence
defied instructions from Veterinary Staff and refused to present
their herds for inoculation. In November 1957i Mr. Watmore, the
member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, told the Legislative
Council of two Chiefs in the Mazabuka District and one in the Choma
2District who were ’entirely uncooperative’ on the subject.
Some time in 1957j African opposition to cattle inoculations 
in the Makuyu area of Monze Chieftaincy resulted in an assault on
a local District Official. The Official in question who was popularly
3
known as ’Siabukombe’ had, apparently, been sent to the area with 
a few messengers to induce protesting farmers to observe veterinary 
rules. He failed to get the farmers to produce their cattle for 
inoculation and in his frustration, he is said to have used strong 
words in showing his contempt for their behaviour. This led to some 
heated exchanges and in the end the farmers grabbed hold of his land 
rover and would not let go. Some Headmen had to intervene and this
^"Interview with William Kazoka, 26.*f.7^ .
^Hansard, 7th November, 1957, No. 93» Col. 175.
3
This Official's name could have been Grantham or Griffiths. 
Africans called him Siabukombe because he was rather thick set.
secured the release of the vehicle, which then proceeded to
Mazabuka. Here, apparently, ’Siabukombe1 informed the District
Commissioner, H.T.Bayldon, of what had transpired. Bayldon who
2
was nicknamed 1Ghamulangula1 by the African community because of 
his fiery temper, then ordered a detachment of the mobile police 
into the area to arrest the ring leaders. After this display of
authority, farmers in the area gave up their struggle with the
3
Veterinary Department and for a while, normalcy was restored.
An attempt to ban the A.N.C. on the Tonga plateau
As African opposition to the federation increased under 
Congress supervision, many Settlers as well as moderate Africans 
began to call for the banning of thejnovement. This was nothing 
new. Similar appeals had, for instance, resulted in 1953 in the 
imposition of a ban on Congress activity within the Kalomo and 
Gwembe Districts of the Southern province. Many Africans had come 
to accept the finality of the Federation and were intent on making 
the most of what was being offered. This group saw no point in 
continued opposition to the Federation and was very much in favour 
of a clamp-down on the protest movement.
In July 195A, John Gaunt, the member for Midland^had argued 
in the Legislative Council for an investigationjof Congress’ activities. 
There had been several reports of incidents in which Congress agents 
molested certain members of the public who were not identifying with
^Interviews with Miles Musumbwe (20.11.73)5 N.M.Muyovwe (6.6.7^) 
and in the Makuyu area.
2
Informants explained that he was given this name, by which a 
local alcoholic beverage was also known, because of his irascibility. 
The author was also told that on more than one occasion, Bayldon 
came close to trading blows with the staunch A.N.C. supporter, Chief 
Chongo.
3
Interviews.
its aspirations and Gaunt felt that it was time that the Admini­
stration addressed itself to the prcblem. He called for the 
appointment of a select committee 'to inquire into the Constitution, 
finances and activities of ... Congress' and to 'report... to the
House its findings together with any recommendations it may deem
1
desirable to make as a result of its investigations'. Gaunt, who,
it appears, was regarded by his colleagues as somewhat of an ex- 
2
tremist, later withdrew his motion after the Chief Secretary had 
assured him of the Administration's determination to protect peace­
ful citizens against Congress supporters.
By July 1956, the threat posed by Congress anti-Government 
activities appeared so great that a similar motion was tabled in 
the Legislative Council by Mr. Rendall, the member for Ndola. He 
called for support for the view that
'Council considers the activities of the A.N.C. to be 
of a character to warrant Government taking such steps 
as are necessary to enable it to give this House full 
information on the Constitution, aims and motives of 
the A.N.C. and to give assurances that its activities 
will not be permitted to subvert the peace and good 
order of the Territory and all its peoples.'3
During the ensuing debate, the African members of the Legis­
lative Council boldly admitted their membership of Congress and 
they condemned the motion as unnecessary. It was, however, quite 
obvious from the tenor of the speeches made by their white counter­
parts, that Congress' nuisance-value was well appreciated.
At provincial level, Administration Officials were equally
^Hansard, 29th July, 195 1^ No. 82, Co. 679.
2
He was the leader of the Dominion party* Mulford, op.cit., examines 
the framework of party politics in Northern Rhodesia during the 
Federal years.
^Hansard, l8th July, 1958, No. 88, Col. 5°2.
concerned about the disruptive effects of the A.N.C.'s propa­
ganda. As the movement’s activities continued unchecked, so it 
became more difficult to obtain compliance with Administration 
rules and orders. Many District Officials thought the answer was 
to ban the movement. In the Mazabuka District, H.T.Bayldon 
(’Chamulangula1), the District Commissioner at the time, who had 
been in several confrontations with local Congress Officials,'*" 
attempted to secure the banning of Congress by working through 
African moderates in the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.).
A motion calling for restrictions to be placed on Congress’ 
activities within the Mazabuka District was tabled by William Kazoka, 
the Chairman of the Native Authority, at a meeting held on the 26th 
April, 1957. Kazoka, who had never shown much enthusiasm for 
Congress’ activities, was a long standing Improved Parmer. During* 
the forties he had served the PT.N.A. as its first Departmental 
Councillor for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Development and,
by 1953, he was the representative of the Choma area in the African
2
Representative Council. In his motion, Kazoka recommended that
'in view of recent disorders and prevailing lawlessness, an order
be passed curtailing the activities of members of the African National 
3
Congress'. The motion was strongly criticised by some of the 
Chiefs wno accused Kazoka of doing the white man's bidding. According 
to a report on the meeting, four Chiefs supported the motion, while
^Interviews with Ellison Milambo (10.2.7^), Job Michello (19.6.7^-) 
and others.
2
During the Federal years, Kazoka was to successfully contest the 
1959 elections as a candidate of the United Federal Party.
"^Minutes of the J>vd meeting of the Mazabuka Area Council held on 
the 26th April, 1957. Privately held.
a 4 3
six others joined by four Councillors opposed it. After much
recriminationi the motion was amended to read:
’(a) An order be made that no meeting may be held in 
any Chief’s area before the Chief has given 
permission for such a meeting,
(b) Any person holding a meeting without the Chief's 
consent is committing an offence.,2
In its amended foim, the motion was subsequently carried.
But even more significant than the final vote which saved Congress
from an outright ban was the atmosphere surrounding the Native
Authority's discussion of the Kazoka motion. Apparently* the
discussion of the motion lasted for two or three days. During
the debate* Peter Habumbu* who was the Deputy provincial President
of Congress and also the P.T.N.A.'s Councillor for public works,
3was suspended from the Native Authority. It appears
that Habumbu had strongly opposed the discussion of any motion
which sought to restrict Congress' operations within the District.
He was therefore being deliberately obstructive. Word of Habumbu*s
suspension and the possible banning of Congress went around the
various reserves and on the eve of the final day's discussion
of Kazoka*s motion* a very large group of Congress supporters
gathered in Monze with the intention of proceeding to the P.I.N.A.'s
A
chambers the next day to hear the final verdict. As they waited,
^The Congress Circular, Vol. Ill, No. 5i May 1957. Macpherson 
Collection.
2Minutes of 3rd meeting of Mazabuka Area Council, op.cit.
■^ Ihe Congress Circular, Vol. Ill, No. 5* May, 1957* Macpherson 
Collection.
A
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the A.W.C. supporters chanted Congress songs and shouted various
Congress slogans. Some of them called for a show-down in the
event of the Native Authority imposing a ban.’*' Cifula Maambo, a
local Congress Official who was directly involved with the crowd,
gave the author an insight into its mood:
1 Our people were very angry. They said bad things 
about Kazoka. They hated him because he was the 
friend of Chamulangula. They said he was a Capri­
corn member who had been given a lot of money by the 
bwanas to help kill Congress. Some wanted to bum  
his house. Amos Hieilaba of Namwala and myself had 
to talk to them not to do anything. We were happy 
when Kaunda came.'2
On the day of the final discussions, the Administration, 
fearing for the safety of Kazoka and others who favoured the ban, 
despatched a unit of the mobile police to stand guard outside
the Authority's chambers. This action was taken in spite of pro-
•3
tests from some Chiefs.^
According to Kaunda, the Congress Secretary-General, who 
arrived on the scene on the day before the final vote was taken, 
the mobile unit was made up of 'sixty-five fully armed' police
4
who carried guns, tear gas and batons. That they were so armed 
is a clear indication of the Administration's estimation of the 
threat posed by the assembled supporters. The mobile unit was assisted 
by ten District Office messengers. However, although according to 
Kaunda's report, the general 'feeling was tense', there were no 
incidents on the day the Chiefs and Councillors voted in favour of
1
Interviews,
2
Interview with Paul Cifula Maambo, 30th April, 1974.
3
The Congress Circular, Vol. Ill, No, 3, May, 1937. Macpherson 
Collection.
**Ibid.
an amendment. The Central Congress leadership had recognised the 
need for restraint and this was why it had despatched Kaunda to 
Monze to keep an eye on the A.N.C.supporters. Kaunda addressed the
1 thousands' who had gathered in Monze and he 'managed to persuade
them to observe the weapon of non-violence*. On the morning of
the meetingi 'only a few hundreds were allowed to go near the
meeting p l a c e . . . B y  midday, they were informed of the result
of the vote and, thereafter, they dispersed to their various
2villages amid chants of 'One Man, One Vote*.
********
Having successfully weathered this attempt to ban its operations, 
the Plateau Tonga Congress Movement was now determined to exploit 
the fresh mandate it had just received. During the latter part of 
1957* its supporters took to harassing local Settler farmers. There 
had been isolated reports in the past from white farmers who com­
plained of Africans who carried out acts of sabotage on their farms 
such as burning their maize crops or wrecking faun machinery. How­
ever, these had been few and far between. But during the final 
months of 1957* these reports became more frequent. On the 28th 
November 19571 Mr.Carlisle,the Member for the South-Western Electoral 
Area which included the Tonga plateau, told his colleagues in the 
Legislative Council of the serious problems facing Settler farmers 
in the Southern province. He explained that the A.N.C. had been 
'very active’ in the Mazabuka and Monze areas. In these areas, he
^Ibid.
2Interviews with Paul Cifula Maambo and others.
K °‘I.P yj >W
continued, lawlessness prevails* and 'unlawful acts are being
perpetrated...'. 'In many cases', the member pointed out, 'the
perpetrators if apprehended claim to be members of the African
1National Congress.1 He went on to spell out some of the acts 
of sabotage that were being carried out on European property by 
Congress supporters who seemed to have no fears of possible de­
tection and subsequent punishment;
'Boundary fences are cut, snares are set and valuable 
stock injured or destroyed and on occasions when you 
are fortunate enough to apprehend anybody, he is quite 
truculent about saying that he is a member of the 
African National Congress.'2
The harassment Carlisle described was in no way restricted 
to Settler farmers. Local provincial officials, even District 
Officers, were molested as well. Carlisle told of an incident 
involving the District Officer at Monze who was prevented from 
carrying out his duties by militant Congress supporters in the 
Monze Chieftaincy. He explained that 'when the District Officer... 
went out on a routine inspection... on the Lochinvar road, the
Africans in the area refused to allow him to carry out his in-
3spection and sent him back to hisheadquarters.'
In his report on political activities within the Southern 
province during 1957* the Provincial Commissioner, Gervas Clay, 
described the year as a 'turbulent one...' during which 'troubles 
arose from the hurly-burly of a young and vigorous country growing
^Hansard, 28th November 1957* No. 93» Cols. 900-901.
2Ibid.
^Ibid.
up where politics are boisterous and too often ill directed.
He commented at some length on the anti-inoculation campaign waged 
by Congress throughout the year in the Mazabuka and Ghoma districts 
as well as in the neighbouring Namwala District, He cited figures 
to show the extent of cattle loss sustained by some African farmers
who* in spite of this, would still not avail themselves of the avail­
able veterinary facilities:
1In general, 1957 was a disappointing year. In
Mazabuka and to a more limited extent in Choma and
Namwala, the disaffected politicians worked up con­
siderable feeling against the blanket inoculations 
for anthrax and quarter-evil which resulted in these 
being rejected by almost the whole of Mazabuka District, 
by the people of Mapanza and Singani areas in Choma 
^DistrictT' and Nalubamba in Namwala jA>istrict7'. In 
these areas there have been heavy losses, particularly 
in areas of Choma where the latest census figures show 
a drop of 1,085 head, figures are however hard to ob­
tain since the owners are for various reasons reluctant 
to disclose them.’2
The anti-inoculation campaign on the Tonga plateau continued 
into 1958, when it was waged with even greater persistence, especially 
in the Choma District and the Mwanachingwala area of Mazabuka District 
In his annual report for 1957, the Provincial Commissioner had drawn
attention to what he considered 'a general feeling of uneasiness1 in
3
the Choma District. This uneasiness came to a head during the 
early months of 1958 as groups of farmers, under Congress' influence, 
expressed their support for the programme of non-cooperation by 
refusing all services offered by the Veterinary Department. The 
local Native Authorities came under pressure to prosecute offenders.
T <L
Native Affirs Report, 1957, p.75*
2Ibid., p.80.^
As a result, several farmers made appearances in Chief Siamaundu's 
court to answer obstruction charges. Many had to pay court fines.
In one area, however, farmers who were found guilty of wilful refusal 
to present their animals for inoculation, were incited by local 
Congress leaders against paying their fines. Congress saw in the 
situation the makings of yet another major challenge of the Admini­
stration's authority. When local District Officials issued in­
structions for the arrest of the farmers concerned, they resisted 
and refused to be taken in. The Provincial Commissioner then decided 
to despatch two platoons of the Northern Rhodesia police to the 
area. On arrival, the armed policemen toured the villages in search 
of the ring-leaders. They encountered opposition from some of the 
farmers who had barricaded the roads leading to their villages.
To dislodge them, tear gas was used and, according to Informants, 
some of the protesting farmers were beaten with truncheons.
The District Administration's-display of authority broke up 
the farmer's resistance. Twenty of them were then arrested for the 
part they had played in the disturbances. Once the protest organisers 
had been detained, the Veterinary Department's team was able to 
carry on with its inoculation programme and an estimated 2?,998
1head of cattle were subsequently treated against trypanosomiasis.
*********
The modus operand! of the Northern Rhodesia Police’s mobile 
unit as seen in the Choma encounter and in previous engagements on
■^ Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.71.
the plateau, came under strong criticism from the local African 
population. In various other parts of the territory, its conduct 
was being equally deplored. In June 1958, the African Repre­
sentative Council discussed the harassment perpetrated by this 
a m  of the Government. Mr._ S. Mununga from the Luapula area called 
on the Council to deplore 'the manner in which the police and 
police mobile unit continue to ill treat members of the public’.
He was supported by several of his colleagues who were equally 
horrified by the heavy-handedness of the police officers. Even 
African moderates within the Council who had on occasion sought 
the assistance of the mobile units in coping with Congress extremists
in their areas, agreed that the police had behaved with excessive
2zeal. One such representative, William Kazoka, from the Tonga 
plateau, explained that although he appreciated 'the work of the 
police and the ... mobile unit ...', he disapproved of the tactics
they employed. He went on:
*1 come from a province where there are times.... 
where I being a member of the Native Authority in, 
cooperation with the Provincial Administration, we 
call upon the mobile unit ... to deal with such 
situations /sic^. I have watched instances of this 
nature going on in my own province. I have seen 
people molested, I have seen the cattle wandering 
about the country-side, the owners taken away and oth­
ers taken to several hospitals in the territory be­
cause they have been molested by the police for no 
other reason, simply because these people have had no 
time to decide whether they agree with a Government 
order or the police instruction /s±c/2 5
Although up against a police force which was so unrestrained in 
its handling of Africans opposed to the policies of the Government,
Debates of the African Representative Council, 17 th June, 1958, 
No.17, Col. 390.
2
Mentioned earlier in this chapter in connection with the attempt 
to ban Congress from operating in the Mazabuka District.
3
Debates of the African Representative Council, 17th June, 1958. 
No. 17, Col. 396.
the Congress leaders on the plateau were determined not to be intimidated.
It was becoming more difficult to get people to risk imprisonment and 
physical injury in confrontations with the Authorities, but this did not 
weaken their determination to continue the struggle against the Federation.
In areas like Monze, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, Chongo and a 
few others, where Congress was very popular and so relatively well organised, 
the protest campaign continued to be quite rewarding. It was not the same 
in less responsive Chieftaincies like Ufwenuka and Chona, and Congress tended 
to pay very scant attention to such areas during the late fifties. As we 
have already seen, the problem of land shortage was more acute in some
2
Chieftaincies than in others, for land alienation had been very uneven.
Congress* message which centred principally on its challenge of the Admini­
stration's land policy was therefore more readily understood in Chieftain­
cies such as Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala where population densities were 
relatively higher and land shortage a more serious problem than in Ufwenuka 
or Chona.
Within the Mazabuka District, the anti-inoculation campaign as well 
as that directed against the Improved Farming Scheme were at their most 
disruptive during 1958 in the Mwanachingwala and Chongo Chieftaincies^ two 
of Congress' principal strongholds. As we have seen already, the Mwanachingwala 
area, as a result of extensive land alienation and population increase, had
3
developed a very serious land shortage problem by the early forties. During
the Federal years, this problem was exacerbated, as the local human and cattle
populations continued to increase. There was also an accompanying influx
of immigrants who had abandoned their homes on the escarpment. Most of the
newcomers came into the area from the poorer Chieftaincies to the east of the
line of rail. In 1957, the Provincial Commissioner had commented on this
development which was forcing some of Chief Mwanachingwala's people into
abandoning their homes:______
1Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Job Michello and other local organisers.
2See Chapter VI, pp.
^See Chapter VI,
'Within the District there is a population movement 
from east to west, where land is more easily avail­
able. There is also a movement out of the District 
by some of Chief Mwanachingwala's people over the 
Kafue river into Mumbwa as they suffer from con­
siderable flooding in their own country annually ^
during the rains and land is in very short supply.'
The hardship and inconvenience engendered by land scarcity
bred much dissatisfaction in the Mwanachingwala area. This feeling
was turned to good account by Job Michello and other Congress
officials who lived in the area. They brought the anti-inoculation
campaign into Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy. In June 1953, Chief
Mwanachingwala, under Congress influence, instructed his people
2against allowing local veterinary officials access to their cattle. 
Unfortunately for the Chief and his supporters, the majority of 
the Chiefs and the Councillors in the Plateau Tonga Native
Authority had come, by this time, to appreciate the need for rigid
3
enforcement of inoculation rules. The cattle losses that had 
occurred during the earlier anti-inoculation campaigns might have 
convinced them that such demonstrations of opposition to the Ad­
ministration were not in the farmer's interest. Most
farmers in the District were aware of the risks involved dn this 
kind of protest, which was why only a few participated in it.
When the District Commissioner asked the Native Authority to handle 
the Mwanachingwala anti-inoculation protest problem, it decided 
to stand firm. The Chiefs and Councillors recommended that, in the 
event of continued opposition, Chief Mwanachingwala should be
■^ Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.77- 
2Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.67.
3
During 1958, the Native Authorities Inoculation Order was to be 
invoked at least 17 times to compel African farmers to put their 
animals at the disposal of the Veterinary Department's staff.
See Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.71.
fined and suspended and the inoculation order carried through.
Faced with an ultimatum from a source from which they expected
1
sympathy* Chief Mwanachingwala and his people gave in.
Another fairly similar situation in which the Plateau Tonga 
Native Authority displayed its reluctance to lend any further sup­
port to protest action, occurred in Chief Chongo*s area during 
the course of 1958. In that year, 'the piecemeal individual farm 
approach to conservation was discontinued..,' and the Agriculture
Department's staff hegan to concentrate on so-called 'planned
2areas'. Pour such areas were demarcated on the Tonga plateau in 
1958, vis. the Upper Kaleya Grazing Scheme, the Mpongo conservation 
scheme, the Mulundu-dima scheme and the Ngwezi rehabilitation 
scheme which was to cover some *f9» 576 acres of land.''*
When, however, the Conservation officers began work in the 
Mpongo area, in Ch&ngo Chieftaincy, they ran arto strong opposition. 
Farmers from eight villages around Mpongo and Kambaza decided to 
show their disapproval of the Administration's land policies by 
opposing the Conservation effort. The Headmen of these villages, 
all of them ardent Congress supporters, had been very active in 
fomenting this opposition. For almost a week, the work of the 
conservation team was held up as protesting farmers threatened 
physical injury to anyone who would attempt to survey their farms 
or instal contour ridges on them. However, like the Mwanachingwala
1Ibid., p.67.
2.X.H.Muchangwe, Tonga Land Utilisation Survey (Lusaka, I960), 
p.l*f. M.M.R.S.
^Ibid.
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dissidents, these demonstrators had taken the support of the 
Native Authority for granted. When news of their protest action 
reached the Native Authority Council, only a handful of the Chiefs 
and Councillors sympathised with their cause. The majority insisted 
that the conservation measures should be enforced because they were 
in the interest of the community. The resistance however continued 
in spite of the Native Authority's ruling.. The District Commissioner 
therefore issued instructions for the arrest of Simon Mpongo, Jere­
miah Kambaza and the other six protest leaders, who were subsequently
sentenced to six months imprisonment.^ This put an end to the re-
2
sistance. Two years later, Ignatius Muchangwe, speaking in his 
capacity as an official of the Department of Agriculture, was to 
look back at the way the protest over the Mpongo scheme was handled 
and was to commend the methods used. During a survey of the area, 
he remarked that 'public opinion has since changed and the area is 
now one of the best conserved in the district and is an example 
of where sterner measures applied at the right time pay dividends
In both the anti-inoculation campaign in the Mwanachingwala 
area and the soil conservation protest in the Mpongo area, one 
striking fact had emerged. Moderate opinion was beginning to pre­
vail in the Gouncils of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority. The 
moderates may have failed in 1957 to get the Congress movement
1Muchangwe, op.cit., and interviews.
2Muchangwe, a Tonga, after serving as Principal of the Monze. 
school of Agriculture, was to become the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Agriculture. See Kelvin Mlenga, ed., Who's Who in 
Zambia, 1967-68 (Lusaka, 1968), p.59.
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banned on the plateau, but the line of action followed by the 
Authority in these incidents demonstrated quite forcefully that 
they were not a spent force. If anything, they were succeeding 
in their determination to establish the Native Authority’s in­
dependence of the protest movement. No longer was Congress to 
expect its unqualified support for the non-cooperation programme.’1' 
Kazoka, the Native Authority's Chairman, a firm supporter of the 
Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.), which he had helped to propagate 
while he was theP.T.N.A.'s Agricultural Councillor, was really 
making his presence felt in the Author!ty's deliberations. Accord­
ing to Informants, he was one of the very few Africans who got on 
well with H.T.Bayldon ('Chamulangula*), the Provincial Commissioner. 
Bayldon appears to have used the Native Authority Chairman to in­
fluence the Chiefs and Councillors. Kazoka did not succeed when 
he tried in April 1957 to persuade M s  colleagues to ban Congress 
from the Mazabuka District, but he was to be more successful in 
M s  efforts to get them to stand up for the Administration's Improved 
Husbandry Schemes. By 1958, it appears that the number of Improved 
Farmers witMn the P.T.N.A. had increased somewhat and, as will be 
seen presently, the CMefs were becoming less vociferous in their 
criticisms of the Administration. The Improved Farmers witMn the 
Native Authority were reaping the benefits of the I.F.S. and had 
little sympathy for those who turned their backs on the loans and 
bonuses to be got from the scheme, simply because they wanted to
1Although the Native Authority had never openly supported Congress, 
its policies over the yeas, with a few exceptions, had been very 
much in consonance with the A.N.C. programme. TMs was no mere 
coincidence.
2
This was not denied by Kazoka when interviewed.
continue prosecuting a struggle which they seeme.d incapable of 
vanning. At a time when the Administration was responding so well 
to the Improved Farmers* requests for more financial assistance**' to 
help them expand production to meet the rising demand for maize 
occasioned by the industrial boom on the Copperbelt, it seemed to 
such farmers in the Native Authority utter folly to continue opposing 
the Government.
A Congress official of this period tried to explain to the
author the disillusionment and frustration which the virtual loss
of Native Authority support engendered in the ranks of the local
Congress leadership:
*In the past, all the Chiefs had helped us. Some worked 
harder and gave more money and help than the others.
But no one had tried to oppose us. Now many of them 
were listening to Kazoka, who was "the very-good friend 
of "Chamulangula" ^Bayldon, the District C$nmi s si one 1/.
They now began to oppose us. Only Mugodi /Bonze/ 1 Chongo, 
Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, "Sian jalika and Mwenda were 
still for us. We were worried very much by this but we 
still continued to fight,'2
There was no doubt that a number of Chiefs on the plateau 
and elsewhere within the territory were, by 19571 beginning to re­
consider their support for the African National Congress. This was 
hardly surprising in a situation where the Administration was becoming 
much less squeamish about the use of its power to depose Chiefs.
In the past, various provincial officials within the Administration 
had urged their superiors to employ what was widely believed to be 
the ultimate sanction in the handling of errant Chiefs, viz. outright
■*“See Table III.
2
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dismissal. The Secretaries for Native Affairs, over the years, 
had however counselled tolerance and had recommended instead such 
actions as the withholding or the threat of withholding subsidies 
while investigations were being carried out. Yet even in cases 
where such investigations confirmed the guilt of the Chief in 
question, the Administration, in the majority of cases, confined 
itself to a reprimand, dismissing only those it considered chronic 
subversives.
On the Tonga plateau such investigations into chiefly conduct
had been carried out in the thirties. They were occasioned by the
passionate opposition of Chiefs Siamusonde, Sianjalika, Mwana-
chingwala and Siowe to the cattle dipping programme of the Veterinary 
1Department. Although District officials had called for the de­
position of some of these Chiefs, no such action was taken, al­
though there was little doubt as to guilt. However, in the 1950s, 
things were to be different. Largely unsuccessful in its attempts 
to woo the Chiefs away from the Congress movement, the Administration 
now resorted to deposing Chiefs who took a keen interest in the 
A.N.C. programme.
In January 1957» Chief Naluama, an ardent Congress 
supporter who had taken a very active part in the movement’s acti­
vities in his area as well as in other parts of the plateau, was 
deposed. The Chief's involvement in Congress politics had been 
commented upon in the provincial annual report of 1953* when he
was said to have 'cooperated considerably' with the protest move-
2
ment and had given very little time to his official duties. In
^ee Chapter 11^ ^ .#0
2Sec/Nat/66F N/OOO6/3 Vol. IV Z.N.A., Mazabuka District Annual 
Report, 1953*
spite of several warnings from the Mazabuka Boma officials, he 
had refused to dissociate himself from the anti-Govemment activity
, in his Chieftaincy. Officials were, by 1957, firmly 
convinced that the Chief was the principal instigator of these 
actions.
Having deposed the uncompromising Chief Naluama, the Ad­
ministration got the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to see to the 
appointment of a new Chief in the area. It was soon quite apparent 
that the new Naluam had learnt a lesson from the way in which his 
predecessor had been treated. It is significant that during the 
anti-inoculating campaigns of 1957* he not only suppressed the 
operations5'of Congress politicians in his area but also demonstrated 
his loyalty to the Administration by extending an invitation to the 
Veterinary Department's inoculating team. This was very heartening
for local officials who were up against anti-inoculation protest in
1
'almost the whole of Mazabuka D i s t r i c t , , and a special note 
was made of this in the Annual Provincial Report of 1957- The 
Provincial Commissioner explained that 'the one bright spot In the 
Mazabuka District was that when quarter-evil broke out in the area 
of Chief Naluama, the most recently appointed Chief in the District, 
he asked the Veterinary Department for inoculations and had the 
support of his people in his . request'. Predictably, this did not 
meet the approval of the local Congress leaders. But, the report 
continued, 'when inoculations were provided, attempts by politicians 
to dissuade the people were firmly dealt with by the people and
Native Affairs Report, 1957* p.80.
those accustomed to issuing threats suddenly found themselves threatened
1and wasted no time in asking for protection1.
Some time in 1959 another, and this time more significant,
deposition of a Chief took place in the Mazabuka District. The
victim was Mugodi Monze. Although he was referred to as 'Deputy Chief
2
Monze' in the 1959 An&ual provincial report, other evidence seems
to suggest that he had been functioning in the position of a regular
3
Paramount Chief of the plateau Tonga, From his home at Katimba, 
the Chief had played a very prominent role;‘,n the politics of the 
African National Congress and had contributed a great deal to the 
development of a radical militancy in several parts of his Chieftaincy. 
The Makuyu anti-inoculation incident referred to earlier in this chapter 
happened just a few miles from his village. On that occasion, his 
reluctance to condemn the actions of the protesting farmers or to 
intervene on 'Siambukombe's' behalf can have left District officials 
in no doubt as to where his sympathies lay.
Under the influence of the Chief and other local Congress 
organisers, the Monze area had moved into the front line of protest 
politics on the plateau, rivalling established bastions like Chongo, 
Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala. In his annual report for 1958, the 
Provincial Commissioner had drawn attention to the political ferment 
in the Monze area. He reported that although 'Africans in rural 
areas generally have not evinced a great deal of interest in politics... 
centres such as Monze show more interest of course*. For failing
1Ibid.
^Native Affairs Report, 1959* p.66.
3
^Interviews.
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to restrain Congress organisers in M s  area, Mugodi Monze was 
summoned by the District Commissioner, H.T.Bayldon ('Chamalangula')
1to the Mazabuka Boma on several occasions to face stern reprimands. 
According to Informants, it was after one such encounter between 
the CMef and Bayldon that the final decision was taken to depose 
Mm.
The immediate background to the fateful . meeting was a dis­
agreement between a Mrs. Lombe, who was the Organising Secretary 
of the Congress1 Womens League in the Mazabuka District and Bayldon. 
Mrs. Lombe had travelled to Mazabuka from her home in the CMsekesi 
area to ob tain permission from the District C[||nmissioner for the 
holding of a series of meetings by the Womens League. She had met 
Bayldon a number of times before on Womens League matters, and the 
District Commissioner had, apparently, never disguised M s  contempt 
for both Mrs. Lombe and her husband, John Lombe, who was also an 
active Congress organiser in the CMsekesi area. Mr. Lombe had 
migrated to the Mazabuka District from Bembaland in the Northern 
Province and it appears that Bayldon had, on a number of occasions, 
attempted to coerce the Lombes into severing their connections
J
with the protest movement, by waving over their heads the threat 
of repatriation to the Northern Province* If tMs threat was to 
be ever implemented, Bayldon would need the support of the Chief in 
whose area the Lombes lived, viz. Mugodi Monze. TMs was hardly 
forthcoming, Mugodi being such a staunch 'Congressman*.
When, however, on tMs occasion, Bayldon, apparently reluctant 
to meet Mrs. Lombe*s request, was insulted by the Womens League 
Organising Secretary, the District Commissioner demanded that CMef
Interviews in Monze Chieftaincy.
Monze should expel the Lombes from his Chieftaincy. This the 
Chief refused to do. He is said to have told the District Com­
missioner that he would only ask the Lombes to leave if orders 
were issued by the Administration for all European settlers to 
vacate the lands they occupied in the Mazabuka District. This 
remark* it seems, was the last straw. A few weeks later, Mugodi
Monze was deposed 'on the grounds that his administration had been
2inefficient for some years...'. A local farmer who was a member 
of the Improved Farming Scheme and who had in fact served as an
Agricultural Assistant in the conservation programme, was appointed
3
and approved by the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to succeed him.
Congress leaders at both central and provincial level were
outraged by the Administration's recourse to deposing Chiefs. By
January 1957* a total of six Chiefs, including Naluama, had been
A
deposed in various parts of the territory, mainly. Congress believed, 
because they had shown sympathy for the protest movement. A few 
more were to follow. The central Congress leadership felt itself 
under an obligation to protect these Chiefs who had risked their 
positions in supporting its programme. In meetings throughout the 
territory, Congress officials condemned the Administration's actions. 
Harry Nkumbula, the Congress President, wrote to the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, demanding an explanation of the reasons behind the
1The author got the most comprehensive account of the disagreements 
between the Lombes and the District Commissioner from Mrs. Buth 
Jere, one time Southern Provincial Secretary of the Congress Womens 
League, in an interview on the 13th July, 197^.
2Native Affairs Eeport, 1939* p.66.
•^Ibid. and interviews in Monze Chieftaincy.
^FCB 103/2/item 3. Congress Circular Vol. Ill* No. 3* January, 1937. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the exact dates of the depositions.
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1the dismissal of the Chiefs. This, predictably, did not achieve 
anything. In spite of added protests from villagers in the 
Chieftaincies concerned, not one of these Chiefs was
reinstated.
%*******
Although it had suffered a number of reverses, the Congress
leadership on the Tonga plateau endeavoured to maintain the rhythm
of protest. In March 1956, Kenneth Kaunda, the Congress Secretary-
General, had referred to the Mazabuka District as Congress* 1 strongest
2
hold in the Southern province*. The movement's leaders were deter­
mined to do all they could to sustain this vital support. In the 
trying conditions of the fifties, this was no easy task.
In the first place, the number of improved farmers continued 
to rise. Between 1957 and 1959* the size of the Improved Farming 
community in the Monze area increased from 37** to 725. In the 
Magoye area, their numbers rose from 257 to ^92. Around Mapangazia, 
it increased from 12b to 321 and in the Kanchomba area, from 180 to 
31^.^ Those who were now registering with the scheme were not being 
attracted so much by the bonuses offered as by the rather generous 
loans policy it operated. As Table II has shown, the level of 
bonus payments did not rise very much during the fifties but, in 
comparison, the amount of money available for loans to registered 
farmers was increasing annually (see Table III). As farmers developed
1Ibid.
^Congress Circular Vol. II, No, 3» 31.3*56.
^Southern Province 'Stocktaking1 (Lusaka, I960), p.^l. M.M.E.S.
more interest in the I.F.S., so they paid more attention to the 
non-political activities of their Farmers Associations and isolated 
themselves from active involvement in the anti-Governraent programme 
of the local A.N.G. movement.
The majority of the Chiefs were also becoming less willing to
associate openly with the protest movement and the support of the
1
rank and file was wavering visibly. Although Congress persisted 
in organising meetings on the plateau, during which local leaders 
would try to bolster morale by spicing their speeches with such 
slogans as 'Nkumbula Cj-pwave Ci Federation* and 'Muntu-omwe, Kusala 
Komwe1, the crowds were growing smaller. Local Congress leaders 
were fully conscious of this sagging morale in certain Chieftaincies 
and they appealed to the President-General to make more frequent 
appearances on the Tonga plateau, an area whose support, material 
and otherwise, Congress could not afford to lose. Nkumbula's frequent
3
visits to the plateau in the mid and late fifties were therefore 
as much a fund raising effort as an attempt to strengthen the move­
ment's appeal, in the light of the provincial Administration's 
determination to induce the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to ban 
its operations in the District.
The work of revitalization that was undertaken in the Mazabuka 
and Choma Districts from the middle of 1957 onwards was to yield 
handsome dividends. The Congress leadership on the Tonga Plateau 
continued to capitalize on the Gwembe Tonga resettlement scheme,
1
Interviews with local Congress organisers.
p
The first called on Nkumbula to destroy the Federation. The second 
was the Tonga version of 'One Man, One Vote',
~Z
Kaunda had reported on these trips to the South in Congress 
Circular, Vol. II, No. 3* 31.3.56.
Table III: Loans given to Improved Farmers In the
Southern Province, 1953-58.
Planting
Season
Total sum provided Amount actually loaned
1953-56 £2,000 £L,¥f7
195^-55 000 3,817
1955-56 8,000 5,606
1957-58 - 10,000
Prepared from Department of Agriculture Annual Reports.
mentioned earlier in this chapter, especially during the course
of 1958 when African refusal to vacate lands that were needed
for the creation of a dam resulted in Chief Chipepo1s area of
the valley, in an armed confrontation with the mobile police, in
1
which eight Africans were killed and thirty-four wounded. Congress 
maintained its attack on the practice of land appropriation and 
repeatedly reminded the people on the plateau of the insecure 
nature of their land tenure. At various meetings in the reserves 
the people were told that Congress was determined to stand up for 
their land rights and they were urged to give more support to the 
movement’s activities in their various Chieftaincies. Overall 
branch involvement began to improve especially around 1959 when 
the threat of another review of the Improved Farming Scheme (l.F.S.) 
forced scores of hitherto indifferent Improved Farmers into joining
1 .Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the circum­
stances leading up to and surrounding the recent deaths and in­
juries caused by the use of firearms in the Gwemba District....
(LUsaka, 1958), p.19.
^Interviews.
the local Congress branch. The I.F.S. was beginning to cost the 
Administration too much and the revenue on which it was run was 
being sharply outstripped by expenditure. Commenting on the sharp 
increase in the number of Improved Farmers during the fifties, 
the 1959 Annual report noted that this ’will mean a very great 
increase in the amount of money to be paid out in bonuses and the 
work involved in supervision would tax the available Agricultural 
Staff*. It went on to say that the increase in expenditure 'is 
considerably greater than the revenue that the fund can be ex­
pected to receive...’. In the circumstances, the Committee ad­
ministering the scheme therefore ’decided to reduce the amount of 
acreage bonus paid to Improved Farmers and to limit the number of
years a farmer could draw this bonus to five’. It also reduced
1the amount used under the scheme in subsidising Scotch carts (see 
Table XV).
The policy changes that were now being made in the running 
of the I.F.S. were to the majority of Africans a vindication of the 
of the A.N.C.'s fears and doubts about the scheme. It now looked 
as though the Congress leaders were right after all when they said 
that the Administration would one day abandon the Improved Farmer, 
Local Congress organisers exploited the news of the planned review 
and local support for the movement began to show a welcome increase 
Enthusiasm for the A.N.C. programme on the plateau showed signs of 
growing to pre-Federation's proportions. As will be seen presently 
this support in the Southern province for the African National Con­
gress was to be crucial in the years that lay ahead.
■^ Native Affairs Report, 1959, p .70. The scheme was finally ter­
minated in the early sixties.
Table IV: Official Expenditure on the Improved Farming
Scheme in both the Southern and Eastern 
Provinces, 195^-57.
Items of Expenditure 195**-55 1955-56 1956-57
Bonus to Improved Farmers
£
27,716
£
3^,987
£
36,307
Subsidies on carts, fertilisers, 
seeds etc. 29,102 20,625 **0,936
Soil and Water Conservation 
works 28,391 27,616 22,787
Grants fo Native Authorities 1,360 **,950 1,528
Administrative Expenses 72S 1,270 2,1*15
Irrecoverable Loans 106 68 -
Total £87,^03 £89,516 £103,973
Compiled from Agriculture Department Annual Reports.
********
Meanwhile, in the Representative Assemblies, within the 
territory, African leaders, joined occasionally by a few white 
sympathisers, were unrelenting in their criticism of conditions 
under the Federation. The Administration's persistent refusal to 
convert all native trust lands into native reserves as demanded 
by an African population which was worried by the fact that portions 
of the trust lands could be alienated to European settlers, was 
one of the main-springs of criticism. Repeatedly, the Administration1 
officials stated, unequivocally, that there was going to be no 
change in the status of the trust lands. In a reply to a motion 
passed in the African Representative Council on the 12th October,
195** on the subject, the Administration explained that 'while the
Government will keep under constant review the Native Trust
Land Order in Council to ensure that the interests of Africans...
are fully safeguarded* there can be no question of the conversion
1of Native Trust Land into Native Reserves1.
This rather blunt statement of official policy was not, however, 
to deter African Representatives from raising the subject again 
in the council, three years later. The occasion was the visit to 
the territory of Allan Lennox-Boyd,the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. MateyoKakumbi from the Central Province, speaking on be­
half of his colleagues, told the British Government official of 
the misgivings that Africans still had about the land situation. 
Among other things, he said:
'We... wish to draw your attention to the question 
of land, particularly land which is classified as 
native trust land .... The African population of 
Northern Rhodesia is increasing and land, under the 
present category of native reserves is becoming small.
The insecurity arising from rights of occupany granted 
to non-indigenous people in native trust land makes it 
unsafe for the indigenous people who are occupants of 
native trust land. We therefore find it... necessary 
to request Her Majesty's Government to consider con­
verting native trust land into native reserves...'2
This appeal was, like the earlier ones, unsuccessful. Such
an apparent disregard of African views only served to confirm the
African leaders in their view that the interests of the African
population would never be adequately sareguarded in a Federal
situation. Many of them were, by now, firmly convinced of the
need for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the Federation. This
they believed would leave the Administration more time to address
1African Representative Council debates. Replies to motions carried 
at the ^rd session of the 3rd Council. See Appendix.
2
African Representative Council debates, 21st January, 1937.
No. 13, Cols. 3-^.
itself to the territory's problems. It would then also be able 
to take decisions concerning the African population, independently 
of Southern Rhodesia's influence. The African leaders argued that 
the conditions under which Africans lived and of which they had 
been complaining over the years, had shown no improvement. A 
Commission appointed to probe allegations of racial discrimination 
in commerce had reported in 1956 that it found 'indisputable evi­
dence that discrimination is being practised in some shops and in 
some similar business premises, solely on grounds of colour*. Con­
trary to official and settler promises, there was no real partner­
ship between the races.
On the 13th June 1956, Mateyo Kakumbi from the Central Province 
introduced a motion in the African Representative Council condemning 
the settlers and the Administration for failing to implement true 
partnership. He called on the Council to deplore 'the failure to 
implement the partnership policy by the Federal and Territorial 
Governments on which Federation was imposed on the British protected 
persons of Northern Rhodesia' and to call 'on those concerned and 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to find immediately a 
policy which will be acceptable to all races*. The motion was un­
animously carried.2
In October 1956, Kenneth Kaunda talked of the partnership
3
of the slave and the free*. To the majority of Africans, partner­
ship was just an empty sound, the Federation a mockery of their rights
“^Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the extent to which 
racial discrimination is practised in shops and in other similar 
business premises (Lusaka, 1956), p.2.
African Representative Council debates, 13th June, 1956. No. l4,
Col. 122.
^Proceedings of the Seventh Annual A.N.G. Conference held in October, 
1956. Macpherson Collection.
‘6 7 4-
Although the majority of the Territory1s whites disagreed with 
the African assessment of Federal conditions, a few agreed that 
the Africans had some kind of a case for complaint. In June 
1957, Harry Franklin, who had once served in the Legislative 
Council as representative of African interestsbut who was now the 
Member for Education and Social Services, highlighted some of the 
issues which, in his view, made for continued African opposition 
to the Federation. 'From the African people’s point of view', 
he explained, 'I cannot see yet any benefit, though it is early 
days I agree. I can see the great increase in the cost of living 
due to the Customs Act having been drawn up avowedly to increase 
customs on items particularly of African consumption. I can see 
the importation of Greeks and Italians for the railways and ... 
various other things that have happened which have not conduced 
to give the Africans their faith back over Federation*.
Two years later, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, now in retirement
2
from the Legislative Council which he left in 1951* expressed in 
a letter to Arthur Creech-Jones, his friend of many years, his 
views on partnership as seen within the Federation. It was quite 
clear from his comments that he too saw little for the African popu­
lation to be sanguine about. He told Creech-Jones that ’things... 
seem to be going from bad to worse. ’’Partnership” is of course 
just moonshine and no one really intends to do anything about it.
Paternalism is as far as the majority of even genuinely liberal­
'sminded people get1.
^Hansard, 24-th June, 1957* No. 92* Col. 206.
p
Northern Rhodesia Colonial Report, 1951* P*4.
^A.C.J. 22/4/10?, Gore-Brown to Creech-Jones, 19.8.58.
Calls for the Territory's secession from the Federation in­
creased during the early months of 1957. These demands were 
prompted not only by African disenchantment with operating con­
ditions but also by the renewed determination of John Gaunt and 
his supporters to get the British Government to concede self- 
government to the settler minority, thereby paving the way for 
the creation of a Dominion. In. the African Representative Council 
and in various Provincial Councils, a motion, whose text could well 
have been drafted by the Congress leaders, was tabled during the 
course of 1957. In it, the African spokesmen impugned the political 
motives of the settler leaders. Robinson Nabulyato, representing 
the Southern province, moved the motion in the African Representative 
Council. It called on members to say 'that because of the political 
moves which are springing up to overthrow Colonial Office Trustee­
ship in Northern Rhodesia and because the African population... was 
and is opposed to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this
2
Council demands the secession of Northern Rhodesia from the Federation'. 
The motion was well supported.
During the course of its sittings in 1957* the Southern Pro­
vincial Council also discussed a motion worded in exactly the same 
way. This debate, according to Gervas Clay, the Provincial Commissioner,
'produced the fire and the crop of wild statements which appear so
3depressingly frequent whenever this subject is raised'.
^In March, 1956, John Gaunt had tabled a motion before the Legis­
lative Council in which he called for self-government. See Hansard,
23rd March, 1956, No, 87, Col. 684.
African Representative Council debates, 7th June, 1957» No. 16, Col. 150 
•^ Native Affairs Report, 1957* p.77.
In the absence of any far-reaching changes in the political 
situation* African opposition to the Federation was to continue 
into the sixties, forcing the Administration into conceding piece­
meal Constitutional reforms which were to lead eventually to
1African majority rule. However, the African National Congress’ 
central leadership was not to survive the strains of these years 
as a united force. During the final months of 1958, the prevailing 
tensions within the movement’s leadership care surfaced to cause a 
major split.
********
The A.N.C. split of October 1958.
During the mid and late fifties, Harry Nkumbula's leader­
ship of the Congress movement came in for much criticism from other 
Congress leaders. They accused him of neglecting his duties and 
of visibly weakening in the face of white opposition. He appeared 
to be becoming too dictatorial in his handling of Congress matters 
and too intent on strengthening the office of President-General at 
the expense of the rest of the Congress Executive. Things came to 
a head on the 2Ath October, 1958. Kenneth Kaunda, Congress' very 
influential Secretary-General, walked out of a Congress meeting for 
good and took some of the movement’s principal organisers with him.
Mulford has examined at some length the immediate and predisposing
2
reasons for this split within the Congress movement. However, for 
the purposes of this study, it is important to look briefly at the
16ee Mulford, on.cit., for an account of the activities leading up 
to Independence "in October, 196**.
2Mulford, on.cit., pp. 73-76.
situation in the Southern province and the Tonga plateau in 
particular, to see what effects, if any, it had on local political 
loyalties.
If anything, Congress' fortunes in the Mazabuka and Choma 
Districts improved after Kaunda and his supporters had left to 
form the rival Zambia African National Congress (Z.A.N.C.). For 
many people in the area, it was purely a question of choosing be-
i
tween 'Mwana wa cisi1, i.e. Nkumbula, and the much more distant 
Kaunda* Kaunda's chances of success here were not helped by the 
fact that he was surrounded by so many Copperbelt-oriented poli­
ticians and Trade Unionists, almost all of whom had spent the greater 
part of their lives working for wages in an urban environment. The 
average African on the Tonga plateau was not going to commit his 
claims into the hands of a group of people, the majority of whom 
had been forced by circumstances to take up permanent residence in 
a Copperbelt town, and whose dealings with the rural areas were 
largely confined to periodic visits to assess the political situ­
ation or to see the odd relation. Such men, to him, could hardly 
be expected to articulate the problems of the rural areas with the 
cogency of an Nkumbula, who, in spite of his deep involvement in 
the Central Congress organisation based in Lusaka, appeared to take 
as much interest in the conditions operating in the rural as in 
the urban areas.
This was a fundamental disadvantage for Z.A.N.C. for even 
past history had shown that there was hardly any real affinity between
^Literally, 'Child of our country'. Nkumbula's position on the 
plateau was helped substantially by the cultural and other ties 
between his people, the Ha, and the Tonga, their neighbours.
the people of the Tonga plateau and those of the Copperbelt and
adjoining areas, on whom the politics of Kaunda's party was now
rooted. The orientation of the Africans of the Mazabuka and
Choma Districts had always been more southward, than northward,
looking. On the subject of labour migration, for instance, more
Africans from the plateau went down to Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa, than to the Copperbelt, where they were conspicuous
by their absence. The Pim Commission had highlighted this fact
quite clearly in its 1938 report . Ohadike has also commented cn
the dearth of Southern province wage labour in the copper mines.
Although during the late fifties and early sixties the number of
people leaving the Mazabuka District for work in the copper mines
was to rise somewhat giving the District an overall share of
A7.09°/o of the amount of labour that left the Southern province
between 19^ *0 and 196**, the rate of flow continued to be very
low compared with other parts of the territory. For these years,
it was only 0.51°/o as compared with average How rates of about
8.90°/o in the North-Western, 12.72°/o in the Northern and 5.03°/o
2
in the Central province.
Even if we are to allow for the almost universal dislike 
of the Southern province's people for mine work, their numbers 
were not any more significant in the Industries, Government De­
partments and mines put together. Compared with the Western Provinces
1Report of the Commission appointed to Enquire into the Financial 
and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1938),
Appendix VI, p.362.
2
P.O.Ohadike, "Development of and Factors in the employment of 
African Migrants in the Copper Mines of Zambia, 19**0-1966",
Zambian Papers ,No. **, 19&9, Ohadike gives the flow rate as
the average annual flow (l9**0-6**) a mid-date male population 
13 years or more.
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10.60°/o representation, the Central's 9.560/o„ the Eastern's 
13.?6°/o ajnd the Northern's 22.62°/o, the Southern province re­
gistered only of the total migrant population in Copper-
belt employment between $56 and 1962. Perhaps this helps to 
e^ qplain one of the other considerations that informed the decision 
of the Congress leadership on the plateau, to carry out a 'starve
the Copperbelt.' campaign during the early months of the Federation.
2
to demonstrate their continued opposition to the Government. A 
campaign of this nature could hardly have failed to affect the 
Copperbelt's African population, thoiagh primarily designed to hit 
its white counterpart. It would appear that the smallness of its 
representation on the Copperbelt was a crucial factor in the plateau 
Tonga Congress leadership's willingness to sacrifice a measure of 
African interests on the Copperbelt, for the furtherance of the 
A.N.C.'s cause.
Kaunda's failure to attract from Nkumbula's ranks any of 
the leading African politicians from the Mazabuka and Choma Districts, 
who had served the A.N.C. at national level and had won some kind of 
territorial recognition for such services, was yet another reason 
for Z.A.N.C.'s lack of penetration on the Tonga plateau. Although 
these men were few in number, their contribution to the protest 
effort had been quite significant. Amos Walubita, for example, had 
distinguished himself in the African Representative Council during 
the early fifties as an uncompromising opponent of the settlers' 
partnership proposals. He had served on the delegation of four
1
Ohadike, on.cit., p.11.
2See Chapter VI, Pj8,
■2
To cite an occasion, on the 2Ath January 1951 Walubita said in the 
African Representative Council: 'I do not know what the word
African representatives to the Closer Association talks held in 
London in April/May 1952. and, like his colleagues, had expressed 
his opposition to Federation by refusing to participate in the 
deliberations.
Another, George Kaluwa, who was elected as the first deputy 
treasurer of the revived Congress in 19^3, and who later served as 
Secretary General when Robinson Nabulyato gave up the job, was one 
of two Congress representatives who went on a protest trip to 
London in October, 1952. Kaluwa was also one of the thirteen 
members appointed to serve on Congress1 first supreme Action Council,
formed in February 1952, to co-ordinate the non-cooperation pro-
2
gramme.
Job Mayanda, another prominent politician from the plateau, 
who was in fact the first Provincial President of Congress, had won 
a seat on the National Executive as Deputy Treasurer at the Congress
3
elections of August 1955- His close associate, Job Michello, after 
years of service with the Central organisation, was to rise to the 
position of Secretary-General. Ellison Milambo, the outspoken 
farmer/politician of Keemba Hill, had also served the movement at
Partnership stands for in the political advancement of this 
country. How can you have a partner with whom you do not share 
things. I am sure ... that this word is just something used to 
shut the mouths of Africans and we are not partners at all.*
See African Representative Council debates, 2Ath January, 19511 
No. 5* Col. ! » ■
^Kaluwa travelled to London with Chief Mpezeni of the Eastern 
province.
SACJ 22/A/8*K Freedom Newsletter, 1, III, A.3.52.
^W.K.Sikalumbi, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
national level in a number of minor roles. During the late fifties,
he served for a time as Chairman of Congress1 National Assembly,^
while, at the same time, he was a member of the movements 5-year
2Development Plan Committee.
The Tonga plateau was not therefore without its quota, albeit 
a small one, of experienced politicians. Kaunda1 s break-away 
movement did not, however, sufficiently impress any of these to win 
their support. Every one of them continued to support Harry Nkumbula 
after 1958. As a result, 2,A.N.C. became, for the rank and file 
within the Mazabuka and Choma Districts, the party of outsiders. 
Although in the townships of the plateau, the Immigrant population 
made up of resident Nyasalanders, Ngoni, Lovale, Bemba, Lozi etc. 
was, at times, to veer towards Kaunda, the bulk of the Tonga popu­
lation in the townships and the reserves consistently refused to 
identify with Nkumbula's opponents. This could well have been their 
way of showing disapproval of 2,A.N.C. 1 s more radical approach to 
solving the people's problems. Of the two parties, the A.N.C. 
was decidedly the more moderate group. The people of the Tonga 
plateau may have believed that the African stood a better chance 
if his interests were represented by moderates who steered clear of 
prison and whose hostility to the Administration did not make them 
totally unacceptable to the whites. As election results even after 
Independence were to prove, the Tonga plateau remained firmly be­
hind Nkumbula, whose charismatic appeal among the grass roots could 
hardly be exaggerated.
“*~The Northern Newsf 31st August, 1959.
2
Sikalumbi, on.cit., p.121.
The majority of the area*s Chiefs continued to give the
A.N.C. their support* although more behind the scenes than openly.
It is important to note that one of the first Chiefly families
to openly identify itself with Kaunda’s United National Independence
Party (U.N.I.P.), the successor of Z.A.N.C.* was the Chonas.^ The
old Chief Chona had himself shown no real interest in Congress 
2
activities, but by 1959 Mainza Chona, his son, had returned home 
after successfully completing his legal studies in England. Mainza 
joined Congress and served under Nkumbula for a while, but the two 
did not get on, mainly because of personality differences and dis­
agreements over priorities, A disillusioned Mainza Chona challenged 
Nkumbula for the leadership of the party in September 1959 and, 
with the support of some of Nkumbula’s Executive members, he became 
President of a splinter group within the A.N.C. This splinter move­
ment was subsequently outlawed by the Administration because, it 
was argued, it failed to comply with certain rules governing the 
registration of societies. Mainza Chona then left the A.N.C. for 
U.N.I.P., of which he became President in November 1959. Before he 
left Congress, Mainza had attempted to wrote Nkumbula's epitaph 
during the Annual A.N.C. Conference of October, 1959. in emphasising 
his opposition to Nkumbula's leadership of the A.N.C., he called 
on the Territory's African population to withdraw its support for 
the Congress leader and urged more support of Kaunda. 'We want 
someone of the nature of Mr. Kaunda - strong, fearless and selfless', 
he told the delegates, 'the name of Nkumbula should be forgotten
i
A few more were to follow after independence. 
2See Chapter VI, p;<30^* e
except for M s  past service.' Continuing M s  attack, he said:
'You should know M m  /ftkumbula/ as Provincial 
President of the Southern province ..... Before 
X stop ... I should tell you frankly that ray 
opinion is that he is absolutely finished. He 
is used up. He is now best suited for armchair 
politics. 'Under no circumstances is he prepared 
to go to jail for freedom’s sake. He tMnks the 
battle is already won .... Nkumbula is an active 
talker but a negative doer. '•*■
TMs brave indictment of the Congress President General, not
wholly without substance, led many on the Tonga plateau to denounce
2the Chonas as traitors and defectors. In many parts of Mazabuka 
and Chona Districts, Mainza Chona and the rest of the Chona family 
are yet to be forgiven for that speech.
The 1963 split in the A.N.C.
Although Nkumbula succeeded in holding together the rest 
of the Congress leadersMp after the 1958 split, opposition to M s  
leadersMp was to gain strength both witMn and outside the Con­
gress Executive during the early sixties. Job Michello, who was 
by tMs time the movement's Secretary General, Mayanda and others 
who had spent so much of their time in orgamsing Congress’ acti­
vities in the Southern province and in Lusaka were finding it very 
hard to continue their work under Nkumbula's leadersMp. The Con­
gress leader's love of the good life was increasing and it was 
widely believed that part of the funds provided by Congress' sympa- 
tMsers in the Congo had been employed on non-party matters. In
^FCB IO5/2/96. Mainza Chona's Address to the A.N.C. Conference 
of October, 1959#
2Interviews.
the aftermath of the 19&2 elections which produced an A.N.C./
U.N.I.P. Coalition Government, Nkumbula shamed his party by 
betraying a willingness to work with the settler-dominated United 
Federal Party (U.F.P.), once the African coalition had failed 
to work, as he believed it would.^ These activities grossly 
undermined Nkumbula's credibility. A substantial section of the 
Congress leadership came to the conclusion that the movement would
A
be much better off without the President-General.
During the months of April and May 1963 various attempts were 
made to deprive Nkumbula of some of his authority. New rules for 
the running of the A.N.C.'s headquarters were issued by the move­
ment's publicity bureau. Michello was called upon to take over some 
of Nkumbula's responsibilities and, together with the National Chair­
man, to play a more active part in the formulation of policy. Quite 
predictably, Nkumbula refused to accept the new measures. The 
President-General's disregard for their wishes forced the dis­
enchanted members of the Congress Executive closer to the Mukuba 
pressure group, another anti-Nkumbula faction within Congress. This 
group formed by a number of clerks, traders and teachers from the 
Central and Southern provinces had repeatedly underlined the need 
for a reform of Congress' organisation, both at Headquarters and 
provincial levels, to curb the growing authoritarianism of the 
leadership and to further enhance the involvement of the rural areas 
in the protest effort. Its members,an a veiled attack on Nkumbula 
and others like him, had condemned the behaviour of party officials 
who drank alcohol while on duty.
Mulford, op.cit., p.30^,
The reformist zeal of the Mukuba group and its allies within 
the national Executive failed to produce any significant change 
in the Congress President and his supporters. Congress was now 
once again divided within itself. In August 196?, Job Michello, 
after suffering molestation at the hands of some young supporters 
of Nkumbula, who accused him of being disloyal and over-ambitious,’1' 
resigned his position as Congress Secretary-General and announced 
the formation of his own party, the Peoples Democratic Party 
(P.D.P.).
Michello's new party never amounted to much. In fact, after 
trying unsuccessfully to get the funds and the electoral support 
he needed tojnake the party a serious proposition, he was to dis­
solve the movement and resume his old position within the A.N.C.
This later merger, more a marriage of convenience than anything 
else, does not, however, detract from the significance of the 19&3 
split. The very fact of the P.D.P. *s formation was a significant 
milestone inpie A.N.C.'s history. If one can be permitted to re­
gard the split within the A.N.C. in 195$ when Kaunda, Kapwepwe and 
others left the movement, as the 'Bemba split', that of 1963 was 
very much a 'Tonga split'. For the first time, some Tonga poli­
ticians who had consistently supported Kkumbula were in open dis­
agreement with him. The seemingly monolithic character of the 
post-1958 Congress leadership was now, on closer inspection, to 
reveal sharp internal divisions and an almost Kaunda-like disenchant­
ment with Nkumbula's leadership. Michello, Mayanda and others who
"^Interview with Job Michello, 19*6,7^.
were now leaving the A.N.C. had worked for many years as Congress 
organisers in the Southern province and they had come to believe 
that they were capable of maintaining a following of their own 
within the province, irrespective of whether they continued within 
the A.N.C.or not. However, as the events of the succeeding months 
were to prove, they had over-estimated their popularity and under­
estimated the charismatic appeal of Nkumbula. Like Kaunda's 
party, U.N.I.P., Michello's P.D.P., though headed by a Tonga, came 
to be regarded by the rank and file in most parts of the plateau
as the work of over-ambitious young men, who were debunking Nkumbula's
ideas and strategies, when they themselves had nothing more positive 
to offer. Although theED.P. was to make some narrow inxoads among 
the plateau's middle class, viz. its relatively well to do farmers, 
the ex-teachers the clerks etc., several;; of twhom had worked in 
close association with Michello and Mayanda over the years, it failed 
to challenge successfully the belief that 'Nkumbula can do no 
wrong' which was so prevalent among the grass roots. Despite 
hostile P.D.P. propaganda, Nkumbula's standing on the plateau re­
mained remarkably high. To most people in the area, he was still 
the embodiment of the spirit of African resistance. The speeches 
he had made before them in the past left scarcely any doubts about
this. Many were therefore prepared to overlook his foibles, which,
to them, were dwarfed out of recognition by his achievements. The 
'true' Congress, viz. Nkumbula's A.N.C. continued to be the accepted 
representative of the interests of Africans on the Tonga plateau.
Its charismatic leader and, perhaps to a lesser extent, its per­
formance in the past, appear to have won for it the right to lead 
the struggle against Federation and white overrule. In the new
Zambia, its primacy in this area was to continue for many years.
is not without significance thatin the December 1973 General
Elections, following the declaration of a one-party state in
Zambia, each candidate who won a seat on the Tonga Plateau was
1
formerly a prominent member of the A.N.C.
1
The author was in Zambia during the elections.
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CONCLUSION
From the material presented in this account, we can begin 
to see some of the factors that made for the popularity of the 
African National Congress (A.N.C.) in this part of Northern 
Rhodesia, now Zambia. The root cause of African opposition in 
the area to both the settler and the Administration appears to 
have been the loss of land suffered by certain sections of the 
African population through the appropriation policies of the 
British South African Company (B.S.A.C.) on the one hand, and of 
the Crown Administration,on the other. The latter Administration 
set aside substantial acreages of fertile land to meet the needs 
of a settler population which it believed would in time become 
much larger. This hope led officials to carry out a reserves 
policy, which in many areas turned the local population off fertile
tracts of land into reserves, most of which were badly watered and
made up of soils of relatively low fertility.
The very fact of l&rge-scale land alienation, in several
cases without compensation, the rather brutal methods of eviction, 
and the Crown Administration's failure to honour the promises of
B.S.A.C. officials who had said that, once evicted, a people's 
right*to continued residence in an area would be respected, created 
a great deal of distrust. This was to harden into opposition to 
Government policies during the thirties. The opposition of Sia- 
musonde, Siowe and other Chiefs to the dipping rules of the 
Veterinary Department during the early 193*° should not be dismissed 
as the conservative reaction of unprogressive Chiefs and their 
people. For as some officials of the time acknowledgeJ this re­
sistance to Government policy derived from an anti-Government feeling
which, though few of the officials could admit it, was a direct 
reaction to the land and forced labour policies of the Admini­
stration.
In spite of the discriminatory land policies which affected 
several Chieftaincies on the plateau, the African population was 
quick to adopt the plough agriculture which was widely practised 
by the settler farmers and enthusiastically encouraged by the 
local missionaries. In the absence of official policy to develop 
African agriculture, African farmers were, for the most part, left 
to their own devices. The Catholic and the Seventh Day Adventist 
Missionaries were very helpful in this connection, but their work 
was mainly concentrated in the reserves that adjoined their Mission 
stationsThe work of the poorly-staffed Agriculture Department 
was up to the mid-1930s almost wholly focussed on the needs of 
the small settler-farming community. The Department lacked the 
resources with which to provide white farmers with the financial 
and other facilities they required. And so while it attempted to 
placate a settler community that considered itself neglected 
by providing whatever assistance it could, the Department isolated 
itself from the problems of African agriculture. The rapid ex­
pansion of African maize production on the Tonga plateau during 
the early decades of the century therefore occurred without any 
official support from the Administration.
During the early decades of Colonial rule African agricultural 
production in the area expanded to record levels to service the 
growth of the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt in the years before 
the Depression and afterwards. This expansion in output was not,
however, to go unchecked. The Administration came under pressure 
from under-capitalized settier-farmers, who were frustrated by the 
unwillingness of the local male population to abandon maize fanning 
in the reserves for the less rewarding task of agricultural wage 
employment. The Government was pressed into introducing discrimin­
atory agricultural controls, not very unlike those employed in 
Southern Rhodesia. Maize Control, which came into operation in 
1936, was designed to protect the settler-farmer against African 
competition. However, contrary to official expectations, the new 
device failed to check African production,which continued to rise 
in good seasons, at a time when European producers were having a 
lot of difficulty in supplying the internal market, three-quarters 
of which was now reserved for them. The Maize Control Act turned 
out to be an unnecessary piece of legislation, for the maize sur­
plus that its originators had envisaged never occurred.
There was also an element of the protective device in the 
Improved Farming Scheme. It appears that officials hoped, among 
other things, that the rules of the scheme would act as a restrain­
ing force on African farmers, making it impossible for them to crop 
very large areas. Yet, its demonstrative value apart, the scheme 
never made much of an impression and its membership never reached 
10°/o of the plateau's African population. This was hardly sur­
prising in an area that was so suspicion-ridden. Non-Improved 
Farmers were penalised through cash levies for refusal to belong 
to the scheme and the monies got from them were used to subsidise 
the Improved Farmer and the general conservation programme. The 
use of the levy was counter-productive for not only did it further
alienate the non-Imp roved Farmer, it also discouraged the adoption 
of the measures the scheme was advocating.
Meanwhile the grievances of the urban and rural populations 
had forced Africans to form Associations to represent their in­
terests in discussions with the Administration, Because of the 
comparatively low standard of education on the plateau and the 
lack of familiarity with the workings of such Associations, alien 
Africans, mostly from Nyasaland and the Western province, who had 
migrated into the area, were to play a prominent organising role 
in both the Welfare Associations and the Northern Rhodesia African 
Congress (N.R.A.C.) formed in 1937. Although their enthusiasm 
within the latter body was to excite the jealousy of their Tonga 
counterparts and precipitate the movement's premature collapse, 
they made a more durable contribution to the activities of the Wel­
fare Associations and, much later, to those of the N.R.A.C of 19^8 
which later became the A.N.C.
Although it never amounted to much, the N.R.A.C. of 1937 
should not be dismissed lightly. Its very formation was an event 
of immense political significance within the context of later 
Nationalist developnents. Kaluwa, a Nyasalander, was the brain 
behind the Congress’ formation. Like the other founder members, 
he had observed conditions in Southern Rhodesia at first hand and 
had come to realise the urgent need for a Congress on the South 
African model. This movement would seek to protect not only the 
interests of Africans on the Tonga plateau, but of all the African 
peoples within the Territory. The Territorial outlook of the 
N.R.A.C. and its Pan-Africanist aspirations are a remarkable
commentary on the political consciousness of its founder members.
The settler population's enthusiastic pursuit of Amalgamation
with Southern Rhodesia, a campaign which it had to win in order to
consolidate its socio-economic and political dominance over the
African population, ruffled the political sensibilities of the
subject population during the late thirties and forties and set
the stage for the even more fiercely contested Federation campaign.
Settler dominance, underpinned by the eolour-bar, was very much a
reality even before the Depression. Socio-political and economic
segregation was already a fact and an African population such as
that on the Tonga plateau which was so close geographically and
otherwise to the reality of settlerdom on the other side of the
Zambesi, knew only too well that African living conditions in
Northern Rhodesia ran the risk of deteriorating to the Southern
Rhodesian level under Amalgamation. This informed awareness of the
conditions under which Africans lived in Southern Rhodesia explains
the almost fanatical zeal with which the Chiefs and their people
opposed the idea of closer union, be it Amalgamation or Federation,
Nkumbula's A.N.C. did not, however, exploit this protest
potential effectively. The Tonga plateau was to the Congress leaders,
first and foremost, a source of funds. Whatever attempts were made
to organise the movement in the area were restricted to the barest
minimum that would ensure the uninterrupted flow of funds into the
Congress' Headquarters. So long as the scatter of local branch
Chairmen and branch Secretaries was able to convince the people to
contribute towards the meeting of expenses, the movement's leaders
felt themselves under no compulsion to organise the people in a
systematic way. This perhaps explains the failure of Congress to __ . , _ ■ ■ =
Although Congress made use of some of the plateau's officials in
its central organisation, their recruitment was a secondary issue.
See Chapter VII pp-SV^-^i*
generate enthusiasm for its programme in those Chieftaincies 
where the absence of extensive land alienation and allied griev­
ances made the local populations less inclined to participate in 
the protest effort. Had Congress endeavoured to galvanise the 
potential support for its programme which existed in the various 
Chieftaincies the response of the people would have been much 
more lively. Considering the virtual absence of any serious 
organizational strategy, the overall response was remarkable.
One gir^ up.-that Congress had the greatest difficulty in in­
fluencing was the Improved Farmers. Although the movement was to 
succeed in attracting some of the more adventurous of these 
farmers, the majority refused to be tempted by the anti-Government 
activity of Congress into jeopardising their positions within 
the scheme. The Farmers Association, a non-provocative and law 
abiding body, was fostered by the Administration, through moral 
and financial support, to serve as a countervailing force to Con­
gress. Having deprived the A.N.C. of the active financial support 
and the organising abilities of the fairly well to do Improved 
Farmers, the Provincial Administration believed that it would 
succeed in weakening the movement's standing on the plateau. It 
was helped in its attempts to isolate the Improved Farmers from 
the general current of protest by the campaign of vilification 
which some of the A.N.C.'s supporters promoted against these 
farmers. On the whole, the official strategy succeeded for, in 
its pre-1953 campaign against Federation, Congress received very 
little active support from the plateau's Improved Fanners.
One group of A.N.C.supporters that stood out quite prominently 
in the party's machine on the Tonga plateau was the African members '
of the Seventh Day Adventist (S.D.A.5 Church. Their observance
of Saturday as Sabbath made it very difficult for them to enter
regular wage employment and the majority of their number therefore
tended to be self-employed and rather successful farmers. Their
economic independence not only served to widen the gulf between
them and the European settlers, it also provided the springboard
that launched several of them into frontline activity in the
politics of protest. The founders of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia
African Congress were mostly S.D.A. As early as 19371 the choir
of the S.D.A. primary school at Rusangu was rendering songs with
1
a political undertone at public gatherings on the plateau. Keemba 
Hill, the centre of A.N.C. organisation on the plateau in the pre- 
Federal and Federal years^was an S.D.A. settlement. While producing 
the plateau's only anti-Government Farmers Association and the 
first Provincial President of the A.N.C. the area's opposition 
to the Improved Farming Scheme was the rallying point of attacks 
on the Administration's agricultural policies throughout the 1930s* 
In several Chieftaincies of the plateau, S.D.A. Congress organisers 
were very active throughout the period under discussion, .in the im­
plementation of the non-cooperation programme.
In all this political activity, the popularity of the A.N.C. 
among the grassroots on the plateau has to be seen in its right 
perspective. Although there were a number of factors which went 
to determine how responsive an area was to Congress' message, the 
most significant appears to have been the extent of land loss the
1See Chapter V, p.‘IfS*
area had sustained. On the whole, Ghieftaincies that had suf­
fered extensive land alienation tended to be more receptive to 
the Congress organisers than those less affected. The people of 
the former areas were also much less inclined to participate in 
the Administration’s soil conservation programme and its Improved 
Farming Scheme, even in the days before the A.N.C. embarked on its 
campaign to discredit these policies.
The Tonga plateau played a much more prominent role in the 
A.N.C.campaign against Federation between 1931 and 1953 than has 
been hitherto acknowledged. Although the area might have been un­
productive of the sort of large-scale protest incidents that were 
to be seen on the Copperbelt, in Lusaka, and in the Northern and 
Luapula provinces, the financial support it gave to the A.N.C. had 
very few, if any,parallels within the Territory. Nkumbula, Kaunda 
and others were quite aware of the value of this support which they 
sought to maintain by giving some prominence at Congress Confer­
ences and in Congress Circulars to the vexed problems of agri­
cultural discrimination and land distribution, subjects that were 
central in the grievances of the plateau's peoples. The continued 
indifference of the majority of the Improved Farmers did not dis­
suade the Congress leaders at Headquarters from further efforts to 
win their support. They knew only too well how much Congress stood 
to gain financially if ito succeeded in attracting the Improved 
Farmer. They were therefore always urging A.N.C. members on the 
plateau to restrain their criticism of the Improved Farmers (and 
their Farmers Associations), for this was a group the Coxgpess leaders 
knew they could not afford to isolate permanently.
After the Federation had been declared in. 1933* Congress made 
an effort to strengthen its position on the Tonga plateau. For 
the first time, it started to organise meetings on a fairly regular 
basis and it embarked on the sale of membership cards. These acti­
vities were, however, confined for the most part to those Chief­
taincies where the A.N.C. was already popular and where its pro­
grams had been very well received. The movement could hardly be 
said to have broken new ground during the fifties. Building on its 
experience of the pre-Federation campaign, the Congress leadership 
on the plateau appears to have divided the area into 'viable1 and 
'non-viable' zones. Since the greater half of the plateau was in 
the viable zone, the Congress leaders tended to concentrate their 
efforts in the more obviously receptive areas, doing very little to 
bring the less enthusiastic Chieftaincies into line.
This tendency of the local A.N.C. to streamline its operations 
and pool its resources during the fifties could also have been a 
reaction to conditions that were operating to reduce its effective­
ness in the area. The loans policy operated under the Improved 
Farming Scheme was attracting more farmers to the soheme and making 
it all the harder for Congress to break the hold of the Farmers 
Associations. The majority of the Chiefs, fearing the very real 
threat of deposition, were now much more restrained in their sup­
port of Congress and few were bold enough to identify openly with 
its protest activities. In the Councils of the Plateau Tonga 
Native Authority, the Moderates were calling for the imposition of 
a ban on Congress activity. Under all these pressures, the Con­
gress leaders appear to have resolved to hold on to those areas that 
had responded positively to their appeals and to sacrifice the m$re
marginal Chieftaincies.
Congress also tended to over-concentrate its activities in 
the reserves of the plateau, during the pre-Federal and Federal 
years, giving very little time to organising protest action in 
the Townships, This seems to have been the result of two main 
factors: the relative smallness of the African population in the
Townships and also its inherent instability which meant that very 
little money could be raised from this section of the African com­
munity for Congress purposes. Apart from the alien African popu­
lation, the majority of town dwellers were ’target workers' who were 
never in the Townships long enough to become a part of the African 
community. Congress therefore left the work of articulating urban 
grievances largely in the hands of its members who sat in the Urban 
Advisory Councils, the Provincial Council and the African Representative 
Council. The District Administration and the settler controlled Town 
Management Boards kept a watchful eye on the movement's activities 
within the Townships and Congress leaders who attempted to incite the 
people usually ended up in prison. Whatever attenpts were made to 
organise protest action in the Townships were therefore limited to 
a handful of rather poorly organised shop boycotts, most of which 
failed to make any impact.
The A.N.C. split of 1958 thus occurred at a time when the 
local Congress movement, hardly noticeable in the plateau’s Town­
ships, was endeavouring to consolidate its position in those Chief­
taincies where it was already most popular. Kaunda's decision to 
leave Congress did not arouse much interest in the plateau. The 
Congress Secretary General was well known to local A.N.C. organisers 
but his activities in the area had not brought him into much contact 
with the rank and file in the various Chieftaincies. To the majority
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of A.N.C. supporters here, he was simply 'Nkumbula's deputy'._ His 
legitimacy, as far as they were concerned, derived from his direct 
association with the Congress leader. Operating independently of 
Nkumbula, he lacked such authority as he had hitherto enjoyedjcn 
the plateau.
The lack of social affinity between the people of the Tonga 
plateau and those of the more northerly areas who were the mainstay 
of Kaunda's breakaway movement, was also a factor operating in 
Nkumbula's favour. Z.A.N.C. and, later on, U.N.I.P., were seen 
as the work of 'townsmen', most of them long-standing urban resi­
dents who took only a casual interest in the affairs of the rural 
areas. There was consequently a reluctance to entrust Trade Union­
ists, Copper-miners and other Copperbelt worker/politicians with 
the responsibility of articulating rural grievances from which they 
seemed so distant.
From 1958 onwards, the A.N.C. came to be regarded as the 
party of the Southern Province, although it also engpyed some 
support in certain other parts of the territory. The majority of 
the people of the Southern province, attracted principally by Nkum­
bula's past record and perhaps also by the less militant posture of 
his Congress, consistently rejected the 'foreign' politics of 
Z.A.N.C. and its successor, U.N.I.P. Although Kaunda was to get 
some support from the alien African population in the Townships,
1
from some of the Chiefs and a handful of the more successful farmers, 
the grassroots remained steadfastly loyal to the A.N.C. and its 
President. In the late forties and early fifties, Nkumbula had 
been very outspoken in his criticisms of the settlers' monopoly of 
political power and authority. He it was who had reversed the
The author did not have time to examine this interestxng 
development more closely.
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cautionary trend of Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership to replace it 
with one that was much more assertive of the rights of the 
African, population. Under his leadership, various problems of the 
rural areas which had been obscured by Lewanika's preoccupation 
with urban protest had come to the fore. Land alienation, 
settler immigration, forced labour, agricultural discrimination 
and related problems were subjects about which Nkumbula showed 
much concern. He was always raising them at meetings with Admini­
stration Officials and at various Congress Conferences and other 
gatherings. This show of concern for their problems endeared the 
Congress President to the Tonga plateau's peoples and pre-empted 
their loyalty.
When in 1963 Job Michello left Congress to form the Peoples 
Democratic Party the stage was set for a struggle in which Nkumbula's 
popularity on the Tonga plateau was being challenged by a Tonga 
politician who was no newcomer to Congress politics. Through his 
activities on the plateau, Michello had become somewhat of a local 
hero and the members of the Congress Women's League had referred 
to him in several of their praise songs. In spite of this Michello's 
new party was unable to build on the store of goodwill its leader 
had come to enjoy. The P.D.P. was seen, not as a party in its own 
right, but as a splinter group from the A.N.C. Michello came to 
be widely regarded on the plateau as a power-seeking and over- 
ambitious politician who left Congress because he had failed to oust 
Nkumbula from the Presidency which he coveted. So whereas 2.A.N.C. 
and U.N.I.P. failed to make an impact on the Tonga plateau mainly 
because their leaders were so distant, the P.D.P. failed because
it____  _
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its leaders, though well known locally, appeared to be motivated 
by sheer ambition and a profound contempt for Nkumbula's leader­
ship which many here believed was both mature and effective.
Michello, Mayanda and others were pre-judged as having nothing 
new to offer. Their place was by Nkumbula's side. Like Kaunda, 
their authority on the plateau was greatly diminished when they 
operated independently of the A.N.C.'s President General. This 
support for the A.N.C. in the Southern province continued into 
the 1970s and was a major obstacle in the drive to establish a one- 
party- state.
$ * * * *
This study has been mainly concerned with outlining the con­
tribution of Africans on the Tonga plateau to the Nationalist struggle 
in the years leading up to 19^8. The succeeding years were to be 
marked by the growing political insularity of the area within the 
context of Nationalist politics. The people of the Tonga plateau 
did not play an effective part in the politics of U.N.I.P. which 
finally led to the attainment of Independence in October 196^.
As a result of pre-occupation with commercial farming, the 
Tonga were largely isolated from the industrial areas within the 
territory which served as a meeting place for people from different 
provinces. This social isolation easily gave way to a political 
parochialism as reflected in the area's continued support of the 
A.N,C. after the split that led to II.N.I.P.'s formation. Whether 
the A.N.C. after 19^8 was a sectional party or not may be a debatable
i
point but there is no doubt that the party drew its most substantial
i
Molteno has argued that the A.N.C. cannot be considered a sectional 
party since it enjoyed minority support in parts of the Western, 
North-Western, Eastern and Central Provinces as well as in the 
Southern province. See R.Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian 
Politics: A study of sectionalism", in W.Tordoff (ed.), Politics
in Zambia (Manchester, 197^)» p.72.
and consistent support from the Tonga plateau which was the centre 
of its organisation in the Southern Province, This continued 
support of the A.N.C. by the vast majority of people on the plateau 
was not simply a demonstration of tribal loyalty to those leaders 
of the movement who came from the Southern Province. It was more 
a recognition of their ability to articulate specific rural grievances 
of which they had first-hand knowledge and experience.
Although the A.N.C.fs dominance on the Tonga plateau was to 
continue for many years, one must not overlook the very important 
in-roads that were made into its support in the area by the opposition 
U.N.I.P. in the years preceding Independence and after. U.N.I.P.'s 
initial campaign efforts in the area failed to make much of an im­
pression, partly because it was appealing to a peasantry whose 
economic interests were largely undifferentiated. Admittedly, there 
were a few individuals at this time who were farming on a large 
scale but because their farms were not as large as the settlers, they 
were able to meet their capital requirements out of profits and 
Government subsidies as mediated through the A.F.I.P.^ By 196 ,^ 
however, this situation had changed considerably. As the granting 
of Independence became inevitable, some of the settler farmers began 
to think of selling their farms and leaving the territory. Many- did 
before and after Independence. This meant that several African 
large-scale farmers on the plateau who had set their sights on these 
farms for some time could now actually own them. Because most lacked 
the resources with which to purchase these properties outright, they 
had to. come into the new U.N.I.P. Government's favour, if they were
"^See Chapter IV, p. Ill,
to qualify for financial assistance. During the 1960s, a number 
of Chiefs, Headmen and large-scale cultivators who were in need of 
Government assistance therefore abandoned the A.N.C. for U.N.I.P. 
This perhaps partly explains the swing to U.N.I.P. in the Southern 
province of some 15 per cent in the 196^ General Elections.'1' Ap­
parently, pressure was also brought to bear on local farmers by 
U.N.I.P. organisers who were determined to make a headway within 
the province. Farmers in need of capital to run their new holdings 
had to give practical demonstration of their support for the new 
Government. Molteno has drawn attention to the fact that in several 
parts of the Southern province, in the years after Independence, the
offer of official credit to many a farmer was conditional upon his
2
producing a U.N.I.P. membership card.
In the years leading up to the declaration of the one- 
party state, the A.N.C. therefore lost several of its prominent 
organisers on the Tonga plateau as their economic interests drove 
them into an alliance with the ruling party. Quite a number of them 
were to hold leading positions in the U.N.I.P. organimiion on the 
plateau, although they do not appear to have made much impact at 
National level until quite recently. The vast majority of small- 
scale farmers who couldn't even raise the initial capital that 
would qualify them for Government financial assistance for the 
purchase of settler farms, however, continued, perhaps out of 
frustration, to support the A.N.C.
1
R.Molteno, op.cit., p.71.
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Notes on Principal Informants
George Barclay
Settler trader of Ghisekesi township. Served as General Manager of 
the Grain Marketing Board between 1950 and 1958.
Age: approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 26.^ -.7^ *
Judah Bbuku
Farmer of Chongo village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at 
Rusangu. One time Adviser and Assessor to the late Chief Ben­
jamin Chongo.
Age: approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 15.12.73
Lazarus Chiabi
Farmer of Sibanyati Siding, Siamaundu.Chieftaincy. Ex-Improved Farmer 
and one time Organising Secretaiy of the Demu African Farmer Associ­
ation.
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 1^.5.7^.
Thomas Chingila
Farmer of Munampamba village, Sianjalika Chieftaincy.
Farmer and Treasurer of the local A.N.C. branch.
Age: Approx. 50 years. Interviewed:
Chief Chona
Successor of Hameja Chona vie died in the early 1960s. Ex-Improved 
Farmer and member of the A.N.C. Later became a member of U.N.I.P.
Age: Approx. 50 years. Interviewed: 28.^.7^.
Ex-Improved 
30.4.74.
Jo.io Cisenge
Farmer of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy, Had gone down to Rhodesia while 
a youth in the charge of Pastor Anderson of the S.D.A. church.
Jojo was directly involved in the founding of the Rusangu S.D.A. 
mission.
Age: Approx. 80 years. Interviewed: 16.11.73
Jacob Hundvanga
Of Liso village, Monze Chieftaincy. Oldest informant interviewed. 
Witnessed arrival of B.S.A.C. pioneering column on the plateau. 
Worked in a factory in Bulawayo during the 1920s.
Age: Approx. 100 years. Interviewed: 22.11.73
Peter Kachesa
Farmer of Peter Mainza village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. of the
late Theodore Kachesa, one of the most successful African commercial 
farmers on the plateau, (See Chapter III, p„ fo^ ,A)~
cUlQy) *. " IA*
Franklin Kaluwe
Farmer of Momba village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu 
and Solusi, in Bulawayo. Became Headmaster at Rusangu in 1936,
Was a prominent A.N.C. branch organiser in the Chongo area during 
the 1950s.
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 18.12.73
Simon Kazembe
Farmer of Kazembe village, Monze Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu. 
Trained as tailor at Solusi in Bulawayo. Ex-Improved Farmer and 
member of the local African Farmers Association, During the
he was A.N.C. chairman of the Katimba branch.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 28.11.73.
William Kazoka
Farmer of the Pemba area. One time Agricultural Councillor of 
the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and member of the African Re­
presentative Council. Ex-Improved Farmer and member of the African 
Farmers Association. Was directly involved in attempts to ban the 
A.N.C. from^ bhe Tonga plateau. (See Chapter VII, p.^^).
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 23.^ .7** and
2 6.^.7 .^
Nelson Liyanda
Farmer of Namalyo farm, Sianjalika Chieftaincy. Educated at 
Rusangu and Waddilove in Southern Rhodesia. Ex-Improved Farmer 
and, for about 8 years, leader of the Monze African Fanners 
Association.
Age: Approx._ 60 years,_ Interviewed: 9.12.73.
Paul Cifula Maambo
Farmer of Maambo village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu.
Deputy provincial president of the A.N.C. during the 1950s.
Age: approx. 65 years. Interviewed: 13.12.73 and
3°;2f.7^ .
Gideon Ndandala Mankapwi
Farmer of Chuungu village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu. 
Founder member of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress. Ex- 
Improved Farmer. Later, A.N.C. branch organiser.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 28.11.73.
Job Michello
Businessmen of New Karawalla Section, Lusaka. Educated at Rusangu 
and in Solusi, BulawayoLater taught at Rusangu. In 1951* he 
was elected A.N.C. deputy chairman in the Munenga section of 
Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy, his home area. Played an active part 
in Congress activities at local and national level (see Chap-ter VIZ, 
p.3$fk). Became Acting Secretary-General of the A.N.C. in 1959 
and was later confirmed as Secretary for the movement. Was returned 
unopposed to the Legislative Council in 196l. In 1962, he served 
as Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources 
after the formation of the Coalition Government. Left the A.N.C. 
in 1963 to form the Peoples Democratic Party but later rejoined the 
movement.
Ellison Milambo
Farmer of Mutakwa village, Mungule Chieftaincy (Central Province). 
Educated at Rusangu and Solusi Mission, Bulawayo* Worked in Bula­
wayo for 2 years. Became Headmaster of Rusangu Primary School. 
Founder member of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress. Ex- 
Improved Farmer and leader of the Keemba Hill African Farmers Associ­
ation. Was active in the local A.N.C. and also served at national 
level (See Chapter VII,
Age: Approx. 55 years, Interviewed: 19*6.7^ and
28.^6.74*
Age: Approx. 80 years. Interviewed: 10.2.7^ and
23:6*7^.
Bruce Miller
Settler farmer of Choma area. Born in Northern Rhodesia, now 
Zambia, in 1930*
Interviewed: 18.5.74.
Naul Moonga
Farmer of Munampamba village, Sianjalika Chieftaincy. Prominent A.N.C 
organiser in this Chieftaincy. Arrested for his political activities 
in 1962 and imprisoned for about nine months.
Age: Approx. 50 years. Interviewed: 29.4.74.
Josjah Mukulumwa
Farmer of Siambalamoto village, Monze Chieftaincy._ Educated at 
Rusangu. Ex-Improved Fanner.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 28.11.73-
Miles Musumbwe
Owner of Sunrise Farm, Chisekesi. Educated at Rusangu. One of 
the earliest Agricultural Demonstrators on the plateau. Bbc-Improved 
Farmer who supported the A.N.C, behind the scenes.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 20.11.73-
Nv» Muvovwe
Headmaster of the Pemba primary school. Quite knowledgeable in 
the early history of the plateau.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 6.6.74.
Paul Mwiindwa
Farmer of Chikonka village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Educated at 
Rusangu, Ex-Improved Farmer and Chairmanof Ufwenuka branch of the
African Farmers Association. In 19531 was appointed Chairman
of the A.N.C. branch in the Ufwenuka area but he gave up his
political activities during the Federal years and returned to
active involvement in the local Farmers Association.
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 21.11.73*
isr- gr-7^
Esau Mwiinga
Farmer of the Bansange area of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Educated 
at Chikuni and Rusangu missions. Joined the local A.N.C. in 1952 
and in 195& w&s appointed Branch Secretary in the Bansange area. 
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 23.11.73.
Fr. Dominic Nchete
Of the Roman Catholic Church, Mazabuka.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 25.4.74.
Stephen Ngandu
Farmer of Chisuwo village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Worked under 
Father Moreau at Chikuni as a farm hand. Went to Southern Rhodesia 
in 1923 and stayed for five years before returning home. Was 
taken twice on cibalo (forced labour).
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 22.11._73.
Harry Nkumbula
Member of the Zambian Parliament. Farmer President-General of 
the A.N.C. (See Chapter VI,
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 20.1.74.
4iS
John Hauma N.yjimba
Farmer of Chiyobola village, Monze Chieftaincy. Three times 
victim of cihalo (forced labour)._ Worked for some time as 
labourer in Bulawayo before the First World War.
Age: approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 19.11.73.
Max Prokoph
Prelate to Roman Catholic Students at the University of Zambia.
Was Principal of Canisius Secondary School, Chikuni, from 19^0-51. 
Age: Approx. 69 years. Interviewed: 1.8.7^ and
Chief Siamusonde
Descendent of Kulumbwa Siamusonde, prominent opponent of the 
Colonial Administration during the 1930s.
Age: approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 12.12.73.
Samuel Sibanda
Farmer of Mujika settlement, Mwanza Chieftaincy. Educated in
Southern Rhodesia. Worked in Bulawayo for five years. Founder
member of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 18.11.73 and
12.5.7^.
Amos Walubita
Farmer and Trader of the Kazungula area of Monze Chieftaincy. 
Educated at the Pilgrim Holiness Church’s Jembo Mission. Ex- 
Treasury Clerk of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, One time 
member of the Southern African Provincial Council and the African 
Representative Council. Ex-Improved Farmer and active Congress
organiser (see Chapter VII, pgBV^gt^for many years, an active 
member of the local African Farmers Association. Widely travelled 
in Europe and the Carribean on Agricultural and Political business. 
During the 1930s was Secretary of the Improved Animal Husbandry 
Scheme and member of the Board of African Agriculture^ In the 
early 1960s was elected Provincial President of the A.N.C. and in 
196^ gained a seat in Parliament.
Age: Approx, 33 years. Interviewed: 12.11.73 and
22„Vf.7'4.
H.Yates-Jones
Settler farmer of Matapeta farm, Choma. Has lived in the territory 
since 1920, Ex-member of the Settler Farmers Association, Choma 
branch.
Age: Approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 17.3-7^.
APPENDIX X
Some of the villages evicted on the Tonga -plateau 
during the early years of Colonial rule *
Around Mazabuka:
Around Lubombo:
Around Dambilo 
and Kayuni:
Around Magoye:
Around Choma:
Around Chisekesi
Kabanje, Namulonga, Sinkope, Mpesu, 
Gheelo, Nkabika, Siowi and Lukoso 
villages.
Ncheeya, Ntimpula, Mukwiza and Nanga 
villages.
Sibaale, Macha, Hakwamba and Munacaande 
villages.
Sianjalika, Ghiperabele, Mwiigasompa, 
Nakuweza, Simoonde, Simonga, Munampamba, 
Silweenga, Chipolokoto,Hankunyanga, 
Mweemba, Haangoba and Chimbwali villages.
Haalembo, Ha nankafu , Chiyoolo, Seepande, 
Mutentalika and Choma villages.
Chingila, Munamunungu and Hantumbu 
villages.
* I am grateful to various Informants, and particular to Fr. 
Dominic Nohete of Mazabuka for the information used in 
preparing this list.
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APPENDIX III
The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia African 
Congress of 1957. (See Sec/Nat/5^8« Z.N.A.)
(i) The meeting shall be known in its dealings as
the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.).
 Object
(a) To heep /sic/ and promote the Welfare and interests 
of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.
(b) To assist in every way necessary the Government and 
Mission bodies in Northern Rhodesia, for the good of the 
country.
(c) To enquire and report any matter tending to injure the 
welfare and interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.
(d) To secure cooperation, just and fair treatment of 
Africans and development of the country.
(e) To keep in touch with all Congress meetings and Welfare 
meetings in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, South Africa.
Membership to the Northern Rhodesia African Congress
shall be open to any member who is over 25 years of age and 
if necessary any member wishing to enrol himself or herself 
as a member of the N.R.A.C., who is below 25 years of age, 
mjar make application through the President to the Executive 
C<!pmittee for admittance.
A
(a) Admission to membershin. Every member before enrolment 
shall be needed to have good knowledge and understanding of 
the aims of the N.R.A.C., failing this no admission to member­
ship shall be open. ’
lb) Every member after acquiring good knowledge and tinder- 
standing of the aims of the N.R.A.C. shall pay in an admission 
fee of 2/- every year until 5 years reaching the total sum or 
10/- when he or she shall be recognised as a full member of 
Northern Rhodesia African Congress.
Subscription: Every member of the N.R.A.C. shall be asked
to pay the sum of 6d every month making a total sum of 6/- 
every year for subscription.
Frequency of meetings: Meetings of the N.R.A.C. shall be
summoned at each time thought necessary by the Executive 
Committee.
Officers: The Northern Rhodesia African Congress shall have
the following as its officers and through them only shall all
matters be taken into consideration: President, Vice-
President, General-Seeretary, Asst-General Secretary,
Treasurer and Executive.
(viii)Executive: The Executive shall govern the N.R.A.C.; It 
shall be made of all officers in section vii'and to members 
of the N.R.A.C.
(ix) Minutes: Minutes of all the proceedings of the meetings
shall be kept by General Secretary and read at each meeting 
and signed by the President.
W  Voting: All resolutions discussed in meetings shall be put
to a vote.
(xi) Procedure: (a) The Congress has made it its law that at
its every meeting, an opening devotional sermon should be 
conducted by a clergy; if a clergy is not get (sic)' a member of 
any denomination will be asked to conduct the opening de­
votional sermon,
(b) The meeting after the sermon will go in its business.
The Secretary will read the minutes and after the President 
will give his presidential address.
(xii) Alteration of Constitution: No alteration of constitution
shall be made in any meeting without consulting the Executive,
APPENDIX XV
The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia 
Africa Correa's formed in 19A8 
(Sec/Nat 353* ZNA)
Name: This body shall be called "The Northern Rhodesia African Congress"
Objects: (a) To promote the educational, political, economic and 
social advancement of the Africans in full cooperation 
with the Government, Native Authorities, Missionary 
Societies, the African Representative Council and such 
other organisations which have the welfare of Africans 
at heart.
(b) Apart from Government Institutions, the Congress shall 
be a mouth-piece of the Africans irrespective of sex or 
social stand.
(c) To break the tribal bars by endeavouring to foster the 
spirit of unity among Africans so that no one tribe shall 
fe.u| inferior or superior in the eyes of the Congress.
Membership: (a) Active membership shall be open to:
(i) Native men and women of Northern Rhodesia at home 
and abroad.
(ii)Alien Africans and Euro-Africans who are residents 
of Northern Rhodesia and take an active interest in 
the development of the country.
(b) Associate membership shall be open to Europeans and 
Asians of goodwill towards the Africans.
(c) The Congress shall have its branches as members and any
other body that wishes to affiliate shall be at liberty 
to do so. Northern Rhodesia African Farmers Associ­
ation; African Drivers Association; African Trade 
Unions; Welfare Societies etc.
(d) Individuals wishing to become members shall be required 
to apply to the General Secretary enclosing a membership 
fee of l/6d for ladies, l/- for students and 2/- for men.
Subscriptions: (a) The annual subscriptions for active members 
Shall be 5/- for male members, 2/6d for female members 
and 2/- for students.
(b) The annual subscription for the affiliated bodies shall 
be 20/-.
(c) Associate members shall subscribe according to their 
generosity.
(d) Donations from all sections of the public shall be 
appreciated.
(e) The financial year shall be from August 1st to May 30th 
of each year.
Office Bearers: President, Vice-President, Secretary, Vice-
Secretary, Treasurer and Vice-Treasurer.
The Executive Committee: shall consist of President, Secretary,
Treasurer. Any other four members appointed at annual conference.
Terms of Office: Office bearers shall be elected every year at
the Annual Conference.
Meetings: (a) The Congress shall meet once a year, preferably
in July.
(b) The Executive Committee shall meet once a year but twice
in the case of an emergency.
(c) The place and date of meetings shall be determined by the
General Conference.
Convening Meetings: (a) The Secretaryshall convene the meeting
at the instance of the President.
(b) Visitors who are invited by the Congress to attend the
annual conference shall participate in the debate but 
shall not vote.
(c) Members of the public who are not invited to attend the 
General meeting shall neither participate in the debates 
nor shall they be allowed to vote.
Amendments and Alterations:
The Constitution shall be altered, amended or nullified at the 
meeting of the General Conference whose quorum shall be two-thirds 
majority of the members actually present.
APPENDIX V
Some of the Songs that were quite popular 
on the Tonga plateau during the Colonial period
I Mwami Monze Irawami wesu
Wakazila ku Iwizi ,
Nakasika ku Demu 
Waka kala kasyonto
Nakalonga ku.cisi ca Demu 
Wakakala ku Gonde 
Nkwaka janv/a rjmkuwa 
Imukuwa Munali
Ba Munali ba mupa ingwadi 
Aku mwambila kuti 
Knya Kuboola bantu 
Abo bantu batuba
Mwami Monze wakaloraba ingwadi 
Yakuya kwi Ingilandi 
Kuya kulomba kuti 
Tulelwe ba mangisi
Elyo bami ba Boma bakati 
Ulayanda lumamba 
Baka musenga lino 
Imyaka limusanu.
English translation:
Monze, our Chief came from the sea to Demu and stayed there for 
a short time. When he left Demu, he came to Gonde where he met 
the first white man, Munali ^Givingstone^'. Munali gave Monze 
a letter and told him that more white men were coming, Monze 
asked for permission to go to England to seek the Queen’s pro­
tection. The white officials said that he was asking for trouble 
Monze was arrested and imprisoned for five years.
II Baiti-lani-na-nzi. Ba ka Congress
Bayanda ku gwasya ’nyika yokwesu 
Icili mu musinze mupati 
Sena mula kuyanda kusalala? 
Amucilile kasimpe ka Mwami 
Mucite mb'Dli luyando lwakwe.
A mutelele nyonse 
Kasimpe kakwe Jesu 
Amuka Kambauke 
Kubantu bakwe boonse 
Tuyanda bantu ball 
Mbuli Mafukuzela
Wakala nduka lwizi 
Kuyanda Iwanguluko 
Tulakucita buti 
Iswe tubana Africa.
Tuswangane tuyume
Tube mbuli samende
Tusebenzele Mwami limwituka kotoke.
English translation;
Why are members of Congress organising themselves? They want to 
help our country. Our country is still under great Darkness.
Do you want to be clean in your hearts? Follow the word of Cod
and do what pleases the Lord.
Listen all of you to the word of God. Go and preach his word to
all his people. We want people who are as determined to fight for 
freedom as Mafukuzela who crossed the great sea to fight for his 
people.
What shall we do, sons of Africa? Let us all come together and 
we shall be as strong as cement in our struggle for freedom.
Let us work until we succeed.
Ill Harry Mwaanga^fakumbulaT1»
Harry Mwaanga,
Nkumbula Wazumanana, Wazumanana 
Mwiingilandi, ngoyu wazyila mwela nyika.
Wazumanana muya makuusa baamba,
Ngilisi, Harry Mwaanga.
English translation:
Hariy Mwaanga, Harry Mwaanga. Nkumbula is fighting our cause in 
England, Here he comes from "the edges of the world. He is not 
afraid to go to the white man. He is not afraid of "the one who 
speaks English. Harry Nkumbula.
